' This suo motu revision is directed against the order, dated 5th January, 1984 passed by the Sind Social Security Court No, II at Karachi refusing to summon and record the evidence as prayed by the applicants in the proceedings before it.
2. Briefly stated the facts are that the applicants, Consolidated Sugar Mills, Ranipur, filed an application under section 57 of the Provincial Employees and Social Security Ordinance, 1965, before the Social Security Institution. The Social Security Institution disposed of the application vide its order, dated 17th May, 1983. Aggrieved by this order, the applicants Sugar Mills filed an appeal under section 59 of the Ordinance before the Social Security Court No, II at Karachi. During the proceedings before the learned Court the applicants filed an application under section 62 of the Social Security Ordinance with a prayer for summoning their witnesses and recording their evidence. The learned Court rejected the application vide its order, dated 5th January, 1984, on the grounds ; firstly, that no evidence could be adduced at the appellate stage as a matter of right and secondly that the evidence that was being summoned was not necessary for the just decision of case. Aggrieved by this order, the applicants have invoked the jurisdiction of this Tribunal under section 38 (3-a) of the I. R.
0., 1969, to examine the legality, propriety and correctness of the impugned order.
3. I have heard Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani, the learned representative for the applicants and Mr. Andaleeb Alvi, learned counsel for the respondents at sufficient length. Mr. Mahmood A. Ghani for the applicants has sought to argue, relying on the D. B. Decision of Karachi High Court on the case National Cement Industries Ltd. v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal and 3 others (1), that in view ofclause (d) of subsection (5) of section 35, I. R.
0., 1969, the ordinary jurisdiction vesting in the Labour Court embraced powers and functions assigned to it by or under any other law. He further submitted that the plain reading of the aforesaid provision would clearly show that any proceeding taken under any such other law will be proceeding under section 35 of I. R.
0., 1969 falling within the ambit of the revisional jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal. He has assailed the impugned order on merits as well, contending that the evidence sought to be adduced was absolutely necessary for the just decision of the case.
4. Mr. Alvi, the learned counsel for the respondents has resisted the suo motu revision on both the grounds and has vehemently urged tha this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to call in question the order passed by the Social Security Court under the revisional powers vested in it as provided in section 38 (3-a) of I. R. 0 1969. He has submitted that under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, appeal can lie against the direction made under clause (3) of subsection (4) of section 15 of that Act before the Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, could under section 35 (5) (d) exercise and perform powers and functions conferred upon or assigned to it under the Payment of Wages Act as well. The submission of the learned counsel would, therefore, make it clear that the proceedings taken under any such other law will be the proceedings under section 35 of the I. R.
0. 1969, falling within the ambit of revisional jurisdiction of the appellate Tribunal. The learned counsel has contended that the facts and circumstances of the instant case are quite different as the impugned order has been passed by the Social Security Court No, II at Karachi which was constituted not under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, but under the Social Security Ordinance, 1965 and the learned Judge of the Social Security Court has acted by passing the impugned order in his capacity as a Social Security Court and not as the Labour Court constituted under Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. He has invited my attention in that respect to the provisions of section 60 of the Social Security Ordinance, 1965, which reads as under : "Constitution of Social Security Court.- Government may, for purposes of this Ordinance, constitute, by notification, a Social Security Court for any Social Security area or areas specified in the notification.
(2) A Social Security Court shall be presided over by a Judge who shall be appointed by Government.
(3) A person shall not be appointed as a Judge of Social Security Court unless he has-
(a) for a period of not less than three years held a judicial office ; or
(b) for a period, or for periods aggregating not less than seven years been an advocate or pleader of the High Court."
' In that respect, he has also invited my attention to the Notification No, 3-346 (L-II)169, dated 16th December, 1969, issued by the Government, in exercise of the powers conferred on it by section 60 of the Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 whereby the Government has appointed the Chairman of the Labour Courts Nos, I and II at Karachi as Judges of the Social Security Court for the respective areas mentioned in the notification. It would, therefore, be clear that the Social Security Court has been constituted under a different statute and not under the Industrial Relations Ordinance and only that the Chairman of the Labour Court was appointed as a Social Security Court shall not confer and perform powers and functions under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in order to bring its decisions within the ambit of the revisional jurisdiction of this Tribunal as provided under section 38 (3-a), I. R.
0., 1969. Accordingly, it is clear to me that the principle laid down in the above-mentioned authority would not be attracted to the facts and the circumstances of the instant case. This Tribunal,1 therefore, has no jurisdiction to call in question the orders passed by the Social Security Court under the revisional jurisdiction as provided in section 38 (3-a), I. R.
0., 1969 as that Court has not been constituted under I. R.
0., 1969. In view of the situation, it would be unnecessary to examine the legality, propriety or the correctness of. The impugned order passed by the learned Social Security Court No, II at Karachi.
5. The result is that the revision application is dismissed. 1981 PLC 561