1. This second appeal under section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) is directed against the orders of the Rent Controller as well as the District Judge Quetta directing ejectment of the appellant from the premises bearing No. 7-16/3, Samundar Singh Street, Quetta.
2. The appellant was inducted into the disputed premises as a tenant by late Wali Muhammad sometime in 1969. She continued to pay rent during his lifetime but after his death the dispute arose as to who should collect such rent. Respondent Ghulam Raza claimed that the property had devolved on him, as the son of late Wali Muhammad, and therefore he is entitled to receive rent. It seems that be did receive rent for some months after the death of Wali Muhammad but later, upon a notice from Bibi Hawwa, the widow of Wali Muhammad, the appellant stopped payment of rent to Ghulam Raza and allegedly made such payment to Bibi Hawwa. The respondent thereupon brought an application before the Rent Controller, on 12th April, 1975, alleging that the appellant committed default in the payment of rent. He also claimed that he needed the premises for his personal bona fide needs and that the appellant/tenant had damaged the property impairing its usefulness.
3. The appellant challenged the locus standi of the respondent to file the application and disputed relationship of landlord and tenant. It was also claimed that a notice under section 13-A of the Ordinance had not been issued and on this score competency of the respondent to file the application was challenged.
4. The learned Rent Controller framed issues with respect to the locus standi of the respondent to file the application, the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the service of notice under section 13-A. It seems that the contentions of personal bona fide needs and damage to the property were not pressed by applicant and therefore no issue was framed in that behalf.
5. These issues were tried as legal, issues and first two of them were found in favour of the respondent-applicant. As regards the service of notice under section 13-A it was left undecided as unnecessary. As a consequence of denial of the appellant as to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties it was held that she was defaulter as regards the rent. Consequently an order of eviction of the appellant was passed by the learned Rent Controller on 30th April, 1977. On appeal the learned District Judge, by his order dated 17th December, 197,7, affirmed these findings.
6. Ghulam Raza claims himself to be the son of Wali Muhammad. His witness Ghulam Abbas, who is admittedly one of the late sons of Wali Muhammad, has supported him in this contention. Bibi Hawwa, the widow, has however challenged this claim of the respondent. She asserts that he was a mere servant, brought up in the household. But this relationship of Ghulam Raza with the late Wali Muhammad would not be material to determine the question whether he was the landlord during the lifetime of Wali Muhammad and continued as such after his demise. The definition of landlord as given in section 2(c) of Ordinance reads as follows : - "2(c). Landlord.-Means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf or for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any otherperson, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised and every parson from time to time deriving title under a landlord."
7. According to this definition it is not necessary that the landlord should also be the owner of the property. Persons other than owners can also become landlords in terms of Ordinance. But the criterion is that such persons should be entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land, A either on his own account or in behalf or for the benefit of any other person. Mr. Munawar Mirza, the learned counsel for the appellant, has laid great stress on the word 'entitled', used in the definition of the term `Landlord'. He contends that entitlement to receive rent has to be distinguished from the mere act of receiving or collecting rent on behalf of any body else. He has also pressed into service the interpretation of the term `entitled to receive' as given by Stroud in his Judicial Dictionary, which says that the term 'does not extend to everybody who has a power to give a receipt and discharge e.g. 'an agent'. The contention raised by Mr. Munawar Ahmad Mirza has force in it. A person appointed by a landlord to collect rent, of his various properties, on his behalf, does not make such collector the landlord of the properties in question. Such rent collector is merely deputed to receive or collect the rent. By such appointment the rent collector does not become entitled to receive rent is conferred on such person, and by virtue of such title the person can collect rent in his own right though on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person. Mr. Khalid Malik, the learned counsel for the respondent contends, that in view of the admission of the appellant that respondent Ghulam Raza used to receive rent even during the lifetime of late Wali Muhammad makes him landlord in terms of section 2(e) of the Ordinance. In the first place mere act of collection of rent and to issue receipts does not mean that such person was entitled to receive rent, unless independently such entitlement is shown. This has not been shown in this C case. Secondly, the appellant has stated, in her cross-examination, that the receipts issued by Ghulam Raza, on such payment of rents during the life time of Wali Muhammad were so issued on behalf of Wali Muhammad . This fact negates the contention, if any, that Ghulam Raza was entitled to receive rent even during the lifetime of late Wali Muhammad.
8. If Ghulam Raza respondent had ever enjoyed any entitlement to receive rent during the lifetime of Wali Muhammad such entitlement came to an end at the time of his death. The property belonging to Wali Muhammad would, on his death, automatically devolve upon his heirs. Unless the heirs conferred such entitlement upon the respondent, he was left with no title, if ever he had any, to receive rent. Not only that the respondent has failed to show any such entitlement, it is openly disputed by one of the heirs of late Wali Muhammad, i.e. His widow, Bibi Hawwa. Except for Ghulam Abbas, no other heir is shown to have consented, much less to have conferred a title, to collect rent by Ghulam Raza. He therefore cannot claim himself to be the landlord of the disputed premises.
9. The second contention raised is that a notice under section 13-A of the Ordinance was a necessary prerequisite for bringing an allegation of default in the payment of rent. The contention raised on behalf of the respondent is, which contention has found favour with Courts below, that as Ghulam Raza used to receive rent of the disputed premises even during the lifetime of late Wali Muhammad, there was no need for issuing, of notice in terms of section 13-A of the Ordinance. This section reads as follows :- "Where the ownership of a building in the possession of a tenant or tented land has been transferred by way of sale, gift, inheritance or in any other manner, whatever, from one person to another, the new owner shall send an intimation of such transfer in writing by registered post to the tenant of such building or rented land, and the tenant shall not be deemed to have defaulted in the payment of rent for the purposes of clause (1) of subsection (2) of section 13, if the rent due is paid within thirty days from the date when the intimation should in the normal course have reached him."
10. Whenever there is a change of ownership .By way of sale, gift, inheritance or otherwise the new owner, as distance from a landlord under the Ordinance, has to give notice in terms of this section.
11. In case of failure to do so the tenant is not be deemed to have defaulted in the payment of rent in term of section 13(2) (i) of the Ordinance. This is a plenary rule and must be followed. This section does not make any exception in the case of statutory landlords, who are other than the owners.
12. Because for the reasons discussed. Above such landlords do not step into the shoes of owners.
13. Their title is limited to receive rent only, and does not extend a step beyond. On the contrary section 13-A requires the new owners to issue a notice in the manner specified in the section, notifying the change of owner--ship. Such clear language cannot be departed from., Unless such notice is issued an allegation of default of payment of rent cannot be brought against a tenant.
14. In view of above discussion I have come to the conclusion that respondent Ghulam Raza has not shown that he is the landlord of the disputed property, and secondly that no notice as required by section 13-A of the Ordinance having been served upon appellant proceedings of eviction on the ground of default could not be initiated. In these circumstances I would accept the appeal and set aside the orders directing her eviction. Parties to bear their own costs.