' SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.--This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order, dated 19-9- 1981 of the Lahore High Court whereby the order, dated 8-3-1979 of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal was declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
2. The appellants who are 73 in number were employed as lower division clerks in the establishment of the Pakistan Railways. They together with some others filed an application before the Authority constituted under the Payment of Wages Act for the recovery of extra wages which they claimed were payable to them by the Railway Administration. Their case was that although they held the posts of lower division clerks, they had been made to perform the duties of upper division clerks. Consequently, they were entitled to receive the difference between the pay of an upper division clerk and that of a lower division clerk. By its order, dated 7-7-1977 the Authority accepted the application and directed the Railway Administration to pay to the appellants an amount of Rs, 1,19,520 together with four times the said amount by way of compensation.
3. From the order of the Authority, the Railway Administration preferred an appeal before the Punjab Labour Court No,2, Lahore. By its judgment, dated 21-9-1977 the learned Labour Court accepted the appeal and dismissed the application on the ground that as the appellants were civil servants, the Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain their application. The appellants filed a revision petition before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. The learned Tribunal accepted the revision petition and set aside the order of the Labour Court on a technical ground based on the proviso to section 17(1)(a), Paym ent of Wages Act. According to this proviso the memorandum of appeal should be accompanied by a certificate from the Authority that the amount awarded to the employee has been deposited with the Authority. In this case the Railway Administration had deposited a cheque in the requisite amount with the Authority before preferring the appeal. The learned Tribunal did not regard the deposit of cheque as sufficient compliance of the said proviso and held that there was no proper appeal before the Labour Court. From the order of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal the Railway Administration filed a constitution petition in the High Court.
A learned Single Judge, relying entirely upon an earlier judgment of the Court reported as Pakistan v. Maqsood All 1981 PLC 307 took the view that the learned Tribunal was not competent to review the order of the Labour Court. Accordingly, it accepted the petition and declared the order of the learned Tribunal to be without jurisdiction and of no legal effect. From the judgment of the learned Single Judge the appellants have come in appeal to this Court.
4. It may be mentioned here that the rule laid down by the Lahore High Court in Maqsood Ali's case was contrary to the view expressed by the Sindh High Court in National Cement Industries v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal 1981 PLC 561. As the two High Courts were not agreed on the question whether the Labour Appellate Tribunal was competent to revise an order made by the Labour Court under the Payment of Wages Act, leave to appeal was granted to resolve the conflict.
5. The Labour Courts have been constituted under section 35(1) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. Subsection (5) of section 35 sets out the functions of a Labour Court. It reads as follows: "A Labour Court shall--
(a) adjudicate and determine an industrial dispute which has been referred to or brought before it under this Ordinance,
(b) enquire into and adjudicate any matter relating to the implementation or violation of a settlement which is referred to it by the Provincial Government,
(c) try offences under this Ordinance, and such other offences under any other law as the Provincial Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this behalf,
(d) exercise and perform such other powers and functions as are or may be conferred upon or assigned to it by or under this Ordinance or any other law."
Section 38, Industrial Relations Ordinance, provided for the constitution and functions of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Subsection (3a) thereof states: "The Tribunal may, on its own motion at any time, call for the record of any case or proceedings under this Ordinance in which a Labour Court within its jurisdiction has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of such order, and may pass such order, in relation thereto as it thinks fit; * * * * * * 'I' * *
6. Section 17(1), Payment of Wages Act , 1936, makes provision for appeals from the decisions of the Authority established under the Act . It reads: "An appeal against a direction made under subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 15 may be preferred within thirty days of the date on which the direction was made before the Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) within whose jurisdiction the cause of action to which the appeal relates arose.
' Subsection (2) of the same section states: "Save as provided in subsection (1), any direction made under subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 15 shall be final."
' It may be mentioned that subsections (3) and (4) of section 15 empower the Authority to issue directions, inter alia, for the payment of wages, due or unreasonably withheld by the employer, to the employee together with compensations and penalty.
7. The case of Maqsood Ali, ibid, was heard by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court. He was of the view that the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon the Labour Appellate Tribunal was confined to cases or proceedings relatable to matters falling under the Industrial Relations Ordinance. An.Appeal heard by the Labour Court in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred . Upon it by section 17, Payment of Wages Act , was not such a matter and for that reason it fell outside the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The learned Judge also referred to the language of subsection (3a) of section 38 where the words "cases or proceedings" were followed by the words "under this Ordinance" and observed that the rules made under the Payment of Wages Act laid down the procedure for the disposal of appeals by the Labour Court and as such while acting as an appellate Court it constituted a special forum outside the ambit of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. For that reason, too, the cases decided and the proceedings undertaken by it as an appellate Court could not be regarded as cases and proceedings under the Ordinance. He, also thought that the scheme of the Payment of Wages Act and the Industrial Relations Ordinance did not provide more than two fora for the redress of the grievance of the workmen. In this context he observed: "Under subsection (2), of section 17, except as provided in subsection (1) thereof, the decision of the Authority under subsections (3) and (4) of section 15 is final. It would, therefore, appear that where the Authority has acted as a tribunal of first instance, after one appeal to the Labour Court acting as the Appellate Authority, if available, no further right of revision to any higher tribunal or Court is available to the party. It is, therefore, clear that the Legislature has not provided more than one appeal or revision, both under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, in respect of matters falling within their own respective jurisdiction. It is, therefore, in this background that subsection (3a) of section 38 of the Ordinance will have to be appraised."
8. On the other hand while coming to a different conclusion in the case of National Cement Industries, ibid, a Division Bench of the Sindh High Court thought that the conferment of appellate jurisdiction on a Labour Court from the orders or directions made by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act was nothing more than mere extension of its jurisdiction and thus the orders passed by it in exercise of this additional jurisdiction were subject to all the incidents of appeal or revision which were ordinarily available to an aggrieved party from its decisions. The learned Judges went on to hold: "The Labour Court before being conferred with the jurisdiction under section 17 of the Act was an already established Court with its jurisdiction defined so as to include the powers conferred under laws other than the I.R.O. And its procedure and powers laid down by section 36 of the I.R.O. Clearly, therefore, subsection (5) of section 35 which lays down the ambit of its jurisdiction already contemplated by clause (d) the conferment of powers and functions upon the Labour Court under the I.R.O. Or any other law. It, therefore, follows that in exercising powers under special laws, the Labour Court exercised, its ordinary jurisdiction subject to all the incidents of appeal or revision ordinarily applicable to the Labour Court. The Act of 1936 does not lay down any special procedure for jurisdiction or determination of an appeal under section 17 by the Labour Court. The disputes under the Payment of Wages Act are in the words of Lord Atkinson disputes closely resembling in character matters under the I.R.O. Over which the Labour Court had already jurisdiction and, therefore, there is no reason to hold that the Legislature intended to keep out of the revisional jurisdiction of the Appellate Court matters under special laws other than the I.R.O. Dealt with by the Labour Court. In our opinion, when a matter under any special law is transferred to the Labour Court under a statutory provision its adjudication and determination by the Labour Court becomes a proceeding under the I.R.O. By virtue of subsection (5)(d) of section 35 so that it is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal. This conclusion is further fortified by the provisions of subsection (7) of section 35 which confer the power upon the Appellate Tribunal to transfer any proceedings from a Labour Court within its jurisdiction to any other such Labour Court.
In this subsection the nature of proceeding has not been defined."
9. It may be mentioned that before the amendment of the Payment of Wages Act by Ordinance XII of 1974, an appeal from the order of the Authority lay before the District Court. There was some doubt whether an order made by the District Court in appeal was final by virtue of the provisions of subsection (2) of the same section and for that reason it fell outside the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115, Code of Civil Procedure. This doubt was resolved by this Court in the case of S.M. Rahman and Co. v. Motabar PLD 1981 SC 282 wherein it was held that the order made by the District Court was revisable by the High Court under section 115, Code of Civil Procedure. The Court observed: "The argument that there is a finality attaching to the order of the Authority under section 15 of the Act subject only to the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court under section 17(c) of the Act, does not advance the case any further, as such finality only means that the order of the Authority can be challenged only by way of appeal to the District Court and not otherwise; but there is no such limitation in respect of the appellate order made by the District Court as ordinarily constituted, in which capacity it is subordinate to the High Court."
' By the amendments made by Ordinance XII of 1974 the forum of appeal was changed from the District Court to the Labour Court. As will be noticed the amendment has revived the controversy whether the decision made by the Labour Court as appellate forum is to be treated as final and beyond the reach of the Labour Appellate Tribunal which ordinarily exercises appellate and revisional jurisdiction over its decisions under subsection (3a) of section 38, Industrial Relations Ordinance. In our opinion, the provisions of clause (d) of section 35(5), Industrial Relations Ordinance should put an end to the controversy. It will appear from this clause that the performance of functions under other laws is a part of the normal duties of a Labour Court. That being so, even when it exercises jurisdiction under other laws it does not act as a special forum outside the ambit of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, but, on the other hand, it is performing a function specifically provided for by the Ordinance. It is, therefore, difficult to subscribe to the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the Lahore High Court that the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the Labour Court under the Payment of Wages Act is not a proceeding under the Ordinance. Consequently, the main premises upon which he has proceeded to hold against the competence of the Labour Appellate Tribunal to exercise revisional jurisdiction is erroneous. His view that the Payment of Wages Act and Industrial Relations Ordinance envisage only two fora for the redress of the grievance of the workmen is founded only on an assumption without any firm basis. As noticed earlier, prior to the amendment of section 17, Payment of Wages Act , the appeal from the order of the Authority lay before the District Court. Despite the provisions of section 17(2) of the Act which clothed the order of the appellate Court with finality this Court, as pointed out above, in S.M. Rahman & Co., ibid, held that the said order was revisable under section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, by the High Court. The rules framed under the Payment of Wages Act for institution and disposal of appeal do not lay down any special procedure which may be regarded as indicative of the intention to constitute the Labour Court as a forum of a special nature.
10. For the reasons stated above we would hold that the order made by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in its revisional jurisdiction was within its competence and the High Court erred in declaring it to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
11. However, this is not the end of the matter. It was stated by the learned counsel for the respondent that he had taken a number of grounds to assail the order of the learned Tribunal, particularly with regard to the competency of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act to entertain the application of the appellants, but these were not considered by the High Court as it elected to interfere with the order of the learned Tribunal solely on the basis of jurisdiction. That being so, we would remand the case to the High Court for decision on other grounds taken in the constitution petition. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.