This Revision application is directed against the judgment given on 31st May 1976, by a learned Additional District Judge, Karachi accepting the appeal of respondent No. 1 and reversing the decision of the learned trial Court rejecting under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. The plaint filed by the applicant herein.
1. The admitted facts of the case are that there exists an employees' Union known as 'B. P. Biscuit Factory Employees' Union'. However, certain employees of the B. P. Factory decided to form a rival employees' Trade Union by the name of 'B. P. Biscuit Factory Comrade Labour Union'. This Union applied for registration under the provisions of section 8 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and the Registrar of Trade Unions duly registered the said Union. However, before the grant of registration to the said Union, respondent No. 1 had filed a suit in the Court of the learned Civil Judge for a declaration that the rival Trade Union was not entitled to registration and an injunction to restrain it from obtaining a registration. On objection being raised by the applicant herein that the relief claimed by respondent No. 1 fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Registrar of Trade Unions, respondent No. 2 herein, the learned trial Court accepted this objection and rejected the plaint.
3. The applicant herein preferred an appeal against the rejection of his plaint to the District Court and the learned District Court held that the suit was maintainable and that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts in regard to the cause of action was not excluded by the provisions contained in the I. R.
O. In coming to this decision it mainly relied upon the provisions of section 18 of the 1. R. O. Which according to it alone specified the matters which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the authorities set up or created by the statute. According to the learned Appellate Court, as the relief claimed by the applicant herein did not fall within the ambit of section 18 of the I. R. O., there was neither an express nor implied bar to the maintainability of the suit.
4. I have heard Mr. A.I Amjad, Advocate for the applicant, and Mr. Shahenshah Hussain for respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2 has remained absent in this appeal.
3. The learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the only issue which fell to be considered by the Court was whether the dispute between the parties fell exclusively within the purview of respondent No. 2, to be decided in accordance with the provisions of the I. R. O., subject to the right of appeal given under the said Ordinance, or the matter also could be dealt with by the civil Courts.
The learned counsel at first attempted to argue that there was an express provision in the I. R. O.
Excluding the jurisdiction of the civil Courts, and in support of his contention, he placed reliance on section 65 of the I. R. O. The said section, however, only grants indemnity and immunity from suits, prosecution or other legal proceedings against any person or anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of the Ordinance or any rule thereunder. It does not provide for exclusion of jurisdiction of civil Courts in respect of disputes which can be dealt with or resolved by various authorities under the Ordinance. When this was pointed out to the learned counsel for the applicant, he very fairly conceded this position and admitted that the said section did not oust the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to entertain any dispute concerning a right or liability created by and required to be adjudi--cated under the Ordinance.
6. The learned counsel for the applicant next contended that the I. R. O. Created certain rights and liabilities and in so far as it provided a machinery : or the enforcement thereof, such rights and liabilities could only be enforced in the manner provided by the I. R. O. And the jurisdiction of the Ordinary civil Courts in such matters was excluded. The learned counsel referred to subsection (1) of section 8 of the I. R. O. Which empowers the Registrar "on being satisfied that the Trade Union has complied with all the requirements of this Ordinance", to register the Trade Union and issue to it a registration certificate in the prescribed form. An appeal against a decision of the Registrar is provided under subsection (3) of the said section. However, the right of appeal is restricted to cases where the application for registration has been rejected or the Registrar has delayed the disposal of the application beyond the prescribed period of 15 days. Reference may also be made to section 10 of the I. R. O. Which empowers the Registrar, on certain conditions, to cancel the registration of a Trade Union.
The learned counsel submitted that since the right to registration as well cancellation of registration of Trade Unions is conferred and provided under the 1. R. O., it is only the Registrar of Trade Unions, subject to the appellate orders of the Labour Court, who can determine the question whether a Trade Union is entitled to registration or its registration is liable to cancella--petition. In support of his argument, the learned counsel relied upon the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Abul A'la Maudoodi v. Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1964 SC 673). In that case the question which fell for consideration before their Lordships was whether there was overlapping of provisions between the Political Parties Act, 1962 and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, and if so, whether the provision of the Political Parties Act, 1962, which was a special statute dealing with political parties, would not override the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908.
Hamoodur Rehman, J., with whom the majority agreed, observed :- "I would have no hesitation in holding that where a special statute dealing with a special subject 1.
Created special liabilities as also provided a special remedy or procedure for the enforcement of that liability then in order to bring about the consequences contemplated by that statute for the breaches of its provisions recourse should be had to that statute and to no other statute."
It was also urged by Mr. A.I Amjad that the suit filed by respondent No. 1 was barred by section 56 of the Specific Relief Act. Clause (d) of the said section reads as follows :- "An injunction cannot be granted . . . . . (d) to interfere with the public duties of any department or the Federal Government or any Provincial Government or with the sovereign acts of a foreign Government."
It was contended by the learned counsel that it was a public duty of respondent No. 2 to grant registration to the applicant's Union, if it fulfilled the requisite conditions, and the grant of an injunction to restrain the Registrar from registering the Trade Unions of the applicant would be interfering with the public duties of the Registrar's department. In my view, there is substance in this contention of the learned counsel. The scrutiny of application for registration of Trade Unions and the grant of registration are clearly public duties of the Registrar and in my humble view no mandatory injunction can be issued to the Registrar to stop him from granting such registration.
7. Mr. Shanenshah Hussain, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, contended that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts was not ousted. His argument was that the machinery provided in the I. R. O. For the registration and the cancellation of registration of Trade Unions was an additional remedy which did not displace or exclude the normal remedy available through the civil Courts. He further contended that the I. R. O. Does not contain any specific provision for the cancellation of registration of Trade Unions and at any rate did not confer upon respondent No. 1, a right to apply for such cancellation. I have already referred to section 10 of the I. R. O. Which, inter alia, provides for the cancellation of registration of a Trade Union by the Registrar, upon being so directed by a Labour Court. By means of a complaint in writing that the Trade Union has contravened, or has been registered in contravention of, any of the provisions of the Ordinance or the Rules. It was thus open to respondent No. 1 to approach the Labour Court to direct the Registrar to cancel the registration of the applicant if its registration by the Registrar was in contravention of the provisions of the I. R. O.
8. In support of his contention that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is not ousted by the provisions of the I. R. O. Providing machinery for the adjudication of disputes concerning registration or non- registration of a Trade Union, Mr. Shahenshah Hussain relied upon a number of authorities. The first authority relied upon by him is a decision of the House of Lords in Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Ministry of Housing and Local Government (1960 A C 260In that case the issue which arose for consideration before the House of Lords was whether the question that a person desiring to carry out any operations on land, etc. Had fulfilled the necessary conditions and was entitled to the permission sought, could only be determined by the Local Planning Authority under the special Act or such a declaration could also be granted by the High Court. It was held that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to grant a declaration was not excluded on the principle that the subject's recourse to Her Majesty's Courts for the determination of his rights is not to be excluded except by clear words. It may, however, be pointed out that in that case the right to carry out operations on land and make changes for the use of land was not conferred by the Act under consideration but was already possessed by the citizens.
9. The next case upon which reliance was placed by Mr. Shahenahah Hussain is reported as Ibrahim v. Muhammad Hussain (PLD 1975 SC 457No doubt in that case it was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that a litigant has a general right to institute a suit of civil nature independently of any statute, but his observation was modified by the qualification that such general right could, expressly or by necessary implication, be barred by statute to the contrary. The next case relied upon by Mr. Shahenshah Hussain is the Karachi case of H. H. Ahmed v. Pakistan (PLD 1972 Kar. 366). In that case, the question which arose for consideration was whether compensation payable under the Sind (Requisitoning of Lands) Act, 1947, could only be determined in the manner provided under the said Act or the compensation was to be determined by reference to the civil Court. It was held that if the right to compensation had been conferred by the aforesaid Act, then the argument would prevail that the determination of compensation would be in accordance with the provisions of the said Act but since the said Act was not in any sense creating a new right when it provided for payment of compensation and further the procedure prescribed in the said Act has been rendered nugatory by Government's own inaction the right of the citizen to invoke the jurisdiction of the civil courts cannot be questioned.
10. It will be seen that the principle that where a statute creates a right and also provides machinery for the enforcement of that right, then accord--ing to the Karachi authority referred to above, resort is to be had to the procedure prescribed in the statute creating the right for its enforcement and c the jurisdiction of the general civil Courts is barred. This is an old principle which has received recognition in England since ancient times, In Doe d. Bishop of Rochester v.
Bridges ( (1831) 1 B & Ad. 847it was observed:- "Where an Act creates an obligation, and enforces the performance in a specific manner, we take it to be a general rule that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner."
Stevens v. Leacocke ((1848) 11 Q B D 731) it was said :- "It is a rule of law that an action will not lie for the infringement of a right created by statute, where another specific remedy for infringement is provided by the same statute."
Queen v. The County Court, Judge of Essex ((1887) 18 Q B D 704 (707)) Lord Esher, M. - R. Said "The ordinary rule of construction applies to this case, that where the Legislature has passed a new statute giving a new remedy, that remedy is the only one which can be pursued."
Barraclough v. Brown (1897 A C 615 (622)the question raised before the House of Lords was whether an action for a declaration of a right would lie on a statute which gave anew right to recover certain expenses in a Court of summary jurisdiction from persons not otherwise liable. It was held by Lord Watson :-- "The right and the remedy are given uno flatu, and one cannot be dissociated from the other. By these words the legislation has, in my opinion, committed to the summary Court exclusive jurisdiction not merely to assess the amount of expenses to be repaid to the undertaker. But to determine by whom the amount is payable, and has, therefore by plain implication enacted that no other Court has any authority to entertain or decide these matters. "
Finally, I may refer to the case of Wilkinson v. Barking Corporation ((1948) 1 K B D 721 (724)In that case the construction of section 35 of the Local Government Superannuation Act, 1937, was in question. Asquith, L. J. Observed : "II is undoubtedly good law that where a statute creates a right and in plain language gives a specific remedy or appoints a specific tribunal for its enforcement, a party seeking to enforce the right must resort to that remedy or that Tribunal and not to others."
11. In my humble view, the right to registration by a Trade Union having been conferred by the 1. R. O., has also the liability to cancellation of registration under certain circumstances, and the statute having provided p the authorities by which and the mode in which the registration was to b granted or cancelled, the right or the liability cannot be enforced in any other manner or through any other forum.
12. For the reasons stated by me above, I am of the opinion that the learned Additional District Judge had misconceived the legal position and that his decision is legally unsound. I would accordingly allow the application with costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.