' Mst. Fehmeeda Khanum filed an ejectment application on 7th September, 1980 against the petitioner from a shop for her own personal use. The application after contest was accepted by the learned Rent Controller vide order, dated 18th December, 1982. The petitioner filed an appeal and the learned Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi dismised the same but granted .The petitioner three months' time to hand ever the possession. This is vide order, dated 17th April, 1983. The petitioner challenged the two orders through W. P. No, 202 of 1983 which was dismissed in limine by my learned brother Mr. Justice Rustam S. Sidhwa on 5th June, 1983. The petitioner filed a Review Application No, 4 of 1983 on 21st June, 1983 on the ground that Mst. Fehmeeda Khanu m the landlady had died on 5th June, 1983 the day the writ petition was dismissed and cause of action had died with her. After notice to the legal heirs of the landlady, it was found that the landlady had died not on 5th June, 1983 when the writ petition was dismissed, but on 7th June, 1983. The learned Judge finding no good ground for review dismissed the application in limine. The request of the learned counsel for the applicant that the review application be converted into a writ petition, was rejected on the ground that the order had already been announced. It was, however, observed that the applicant may file a fresh writ petition, if it so desires". This is vide order dated 3rd July, 1983.
Hence, the present writ petition.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has vehemently contended that since the landlady who wanted the ejectment of the petitioner for use of the shop by herself has died, the ejectment proceedings have come to nothing. He has placed reliance on Irshad Ali and 2 others v.
Muhammad Umar, Muhammad Ashraf v. Mst. Azizan and 4 others and Safdar Ali Ghauri and 71 2 others v. Sh. Maqbool Elahi. Learned counsel also submitted that if I was not to follow these authorities, the case may be referred to a larger Bench.
3. I have gone through the record and the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In all the cases quoted, the landlord who sought ejectment for personal use had died prior to the conclusion of the proceedings before the relevant authorities under the Rent Restriction Ordinance. In the case in hand, the landlady was alive when her prayer for ejectment was accepted by the two competent Courts of exclusive jurisdiction i,e, the learned Rent Controller and the appellate authority the learned Additional District Judge vide orders, dated 18th December, 1982 and 17th April, 1983, respectively. She was even alive when the writ petition filed against her was dismissed in limine by the learned Judge on 5th June, 1983 because she died two days' later on 7th June, 1983. Therefore, the order of ejectment of the petitioner has become final during her lifetime. If after the final orders passed by the competent Courts of exclusive jurisdiction and upheld by High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction, an unsuccessful litigant continues to carry on the litigation, that will not mean that the successful party must survive till eternity or until the unsuccessful litigant exhausts himself. If it were the law, there will never be an end to litigation.
The right to repossess her property having come to vest in her lifetime, will pass on to her heirs on her demise. Therefore, there is no force in the contentions that ejectment orders have become infructuous. The submission that if I were not to fellow the authorities quoted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I should refer the matter to a larger Bench was considered and might have been acceded to but for the fact that the authorities are not applicable to the facts of the case in hand. In all the judgments quoted, the landlord had died during the pendency of the proceedings before the relevant authorities under the Ordinance. Here in this case proceedings had concluded and finally under the relevant law before the competent authorities of exclusive jurisdiction and their orders have been upheld by the High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction. Therefore, there is no need of referring the case to a larger Bench.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner asked for time to vacate the premises. The petitioner was given three months' time by the learned Additional District Judge vide order; dated 17th April, 1983.
The petitioner filed a writ petition which was dismissed on 5th June, 1983 and a review application on 3rd July, 1983. The petitioner has not vacated the premises and has filed another Constitutional petition challenging the same orders of ejectment. The petitioner has had full benefit of the indulgence allowed by the learned appellate Court and in the circumstances of the case the petitioner is not entitled to more.
5. For the reasons given above, the writ petition is dismissed in limine. PLD 1981 Kar. 273 PLD 1981 Lab. 201 1981 CLC 74$