AJMAL MIAN, J.---This is a petition for leave to appeal against the order dated 22-10-1997 of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, whereby he while admitting Writ Petition No,23788 of 1997, passed an interim order on C.M. No,1 of 1997, ordering the notice for 10-11-1997 and in the meantime suspending the operation of the impugned order dated 10-10-1997 terminating respondent No,1 's services as the Vice-President in petitioner No,1 bank i.e, the United Bank Limited, hereinafter referred to as the UBL, under the Golden Handshake Package.
2. The brief facts are that UBL has been suffering losses inasmuch as in the year 1995 it incurred a pre-tax loss of Rupees 510 million. This was increased to Rupees 1523 million in the year 1996 as per averment in the writ petition. It appears that one of the reasons found for the above losses was high and disproportionate personnel cost as a ratio of its income. The UBL got a study carried out in July, 1996, by Nexus Group, an independent management consultant. They opined as under as to the strength of the staff:- Current StaffExcess Staff "Regional Officers1,021 550 Zonal Officers 1,703 850 Branches 15,858 6,500 18,582 7,900"
It appears that another study was carried out in January, 1996, by a committee constituted by the Federal Government named as the Expenditure Review Committee which submitted its recommendations about UBL on 30-11-1996 as follows:-- "Staff Position as on December 31, 1995: Name of Bank No, of BranchActual Staff StrengthEstimated RequirementSurplus Staff UBL 1706 22099 17060 5039"
3. It seems that on the basis of above study the management of UBL decided to reduce the strength of the staff by 5416 personnel by offering them Golden Handshake Package, which provided as under:-- "LEVEL AVERAGE PACKAGE AFTER TAXMONTHLY RETURN @ 16% ON THE PACKAGEPRESENT TAKE HOMEPACKAGE INCOME AS % TAKE HOME Rs, 8000 Rs, Rs, % SEVP 3,678 49,036 66,329 74% EVP 2,834 37,782 39,944 94% SVP 2,684 36,788 32,430 110% VP 2,412 32,157 21,143 152% AVP 2,130 23,410 17,827 159% OG1 1,739 23,182 15,440 150% OG2 1,278 17,041 9,897 172% OG3 790 10,533 7,650 138%"
4. It is evident from the above scheme that the UBL was to pay compensation for the termination of services of its employees on the above basis. Respondent No,1 as the Vice-President is to get more than Rs,24,00,000 as compensation. It further seems that the management also decided that the retrenchment of the staff would be from those who came into their present Grade on or after 1-10- 1991 in order to eliminate the allegation of any discrimination. After that notices were issued under clause (1) of Rule 15 of the United Bank Limited (Staff) Service Rules, 1981. The said clause (1) of above Rule reads as follows:-- "15. Termination of services: (1) Services of an employee in Category-1 may be terminated by the competent authority on 3 monthsnotice or on payment of a sum equal to his substantive pay for three months in lieu thereof: Provided that the competent authority may allow, at its sole discretion, all or any of the benefits ordinarily admissible on retirement from service to an employee in Category-1 whose services have been terminated under this sub-rule, except in the case of employees involved in frauds, forgeries, misapropriation, defalcation, causing any other financial loss to the Bank, business pursuits living beyond means or any other type of misconduct: Provided further that the services of a probationary officer may be dispensed with on one month's notice or on payment of a sum equal to his substantive pay for one month in lieu thereof."
5. It will not be out of context to mention here that it was candidly submitted by Mr. Saleem Sehgal, learned Advocate Supreme Court for respondent No,1, that the above Rules are not statutory rules.
Be that as it may, it seems that respondent No,1 was also served with the notice under the above Rule, pursuant whereof as per averment in the petition, he relinquished his charge on 10-10-1997.
After that he filed the aforementioned writ petition. Alongwith it he filed aforesaid C.M., upon which the above interim order was passed. The effect of the above interim order suspending the termination order is that respondent No,1 is to be reinstated without the disposal of the main writ petition.
6. It may be pointed out that UBL in its objections had raised a number of legal pleas including the plea that the Service Tribunal has jurisdiction in view of section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, which is applicable to the UBL employees and, therefore, the petition was barred under Article 212 of the Constitution. It was also contended that the relationship between the UBL and respondent No,1 was that of master and servant and hence the above writ petition was not competent in the absence of violation of any statutory rule or law. However, the learned Judge in Chambers while admitting the aforementioned writ petition for regular hearing passed the above interim order. The UBL has, therefore, filed the present petition for leave to appeal.
7. Mr. Raja Muhammad Akram, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the petitioners, has vehemently contended that as the relationship between the UBL and respondent No,1 was that of master and servant and in the absence of violation of any statutory rule, the learned Judge in Chambers was not entitled even to admit the writ petition for regular hearing and to grant aforesaid interim order, the effect of which is to reinstate respondent No,1 into service. His further submission was that the aforementioned interim order was violative of the law enunciated by this Court in the case of Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and others (1997 SCMR 1508).
On the other hand, Mr. Saleem Sehgal, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for respondent No,1, has urged that the impugned termination order was violative of Articles 25 and 31 of the Constitution and, therefore, the above writ petition was competent. Reliance was sought by him on the case of Managing Director, Ittehad Chemicals Ltd., Kala Shah Kaku, District Sheikhupura and 2 others v. Mushtaq Ahmad (1997 MLD 798), on the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. And another v. Tarun Kanti Sengupta and another, and on the case of Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.L. Mazdoor Congress and others (AIR 1991 SC 101). His further submission was that the rule of master and servant is no longer applicable inter alia in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Mrs. Anisa Rehman v. P.I.A.C. And another (1994 SCMR 2232).
8. We would not like to comment on the merits of the case as the above questions are to be examined by the High Court. However, we may observe that the judgment in the case of Mrs. Anisa Rehman (supra) was rendered by one of us (Ajmal Mian, J.). The ratio of the above judgment is that even an employee of a Corporation cannot be demoted while in service in violation of the principle of natural justice. It did not lay down that the principle of master and servant consistently enunciated by this Court in the following cases:--
(i) Lt.-Col. Shujauddin Ahmad v. Oil and Gas Development Corporation (1971 SCMR 566);
(ii) Chairman of East Pakistan Development Corporation v. Rustam Ali (PLD 1966 SC 848);
(iii) Lahore Central Cooperative Bank Limited v. Pir Saifullah Shah (PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 210);
(iv) Zainul Abedin v. Multan Central Cooperative Bank Limited (PLD 1966 SC 445);
(v) Shahid Khalil v. P.I.A.C., Karachi (1971 SCMR 568);
(vi) A. George v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PLD 1971 Lah. 748);
(vii) R.T.H. Janjua v. National Shipping Corporation (PLD 1974 SC 146); (viii)Muhammad Yousaf Shah v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PLD 1981 SC 224);
(ix) Anwar Hussain v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and others (PLD 1984 SC 194);
(x) Anwar Hussain v. The Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and others (1992 SCMR 1112);
(xi) Raziuddin v. Chairman, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and 2 others (PLD 1992 SC 531);
(xii) Chairman, WAPDA and 2 others V. Syed Jamil Ahmed (1993 SCMR 346); (xiii)Muhammad Umar Malik v. The Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. Through its President, Karachi and 2 others (1995 SCMR 453). Is no longer the correct law.
However, in the instant case at this stage, the only question before us is, as to whether was it a fit case to pass the impugned ad interim order suspending the termination notice, the effect of which is to reinstate respondent No,1 on 22-10-1997 though he relinquished the charge on 10-10-1997. This is in conflict with what has been held by this Court in the case of Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and others (supra). The relevant observations read as follows:-- "11. As regards the merits of the case, it may be pointed out that it is a well-settled proposition of law that the object of passing of an interlocutory order or status quo is to maintain the situation obtaining on the date when the party concerned approaches the Court and not to create a new situation. Another well-settled principle of legal jurisprudence is that generally a Court cannot grant an interlocutory relief of the nature which will amount to allowing the main case without trial/hearing of the same. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in the case of Qazi Inamul Haq v. Heavy Foundry and Forge Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. And another 1989 SCMR 1855, in which the petitioner had been prematurely retired from service. He filed a suit and obtained a temporary injunction from a learned Civil Judge, which was vacated by a learned Additional District Judge. The petitioner then preferred a revision petition before the High Court of Sindh, which was declined for the following reasons:-- "(a) The order of retirement had already taken effect before the civil suit was instituted to challenge it; and
(b) Even if the petitioner had merely an arguable case, the other two essential factors, i.e, presence of balance of convenience, which is in fact balance of inconvenience and causing of irreparable loss did not exist."
The above High Court order was affirmed by this Court. It is evident from the above-quoted extract that generally a Court cannot grant an interlocutory relief of the nature which will amount to allowing the main case before its conclusion.
9. We are mindful of the fact that this Court generally does not interfere with an interim order of a High Court but in exceptional circumstances it does interfere with the same. This aspect has also been dealt with in the judgment of Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and others (supra) as under:- "7. We may observe that this Court, being the apex Court, generally does not interfere with interlocutory orders passed by competent Courts, but if the same are arbitrary, capricious and against the well-settled principles of law, this Court is bound to interfere with the same in order to obviate miscarriage of justice. The principle, that non interferene in interlocutory orders of the Courts below by this Court is a matter of rule and interference is an exception, seems to be a sound principle. However, if the exercise of discretionary power through interlocutory orders is of the nature which has been referred to by us hereinabove, such a case will fall within the exception warranting interference. The present cases fall within the category of exception."
10. In our view the present case falls within the category of exception referred to in the above extract. The facts of the instant case warrant interference by this Court at this stage. It had been consistently held by this Court inter alia in the cases referred to hereinabove in para. 8 (i) to (viii) that relationship between a Corporation and its employees was that of master and servant and that the remedy for wrongful termination of service of an employee was a suit for damages and not relief for reinstatement. The above view was modified in the case of The Principal, Cadet College, Kohat and another v. Muhammad Shoaib Qureshi (PLD 1984 SC 170), wherein it was held that in case of breach of a provision of statute or a statutory rule an employee of a corporate body would be entitled to file a constitutional petition for reinstatement. This view has been followed inter alia in the cases referred to in para. 8 (ix) to (xiii). The above view has not been deviated uptil now.
Respondent No,1 has yet to establish as to how there has been violation of Articles 25 and 31 of the Constitution. Till then, in our view, respondent No,1 has no prima facie case for an ad interim order suspending the order of termination.
11. We may observe that even balance of convenience is in refusal of the above ad interim order. If the above ad interim order is allowed to continue, respondent No,1 will be acting against the wishes of his employer and would he handling huge financial transactions. If eventually respondent No, l's above writ petition is dismissed, it will not be possible to retrieve the above position. On the other hand, if the above ad interim order is withdrawn and eventually respondent No,1 succeeds in his above writ petition, the position can be retrieved as he would be entitled to receive all back benefits. Another aspect which was overlooked by the High Court was that the grant of above ad interim order would result into suspension of termination orders of 5416 employees, who are intended to be covered by the above Golden Handshake Package. This will also adversely affect other Banks and Corporations, which have also introduced similar Golden Handshake Schemes or intend to introduce the same.
12. We may also point out that even no irreparable loss will be suffered by respondent No,1 if the above ad interim order is withdrawn as the termination of his services is not simpliciter, but he is entitled to receive more than two and a half million rupees as compensation, which will fetch him more profit if the same is deposited in a fixed deposit scheme than his salary which he was drawing at the time of the service of the impugned order of termination of his services. Additionally, the effect of the impugned order is that respondent No,1 stood reinstated before the disposal of his writ petition which runs counter to the judgment of this Court in the case of Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division and others (supra).
13. The upshot of the above discussion is that we are inclined to grant leave to consider, whether the learned Judge in Chambers was justified in passing the impugned order. Leave is, accordingly, granted. The operation of the above impugned order of the High Court is suspended.
The appeal arising out of the above petition may be fixed for heairng at an early date.
…and 17 more citing cases