ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, J.-This Constitutional Petition raises the question of law whether the Labour Appellate Tribunal constituted under section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the I. R. 0. is competent to exercise revisional jurisdiction under subsection (3-a) in respect of an order passed by the Labour Court on an appeal under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. This question has arisen in the following manner.
2. Respondent No, 4 Dr. Miss Akhtar Jamal was appointed as part-time doctor by the petitioner National Cement Industries Limited on 9th August, 1965'on a monthly salary of Rs, 300 and was subsequently confirmed in service. Subsequently on 25th October, 1975 the petitioner terminated her service for reasons which are not relevant for the present purposes. Thereupon she filed an application under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) before the Authority under Payment of Wages Act, Karachi. The petitioners appeared before the Authority and filed their reply to the application of respondent No, 4 in which they, inter alia, raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the application on the ground that since the dispensary in which the said respondent was employed was outside the factory premises, it was not an industrial establishment and hence the Act was not applicable to her case. The Authority accepted the preliminary objection of the petitioners and dismissed the application of respondent No, 4 under section 15 of the Act as not maintainable vide its order dated 16th May, 1977. On appeal filed by respondent No, 4, however, the First Sind Labour Court, Karachi4 disagreed with the view of the Authority and set aside the order passed by it remanding the case to the Authority for disposal on merits according to law vide its order dated 14th March, 1978. The petitioners then invoked the suo motu revisional jurisdiction vesting in the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi under section 38 (3a) of the I. R. O. To challenge the legality and propriety of the order passed by the Labour Court. The Appellate Tribunal, by its order dated 5th August, 1979, held that the appellate orders of the Labour Court passed under section 17 of the Act not being passed under the provisions of the I.
R.
0. Cannot be deemed to' be proceedings under the said Ordinance and were, a therefore, not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the 'Appellate Tribunal. On this view the revision application of the petitioners was dismissed as not maintainable. The petitioners now seek to call in question the aforesaid order, of the Appellate Tribunal.
3. We have heard Mr. Noor Muhammad, learned counsel for the petitioners only as the respondents in spite of notice have remained absent.
4. The Labour Courts have been established under section 35 of the I. R. O. The functions and powers of a Labour Court have been laid down,under subsection (5) of section 35 as under "(5) A Labour Court shall - (a)I adjudicate and determine an industrial dispute which has been referred to or brought before it under this Ordinance,
(b) enquire into and adjudicate any matter relating to the implementation or violation of a settlement which is referred to it by the Provincial Government,
(c) try offences under this Ordinance, and such other offences under any other law as the Provincial Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this behalf,
(d) exercise and perform such other powers and functions as are or may be conferred upon or assigned to it by or under this Ordinance or any other law."
The powers of the Labour Appellate Tribunal established under section 38 of the I. R. 0. Include the power of suo motu revision under subsection (3a) of section 38 which reads as under :- "The Tribunal may, on its own motion at any time, call for the record of any case or proceedings under this Ordinance in which a Labour Court within its jurisdiction has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of such order and may pass such order, in relation thereto as it thinks fit : Provided that no order under this subsection shall be passed revising or modifying any order adversely affecting any person without - giving such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard."
According to the view of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the power to hear and adjudicate upon an appeal against the orders of the Authority passed under section 15 of the Act has been conferred on the Labour Court by section 17 of the Act and not under any provision of the I. R. O. Consequently, the orders passed under section 17 of the Act are not passed under the provisions of the I. R. 0. Nor are the proceedings in such an appeal to be deemed to be proceedings under the I. R. 0. In other words, in the opinion of the Appellate Tribunal the revisional jurisdiction vesting in it extends only to the proceedings of a Labour Court under the I. R. 0. And not under any other special law. Mr. Noor Muhammad has contended before us that in view of clause (d) of subsection (5) of section 35 the ordinary jurisdiction vesting in the Labour Court embraced powers and functions assigned to it, inter alia, by or under any other law. He submitted that the plain reading of the aforesaid provision, therefore, clearly shows that any proceedings taken under any such other law will be proceedings under section 35 of the I. R. 0. Falling within the ambit of the revisional jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal. It may be stated that prior to the amendment of section 17 of the Act by Ordinance XII of 1974 an appeal was provided against an order passed by the Authority under section 15 to the District Court which was by the aforesaid amendment substituted by the "Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969". The question whether a revision was competent under section 115 Code of Civil Procedure against an order passed by the District Court in exercise of powers under section 17 of the Act has been considered in several decisions by the superior Courts of this country including this Court. In Abdul Salam v. Hafeez Sons Limited , it was held by Abdul Hafeez Memon, J. (as he then was) that the order passed by the District Court was amenable to the revisional jurisidiction of the High Court for the reason that the District Judge while exercising powers in appeal under section 17 of the Act, functions as a Court and not as a persona designata.
In this connection, he made the following observations : "It will be noticed that the jurisdiction to hear an appeal against a direction by an 'Authority' has been conferred on a District Court, by designation without anything more. It is well settled by now that when a jurisdiction is conferred on an established Court without anything more the decision given by that Court is subject to all the incidents of appeal and revision as the District Judge in such a case performs his functions in the normal exercise of the powers under the Act as a Presiding Officer of the principal Civil Court in the District and not as a persona designata."
Similar view was taken in Motabar v. S. M. Rehman & Co. , in which it was held as under :- "The question has to be decided by reference to section 17 of the said Act. According to this section, an appeal can be filed against the judgments of the authority "before the District Court". As the said Act does not define the term "District Court" Mr. Hanafi rightly submitted that the term meant the District Court as defined in the General Clauses Act. As the District Court under the General Clauses Act is clearly a Court subordinate to the High Court, it follows that a revision would lie under section 115 against judgments of the District Court under section 17 of the said Act. ..................................
The fact that the powers of the Authority under the said Act are limited or are not as wide as those of the Civil Court would limit the scope of a revision, but 1 do not see how it would exclude a revision, nor can this Court's jurisdiction be so lightly excluded. On the contrary, the presumption always is in favour of the jurisdiction of the superior Courts and as there is nothing in the said Act to exclude the jurisdiction of this Court. Mr. Arif's argument is without merit.'
The principle upon which these judgments proceed was first laid down in a case from the English Jurisdiction by the House of Lords in National Telephone Company Ltd. v. Post Master-General . By the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, the Railway and Canal Commission was established as a Court of record, and an appeal lay from the Commission to the Court of Appeal except upon questions of fact and locus standi. By another statute, namely, the Telegraph (Arbitration) Act, 1909 it was enacted that any reference between the Post Master-General and any body or person under any agreement relating to telephones should, if the parties agreed, be referred to the Railway and Canal Commission who are bound to determine it ; and that all proceedings relating thereto should be conducted by the Commission in the same manner as any other proceeding was conducted by them under the Railway and Canal Traffic Act. A difference having arisen as to the value of the plaint between the Post Master-General and a telephone company the Commission at the request of the parties fixed and determined the value. The question arose whether an appeal lay from the decision of the Commission on a point of law to the Court of Appeal and it was held by their Lordships that the reference to the Commission under the Telegraph (Arbitration) Act, 1909 was a reference to them as a Court of record and not as Arbitrators, and that an appeal lay from their decision on a point of law to the Court of Appeal. Viscount Haldane, L. C. Made the following observation : "My Lords, the substantial question in the case turns on the construction of Telegraph (Abritration)
Act, 1909. That Act provides, by S. 1 that any difference of a kind which includes the present ease shall; if the parties agree to such a reference, be referred to the Commission, and the Commission is bound to entertain the question. Section 2 enacts that such a proceeding shall be conducted in the same manner as any other proceeding is conducted by the Commission under the Acts of 1873 and 1888, subject to the proviso that by consent, and if the Commissioners approve, the question1 2 3 may be determined by the two appointed Commissioners instead of the whole body. It is contended by the appellants that in a reference under this Act the Commission is not in the same position as in a reference under the general Acts establishing it, and that, as no right of appeal is expressly given, none can be presumed.
My Lords, if the reference is one on the same footing as a reference under the general Acts, that is, reference to the Commission as a Court of record, with a right of appeal expressly provided, this is decisive against the points raised in the argument for the appellants. And I find nothing in the Act of 1909 to ett down the effect of the words at the end of S. 1, which appear to mc to provide for a reference to the Commission in its usual capacity. When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it, in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches."
Lord Atkinson, who also concurred made the following observation "It is not, in substance, in my view, at all a question of giving a right of appeal by implication. It is simply the question of extending the jurisdiction of an existing Court of law, with all its incidents including a right of appeal, to a new matter closely resembling in character those matters over which it had already jurisdiction as a Court of Law."
The dictum laid down in the aforesaid case was followed by the Supreme Court in Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner . The same principle was followed by the Privy Council in Adaikappa v.
Chandrasekhra . In this case after a final decree in a mortgage suit was passed, the judgment- debtor made an application in the suit under section 19, Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, which was dismissed. The question was whether an appeal lay against such an order and it was held: "The true rule is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such disputes the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal."
3. The rule laid down in the National Telephone Company's case has also been followed in Hemsingh v. Basant Das .
5. In view of the aforesaid judicial pronouncements of high authority, we have come to the conclusion that by a parity of reasoning there can be no doubt that the Appellate Tribunal under the I. R. O. Is competent even to exercise its revisional jurisdiction in respect of an order passed by the Labour Court in exercise of power vesting in it under any law other than the I. R. 0 The Labium Court before being conferred with the jurisdiction under section 7 of the Act was an already established Court with its jurisdiction -defined so,as to include the powers conferred under laws other than the I. R. O. And its procedure and powers laid down by section 36 of the I. R. 0, Clearly, therefore, subsection (5) of section 35 which lays down the ambit of its jurisdiction already contemplated by clause (d) the conferment of powers and functions upon the Labour Court under the I.R.O. Or any other law. It, therefore, follows that in exercising powers under special laws, the Labour Court exercised its ordinary jurisdiction subject to all the incidents of appeal or revision ordinarily applicable to the Labour Court. The Act of 1936 does not lay down any special procedure for jurisdiction or determination of an appeal under section /7 by the Labour Court. The disputes under the Payment of Wages Act are in the words of Lord Atkinson disputes closely resembling in character matters under the I. R. 0. Over which the Labour Court had already jurisdiction and, therefore, there is no reason to hold that the Legislature intended to keep out of the revisional jurisdiction of the Appellate Court matters under special laws other than the I. R. 0. Dealt with by the Labour Court. In or opinion, when a matter under any special law is transferred to the Labour Court under a statutory provision its adjudication and determination by the Labour Court becomes ac proceeding under the I. R. 0. By virtue of subsection (5) (d) of section 35 so that it is amenable to4 5 6 the revisional jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal. This conclusion is further fortified by the provisions of subsection (7) of section 35 which confer the power upon the Appellate Tribunal to transfer any proceedings from a Labour Court within its jurisdiction to any other such Labour Court.
In this subsection the nature of proceeding has not been defined.
6. For the foregoing reasons, we allow this petition and hold that the impugned order was passed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal without lawful authority and is of no legal effect. The case shall, therefore, be remanded to the Labour Appellate Tribunal for disposal on merits according to law.
There will, however, be no order as to costs. PLD 1974 Kat 118 PLD 1971 Quetta 47 1913 A C 546 PLD 1970 SC 1 AIR 1948 P C 12 AIR 1936 P C 93