MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.---- Through this constitutional petition, petitioner has assailed order dated 10.07.2021 and judgment dated 15.09.2021, passed by learned Civil Judge and Additional District Judge, Lahore, respectively, whereby learned Trial Court suspended orders dated 03.07.2021 and 05.07.2021, passed by respondent No.5/District Registering Authority, Lahore and respondent No,4/Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore, respectively, and held the contempt petition to be maintainable and petitioner's appeal in this regard was also dismissed by learned lower Appellate Court,
2. Brief facts of the case are that respondent No.1/plaintiff filed suit for declaration along with permanent and mandatory injunction regarding 22 schools detailed in para 1 of the plaint, contending that respondent No.5/District Registering Authority, Lahore illegally and unlawfully passed order dated 27.01.2021 in violation of injunctive orders passed by the Court and Intellectual Property Tribunal Act, which was assailed by him by filing civil suit, wherein vide order dated 02.02.2021, Civil Court passed injunctive order by suspending operation of said order dated 27.01.2021 and restrained respondent No.5 from cancelling registration of the schools of respondent No.1/plaintiff. He also filed separate appeal before respondent No.4/Commissioner, Lahore Division/Appellate Authority against order dated 27.01.2021, wherein petitioner's counsel raised an objection regarding maintainability of said appeal. Respondent No.4/Commissioner vide order dated 06.03.2021 sine die adjourned said appeal till decision of aforesaid suit. However, after transfer of previous incumbent of the Appellate Authority, on an application moved by petitioner, he proceeded with the appeal.
Through his suit, respondent No.1 sought declaratory decree to the effect that impugned orders dated 27.01.2021 and 22.05.2021, all subsequent proceedings to the benefit of petitioner, non- disposal of application/ objections of respondent No.1, interference in the running of the schools and cancellation of registration of the schools, branches and extending threats are illegal, void ab- initio, without any lawful authority and jurisdiction, thus, same are inoperative qua his rights.
Learned Civil Court issued ad-interim injunction vide order dated 16.06.2021. Subsequently, on 06.07.2021, respondent No.1 moved contempt application against petitioner and respondents Nos.4 to 9, before learned Trial Court contending that respondents Nos.4 to 8, in connivance with the petitioner, thereby violating the above said injunctive order, cancelled registration of his schools on 03.07.2021 and vide order dated 05.07.2021, passed by respondent No.4/Commissioner, respondent No.1 has been restrained from using the name "American Lycetuff DNK School System". Learned Trial Court issued notices to the petitioner and respondents Nos.4 to 9. On 07.07.2021, petitioner appeared through her counsel, who was directed to submit her written reply. On 10.07.2021, petitioner moved an application under Section 151, C.P.C. for summary dismissal of the contempt petition being non-maintainable, whereas on the said date, respondents Nos. 4 to 9 submitted their written reply. Learned Trial Court, after hearing arguments of learned counsel for the parties, proceeded to suspend orders dated 03.07.2021 and 05.07.2021, and held the contempt petition to be maintainable, vide order dated 10.07.2021. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner preferred appeal, which was also dismissed vide judgment dated 15.09.2021. Hence, instant petition.
3. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the Court cannot grant final relief in the garb of interim injunction, especially when injunctive order was also not extended. His precise submission is that no injunction can be granted in contempt proceedings. He adds that even otherwise, any order passed during existence of a stay order, is not a nullity in the eye of law, rather disobedience of a stay order can be a ground for punishment to the person who disobeyed the order, but the order does not automatically nullify. He further submits that impugned decisions have been passed in complete oblivion of the facts and circumstances of the case, thus, same are illegal, unjust and liable to be set aside. He contends that admittedly, the proceedings were being undertaken by the Trial Court under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3), C.P.C., which only authorize the Court to either attach the property of contemnor or direct his imprisonment. In support of his submissions, he relied upon Gaman and 5 others v. Muhammad Ali and 8 others (PLD 1995 Supreme Court 572), Obaidullah and another v. Habibullah and others (PLD 1997 Supreme Court 835), Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and others v.
Muhammad Zaman Khan and others (1997 SCMR 1508), United Bank Limited and others v. Ahsan Akhtar and others (1998 SCMR 68), Shahzada Muhammad Umar Beg V. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another (PLD 1970 Supreme Court 139), Syed Mushtaque Hussain Shah v. Riaz Muhammad Hazarvi and another (PLD 1978 Karachi 612), Muzaffar Ali Khan v. Sindh Co-operative Housing Authority and 2 others (1985 CLC 1995), Favazuddin and 5 others v. Karachi Building Control Authority through The Chief Controller of Building and others (2000 YLR 1161), Sh. Irshad Ahmad v. English Leasing Ltd. and 6 others (2004 YLR 2700), Waheed Khan v. Additional Chief Secretary FATA and 4 others (2011 MLD 925), Muhammad Aslam v. Muhammad Nazeer and 2 others (2011 MLD 1449), Rasheed Khan v. Muhammad Khan and others (2012 CLC 1113), Mst.
Salina Bibi and others v. Member (Judicial-V) BOR/Chief Settlement Commissioner and others (2013 CLC 776) and Nazar Muhammad and 3 others v. Muhammad Azam and 8 others (PLD 2013 Lahore 264).
4. Conversely, learned counsel for respondents defends the impugned decisions and contends that interim order continues despite the fact that no specific order extending the status quo has been passed. He adds that the Court is fully competent to take notice of changed circumstances and subsequent events for the determination of controversy between the parties. He further submits that any order passed in violation of injunctive order is invalid and illegal for all intents and purposes and the Court can initiate proceedings under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3), C.P.C. against the violator for disobedience of its order and can also exercise its power under Section 151, C.P.C. to prevent abuse of its process. He further contends that corrective measures can be taken against wrong doers to uphold and maintain the majesty of law. He adds that if a party against whom injunctive order has been passed, is doing something for its own advantage and to disadvantage of other party, the Court has inherent jurisdiction to bring back such party to original position. He further contends that the Act of Court shall prejudice no one and corpus of litigation would be preserved during pendency of litigation. In the end, he submits that even otherwise, impugned order of learned Trial Court is interlocutory in nature, therefore, no interference is warranted. In support of his contentions, he referred to Bakhtawar etc. v. Amin etc. (1980 SCMR 89), Mrs. Dino Manekji Chinov and 8 others v. Muhammad Marin (PLD 1983 Supreme Court 693), Raja Talat Mahmood v. Ismat Ehtishamul Haq (1999 SCMR 2215), Syed Ali Asghar and 3 others v.
Creators (Builders) and 3 others (2001 SCMR 279), Muhammad Sabir Khan and 13 others v.
Rahim Bakhsh and 16 others (PLD 2002 Supreme Court 303), Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 872), Rahat Khan alias Zafri v.
Captain (R) Tahir Naveed and 6 others (2009 CLC 433), Mst. Basan Bi and 2 others v. Additional District JudKe-V East Islamabad and others (2016 CLC 1111), Messrs Ismail Industries Limited through Authorized Officer v. Mondelez International and 2 others (2019 MLD 1029) and Abdul Aziz and 2 others v. Ch. Asghar Ali (PLD 2020 Lahore 831).
5. Arguments heard. Available record perused.
6. Perusal of record shows that the contempt petition is offshoot of pending suit filed by respondent No.1, which has been filed for implementation of ad-interim injunctive order dated 16.06.2021, issued in the suit and cancellation of orders dated 03.07.2021 and 05.07.2021, passed by respondents Nos.5 and 4, respectively. Petitioner also moved an application under Section 151 C.P.C. for dismissal of the contempt petition. Through the impugned order, learned Trial Court has only clarified the factual position of existence of ad-interim injunction and maintainability of contempt petition, which is also interlocutory in nature. Record shows that Respondent No.1's application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. and miscellaneous application under Section 151, C.P.C. against orders dated 03.07.2021 and 05.07.2021, filed in the suit, are still pending adjudication before learned Trial Court, which are yet to be decided. No doubt, if an application under Section 151, C.P.C. is filed in the main suit, the Court is competent to grant relief as per the well settled principles of law enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Syed Ali Asghar's case supra. The stance of petitioner is that the application has been filed along with the application for initiation of contempt proceedings, in support whereof, learned counsel referred to copy of the application as well as order sheet which, according to learned counsel for respondents, is an omission on part of the Court. However, record does not ex facie suggest that the application was not filed along with the contempt proceedings.
Furthermore, the material aspect of the matter that respondent No.1 himself approached respondent No.5/ District Registering Authority, Lahore for registration of some of his schools with the name and style of "American Lycetuff DNK School System" until and unless the matter is resolved between the parties whereupon respondent No.5 granted provisional e-license with the said name to respondent No.1 on 03.07.2021. Being aggrieved, petitioner filed appeal before Commissioner, who not only cancelled the registration of schools on 05.07.2021 but also suspended the provisional e-license granted to respondent No.1 besides restraining respondent No.1 from using the name and style of "American Lycetuff DNK School System", despite restraining order dated 16.06.2021, passed by learned Trial Court.
7. Undoubtedly, learned Trial Court can exercise its power under Section 151, C.P.C. to prevent abuse of its process and corrective measures can be taken against wrong-doers to uphold and maintain the majesty of law, provided the application is moved in the main suit. Reference can be made to Muhammad Sabir Khan's case supra. From the application as well as order sheet, it is clear that application in hand was not moved in the main suit rather same was filed in contempt proceedings and in the light of Muhammad Aslam's case supra, no such order can be passed. The argument of learned counsel that it is an act of the Court, which cannot prejudice the respondents, is not supported from the contents of the application as well as order sheet. Undeniably, when a party against whom interim order is passed is doing something for its own advantage or to the disadvantage of other party, the Court can, under its inherent jurisdiction bring back such party to original position, but no such order has been passed in the main suit.
The proceedings on contempt/ disobedience of the order of the Court are governed by Order XXXIX Rule 2(3), and Rule 2-C of Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Both these provisions are reproduced below for reference:--
2. Injunction to restrain repetition or continuance of breach.--
(3) In case of disobedience, or of breach of any such terms, the Court granting an injunction may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in prison for a term not exceeding six months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release.
2-C. Consequence of disobedience or breach of Injunction.--
(1) In case of disobedience of any injunction granted or order Made under rule 1 or 2 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order made, the Court granting the injunction or making the order, or any court to which the suit or proceedings` is transferred, may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the prison for a term not exceeding three months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release.
(2) No Attachment made under this rule shall remain in force for more than one year, at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues, the property attached may be sold and out of the proceeds, the court may award such compensation as it thinks fit to the injured party and shall pay the balance if any, to the party entitled thereto.
In neither of these provisions, the Court is competent to restore the status quo ante. The scope of these provisions is limited to determine the issues of disobedience/ breach of the order and fixing responsibility on the person guilty of such disobedience or breach. Undeniably, the Court has got inherent jurisdiction to bring back the party to a position where it originally stood as if the order had not been contravened. Reliance is placed upon Bakhtawar's case supra. But such order can only be passed in the suit and not in the proceedings under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3) and/or 2-C, C.P.C., which are limited in scope only to the extent of penalties provided therein. It is settled law that the rules of equity cannot be given precedence and over-riding effect over the clear mandate of law.
Courts are supposed to confine themselves within the contours drawn by the law and they cannot be permitted to travel beyond the permissible scope of a provision or statute. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon Director General, National Savings, Islamabad v. Balqees Begum and others (PLD 2013 Supreme Court 174).
The argument of learned counsel for petitioner that interim relief was not extended has no force.
The interim order dated 16.06.2021 was in field when order dated 05.07.2021 was passed. As per well-settled principles of law, restraining order would continue provided no lapse is attributable to the conduct of plaintiff, despite the fact that no specific order was passed extending the order granting status quo, as held in Raja Talat Mahmood's case supra. So far as the other argument of learned counsel for petitioner that Court cannot grant final relief in the garb of interim injunction, is concerned, there is no cavil with the said argument, however, main application for grant of temporary injunction is still pending. This argument can be raised before the Court concerned, and if it comes to the conclusion that prima facie the order is illegal and without lawful authority, it can suspend said order. Therefore, this question is left open to be decided by learned Trial Court while deciding the main application keeping in view the provisions of Section 56(d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877.
8. In view of the above, instant petition is allowed in the manner that impugned order dated 10.07.2021 as well as judgment dated 15.09.2021, passed by learned Civil Judge and Additional District Judge, Lahore, respectively, are declared to be illegal and without lawful authority, thus, same are set aside. However, learned Trial Court is at liberty to pass order in application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C., pending in the main suit and ensure compliance of the injunctive order, if it still holds the field. Learned Trial Court is also directed to decide all pending applications including application for initiation of contempt proceedings under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3), C.P.C., application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. and application under Section 151, C.P.C., strictly in accordance with law, if not already decided, keeping in view the submissions raised or to be raised by learned counsel for the parties as well as the case law referred supra, through a well- reasoned speaking order, preferably within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order and if need be, hold day to day proceedings to decide the afore- referred applications, and thereafter, conclude the suit proceedings within a period of six months, positively.