This second appeal has been preferred by Ghulam Qadir and two others against an order for their ejectment from a shop.
2. The order under appeal was passed by a Rent Controller on an application, under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. Filed by the respondent, Rehmat -Ullah, seeking ejectment of the appellants on the grounds that he needed the shop for .His personal use and that the appellants had committed default in the payment of rent. Both these pleas were upheld by the learned Rent Controller with the result that he directed the appellants to vacate the shop in dispute. Fling aggrieved by the order of the learned Rent Controller, the appellants went in appeal before an Additional District Judge, who reversed the finding of the learned Rent Controller on the issue relating to the default but concurred in his finding regarding the personal need of the respondent. He, therefore, affirmed the order of ejectment passed against the appellants.
Dissatisfied with the order of the learned Additional District Judge, they have now come up in second appeal to this Court.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the two tribunals below had misread the evidence while recording a finding that the respondent needed the house in dispute in good faith for his personal use. On being asked by me, learned counsel for the appellants read out, from his brief the evidence led by the respondent. Appearing as his own witness, Rehmat Ali respondent deposed that his eldest son wanted to contract marriage but the same was held up because in the house now occupied by him along with his family there was no scope for accommodating his son after his marriage. At present, in the aforesaid house the respondent is residing along with his parents and three children. One of his daughters is married and her husband is also living in the same house. The respondent examined two witnesses, namely, Sultan Ali (P. W. 1) and Bashir Ahmad (P. W. 2) who supported his testimony. Bashir Ahmad also disclosed that in the house lived in by the respondent there were only two rooms besides the kitchen. It is, therefore, abundantly clear from the evidence led by the respondent that he really needs the house in dispute for his personal use.
4. What the learned counsel for the appellants emphasised was that although in the application for ejectment filed by him the respondent had stated that he required the house in dispute in good faith for his personal use yet in his statement as his own witness he did not make mention of the words "in good faith" and as such the _ respondent had failed to fulfill the requirements of paragraph (a) of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of subsection (3) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, which reads as follows: "(a) He requires it in good faith for his own occupation or the occupation of any of his children."
With a view to interpreting the expression "in good faith" the learned counsel referred to clause (27) of section 2 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956, which provides that a thing shall be deemed to be done in good "faith" where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not.
5. 1 agree with the learned counsel for. The appellants that before a landlord can evict his tenant from the premises occupied by the tenant, on the ground of personal need, he has to establish that he requires the premises. In good faith, for his own use, but while showing his good faith it is not necessary that in his deposition he should make a specific mention of the words "in good faith". If his evidence leaves no room for doubt that he, in fact, needs the premises for his own occupation, it would satisfy the requirements of paragraph (a) of sub-clause (1) of clause (a) of subsection
(33) of section 13 of the aforesaid Ordinance even though he does not utter the words "in good faith" during the course of his statement as a witness. Since, in the present case, by adducing the evidence referred to above, the respondent had clearly demonstrated that the house in dispute was actually and honestly needed by him for his own .Family (including a son whose marriage is held up for want of the required accommodation), it had been rightly held by the two tribunals below that he required the house in dispute, in good faith, for his personal use. The mere fact that in his own statement as a witness the respondent did not say, in so many words, that he needed the house in good faith would not, by itself, warrant a conclusion that the house was not so needed by him.
6. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent should have examined his son (who is going to be married) as a witness for the purpose of establishing his personal need but as he did not appear in the witness-box his failure to do so was fatal to the case of the respondent. In support of his contention, he relied on the case of Sufi Muhammad Yasin and others v. Dr. Major Abdul Khaliq (PLD 1974 KART 1231). Learned counsel maintained that the respondent's son was living abroad and that is why he was not examined before the learned Rent Controller. In this connection, he invited my attention to the statement of Ghulam Qadir appellant who stated that the respondent's son was living is some foreign country.
7. As regards the above statement of the appellant that the respondent's son was staying abroad, admittedly, there is no evidence to support it. No suggestion in this behalf was made to the respondent or any of his witnesses when they were examined before the learned Rent Controller.
The respondent had no occasion to contradict the above statement of the appellant because it was made after the respondent had concluded his evidence, including his own statement. I am, therefore, not convinced that the respondent's son is,. In fact living abroad. Even if his son has gone abroad there is nothing to show that he is unable to come back for the purpose of marriage or there will be any bar to his continued stay in this country.
8. As regards the effect of the failure of the respondent's son to appear as a witness, I feel that, in the circumstances of the present case, it is of little consequence. The case o:' Sufi Muhammad Yasin and others v. Dr. Major Abdul Khaliq cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, was also relied upon by them before the learned Additional District Judge who observed that the case under report was distinguishable from the case in hand. While dealing with this aspect of the matter, the learned Additional District Judge said: "I have carefully gone through the said authority and find that in that case the landlord who was a medical practitioner had sought the eviction of his tenants on the ground that he intended to expand his clinic and required the disputed premises for his son and two daughters and that he wanted them to work with him in his clinic. The two daughters are qualified doctors. It was observed that the two daughters were present in Pakistan and had not been examined toshow their willingness to join their father in his clinic as they were working independently on their respective assignments and that the failure to do so was fatal to the case of the landlord.
In the instant case, the respondent seeks the eviction of the appellants from a residential house on the ground that his son was of marriageable age and that he required the disputed house,in good faith, for lodging his son after the marriage of the son. This plea was specifically taken by the landlord in his petition and he has led sufficient evidence to substantiate it. His failure to examine his son on this point is not as material as it was in the case cited in PLD 1976 Kar. 1231, as the son in this case has no choice to live with or separately from his father after his marriage, the father being the sole master of his household affairs and his decision on this point should be considered to be effective and final." '
I generally agree with the reasoning of the learned Additional District Judge and hold that since the facts of the two cases are materially different the respondent herein cannot be non-suited on the short ground that he has failed to produce his son as a witness.
9. No other plea was put forth by the learned counsel for the appellants.
10. As no legal defect has been noticed in the impugned order, the appeal is dismissed in l1mtne.
The appellants are, however, allowed two months' time to vacate the premises in dispute.