' Petitioner/plaintiff through the filing of the present revision petition, has called in question judgment, dated,. 11-2-2004, whereby the learned Additional District Judge dismissed his appeal and maintained order, dated 4-11-2002, passed by the learned trial Court, through which it dismissed petitioner's application for the grant of temporary injunction, filed in a suit for declaration.
2. Precisely stated the facts necessary for the decision of the present revision petition are that the petitioner filed a suit, thereby claiming a decree for declaration, which was resisted by the respondents through filing the written statement and ultimately the learned trial Court framed certain issues. In the earlier round of litigation, the matter came up before this Court in another revision petition (C.R. No.843 of 2002), which was disposed of by this Court, on 20-6-2002, and directions were issued to the learned trial Court to decide issue No.4, about jurisdiction, as preliminary issue, and after the decision of the said issue, the petitioner was allowed to file a fresh application for the grant of temporary injunction. According to the petitioner pursuant to the directions of this Court, as noted above, the learned trial Court decided the said issue in favour of the petitioner and thereupon he filed an application for the grant of temporary injunction with the prayer that the operation of resolution, dated 26-11-2001 be suspended, which was resisted by the respondents. The learned trial Court dismissed the said application, vide order, dated 4-11-2002.
Appeal, filed by the petitioner, was also dismissed on 11-2-2004, hence the present revision petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while referring to the prayer made in the plaint, has submitted that the petitioner has prayed for the grant of permanent injunction, therefore, his application for temporary injunction could not be dismissed on the ground that he has not prayed for the grant of permanent injunction. He has next contended that it has nowhere been stated that the petitioner is an employee of the Company, in fact he is also a Director of the Company and holding second highest shares in the company, therefore, the impugned judgment is not sustainable.
4. In view of the contentions raised by the learned counsel, it appears appropriate to reproduce the prayer made by the petitioner in his . Plaint which reads as follows:-- "In view of what has been stated above, it is respectfully prayed that a decree for declaration to the effect that the plaintiff continues to be the Director Marketing of English Leasing Limited/defendant No.1 and is entitled to perform his functions exercising the powers as such without any interference from the defendants and that the resolution, dated 26th November, 2001 and the letter, dated 28th December, 2001 is illegal, unlawful, void, without jurisdiction and nullity in the eye of law, may kindly be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants with costs.
' Ad interim stay may kindly be granted."
' It flows from bare reading of the aforenoted prayer that the petitioner did not pray for the grant of the decree for perpetual injunction and the only relief claimed by the petitioner is regarding the grant of decree for declaration. It is true that ad interim injunction has also been prayed but the fact remain that no relief for the grant of decree of perpetual injunction was claimed in the suit. The learned Additional District Judge has rightly held that "it is settled proposition of law that in case permanent injunction is not claimed in a suit, temporary injunction cannot be granted", which findings are in consonance with the principle laid down in the judgment reported as Marghub Siddiqi, v. Hamid Ahmed Khan and 2 others (1974 SCM R 519), wherein the apex Court of the Country, while dealing with the identical question of law, has held as under:- "Apart from the question that in the present case the trial Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by deciding the question of the validity of the resolution finally it appears to us that present petition must fail, for, the ad interim injunction could not have been granted for two other very good reasons which have unfortunately not been noticed by the Courts below.
' The first is that in a suit where no perpetual injunction is claimed no question of granting ad interim injunction can possible arise. In the present case, the application for ad interim injunction should have failed on this ground alone.
' Secondly.. ,"
' Being guided by the aforesaid law declared, I am constrained to hold that as the petitioner did not claim the decree for perpetual injunction in the suit, therefore, the temporary injunction has rightly been refused by both the Courts below.
5. So far as the next contention is concerned, suffice it to say that the learned Additional District Judge has rendered his tentative findings by holding that for the sake of arguments, even if the petitioner is removed from Director Marketing, he can file a suit for damages. Relevant portion from the impugned judgment is reproduced below:-- "....For the sake of arguments, even if that is true against his removal from the post of Director Marketing, efficacious remedy is available in the shape of suit for damages and there is no question of irreparable loss which is a necessary ingredient for the grant of an injunction."
6. Prayer made by the petitioner in his plaint, as reprbduced above, manifests that the petitioner has claimed a decree for declaration to the effect that he continues to be the Director Marketing of defendant No.1 and is entitled to perform his functions without any interference. It is evident from the above that one of the reliefs claimed by the petitioner is that he continues to be the Director Marketing. The controversy as to whether the petitioner is the Director Marketing or the employee of the- Company is germane to the main dispute, as highlighted in the suit, which is to be decided after recording the evidence of the parties. Any findings by this Court at this stage, on the status of the petitioner in the Company, may prejudice the cause of either of the parties. To my mind, the first ground is sufficient to dismiss petitioner's revision petition, therefore, on the basis.Of aforesaid two counts. I have refrained myself from giving any findings on the said issue.
7. Additionally, as noted above, that the main relief claimed by the petitioner in the suit, cannot be granted, at this stage. It has been held in United Bank Limited and others v. Ahsan Akhtar and others (1998 SCM R 68) that "generally a Court cannot grant an interlocutory relief of the nature which will amount to allowing the main case before its conclusion."
8. In the above perspective, I have examined the impugned order/judgment and find that the same do not suffer from any legal infirmity and both the Courts, while deciding the matter, did not commit any illegality or material irregularity, thus there is no legal justification for the invocation of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. In view whereof, both the impugned order/judgment are hereby maintained.
9. Upshot of the above discussion is that the present revision petition is devoid of any merits, thus, the same stands dismissed in limine.