' This is a second appeal against an order for the ejectment of the appellants, Muhammad Asghar and others from a house owned by the respondent, Jameela Khatoon.
2 The ejectment of the appellants was ordered by a Rent Controller on the ground that the respondent needed the house for her own occupation. His finding was also upheld by an Additional District Judge who heard the first appeal of the appellant against the order of the Rent Controller.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants, contended that since the respondent did not herself enter the witness-box to say that she needed the house for her own occupation, the evidence led by her in this behalf did not justify a finding that she required the house, in good faith, for beer own use. He relied on Haji Ghulam Muhammad v: Abdul Qadir and Ghulam Mohyud Din v. Suba Khan, to support his contention. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent urged that since the evidence led by the respondent clearly showed that at present the respondent is living in a rented house, the two tribunals below were right in holding, on the basis of the aforesaid evidence, that her requirement was bona fide and that the failure of the respondent to appear as a witness to corroborate the testimony of her witnesses could not constitute a valid ground for disturbing the concurrent finding of the two tribunals below. Learned counsel for the respondent cited Mansoor Ahmad v. Bashir Hussain Babri and Ghulam Qadir and another v. Rehmat Ullah, to advance his plea.
5. As for the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellants the view expressed in the case of Haji Ghulam Muhammad was that when a landlord seeks ejectment on the ground of personal need "the reasonableness or good faith/bona fides" of his demand "depends upon1 2 3 4 various factors and it cannot be ignored that one of the material items of evidence for consideration, of course, would be the statement on oath of the landlord himself".
6. In the case of Ghulam Mohyud Din the landlord needed the premises in dispute for occupation by his son. Both the landlord and his son entered the witness-box to substantiate the plea of the personal need. It was contended on behalf of the tenant that since there was no other evidence, their own statements were not enough to hold that their requirement was bona fide. While repelling this contention, my learned brother Zakiuddin Pal, J. Observed as under:- "It is always the landlord of the property who can show reasonable cause for occupying a particular property for personal need. If he himself fails to make out a case for bona fide personal need then other evidence produced by him in this behalf would be of no use. In this view of the matter it is always the statement of the landlord as well as of the person for whose benefit premises are sought to be vacated, which is most relevant to determine the point in issue. The statement of the appellant as well as of his son as referred to above makes out a case for bona fide personal need of the appellant to occupy the shop in question."
7. As regards the case-law relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, he cited the case of Mansoor Ahmad to contend that since the respondent was living in a rented house, that circumstance, by itself, proved her bona fide personal requirement. In the case of Ghulam Qadir and another, which was decided by me, it was held that if the evidence led by the landlord clearly demonstrates that he actually and honestly needs certain premises the mere fact that in his statement the landlord does not say, in so many words, that he needs the premises in good faith does not warrant a conclusion that his requirement is not bona fide. What happened in the instant case was that the respondent did not herself enter the witness-box but produced other evidence to substantiate her plea of personal need. In the case of Haji Ghulam Muhammad as well as in that of Ghulam Mohyud Din it was emphasized that the landlord was a "material" witness and his statement was "most relevant" to determine the question of personal requirement. In the case of Ghulam Mohyud. Din it was further observed that if the landlord and his son who needed the disputed premises, had not appeared as witnesses, any other evidence would have been of no avail to the landlord. It has, thus, been emphasised that when a landlord seeks ejectment of his tenant on the ground of personal need, he should come forward to state on oath that his requirement is bona fide ' There might, however, be cases in which the landlord would not be able to examine himself as a witness for reasons beyond his control, for instance, such physical or mental disability as would not let him make a statement even on commission, and in those cases it would be just and proper not to draw an adverse inference against him but if he avoids entering the witness box without any such reasons, it wili certainly be a circumstance detracting from his bona fide which, together with the other circumstances of the case, will be taken into account for deciding the overall question of personal need.
8-A. The cases of Mansoor Ahmad and Ghulam Qadir and another cited by the learned counsel for the respondent are of no help to the respondent because it has not been ruled therein that the failure of the landlord to appear as a witness is of no consequence. The said two cases are also distinguishable on facts because in those cases also the landlord had gone into the witness box to support his averment of bona fide personal requirement but the landlady in the instant case did not examine herself as a witness, and no explanation has been offered for this shortcoming on her part. Her attorney did appear as a witness but he did not say that the respondent needed the house in good faith. He and her two other witnesses, namely, Meher Din (A. W. 1) and Sher Muhammad (A. W. 2) said that she was living in a rented house owned by the said Sher Muhammad. Both of these witnesses are, admittedly, related to the respondent. It was Sher Muhammad only who also said that she needed the house in dispute, but since his statement is not supported by the respondent or her attorney, it is not enough to substantiate her plea of bona fide personal requirement.
9. The evidence of the respondent also stands rebutted by the appellants' evidence consisting of the statement of Muhammad Masoom (R. W. 1), Zia Ullah (R. W. 2) and Muhammad A shraf (R. W. 3).
They all deposed that the respondent did not need the house in dispute. According to them, she is not living in a rented house. The witnesses produced by the appellants appear to be disinterested ones and there is nothing for which their evidence may be discarded. I am, therefore, unable to believe that the respondent is living in a rented house.
10. Even if she is occupying a rented house, that fact does not, by itself, justify a conclusion that her need is bona fide because, many a times, the owners of the houses like to live in rented houses because the rent paid by them for the rented accommodation happens to be far less than what they charge for their own houses. In sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of subsection (3), of section 13 of the Ordinance, the following three pre conditions have been laid down for seeking ejectment of a tenant by a landlord from a residential building on the ground of personal need-
(a) he requires it in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any of his children;
(b) he is not occupying another residential building, suitable for his needs at the time, in the same urban area in which such building is situated; and
(c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Ordinance in the said urban area."
11. In the case of Mansoor Ahmad, relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, it was held that if a person is living in a rented house that house cannot be treated as "any other residential building, suitable for his needs" for the purpose of paragraph (b) of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of subsection (3) of section 13 of the Ordinance. Thus, if a landlord is himself in occupation of a rented house, the precondition embodied in paragraph (b) would be satisfied but he will still have to establish his good faith in order to fulfil the precondition spelled out in paragraph (a). It would, therefore, follow that even if the respondent is living in a rented house, it does not absolve her of the responsibility of showing that she, in good faith, needs the premises in question.
12. In view of the above discussion, I have reached the conclusion that the respondent has not been able to establish that she, in good faith, requires the house in dispute for her own occupation. I, therefore, accept the appeal with costs, set aside the order of the learned Additional District Judge and dismiss the application filed by the respondent for ejectment of the appellants. PLD 1975 Lah. 200 PLD 1977 Lab. 1094 PLD 1977 Lab. 532 PLD 1979 Lah. 382