' AJMAL MIAN, J.---By this common judgment, we intend to dispose of the above two appeals which involve common questions of fact and law, and are directed against a common judgment dated 22-9-1983 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh inter alia in Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-304 of 1981 and D-574 of 1981, filed by the appellants in the above two appeals, respectively, dismissing the same. Leave to appeal was granted to consider the questions, whether the order passed, by the Labour Court in respect of the rights granted under the Standing Order No, 12(3) of the West A Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, hereinafter referred to as the Standing Order, was final, or whether the aggrieved persons were entitled to avail the remedy of appeal against such order under section 37(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, hereinafter referred to as the I.R.O.
2. The facts to be noted are that the appellants were permanent workmen in the Dyeing and Printing Factory run by respondent No,2. Their services were terminated with effect from 1-9-1978 on the ground of closing of the department concerned on account of continuous financial losses. The appellants invoked section 25-A of the I.R.O. Inasmuch as they served a grievance notice and filed petitions under the above provision before the IIIrd Sindh Labour Court at Karachi, upon the failure of respondent No,2 to redress their grievance in response to the grievance notices. The above petitions were resisted by respondent No,
2. However, the Labour Court by its order dated 23-8-1980 allowed the appellants' above petitions, setting aside the termination orders and directing the re- instatement of the appellants with back benefits. Thereupon, respondent No,2 filed appeals before the learned Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi, hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal, which were allowed by a judgment dated 16-2-1981 and the above order of the Labour Court was set aside. After that, the appellants filed the above Constitutional petitions on the ground that as they had invoked section 25-A of the I.R.O. Pursuant to Standing Order No,12(3), no appeal was competent before the Tribunal. However, the learned Judges of the Division Bench held that the appeals were competent and, therefore, dismissed the petitions. Against the above judgment of the Division Bench of the Sindh High Court, the appellants filed petitions for leave to appeal, which were granted to consider the above questions.
3. In support of the above appeals, Mr. Ali Akbar, learned A.O.R. Appearing for the appellants, has vehemently urged that since under Standing Order No,12(3) only section 25-A of the I.R.O. Was incorporated by reference and not section 37(3) of the I.R.O., no appeal was competent before the Tribunal. To put it in different words, his contention was, that since the incorporation of section 25-A of the I.R.O. In Standing Order No,12(3) was by reference, no other provision of the I.R.O. Could be imported including the provision relating to the filing of an appeal. On the other hand, Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, learned A.S.C. Appearing for respondent No,2, has urged that in fact Standing Order No,12(3) confers jurisdiction on the Labour Courts which are established Courts and, therefore, ordinary incidents of procedure of that Court will be attached including general right of appeal or review. His further submission was that even otherwise since the appellants were workmen within the definition of "workman" given in section 2(xxviii) of the I.R.O., their petitions under section 25-A of the I.R.O. Were competent without reference to Standing Order No, 12(3) and, therefore, any decision in respect thereof was subject to an appeal under section 37(3) of the I.R.O.
4. In order to appreciate to above contention, it may be pertinent to reproduce Standing Order No,12(3), which reads as follows:-- "12(3). The services of a workman shall not be terminated, nor shall a workman be removed, retrenched, discharged or dismissed from service, except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken. In case a workman is aggrieved by the termination of his services or removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal, he may take action in accordance with the provisions of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance."
A perusal of the above-quoted para 3 of Standing Order No,12 indicates that it prohibits the termination of service of a workman without a written order and without containing the reason of termination. It may also be noticed that it also provides that a workman, who is aggrieved by the termination of his services or removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal, may take action in accordance with the provisions of section 25-A of the I.R.O. And thereupon the provisions of said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance.
5. There is no doubt that this is a case of incorporation of section 25-A into Standing Order by reference. Such an incorporation by reference has been commented upon by Crawford on Statutory Construction (Interpretation of Laws) at page 439, para. 234, Corpus Juris, Secundum, Volume 82. Page 486, American Jurisprudence, Volume 73, pages 284 to 286, and Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition), Volume 44, page 544, para. 889, the relevant portions of which read as follows:-- "Crawford on Statutory Construction (Interpretation of Laws) at page 439, para. 234:
234. Adopted Statutes.---A statute may adopt all or only a part of another statute by express reference, or by re-enactment of the former in verbatim or in substantially the same language.
Where this is true, the adopted provisions become a part of the adopting statute. Similarly, a statute may adopt the provisions of another statute by what is known as descriptive reference. In this case, the adopted provisions become a part of the adopting statute but only those provisions which relate to the new statute's subject."
"Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 82, page 486: Construction with Statute adopted by reference in general.- --Where a statute adopts a part or all of another statute by a specific and descriptive reference thereto, as it may do in accordance with the rules stated supra, paras. 70-72, the effect is the same as if the statute or part thereof adopted had been written into the adopting statute Where, however, the adopted statute is referred to merely by words describing its general character, only those parts of it which are of a general nature, or particularly relate to the subject of the adopting statute, will be considered as incorporated into the latter When the Legislature in adopting the procedural provisions of another Act, made substitutes in certain instances it will be inferred that, on matters not specified, no substitutions were intended In dealing with cases of legislation by reference, the primary consideration to be kept in view is the general scope and object of the amending legislation, and, in determining whether a reference adopted or included a particular clause of the first Act, neither statute should be subject to a strained construction.
Effect of modification of adopted statute. ---The question whether one statute absorbing or incorporating by proper reference provisions of another will be affected by amendments made to the latter is one of legislative intent and purpose. As a rule the adoption of the statute by reference is construed as an adoption of the law as it existed at the time adopting statute was passed, and, therefore, is not affected by any subsequent modification of the statute adopted unless an intention to the contrary is clearly manifested, but, where the legislative intent to do so clearly appears, the adopting statute will include subsequent modifications of the original Act."
"American Jurisprudence, Volume 73, pages 284-286:
(29) Effect of subsequent amendment or repeal of adopted statute--It is a general rule that when a statute adopts a part or all of another statute, domestic or foreign, general or local, by a specific and descriptive reference thereto, the adoption takes the statute as it exists at this time and does not include subsequent additions or modifications of the adopted statute, where it is not expressly so declared. But when the adopting statute makes no reference to any particular statute or part of statute by title or otherwise, but refers to the law generally which governs a particular subject, the reference in such a case includes not only the law in force at the date of the adopting Act, but also all subsequent laws on the particular subject referred to, in so far at least as they are consistent with the adopting Act. Indeed, there is even authority that when the reference is general, the referring statute takes the law referred to not only in its contemporary form, but also as it may be subjected to elimination altogether by repeal "Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition), Volume 44, page 544, para. 889:
889. Express incorporation of earlier provisions.---Where a statute incorporates by reference the whole or any part of an earlier statute, the provisions so incorporated must generally be construed as they would be if set out in full in the later statute. Where a general Act is incorporated with a special Act subsequently passed relating to a particular subject-matter, a provision in the special Act prevails over an inconsistent provision in the general Act.
' Where particular sections of an earlier statute are expressly incorporated into a latter statute, there is a conflict of authority as to whether other parts of the earlier statute which are not incorporated may or may not be referred to in construing the sections which are incorporated. It seems probable that, on the principles already referred to in connection with earlier statutes in pari materia, they may be referred to, but only where there is an ambiguity or obscurity in the incorporated sections which cannot otherwise be resolved."
6. The gist of the above extracts from the above well-known treatises, seems to be that the effect of the incorporation of a provision of a statute into another statute is, that it becomes part of the latter statute as it stood on the day of the incorporation. Any subsequent amendment made in such a provision in the parent statute, cannot be read into the other statute which incorporated the above provision by reference, unless a contrary intention appears from the provision incorporating same. From the language of Standing Order 12(3) quoted hereinabove, it is evident that the Legislature intended even to apply subsequent amendments in section 25-A of the I.R.O. By providing that "and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance".
7. The question which requires consideration is, as to whether the Legislature intended not to provide a right of appeal against an order which may be passed by the Labour Court under section 25-A of the I.R.O. At this juncture, it may be pertinent to refer to the legislative history on the subject.
It may be painted out that prior to the incorporation of section 25-A of the I.R.O. Into Standing Order No,12(3), Standing Order 18 provided the remedy in respect of a grievance arising out of the various Standing Orders by providing the service of a grievance notice by an individual workman on the employer, and then filing of a complaint to the Industrial Court having jurisdiction within 30 days from the decision of the employer or within 60 days of the workman bringing the grievance to the notice of the employer under the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 (Ordinance No,IV of 1968). Against a decision of the Industrial Court, a right of appeal was provided under section 16 of the above Ordinance. It may be stated that Labour Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972 (Ordinance No,IX of 1972) was promulgated by the President on 13-4-1972, whereby a number of amendments were made in the various statutes relating to Labour Laws including the Standing Orders inasmuch as aforesaid Standing Order No,18, which provided the forums for agitating grievance by an individual workman, was omitted. Whereas in the I.R.O., inter alia, section 25-A was first time. Incorporated providing a detailed procedure for getting redress by individual workmen.
An award given by the Labour. Court under section '25-A was subject to an appeal under section 37(3) of the I.R.O. The effect of the above omission of Standing Order No,18 and the incorporation of section 25-A in the I.R.O., was that the workmen as defined in section 2(xviii) of the I.R.O., which may include workmen as defined in section 2(i) of the Standing Order, were entitled to invoke the above section 25-A for getting redress against their individual grievances subject to the right of appeal under section 37(3) of the I.R.O.
8. It may further be observed that above Ordinance No,IX of 1972, which made inter alia the above amendments, was followed by Labour Laws (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1972 (Ordinance No,XVIII of 1972) promulgated by the President on 24-5-1972, whereby inter alia Standing Order No,12 was substituted, which inter alia under clause (3) incorporated above section 25-A of the I.R.O. First time. It also made amendment in section 25-A of the I.R.O. Inasmuch as for the words "an award", the words "a decision" were substituted. From the above legislative history on the subject in issue, it is evident that a workman aggrieved by an order of termination of service, was entitled to agitate his grievance under the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968, before the Industrial Court and then through an appeal under section 16 of the above Ordinance, before a tribunal till the omission of Standing Order No,18 by above Labour Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972, on 13- 4-1972. After the promulgation of the above Ordinance, a workman aggrieved by an order terminating his services under Standing Order No,12(3), was entitled to agitate his grievance before the Labour Court under section 25-A of the I.R.O. And then before the appellate Court under section 37(3) of the I.R.O.
9. If we were to accept Mr. Ali Akbar, learned A.O.R. For the appellants' above contention, we will have to hold that the effect of the incorporation of section 25-A into Standing Order No,12(3) by the Labour Laws (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1972, on 24-5-1972, is to deny the right of appeal to a workman aggrieved by an order terminating his services under Standing Order No,12(3), which right he was enjoying as pointed out hereinabove prior to the above incorporation of section 25-A into the Standing Order No,12(3). At this juncture, we may refer some of the cases on the above controversy: ' The first case seems to be Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Lahore v. Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and another PLD 1979 Lah. 415, in which Gul Muhammad Khan, J. (as he then was) after tracing the legislative history of the above incorporation of section 25-A by reference and after referring to the case-law, concluded that the effect of the above incorporation of section 25-A into Standing Order No,12(3), was to deny the right of appeal. He, therefore, allowed the writ petition against the appellate order of the Tribunal whereby the order of the Labour Court was set aside. The relevant portion of the observation reads as follows:-- .... The facts given above show that originally S.O. 18 contained a remedy for any violation of S.O.
12(3). Both the provisions were amended by Ordinance IX of 1972. S.O. 18 was repealed. S.0.12(3) was extended to all the workers, with better rights. A remedy was, however, provided under the I.R.O.
Under section 25-A which was inserted simultaneously in the I.R.O. An aggrieved workman could approach, directly or indirectly, his employer as well as the Labour Court. He could also challenge the order of the Labour Court in appeal before the Tribunal under section 37(3), which was also amended by Ordinance II of 1972. Later, on 24th May, 1972, the above arrangement was upset and the provisions under consideration were enacted by adoption in S.O. 12(3). The result was that a worker could have a resort to a remedy referred to in section 25-A not because of his right generally but only because of and to the extent it was so allowed by S.O.12(3). Further, being a particular remedy in a special statute it naturally excluded the general remedy. The relevant provisions of S.O.12(3) stated that an aggrieved worker may take action in accordance with provisions of section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969 (XXIII of 1969) and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance. Had the Legislature intended to continue the right of appeal it would not have brought any amendment at all. The fact, that there was an amendment and that too about a month and a half after the previous statutory arrangement providing an appeal, clearly goes to show that the Legislature wanted to go back to the scope of the remedy as previously provided to a class of workmen in S.O.
18. Further, a comparison of the import of the provision as it existed before 24th May, 1972, and thereafter would leave no manner of doubt that the Legislature was substituting one remedy for two already existing. Again, as section 37(3) was, already there providing an appeal against the order of the Labour Court, the Legislature could say so expressly, if the intention was to make that section applicable to such cases also. So, rule (d) applied in this respect."
' It may be observed that against the above judgment, this Court granted leave to appeal. The leave granting order is reported in 1982 SCMR 167 (Sahibzada KA.K. Afridi v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Karachi and another). It appears that on 10-2-1991, the appeal against the above judgment, has been allowed by this Court at Lahore Bench, the judgment of which is not yet available.
10. The above question also came up for hearing before Shafiur Rahman, J., sitting as S.B. At the Lahore High Court (as his Lordship then was), in the case of Cotton Trading Corporation (Pakistan), Faisalabad v. Rana Shabbir Ahmad and another 1981 PLC 981, in which the above case of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Lahore v. Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and another (supra) was considered and the writ petition filed against the appellate order of the Tribunal, was dismissed and it was held that there were two reliefs equally available; one under section 25-A of the I.R.O. And one under Standing Order No,12(3) and, therefore, the relief, which was more beneficial having the right of appeal, could be opted. It may be advantageous to reproduce the relevant observation, which reads as follows:-- " The question here is not what is the effect and extent of incorporation but the question is whether two reliefs are equally available one under section 25-A of the I.R.O., and one under Standing Order 12, clause (3) as after incorporation and the one happens to be more benefyal than the other, then with whom would be the choice lie. It is the accepted principle that the remedies which are more beneficial in accordance with the sense of fairness and equity have to be preferred over those which give truncated relief to the aggrieved person. By all means, a law which affords a right of appeal to the aggrieved party against the first decision is a more beneficial provision than the one which completely shuts out such appeal. Therefore, on the strength of I.R.O. And the definition of workman therein the respondent could avail of the remedy of appeal."
11. The above question again came up for hearing before Shafiur Rahman, J. (as his Lordship then was) in the case of M/s. Shahi Bottlers Ltd., Lahore v. Khushi Muhammad and 5 others 1979 PLC 424, in which a contrary view to the view taken in the above case of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Lahore v. Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and another (supra) was taken and it was held that the effect of incorporation of section 25-A of the I.R.O. Into Standing Order No,12(3), is not to deny the right of appeal. The relevant observation reads as follows:-- "5. The expression 'and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance' have to be noted. If it were the intention of the Legislature to stop at incorporating section 25-A and to restrict the incorporation to it, such an expression would not have followed. The only meaning that can be given is that once resort to 25-A is taken on the strength of this provision the provisions of that section in the matter of redress of individual grievance shall apply. Whatever therefore is the procedure embeded or attached or linked with section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance in the matter of the redress of grievance will automatically be available. The provision being remedial in nature, the full benefit of the remedy has to be given to the party claiming it. The restriction of the remedy only to the stage of Labour Court and not extending it beyond to appeal and other proceedings available would appear to be somewhat arbitrary and out of context. The judgments referred to particularly, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation is under examination by the Supreme Court 1982 SCMR 1617."
12. Reference may also be made to the case of Security Papers Ltd., Karachi v. Sindh Labour Court No,4, Karachi and another 1981 PLC 898, wherein Z.C. Valliani, J., while dismissing a petition against an order of the Labour Court in which subject-matter of the controversy was an order passed under Standing Order No,12(3) on the ground that the petitioner should have filed an appeal before approaching the High Court through a Constitutional petition, observed as follows:-- "14. I have carefully considered abovementioned citations as well as the authorities quoted by both the learned counsel for the parties and I am inclined to agree with the reasonings given in 1981 PLC 981, 1979 PLC 424 and by the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal at Karachi given in Appeal No, Kar- 590 of 1979, that the remedy by way of appeal under section 37(3) of I.R.O., 1969 is available in cases initiated under Standing Order 12(3) of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 by virtue of the amendment of S.O. 12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 by Act XXIII of 1973, in view of the wording of S.O. 12(3) of the West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 after the amendment in question, as in my opinion legislator by the amendment in question did not only incorporate section 25-A .Of I.R.O., 1969 in section 12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 but gave a right to a workman, who was aggrieved by the termination of his services to apply to the Labour Court for redress under section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969 in the same manner as worker under the latter enactment is entitled to do, in respect of right secured to him under any law, award or settlement. The wording of amendment brought in S.O. 12(3) of West Pakistan (Standing Orders)
Ordinance, 1968 by Act XXIII of 1973 clearly suggests that entire procedure available under I.R.O., 1969 for adjudication of grievance of worker under section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969, has been made available to worker who under S.O.12(3) of West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 takes his matter to the Labour Court under section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969, which obviously includes right of appeal as has been held by the various authorities cited by the learned counsel for the respondent No,3. I entirely agree with the reasonings given in the said authorities, which are based on cogent reasons, after consideration of various case-law which was cited before them. If the legislator did not intend that the provisions of section 37(3) of I.R.O., 1969 be available to workman in respect of his grievance under section 12(3) of West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, it could have clearly mentioned so, while amending S.O.12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. In view of this conclusion arrived at by me, I hold that the provisions of section 37(3) of I.R.O., 1969 are available to the proceedings initiated under S.O.12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, before the Labour Court and as such the petitioners have and had a right of appeal against the order, dated 13th September, 1980, of respondent No,1 under section 37(3) of I.R.O., 1969 in spite of section 1(3) of Order XXI of 1979."
13. We are inclined to hold that clause (3) of Standing Order 12 has been I couched in such a language which clearly indicates that the Legislature did not intend to deny the right of appeal in respect of an order of termination of services to a workman under the above provisions of the Standing Order, but the intention was to provide a remedy which is available in the form of section 25-A, which will necessarily imply the right of appeal under section 37(3) of the I.R.O. As any order passed under section 25-A will be a decision in terms of above section 37(3) as to make it appealable. It may also be pointed out that by virtue of clause (d) of subsection (5) of section 35 of the I.R.O., the Labour Court has been empowered not only to adjudicate and determine an industrial dispute which may have been referred to or brought before it under the above Ordinance, but has been empowered to exercise and perform such other powers and functions as are or may be conferred upon or assigned to it in the said Ordinance or any other law. The expression "any other law" will include Standing Order No,12(3).
14. We are also of the view that the effect of the incorporation of section 25-A of the I.R.O. Into Standing Order No,12(3), is to confer jurisdiction on an established Court, namely, the Labour Court as constituted under section 35 of the I.R.O. And, therefore, the procedure and the incidents including a right of appeal, will be available against a decision given by the Labour Court. In this behalf, reference may be made to the following cases:--
(i) National Telephone Company Limited (In Liquidation) and another v. His Majesty's Postmaster- General (1913 AC 546);
(ii) Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao and others (AIR 1916 PC 21);
(iii) Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin (1961 IA 158);
(iv) Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner and others (PLD 1970 SC 1);
(v) In re: Suo Motu Shariat Review Petition No,1-R of 1989 (PLD 1990 SC 865); and
(vi) National Cement Industries Ltd. v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and 3 others (1981 PLC 561).
' In the above first case, the House of Lords held that as the Commission acting under the Telegraph (Arbitration) Act, 1909, was referred to as a Court of record under the above statute, an appeal against its decision would be competent to the Court of Appeal. In the second case, the Privy Council while construing the provisions of Madras Forest Act (No,V of 1882) held that since under section 10(2) of the aforsaid Act, the appeal was provided to the District Court as one of the ordinary Courts of the country, the ordinary rules of Civil Procedure Code would be applicable. In the third case, the Privy Council while construing sections 4 and 75 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, held that as the above Act gave a right of appeal to the High C art, an appeal from the decision of the High Court would lie to the Privy Council under and subject to the Code of Civil Procedure. It was also held the where a Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country, the ordinary rules of the Code of Civil Procedure apply. In the fourth case, the Supreme Court of Pakistan quoted with approval the observation referred to hereinbelow from the above judgment of the House of Lords. It may be advantageous to reproduce the relevant portion of the above Supreme Court judgment, which reads as follows:-- " The view taken by me as regards power to review also finds support from the dictum laid down by the House of Lords in the case of National Telephone Company Ltd. v. Postmaster-General. The dictum laid down in that case, in the words of Viscount Haldane, is as follows:-- ' When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right to appeal from its decisions likewise attaches.'
' As the High Court has been found to have power under clause (b) of section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure to review an order made in its writ jurisdiction in a civil matter, the appeal succeeds.
I would, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and declare that, apart from the High Court's power to correct errors apparent on the face of the record in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, it has power under the Code of Civil Procedure to.Review its own order made in writ jurisdiction in a civil matter. The High Court will now hear the application for review according to law. Having regard to the intricacy of the point of law involved, I would not make any order as to costs."
' In the above fifth case, the question before the Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court was, whether it enjoys the power to review its own judgment in spite of the fact that under clause (9) of Article 203-E of the Constitution, the Federal Shariat Court has been expressly given the power to review its orders/decisions but the said power has been deliberately denied to the Shariat Appellate Bench by omitting the same in clause (2) of Article 203-F of the Constitution. It was held by the Shariat Appellate Bench that since under Article 203-F of the Constitution, the appeal is provided to this Court against the orders/decisions of the Federal Shariat Court, it can press into service Article 188 of the Constitution, which provides that the Supreme Court shall have powers subject to the provisions of any Act and of any rule made by the Supreme Court, to review any judgment pronounced or any order made by it. Whereas in the last above-cited case the question before a Division Bench of the Sindh High Court was, whether the Appellate Tribunal was entitled to exercise revisional power under subsection 3(a) of section 38 of the I.R.O. In respect of an order passed by the Labour Court in exercise of the appellate power under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. It was held that when a matter under any special law is transferred to the Labour Court under a statutory provision, its adjudication and determination by the Labour Court becomes a proceeding under the I.R.O. By virtue of subsection (5)(d) of section 35 so it is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal. The judgment was written by Zaffar Hussain Mirza, J.
(as his Lordship then was). It may be instructive to reproduce the relevant observation from the above judgment, which reads as follows:-- "5. In view of the aforesaid judicial pronouncements of high authority, we have come to the conclusion that by a parity of reasoning there can be no doubt that the Appellate Tribunal under the I.R.O. Is competent even to exercise its revisional jurisdiction in respect of an order passed by the Labour Court in exercise of power vesting in it under any law other than the I.R.O. The Labour Court before being conferred with the jurisdiction under section 17 of the Act was an already established Court with its jurisdiction defined so as to include the powers conferred under laws other than the I.R.O. And its procedure and powers laid down by section 36 of the I.R.O. Clearly, therefore, subsection (5) of section 35 which lays down the ambit of its jurisdiction already contemplated by clause (d) the conferment of powers and functions upon the Labour Court under the I.R.O. Or any other law. It, therefore, follows that in exercising powers under its special laws, the Labour Court exercised its ordinary jurisdiction subject to all the incidents of appeal or revision ordinarily applicable to the Labour Court. The Act of 1936 does not lay down any special procedure for jurisdiction or determination of an appeal under section 17 by the Labour Court. The disputes under the Payment of Wages Act are in the words of Lord Atkinson disputes closely resembling in character matters under the I.R.O. Over which the Labour Court had already jurisdiction and, therefore, there is no reason to hold that the Legislature intended to keep out of the revisional jurisdiction of the Appellate Court matters under special laws other than the I.R.O. Dealt with by the Labour Court. In our opinion, when a matter under any special law is transferred to the Labour Court under a statutory provision its adjudication and determination by the Labour Court becomes a proceeding under the I.R.O. By virtue of subsection (5)(d) of section 35 so that it is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal. This conclusion is further fortified by the provisions of subsection (7) of section 35 which confer the power upon the Appellate Tribunal to transfer any proceedings from a Labour Court within its jurisdiction to any other such Labour Court.
In this subsection the nature of proceeding has not been defined."
15. Reference may also be made to the case of R.MA.RA. Adaikappa Chettiar and another v. R.
Chandrasekhara Thevar (PLD 1947 PC 279), in which after the preliminary and final decrees were passed in a mortgage suit, the judgment-debtor made an application in the suit under section 19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act to the Court which passed the decrees, praying that the decrees be amended in accordance with the provisions of the aforesaid Act and the debt might be declared to have been wholly discharged. The Court dismissed the above application on the ground that the judgment-debtor was not an agriculturist. The question arose, whether an appeal against the above order was competent though section 19 of the aforesaid Agriculturists Relief Act did not confer any such right, it was held by the Privy Council that the aforesaid order was not made in execution proceeding but was made in a suit which amounted to a decree within the meaning of section 2(2) of Civil Procedure Code, hence the appeal was competent under section 96 of the C.P.C.
16. From the above-cited cases it is evident that by now it is a well-settled principle of law that if jurisdiction is conferred on an established Court without more, it will import the ordinary incidents of procedure attached to that Court and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attached to it.
17. Besides the above reasoning, we may also observe that we are inclined to subscribe to the view of Shafiur Rahman, J. In the case of Cotton Trading Corporation (Pakistan), Faisalabad v. Rana Shabbir Ahmad and another (supra), in which it has been held that the right of appeal can be sustained on the ground that there are two reliefs equally available, one under section 25-A of the I.R.O. And one under Standing Order No,12(3), and the relief which is more beneficial and which provides the right of appeal, can be opted.
18. In any view of the matter, the judgment under appeal is unexceptional and does not warrant interference by this Court.
19. Before parting with the above discussion, we may observe that Mr. All Akbar also attempted to argue the matter on merits, but we find that before the High Court in the writ petitions, the matters were not contested on merits as is evident from the judgment, wherein at page 1 the following observation has been made:-- "The judgments of the Labour Court as well as of the Labour Appellate Tribunal are quite detailed and have analysed facts and findings arrived at, have not been challenged before us."
Even otherwise, leave has not been granted by the Court on the question of merits and, therefore, we are not inclined to go into the above question.
20. The upshot of the above discussion is that the above appeals have no merits and, therefore, they are dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.