' This petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution calls in question the order dated 31-5-1980 passed by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, whereby it has been held that an order of the Labour Court passed in appeal under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act is not revisable by the Labour Appellate Tribunal under section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance.
2. Petitioner was employed as Sub-Station Operator-I under respondent No,2. Being aggrieved by the refusal of payment of wages for the festival holidays, he filed an application under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, hereinafter mentioned as the Act, before the Authority, for the recovery of the unlawfully deducted wages of Rs, 691.40. This application was accepted on 10-8-1977 and a sum of Rs,4,148.64 was awarded in his favour by way of deducted wages and 5 times compensation thereon. Respondents filed appeal under section 17 of the Act before the Labour Court. The appeal was accepted on 19-10-1977. Petitioner's claim was rejected on the ground that festival holidays could not be accumulated for claiming extra wages. Feeling aggrieved against this order, petitioner filed revision petition under section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, hereinafter called the I.R.O., before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. However, this has been dismissed on the ground that an order passed by the Labour Court under section 17 of the Act is not amenable to the Revisional Jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. In coming to this conclusion, the learned Appellate Tribunal held that the Revisional jurisdiction under section 38(3)
(a), I.R.O. Is available only in respect of those matters in which proceedings initiated and culminated under the I.R.O. Itself, and not under any other enactment. This view was based on the reasoning that a Labour Court while disposing of an appeal under section 17 of the Act does not pass such order under the I.R.O., therefore, Revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked against such an order.
3. Kh. Z.H. Tahir, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal has illegally refused to exercise the jurisdiction which lawfully vested in him. An appeal under section 17 of the Act is not heard and decided by the Labour Court as persona designata, with the result that the appellate proceedings before the Labour Court are deemed to be proceedings under the I.R.O., and, therefore, the Tribunal under section 38 of the I.R.O., has the jurisdiction to revise such an order. Learned counsel has placed reliance on two D.B. Decisions of the Sindh High Court in National Cement Industries Ltd. v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal (1981 PLC 561) and Abdul Razzaq and 7 others v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and another (1990 PLC 261).
The two learned Benches in these cases have held that the Labour Appellate Tribunal has the jurisdiction to hear revision petition against an appellate order of the Labour Court passed by it under section 17 of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also cited decisions of the Labour Appellate Tribunals of the Punjab and Sindh, reported as Assistant Director, Labour Welfare (Inspection) Multan v. Occupier/Manager, Hilal Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd. (1989 PLC 167), Pakistan PVC Ltd. v. Noor Khan and others (1991 PLC 718) and Sheikh Silk Mills, Karachi v. Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No,3 (1993 PLC 368), to show that the revision petitions are being consistently heard and decided by the Tribunals in matters arising out of the proceedings under the Act.
4. Sh. Maqbool Ahmed, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the WAPDA, on the other hand, has submitted that the jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal is confined to those cases only in which proceedings before the Labour Court have initiated under the I.R.O. Itself and not under the Payment of Wages Act. He placed reliance on Pakistan through Chairman, Pakistan Railway Board, Lahore v. Maqsood Ali and 2 others (1981 PLC 307), which is a judgment of this Court delivered by Rustom S. Sidhwa, J., as his Lordship then was.
5. It may, thus, be seen that there are conflicting views of the Lahore and Sindh High Courts on the question of jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in matters arising out of the proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act. In order to resolve the controversy in hand, relevant provisions of the Act and the I.R.O. Will have to be examined. Section 17(1) of the Act reads as follows:- "An appeal against a direction made under subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 15 may be preferred within 30 days of the date on which the direction was made, before the Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) within whose jurisdiction the cause of action to which the appeal relates arose."
Previously, the appeal lay before the District Court but it was through an amendment incorporated by Ordinance 12 of 1974, that the appellate jurisdiction was conferred on the Labour Court.
6. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court is specified in subsection (5) of section 35 of the I.R.O., which is reproduced below:-- "(5) A Labour Court shall,-- (a)
(b)
(c)
(d) exercise and perform such other powers and functions as are or may be conferred upon or assigned to it by or under this Ordinance or any other law."
Section 38 of the I.R.O. Provides for the creation of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the scope of its authority. Subsection (3-a) of this section prescribes the field of jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. It provides:-- "(3-a) The Tribunal may, on its own motion at any time, call for the record of any case or proceedings under this Ordinance in which a Labour Court within its jurisdiction has passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety A of such order and may pass such order, in relation thereto as it thinks fit: ' Provided that no order under this subsection shall be passed revising or modifying any order adversely affecting any person without giving such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard."
7. Mr. Justice Rustam S. Sidhwa, in the case of Maqsood Ali while holding that the Tribunal had no revisional jurisdiction over Appellate Orders of the Labour Court passed under section 17 of the Act, observed as follows:-- "The Labour Court acting as the Appellate Authority under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, clearly acts by virtue of the powers conferred under section 17 of the Act and not under any power conferred by any provision of the Ordinance. In acting as the appellate authority, the Labour Court is not bound by the rules of procedure provided by the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 but by that provided by the Paymqt of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the appeal before the Labour Court constitutes a case or proceedings under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, so as to bring the case within the revisional jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The words 'case or proceedings under this Ordinance' appearing in subsection (3-A) of section 38 of the Ordinance, are specially intended to cover only those cases, the remedy whereof is provided by the Ordinance or where the remedy is not so provided, special law empowers the Labour Court to hear and adjudicate the dispute or decide the appeal and the Labour Court has to apply its own procedure. The maxim expression unius est exclusio alterius fully applies to the instant case. The words 'under this Ordinance' have been specifically added to make sure that the finality which by otherwise is applicable to original or Appellate decisions given by labour tribunals or Courts acting under other special acts dealing with labour matters, is not disturbed."
' The contrary view taken by the learned Division Bench of Sindh High Court in the case of National Cement Industries has been expressed by Zafar Hussain Mirza, J. As his Lordship then was, in the following words:-- "The Labour Court before being conferred with the jurisdiction under section 17 of the Act was an already established Court with its jurisdiction defined so as to include the powers conferred under laws other than the I.R.O. And its procedure and powers laid down by section 36 of the I.R.O. Clearly, therefore, subsection (5) of section 35 which lays down the ambit of its jurisdiction already contemplated by clause (d) the conferment of powers and functions upon the Labour Court under the I.R.O. Or any other law. It, therefore, follows that exercising powers under special laws, the Labour Court exercised its ordinary jurisdiction subject to all the incidents of appeal or revision ordinarily applicable to the Labour Court. The Act of 1936 does not lay down any special procedure for jurisdiction or determination of an appeal under section 17 by the Labour Court. The disputes under the Payment of Wages Act are in the words of Lord Atkinson disputes closely resembling in character matters under the I.R.O. Over which the Labour Court had already jurisdiction and, therefore, there is no reason to hold that the Legislature intended to keep out of the revisional jurisdiction of the Appellate Court matters under special laws other than the I.R.O. Dealt with by the Labour Court. In our opinion, when a matter under any special law is transferred to the Labour Court under a statutory provision its adjudication and determination by the Labour Court becomes a proceeding under the I.R.O. By virtue of subsection (5)(d) of section 35 so that it is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal."
' The above view has been affirmed in the case of Abdul Razzaq, Chief Justice Ajmal Mian, as his Lordship then was, summarised the conclusion of the learned Bench as follows:-- "Admittedly a Labour Court is a Court which exercises jurisdiction to hear an appeal under the Payment of Wages Act assigned to a Labour Court by virtue of clause (d) of subsection (5) of section 35 of the I.R.O. And, therefore, the order passed 'by the Labour Court will be amendable to revisional jurisdiction under subsection (3-a) of section 38 of the I.R.O."
8. Previous to the amendment of section 17 of the Act brought about in 1979, the Appellate jurisdiction vested in the District Court. A similar question arose in "S.M. Rehman and Company v.
Motabar and others (PLD 1981 Supreme Court 287), as to whether Revision Petition under section 115, C.P.C. Was competent against the appellate order of the District Court passed under section 17 of the Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that such an order was revisable by the High Court under section 115, C.P.C.. The relevant finding at page 285 of the report is reproduced below:-- "From a review of the present cases cited before us, we are of the view that the learned Judge in the High Court has rightly held that the appellate order made by the District Court under the Payment of Wages Act was amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The term 'District Court' has not been defined in the Payment of Wages Act, and, accordingly, it has to be given its ordinary connotation, as indicated in the General Clauses Act and in the Civil Procedure Code, according to which it is a Court subordinate to the High Court. The argument that there is a finality attaching to the order of the Authority under section 15 of the Act subject only to the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court under section 17(c) of the Act, does not advance the case any further, as such finality only means that the order of the Authority can be challenged only by way of appeal to the District Court and not otherwise; but there is no such limitation in respect of the appellate order made by the District Court as ordinarily constituted, in which capacity it is subordinate to the High Court."
9. I respectfully follow the view taken by the two learned Benches of the Sindh High Court, and, with utmost respect, I am unable to agree with the views expressed by Rustam S. Sidhwa, J. In the case of Maqsood Ali.
10. Subsection (3-a) of section 38 of the I.R.O. Provides that the revisional jurisdiction may be exercised by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in respect of any "case or proceedings under this Ordinance". Therefore, the controversy standard reduced to the, meaning of "any case or proceedings under this Ordinance". If it is found that an appeal decided by the Labour Court under section 17 of the Act, is also a case decided by the Labour Court under the I.R.O., then revisional jurisdiction under section 38 of the I.R.O. Is undoubtedly exercisable by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. However, if it is found that the proceedings or order passed in appeal preferred under section 17 of the Act cannot be regarded as a case or proceedings under the I.R.O., then obviously Labour Appellate Tribunal will not have the revisional jurisdiction. If the jurisdiction to hear appeal under section 17 of Act, had been granted only by the provisions of the Act, then of course, it could be said that the proceedings in the Labour Court are not under the I.R.O., but are under the Act. But there is additional power conferred by section 35 of the I.R.O., which says that Labour Court will also have jurisdiction in respect of matters which are assigned to it by "any other law". Therefore, powers which are exercisable by the Labour Court under any other law, stand adopted and conferred under the I.R.O. Itself, with the result that orders passed by the Labour Court in appeals under section 17 of the Act become amenable to the jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal under section 38 of the I.R.O. It has to be remembered that I.R.O. Is the general law concerning matters relating to the workman. If powers are conferred under' a special law on a forum established under the general law, then while exercising powers under the special law, such forum exercises its normal jurisdiction. Therefore, I am of the view that a Labour Court while deciding an appeal under section 17 of the Act exercises its normal jurisdiction under section 35 of the I.R.O. subject to the incidence of revision under section 38 of the I.R.O. By the Labour Appellate Tribunal. I am fortified in my view by the high authority of the learned Supreme Court in Muhammad Hussain and others v.
Islamic Republic of Pakistan through Chairman, Railway Board and others (PLD 1991 SC 385), wherein their Lordships concluded as 'under:- "In our opinion, the provisions of clause (d) of section 35 (5), Industrial Relations Ordinance should put an end to the controversy. It will appear from this clause that the performance of functions under other laws is a part of the normal duties of a Labour Court. That being so, even when it exercises jurisdiction under other laws it does not act as a special forum outside the ambit of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, but on the other hand, it is performing a function specifically provided for by the Ordinance. It is, therefore, difficult to subscribe to the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the Lahore High Court that exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the. Labour Court under the Payment of Wages Act is not a proceeding under the Ordinance."
' This judgment was not cited during the arguments by the learned counsel for the parties, but came to my notice subsequently.
In view of what has been discussed above, the writ petition is accepted and the order dated 31-5- 1980, passed by the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, is declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The case is remanded to the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore, who shall decide the revision petition of the petitioner on merits, in accordance with law.
The parties are left to bear their own costs.