1. ' This appeal is directed against the judgment, dated 28-4-1992 in Rent Case No,2165 of 1984 whereby learned VIIth Rent Controller, Karachi (South) had allowed the ejectment petition of the respondent on the ground of her personal requirements. According to the averments made by the respondent in her ejectment petition, she has been residing with her entire family in a 2-room Government Quarter (E.F/20, Karachi Airport); this quarter was originally allotted to respondent's husband who was the employee of "Airport Health Department" and on his retirement in February 1975, it was allotted to her elder son who had also obtained employment in the same department.
2. According to the respondent, the quarter was no longer sufficient for the requirements of her growing family, and therefore, she wanted to shift to her own house which was an evacuee property and in which the appellant has been residing as her statutory tenant since its permanent transfer to her in June, 1969. The original rent was Rs,19.75 per month which was increased to Rs,28 per month in two stages. In his written statement the appellant denied every thing, including the averment of the respondent that she was residing in Quarter No,EF/20 Karachi Airport, that the said quarter was a 2-room accommodation or that it was allotted to her son or that her husband had retired from service. According to him the dispute had arisen in August 1976 when the respondent had also demanded the payment of water and other taxes. Personal requirements of the respondent were also denied. The respondent examined her husband and attorney Syed Anwar Hussain as A.W. 1 and her son Syed Sarwar Hussain as A.W.2, besides producing certain documents.
3. The appellant examined his attorney Muneer (a nephew) as R.W. 1 and her son Umer Farooq as R.W.2. On the basis of this evidence, learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the respondent had proved the bona fides of her personal requirements and allowed the ejectment petition. Hence this appeal.
4. ' Learned counsel of the appellant brought to my notice para. 5 of affidavit-in-evidence of A.W.1 Syed Anwar Hussain and compared it with para.7 of the ejectment petition and claimed that the personal requirements as shown in them were quite different from each other. He also argued that the demised premises is only a flat which cannot be sufficient for the large family of the respondent and the accommodation available in it has not been shown by the respondent. He also claimed that A.W. 2 Syed Sarwar Hussain (son of the respondent) has not supported her. According to the learned counsel, it is a case of no evidence. He also said that respondent's attorney, her husband, had claimed that he had filed the ejectment petition as attorney whereas it is filed under the signatures of respondent herself and therefore, it was admittedly filed by the attorney after forging the signatures of the respondent, and therefore, it is not even maintainable. He also stated that A.W.2 Syed Sarwar Hussain had not given any notice to her mother, the landlady to vacate the quarter and therefore, there was no necessity for the respondent to shift to the demised premises.
5. He also argued that the details of the requirements have not been given by the respondent.
6. Learned counsel relied upon the following judgments in support of his arguments.
(1) 1991 CLC 1902 Fasahat All v. Mst. Noor Jehan Begum.
(2) 1983 CLC 100.
(3) 1980 CLC 604 Fahmeeda Jahan Begum v. Varindamal.
(4) 1988 CLC 648 Ghulam Nabi Khan v. Qadeemullah.
(5) PLD 1985 Kar. 624 Sultan Press Ltd. v. Muhammad Hassan.
(6) PLD 1991 SC 590 Faqir Muhammad v. Mst. Muhammad Bibi.
(7) 1982 CLC 892 Abdullah v. Hassan Abbas. (8) 1990 CLC 399 Mrs. Azra Kazi v. Syed Serajuddin Qadri.
(9) 1990 CLC 904 Shahbaz Begum v. Ikhlas Ahmed.
(10) 1985 CLC 3014 Fida Hussain v. Noor Muhammad Bana.
7. ' On the other hand, learned counsel of the respondent maintained that the respondent has been living in the Government Quarter since before 1969 when the demised premises were permanently transferred to her by the Settlement Authorities and it was only natural to expect that her children would grow up and she would require more accommodation. Besides, he argued, Government accommodation is only temporary shelter and not her property and, besides, it is now in the name of respondent's son and the respondent is entitled to live in the house of her own even though it may not be sufficient for her needs.
8. ' To begin with, the claim of the respondent in para. 3 of her ejectment petition was that she was living in Quarter No,EF/20 Karachi Airport which was allotted in the name of her elder son. The appellant did not deny that the respondent was living in the said Quarter but he categorically denied that this quarter was allotted to her son and the son of the respondent A.W. 2 Syed Sarwar Hussain, while claiming in his affidavit-in-evidence that he was producing his allotment order, did not actually produce it. Thus, the allotment of this quarter to respondent's son is not proved and it appears that the position taken by the appellant in para. 3 of his written statement cannot be assailed and I am inclined to agree with it. At the same time it is an established fact that the respondent is living in the quarter because even the appellant in the title of the memo of this appeal has shown the respondent as living in the quarter and she was also served on the address of the quarter. It therefore follows that the respondent alongwith her family is unauthorisedly occupying and living in this Government Quarter. In this view of the factual position, the respondent and his family can be thrown out of the quarter by the concerned Government Department at any time since an unauthorised occupant has no vested right to live in a Government Quarter meant for its employees. However, the appellant does not even aver either in his written statement or in his affidavit-in-evidence that the respondent has any accommodation of her own in her power or possession where she may go if ejected from the quarter in question. This alone is sufficient ground for the respondent to evict the appellant. No doubt this is not the stand of the respondent that the quarter is in unauthorized possession of her son but since this is the stand of the appellant himself he must face the consequence of this stand.
9. ' The ejectment petition is not based on the retirement of the husband of the respondent. Such retirement had nothing to do with the personal requirements of the respondent. The retirement of respondent's husband is rather irrelevant for purposes of the ejectment application and is evidently introduced in the ejectment petition just to show under what circumstances the respondent is living in Government quarter allotted to her son, that her husband and other children are also living in this quarter and that now, with the growing up of the children, the two-room quarter was proving kself inadequate for the family needs and therefore she wanted to shift alongwith her other children, leaving the quarter to her elder son. It is surprising to note that in para 7 of his written statement the appellant even denied that the family of respondent has grown ever since the commencement of the relationship of landlady and tenant between the parties (in 1962 per para 2 of affidavit-inevidence of appellant's attorney R.W.1 Muneer).
10. ' The averment in para 9 of the affidavit-in-evidence of respondent's attorney R.W.1 Syed Anwar Hussain that present accommodation in which the respondent is living is a 2-room quarter where 5 grown up children of the respondent were also living has not been challenged in the cross- examination and no question in this regard has been put to Syed Anwar Hussain. This averment has thus gone unchallenged and it shall be deemed to have been conceded by the appellant. As such it is not possible to believe when Appellant's attorney R.W.1 Muneer says in para 4 of his affidavit that this accommodation is sufficient for the respondent and her family. It may be noted that respondent and her husband and elder son and his wife and four other children of the respondent are living in this quarter and the two rooms can only properly cater at the most for the two families. The living of other four grown up children in the quarter (which is an admitted fact) must be a source of incoivenience and embarrassment for all the inmates of the quarter. Besides, this argument becomes relevant only if the quarter were the property of the respondent but this is not so in the present case. It is a Government accommodation and even according to appellant himself it is not even allotted to respondent's son (who is therefore an unauthorized occupant). As such, the respondent is entitled to live in her house and it is immaterial whether the demised premises is also inadequate for the needs of the respondent. It shall at least be some sort of shelter for her and her children, howsoever, inadequate it maybe.
11. ' It is worth noting that even appellant's attorney admits in para 2 of his affidavit-in-evidence that the appellant is tenant of the respondent since 1962 and during this whole period from 1962 till 1984 the respondent had never made any request to the appellant to vacate the house which speaks volumes for the bona fides of the requirements of the respondent. It was after 22 years of the commencement of the tenancy that the respondent raised the plea of her personal requirements.
12. Her five children must have grown up during these 22 years (and some of them even might not have been born at the time of commencement of tenancy) and it cannot be believed for a moment (as said by the appellant in Para. No, 7 of his written statment) that the children of the respondent did not grow up during these 22 years. It is also incorrect to say that respondent's attorney fraudulently filed the ejectment petition by forging the signature of the respondent on it.
13. Her signatures on the petition quite evidently tally with her signatures on the rent receipt Exhs.6 to 17 which the appellant himself had brought on record during the cross-examination of respondent's attorney. It is correct that respondent's attorney in his cross-examination had stated that he had signed, verified and filed the ejectment petition but this was evidently a bona fide mistake because he stood to gain nothing by telling a lie to that effect. He was not confronted with the signature on the ejectment petition. Further on in the cross-examination he has clarified the position when he said that it was incorrect to suggest that his wife had not filed the ejectment petition and that he had filed it falsely on her behalf.
14. ' Learned counsel had also assailed the impugned judgment on the ground that it is not a speaking order and the learned Rent Controller has given his findings in just two lines just preceding the discussion under issue No,2. I must agree with the learned counsel that the judgment is not in proper form and the learned Rent Controller has abruptly come to the conclusion that the issue must be decided in favour of the respondent. Even so, I am of the view that since the conclusion arrived at is correct, impugned judgment cannot be set aside due to this infirmity.
15. ' It may also be noted that R.W.2 Umer Farooq claimed to be the son of Abdul Sattar and at the same time he also claimed to be the son of the appellant and both these things cannot be correct since the appellant is Noor Muhammad and not Abdul Sattar. Besides, he did not submit himself to cross-examination and remained absent on the date fixed for his cross-examination. As such, his affidavit-in-evidence is of no evidentiary value and therefore, must be ignored. The only other witness of the appellant, his attorney R.W.1 Muneer, admitted in cross-examination that he did not know anything with regard to the dispute and in reply to every material question he replied that he did not know about it. He did claim (and this was out of the pleadings of the appellant) that the respondent had a house of her own for her living but, even so, he did not give any details of such house and admitted that he could not produce any evidence to sustain his claim. His evidence amounts to nothing and, far from the case of the respondent being one of no evidence, as was argued by learned counsel of the appellant, it is the case of the appellant which is one of no evidence.
16. ' The one dozen reported judgments relied upon by learned counsel of the appellant do not advance the cause of the appellant. In the case of Fasahat All v. Noor Jahan Begum, the landlord was the owner of innumerable properties, the landlord had also filed, some time earlier, an ejectment petition on the ground of default, and the bona fides of the personal requirements of the landlord were assessed in this background. A similar background does not exist in the present case. The above-noted second judgment 1983 CLC 1000 is not at all relevant in the context of this case. The above-noted third judgment 1980 CLC 604 is also of not much help to the appellant. In that case the landlord was himself living in rented premises and it was held that even then he must show that such premises were not sufficient for his needs. In the present case, the landlady is living in a Government quarter which is in unauthorized possession of the son of the respondent from which she and the rest of the family can be evicted without notice. Even if it were to be believed contrary to the averments of the appellant in his pleadings that the quarter is allotted to the son of the respondent the status of the son is merely that of licensee and the license can be withdrawn without notice and in case of his transfer it shall have to be vacated within two months. A person living in such a quarter cannot be equated with a person living in rented premises where his rights as tenant are secure and are governed by Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. Even otherwise, the five children of the respondent, who must have been kids at the time of the commencement of the tenancy 22 years ago, must have grown up into young adults during this period to which another nine years must be added covering the period from the institution of the ejectment case in 1984 upto now. The same observations apply to the above-noted fourth case 1988 CLC 648. Cases referred to above at serial numbers fifth, seventh, eighth, nineth and tenth are equally inapplicable in the context of the present case. The remaining judgment, that at No, sixth PLD 1991 SC 590 lays down that the law and the Courts shall assist only those litigants whose claim and approach to the Courts are based on honesty and good faith. This judgment, if anything, goes against the appellant, a perusal of whose written statement and affidavit-in-evidence of whose attorney leave to doubt in my mind that the claim of the appellant and his approach to the Courts is neither based on honesty nor on good faith.
17. ' For the above-noted reasons I am satisfied that the respondent landlady has proved beyond any reasonable shadow of doubt that she bona fidely requires the demised premises for herself and her husband and children and the large family needs bifurcation due to the space limitations of the Government quarter in which the whole family is at present living. I would therefore maintain the judgment of learned Rent Controller and dismiss the appeal with costs. Appellant is allowed two months' time to vacate the premises.