' NASIR ASLAM ZAHID, J.---Petitioner Raja Talat Mahmood has filed this petition seeking leave against the impugned judgment, dated 2-6-1999 of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, whereby his appeal under Order XLIII, Rule 1, C.P.C., against the order, dated 30-9-1998 passed by Civil Judge First Class, Rawalpindi, has been dismissed. We have heard the arguments of Mr. Muhammad Younis Bhatti, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the petitioner, and referred to the relevant record.
2. Facts leading to the filing of the appeal before the High Court have been given in some detail in the impugned judgment of the High Court, paras. 1 to 6 whereof are reproduced here:--- "Respondent filed an application under the provisions of Order 39, Rule 2(3), C.P.C., against the appellant before the trial Court,complaining that the appellant has violated and disobeyed the interim order of injunction, dated 1Q-4-1998 in his favour passed by the Court. This application was contested; issues were framed; evidence of the parties was recorded and vide order, dated 30-9- 1998 (impugned order) the Court found the appellant guilty of violating the injunction order, consequently, punished the appellant to undergo civil prison for three months. Moreover, the appellant was also directed to restore the vacant possession of the suit property to the respondent.
Hence, this appeal.
2. Relevant facts of the case are, that the respondent on 10-4-1998 filed a suit for specific performance and permanent injunction, etc., against the appellant, defendant No,2, Syed Laeeq defendant No,1 and the District Housing Committee, Rawalpindi defendant No,3. It was claimed by the respondent that Syed Laeeq Ahmad Shah vide judgment of sale, dated 13-9-1997, agreed to sell the property bearing No,F/1034, Satellite Town, Rawalpindi, in his favour and received a sum of Rs,1,00,000 (Rupees one lac only) as earnest money. Defendant No,3 has issued some transfer order, dated 10-6-1995 showing the transfer of the suit property in favour of the appellant/defendant No,2, which is void, illegal and ineffective qua the rights of the respondent.
Furthermore a decree for permanent injunction was also sought restraining defendant No,2 from claiming any right over the suit property and from interfering in the peaceful possession of the respondent.
3. The respondent in her plaint had averred, that earlier to the aforesaid agreement the respondent was in possession of the suit property as a tenant under Syed Laeeq Ahmad/defendant No,1 in the first week of March, 1997, appellant/defendant No,2 attempted to interfere in her peaceful possession over the suit property on the pretext that he has purchased the property, from Syed Laeeq Ahmad. In such situation, respondent was constrained to file suit for permanent injunction against the appellant as well as Syed Laeeq Ahmad, which was decreed on 5-6-1997. It is further stated in the plaint that defendant No,2 has initiated ejectment proceedings against the respondent from the suit property.
4. That alongwith the above suit an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C., was also filed by the respondent, praying therein, that appellant/defendant No,2 till the final decision of the case be restrained from claiming any right in respect of the suit property and defendants Nos.1 and 2 be restrained from further alienation of the property and from interference in the peaceful possession of the respondent. On this application, the trial Court vide order, dated 10-4-1998 was pleased to direct for the maintenance of 'status quo' summonses/notices were ordered to be issued to the defendants for 24-4-1998. Appellant seems to have been served as he was represented by Dr. Raja Khalid Ismail, Advocate on 24-4-1998. Quite a number of opportunities were availed by the appellant for the filing of written statement, and reply to the interim application, which was ultimately filed on 28-7-1998. In this written statement, the stand taken by the appellant was that Syed Laeeq Ahmad had no concern with the suit property, which throughout had vested in him and that the respondent in fact was tenant not under Syed Laeeq Ahmad but under the appellant. In para. No,3 of the written statement, the previous decree for permanent injunction, dated 5-6-1997 as mentioned above passed in favour of the respondent against the appellant, etc., was admitted.
It is stated in written statement that it is the appellant who is the owner and landlord of the respondent. In reply to para. No,10, by denying that any cause of action has arisen in favour of the respondent a plea was taken that during the pendency of the suit, through a compromise, respondent had vacated and handed over the possession of the suit property to the appellant, but thereafter, she had started blackmailing him. It was averred that in the circumstances, the suit has become infructuous. It is pertinent to state here that neither details of the compromise such as date etc. Nor any written instrument in this behalf was filed with the written statement.
5. On 29-7-1998, respondent filed an application under Order 39, Rule 2(3), C.P.C., stating that on 27-7-1998 at 10-30 p.m. The respondent alongwith armed persons raised the suit property and forcibly took over the possession in violation of the status quo order. The matter has been reported to the police and F.I.R. No,268, dated 27-7-1998 has been lodged.
6. In reply to this application the appellant has taken the same stance of a compromise, with further plea that after the compromise and handing over the possession of the suit property to the respondent with an intent to blackmail pressurized the appellant to pay Rs,5,00,000 and on refusal has filed the instant petition. In this reply as well no particulars or details of the compromise were given, even it is not specified as to what was the consideration of this agreement and the date and time when it was arrived. Rather a conspicuous and significant fact mentioned in this reply is that the appellant disclosed to have filed a suit for permanent injunction against the respondent to prevent her from interfering in his possession qua the suit property. But the date of filing of this suit and other particulars are again missing. That the trial Court in view of the written versions of the parties framed the following issues:---
(1) Whether the petition is not maintainable in its present form? OPR.
(2) Whether petition is barred by law? OPR.
(3) Whether the petitioner has not come with clean hands and is also estopped by his words and conduct? OPR.
(4) Whether the present petition is false, frivolous and as such the respondents are entitled to get special costs under section 35-A, C.P.C.? If so, to its effect and to what extent? OPR.
(5) Whether the petitioner handed over the possession of the suit property to the respondent through compromise? OPR.
(6) Whether the respondents have violated the orders of the Court, dated 10-4-1998. If so, its effect?
OPA.
(7) Relief.
' Parties led evidence. The respondent examined Ehtishamul Haq, her husband as A.W.1 as special attorney and also produced documents as A-1 to A-9, whereas appellant himself appeared as R.W.1 and examined Niaz Ali Abbasi as RW-2 and Raja Muhammad Qurban as R.W.3. No significant documentary evidence was produced by him. The trial Court as mentioned in the opening para. Of this judgment punished the appellant vide impugned order and also directed for the restoration of suit property."
3. As observed by the impugned judgment, dated 2-6-1999, the appeal has been dismissed by the High Court. Before us, learned counsel for the petitioner repeated and reiterated the same arguments that he had advanced before the High Court in support of the appeal there. All contentions before the High Court (reiterated before us) have been considered and dealt with in the impugned judgment of the High Court. No new or fresh argument has been advanced in support of the present petition. Following contentions have been reiterated by Mr. Muhammad Younis Bhatti learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of the present petition:--
(a) At the time the alleged violation of the status quo order took place on 27-7-1998, according to learned counsel, there was no status quo or interim order in existence as the order of status quo, dated 10-4-1998 passed on the application. For interim injunction moved by the respondent had ceased to be operative after expiry of 15 days. In the circumstances, it was argued that when there was no status quo order in existence, question of violation of any such order on 27-7-1998 by the petitioner did not arise.
(b) It was then argued that, under the law, proceedings under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3), C.P.C., could only be taken by the same Court which had granted interim injunction, but in the present case, status quo order, dated 10-4-1998 had been passed by Mr. Nasrullah Ranjah, Civil Judge, Rawalpindi, whereas proceedings were taken and the impugned order had been passed by Mr. Sanaullah Malik, Civil Judge, Rawalpindi. According to learned counsel, Mr. Sanaullah Malik was not competent to conduct the said proceedings and pass any order in such proceedings. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied upon a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in the case of Waseem Azam v. Qudratullah (1994 MLD 827).
(c) it was next argued that procedure required to be adopted for conducting proceedings under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3), C.P.C., had not been adopted/followed and, as a result, order, dated 30-9- 1998 of the Civil Judge was not sustainable in law. Reliance in this regard was placed on the judgment of the Lahore High Court in the case of Hatim v. Shah Din (PLD 1952 Lahore 77).
(d) On merits, it was argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that on behalf of the respondent only one witness appeared who was the attorney of the respondent whereas three witnesses (petitioner and his two uncles) appeared for the petitioner and on evidence, no case had been made out by the respondent establishing violation of the status quo order, dated 10-4-1998 by the petitioner inasmuch as, earlier to that, a compromise had been effected between the parties pursuant whereof vacant possession of the house in question had been delivered by the respondent to the petitioner for consideration.
4. As observed, all the aforesaid contentions had been advanced on behalf of the petitioner before the High Court and the same had been considered and rightly rejected by the High Court.
' In support of the first contention, learned counsel had referred to Rule 2-A of Order XXXIX, C.P.C., and it was argued that, in view of the aforesaid Rule 2-A, an interim injunction could only be granted for 15 days and such order of injunction expires after 15 days and the same could be extended only if the conditions laid down in the proviso to Rule 2-A were fulfilled and, in the instant case, as no extension order was passed, the interim order of status quo, dated 10-4-1998 became inoperative and ineffective on the expiry of 15 days, whereas violation of the order of the Civil Judge is alleged to have taken place on 27-7-1998 when no interim order of injunction was in the field.
' Rules 2-A and 2-B of Order XXXIX, C.P.C., inserted by Civil Laws Act XIV of 1994 are as follows:-- "(2-A) An interim injunction passed under Rule 1 or 2 in the absence of defendant shall not ordinarily exceed fifteen days: ' Provided that such injunction may be extended for failure of its service on the defendant when such failure is not attributable to the plaintiff or when the defendant seeks time for defence of application for injunction.
(2-B) The order of injunction made under Rule 1 or 2 after hearing the parties or after notice to the defendant shall cease to have effect on the expiration, of six months unless extended by the Court after hearing the parties again and for reasons to be recorded for such extensions: ' Provided that report of such extension shall be submitted to the High Court."
' In the present case, by order, dated 10-4-1998, the trial Court directed issuance of summons in the main suit and also notice of the application for interim injunction against the defendants including the petitioner for 24-4-1998. Status quo order was also passed on the same day. Order-sheet of the trial Court shows that neither any written statement nor any reply/objection/counteraffidavit to the application for interim injunction was filed by the petitioner/defendant No, 2 till 28-7-1998 and that between 10-4-1998 to 28-7-1998 six dates were fixed by the trial Court and on all such dates counsel for the petitioner was present and the same was adjourned as reply/written statement was not ready. Ultimately the written statement was filed on 28-7-1998 and therein plea was taken regarding oral compromise between the parties. In the circumstances, where neither any reply was filed nor any request was made for discharge of the interim injunction/status quo order, the legal position would be that the interim order would continue despite no specific order having been passed extending the order, dated 10-4-1998 granting status quo. Rule 2-A of Order XXXIX, C.P.C., does not require a specific order for extension of the interim injunction after expiry of 15 days in case defendants seek time for defence of application for injunction. From the order-sheet it follows that from 24-4-1998 (the next date after 10-4-1998) till 28-7-1998 (when the written statement was filed by the petitioner) on all the various dates of hearing as the reply was not filed, dates were given enabling the petitioner to file his reply. In such circumstances, it was not necessary to pass specific orders of extension of the interim status quo order on each date of hearing. Status quo order, dated 10-4-1998 would be deemed to have continued. It is under Rule 2-B that the interim injunction stands expired after 6 months.
' Petitioner's position was also to the effect that the interim order had continued. Nowhere in the pleadings or even in the memo. Of appeal before the High Court, any plea was taken that the status quo order stood discharged on 25-4-1998 on the expiry of 15 days. It is only during the arguments before the High Court that this point was pressed.
' We find no merit in this contention.
5. The second contention that the proceedings taken by Mr. Sanaullah Malik, Civil Judge, Rawalpindi, and the order, dated 30-9-1998 passed by him are illegal and without jurisdiction as the original order of status quo had been passed by Mr. Nasrullah Ranjah, Civil Judge, Rawalpindi, has also no substance, in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The High Court in para.14 of the impugned judgment has dealt with this contention in great detail. It was pointed out that several proceedings were pending between the parties in different Courts and, under the orders of the High Court, it was directed that the District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi, should entrust the civil suits pending between the parties to one Court to avoid conflicts. Pursuant to such orders the District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi, by order, dated 2-9-1998 directed that the case be transferred to the Court of Mr. Sanaullah Malik, Civil Judge, Rawalpindi, because at the time of passing such order Mr. Nasrullah Ranjah had been transferred without substitute. The High Court has pointed out that neither the orders of the High Court for directing the adjudication of the cases nor the order of the District Judge transferring the case were challenged by the petitioner. Then petitioner participated in the proceedings and at no point of time raised any objection about the competence of jurisdiction of Mr. Sanaullah Malik to take the aforesaid proceedings. No issue was struck on this point nor any plea was taken to that effect in the memo. Of appeal filed by the petitioner before the High Court. Mr. Muhammad Younis Bhatti, learned counsel, conceded that Mr. Sanaullah Malik otherwise had jurisdiction to decide the application under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3), C.P.C. Learned counsel had cited the case of Waseem Azam v. Qudratullah (1994 MLD 827). The case is clearly distinguishable and does not support the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
6. The next contention was that the proper procedure had not been followed by the trial Court in the proceedings conducted by it under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3), C.P.C., against the petitioner.
According to learned counsel, such proceedings being criminal in nature, a charge should have been framed and then proceedings conducted as if it were criminal proceedings. Reliance was placed, as observed, on a judgment of the Lahore High Court in the case of Hatim v. Shah Din (PLD 1952 Lahore 77).
' In para.16 of the impugned judgment this contention has been rejected as follows:-- "As regards the argument that proper procedure has not been followed by the Court below in adjudicating the matter, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the case reported as Hatim v. Shah Din (PLD 1952 Lahore 77). However, he lias failed to show as to what error has been committed by the Court below in proceeding and adjudicating the application. As held in PLD 1952 Lahore 77, 'there is no precise procedure which has been laid down to adjudicate such application and the Court is supposed to put the person at his fault on his guard by framing a question or as an issue which should embody all the elements of a charge under the criminal jurisdiction'. In the instant case, proper issues were framed which covered the controversy between the parties and the appellant was fully conscious and aware of the charge against him vis-a-vis the violation of the order passed by the Court on 10-4-1998.
' Moreover, learned counsel for the appellant has also failed to establish as to what prejudice has been caused to the appellant in the proceedings. The parties were given full opportunities of adducing their evidence and there is nothing on the record which could validly show that the appellant has been denied the right of hearing as required under the law."
' We find no error in the reasoning of the High Court. It may be added that during the proceedings no objection had been raised at any time or stage regarding the procedure adopted by the trial Court. Even in the memo. Of appeal before the High Court no grievance was made in this regard.
The High Court rightly rejected this contention.
7. Lastly on merits, the contention was that only one witness was examined on behalf of the respondent whereas three witnesses appeared for the petitioner including the petitioner. Number of witnesses is not the deciding factor. It is the quality and worth of the evidence given by the witnesses which matteRs, Then respondent's case had support of admitted documents including an ex parte decree and proceedings of the suits. On the other hand, a general and vague stand was taken that an oral compromise had been effected between the parties; no date or time about when such compromise had taken place nor details of the compromise were given. In a hotly contested dispute where several proceedings had taken place including criminal proceedings, on the basis of the evidence and circumstances, the trial Court as well as the High Court rightly rejected the defence of the petitioner founded on the so-called oral compromise.
8. There is no merit in this petition, Civil Petition No,1034 of 1999 is dismissed and leave is refused.