1. 'SHAHID ANWAR BAJWA, J.---An agreement of tenancy was executed in July, 1982 between the present petitioners as tenants and the present respondent No,1 as landlord. It was in respect of ground floor of premises situated at 124-U Block-2, Tariq Road, P.E.C.H.S. Karachi. Ejectment application was filed by landlord in January, 2002 on grounds of default, impairment and personal bona fide need. On the ground of personal bona fide need the following was stated; "6. That the applicant is an old person who requires the close look after and care of some close family members, so the applicant has decided to call back his son who is jobless and to put him in business at the shop in question. The applicant has sufficient funds in order to establish business for his son.
9. That even otherwise, the opponents are liable to be ejected on the sole ground of personal need of the applicant, the need is very genuine, honest and in good faith as the opponents are reluctant to vacate the premises, hence this application" .
2. 'Written statement was filed. Thereafter affidavit-in-evidence of one Shahab. Murtaza Rizvi, son of present respondent, was filed. However on 31-11-2003 it was stated that said Shahab Murtaza Rizvi would not appear as witness. Thereafter applicant himself appeared as witness. After conclusion of evidence vide order dated, 17-12-2004 ejectment application was dismissed. Being aggrieved by dismissal of the ejectment application an appeal was filed by present respondent and the Appellate Court vide order dated, 19-3-2008 while rejecting grounds of default and impairment, allowed appeal on ground of personal need. Being aggrieved by that order this writ petition has been filed by the tenants/petitioners.
3. 'Learned counsel for the petitioners made the following submissions:
(1) That the Appellate Court has not considered evidence and there is misreading of evidence,
(2) That although son of the present respondent filed his affidavit, thereafter he withdrew his affidavit and returned to the United States.
(3) That name of son was neither mentioned in the ejectment application nor in the affidavit- inevidence and nature of business was also not specified.
(4) Fact that two grounds have been rejected concurrently by the Courts below establish mala fides on part of the landlord in filing ejectment application because landlord for ulterior motives wanted to get the property vacated on one ground or the other. Learned counsel relied upon Akbar Ali v. Abdul Majid, 1988 MLD 1412, Mst. Sanjeeda Begum and 9 others .v Muhammad Afsar, 1992 MLD 1737, Haji Peer Muhammad v. Haji Abdul Rashid, 1%8 SCMR 959, Muhammad Mujibur Rahman Siddiqui v. Abdul Bari and 3 others, PLD 1981 Karachi 537, Fakhruddin and others v. Muhammad Younus, 1986 CLC 821 and Farahat Ali v. Mst, Noor Jehan Begum, 1991 CLC 1902.
4. 'Learned counsel for respondent No,2 made the following submissions:
(1) As far as question of mala fides is concerned, there is adequate protection provided in section 15-A of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979.
(2) She submitted that it is not a requirement of law that name of the son be mentioned or even nature of business be specified in the ejectment application.
(3) That in cross-examination respondent No,2 clearly stated that the son, whom he wanted to live with him, was Shahab and no question as to why Shahab withdrew his affidavit and whether Shahab wanted to return to Pakistan or not was asked in the cross-examination. She relied upon Mst.
5. Zubeda through her son and General Attorney v. Muhammad Nadir, 1998 MLD 3011, M. Muhammad Sharif v. M.S. Sultan, 1981 SCMR 844, Dilshad Muhammad v. Mst. Zubaida Begum, 1981 SCMR 895, Zahoor Din v. Mirza Ayub Baig, 1981 SCMR 1081, Muhammad Iqbal and another v. Mst. Saeeda Bano, 1993 SCMR 1559, Syed Jan Muhammad and another v. Syed Abdul Khair, 2001 SCMR 1287, Mst.
6. Bismillah Begum through legal heirs v. Mahji, 1991 MLD 1303, Haji Mohibullah & Co. And others v.
7. Khawaja Bahauddin, 1990 SCMR 1070, Juma Sher v. Sabz Ali, 1997 SCMR 1062, Muhammad Iqbal v.
8. Syed Sohail Wajid Gillani, 2004 SCMR 1607 and Muhammad Sharif and another v. Muham'mad Afzal Sohail and others PLD 1981 SC 246.
9. 'Learned counsel for petitioners also referred to para-8 of his affidavit-in- evidence and contended that this para, has I not been considered by the Appellate Court. The said para-8 is in the following words: "8. I say that the applicant is old and disabled person and is unable to move and is not in a position to do his own business and his all sons are Green Card Holder and are doing their business in USA and the applicant has created this ground mala fidely as he knows that people spent million of rupees to get the American Visa and it seems very peculiar that persons doing their jobs and business in America how will they prefer to come here to start a new business for which no ground work has been done. It is further submitted that apart from his shop the applicant has two more shops which are also on Pugri basis to the tenants on first floor and the rent of the first floor shop is Rs, 7,000 since very long."
10. 'I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. I have also gone through the record as well as the case- law cited by the learned counsel. Since grounds of default and impairment have been given up by the landlord, I will refer only to the ground of personal need.
11. 'Learned Rent Controller who rejected this ground, stated as under: "It will be pertinent to state that plea regarding Pugri was not raised in the written statement or only at the time of the cross-examination this fact came into picture which clearly shows that it is an afterthought plea and furthermore it has not been substantiated by any convincing evidence, even otherwise if the payment of Pugri is proved that will not come as hurdle in the way of applicant if he independently succeed in proving his personal bona fide need. The bona fide need of his son, who is in USA, but jobless and expected to come in Pakistan in very near future and applicant wants to put him in said premises so that he can start his business thereon. Furthermore the applicant is an old man who requires care and custody of some close family members and as such he has decided to call back his jobless son to put him in business at the shop in question. It is pertinent to observe that the applicant has not mentioned the name of his son whom he has called back from USA and the applicant failed to disclose the nature of business to be carried out by the foreigner son. The applicant has submitted affidavit in evidence of his son Syed Shahab Murtaza Rizvi with the application dated, 19-2-2003 that the applicant be allowed to file affidavit-in-evidence of aforesaid applicant's son and that said Shahab Rizvi has stated in para-6 of the affidavit-in- evidence that he has come to Pakistan and he wants to start his own business and does not want to return U.S.A, due to crisis. Thereafter an application under section 19 of SRPO, 1979 was filed by the applicant that a Commissioner may be appointed to record the evidence of applicant at his residence as the applicant is of very old-age and chronic patient of heart and unable to attend the Court, which was granted and the evidence of the applicant was recorded through Commissioner.
12. First of all it is beyond imagination that a person for whose personal requirement, shop is required, returned to Pakistan filed his affidavit-in-evidence and instead of deposing his affidavit was withdrawn and ' revoked as is apparent from the case file on 2-11-2003 and in lieu of that again old-age and heart patient was subjected to cross examine, which from the very beginning 'cause sufficient doubt upon the bona fide requirement of the applicant. It is settled law that if the evidence of the applicant is consistent with the pleadings and not shaken in cross- examination then the landlord's statement should be taken as proved regarding the bona fide need. In the instant case the applicant has stated in para.6 of his affidavit-in-evidence that the premises is required for his son, who is in USA and jobless, but he has failed to mention-the name of his son and stated in cross- examination that " it is incorrect that I have not mentioned the mane of my son in my affidavit-in- evidence for whom premises in question is required". Had the shop been, required by his son Shahab Rizvi then no plausible reason come to mine that why his affidavit-in- evidence was withdrawn after returning from America. It can safely be presumed that he again return to USA i.e, why this qld man has to depose and no description regarding finance nature of business and the management of business has been described so it can be said that at the most it is mere desire and wish and of bona fide need on the part of the applicant. Had there been bona fide need on the part of the applicant then he must have stated in his affidavit-in-evidence with clarification and mere wish or desire on the part of the applicant cannot be equated with the personal bona fide need of the applicant. Furthermore if taking into consideration all the attending circumstances as the applicant has kept cheques with himself and did not present for encashment to create artificial ground of default, unilaterally plea of increasement of Rs,2000 in the monthly rent and then the mere words regarding the damaging of the premises appears to be calculated more on the part of the applicant to eject the tenant' from the premises on one pretext or the other so in the circumstances I hold that the applicant has miserably failed to prove personal bona fide requirement and as such this point is answered in Negative."
13. 'On the other hand learned Appellate Court held to the contrary as under:- "Now coming to the point of personal need the applicant in his ejectment application as well as in his affidavit-in-evidence has stated that the shop in question is required in good faith for personal bona fide need of his son, who is in USA but jobless and now expected to come in Pakistan in very near future, therefore I want the said premises so he can start his own business. On the other hand the opponent/tenant claims in His affidavit-in-evidence and written statement that applicant/ landlord is old and disabled person and is unable to walk and is not in position to do him own business and his all sons are Green Card holders and doing their business in USA and people spent million of rupees to get American visa, then how will they prefer to come to Pakistan.
14. 'It is settled law for personal bona fide use that where statement of landlord on oath was quite consistent with his averments made in the ejectment application and the same had neither been shaken nor anything had been brought in evidence to contradict to statement, such statement on oath would be considered sufficient for acceptance of ejectment."
15. 'Thereafter Appellate Court relied upon a number of case-law and with regard to the contention regarding non-appearance of said Shahab it observed as under: "With regard to the contention of the respondents Advocate that applicant has required the premises for his son Shoaib but neither Shoaib came in witness box nor he is in Pakistan. In this respect I take guidance from the case-law 1981 SCMR 1081 in which it is held that; "Burden is on landlord to prove his bona fide requirement by leading evidence which need not necessarily include son concerned as a witness."
16. 'Hence in view of above the landlord has proved his bona fide personal need against the respondent of demised premises. I therefore, allow the appeal on the ground of personal need and set aside the impugned order dated, 17-12-2004 only on the ground of personal need. Accordingly the ejectment application is allowed with direction to the tenant/ respondent to hand over the peaceful vacant possession of demised shop within 60 days of this judgment."
17. 'I may also refer here to certain parts of evidence, which have been emphasized by both the learned counsel. In cross-examination the landlord stated as under:- "I have no knowledge that vn the Tariq Road, the shop/premises are let out or given on Lenancy basis without advance or deposit "
18. "It is incorrect to suggest that I have no personal need of the shop in question. Voluntarily says that I have personal need the shop in question or the personal need and personal use of my son. I am ready to compromise if the shop in question is returned to me because I have personal need of the same."
19. 'Lot of emphasize was placed by learned counsel for the petitioners on the fact that name of the son had not been mentioned in the ejectment application or even in the affidavit-in-evidence. He also emphasized that nature of business had not been specified and that son did not enter witness box. Answer by the learned counsel for respondent was that it is not a requirement of law that name of the son be mentioned or nature of business be specified or concerned son be produced as witness. She, however, submitted that in any case name of the son was clearly stated in cross- examination of the landlord. Both learned counsel have relied upon extensive case-law in support of their above three submissions and it may be fruitful to refer to the case-law at this stage.
20. 'Learned counsel for petitioner first of all relied upon Akbar Ali's case (supra). Facts of this case were that eviction application was filed on the ground that the shop in question was needed by the landlord for his own use for business purposes. It was stated in the eviction application that landlord did not have any shop in his possession and he had not got any shop or premises vacated before filing of the eviction application. Details of the business were not disclosed by the landlord. It was observed in respect of personal need as under: "I have gone through the depositions of the witnesses and the pleadings. It is an admitted position that the respondent is carrying on work of plumbering for last 25 years. He has not given the reason why he did not approach the appellant or his late father for the shop in dispute. The respondent has not approached the appellant or his late father for the shop in dispute. The respondent has not even disclosed where he was doing plumbering work and why he required the shop in dispute. The respondent even asserted in his eviction application that he intended to do plumbering work. I am of the view that a mere desire for doing a business is not the , requirement of law. The landlord has to prove that he required the premises in good faith and mere wish, convenience, whim, or fancy of landlord would not be enough to show that the landlord required the premises in good faith. The mere ipse dixit of the landlord that he required the premises for his personal occupation or use was not enough."
21. 'In Sanjeeda Begum's case (supra), shop had been let out. Ejectment application was tiled on three grounds including ground for starting business to settle minor son of the landlady who had come of age. Ejectment application was dismissed and the order was challenged in appeal in the High Court as at that time Sindh High Court was the appellate forum. The High Court held as under: "6. So far as the case of the appellant vis-k-vis her personal need is concerned, the learned Controller appears to have rightly declined to accept the same. Admittedly, no details were supplied by the appellants in this regard, to establish their bona tides. Neither the nature of business proposed to be started by her son in the said shop was stated, nor the name of appellant was specifically mentioned for whose benefit the shop in question was required by the appellants.
22. No doubt, during the cross- examination of appellant Atiq Mirza, it transpired that the shop was required by appellant Zaheer Mirza, it transpired that the shop was required by appellant Zaheer Mirza who was doing business of affixing stones on jewellery in his own house, but the same was not the case of the appellants either in the eviction application or the affidavit-in-evidence filed on their behalf. Consequently, the learned Controller found that the appellants had failed to establish their bona tides as required under the law. "
23. In Haji Peer Muhammad's case (supra), the petitioner filed ejectment application in respect of shop on ground, inter alia, that the shop was required by the petitioner in good faith for occupation of' his son. Ejectment application was dismissed by the Rent Controller. Appellate Court reversed order mainly on the gorund that petitioner had not examined his son. Matter was taken to the High Court in second appeal, which appeal was dismissed. Matter ended up before the apex Court and the Honorable Supreme Court held as under: "Learned counsel appearing in support of this petition has argued that the learned District Judge was wrong in drawing such a presumption. But having read the judgment of the learned District Judge, we are unable to agree with the leamed counsel. In the facts and circumstances of this case, which showed that it was being seriously contested that the alleged requirement was bona fide, for, the relationship between the petitioner and his son was not cordial and that the said Tajammal Hussain owning in his own right other suitable properties for carrying on business, could not possibly have had any need for the shop in dispute, the examination of Tajammal Hussain was material. Tajammal Hussain is alive and is present in Peshawar. In the circumstances an inference may well be drawn that he is being withheld. The learned District Judge cannot* in the circumstances, be said to have drawn the presumption wrongly."
24. ' In Fakhruddin's case (supra), facts were that tenancy was in respect of shop and ejectment application was filed on the ground, inter alia, of requirement for personal use. The landlord appeared in witness box and pleaded that he wanted to get his shop vacated from the tenants and landlord also produced his own landlord in respect of his residential premises. Second that landlord admitted that one of the sons for whom the shop was stated to be required was 18 years of age. It was on this basis that Rent Controller held that the applicant could not establish that he was in need of the premises. It was pleaded that the son wanted to have his separate business.
25. The High Court observed as under: "In the peculiar circumstances of this case the failure of Fakhruddin to present himself before the Court and to establish that he wants a separate business for himself and that he was not satisfied with the business carried on with the partnership of his brother or that he wanted a separate income for himself was necessary to be established and the same could be done by examination of Fakhruddin alone. The appellants have not alleged that Fakhruddin was not available for the purpose of examination in Court or that he was prevented by one reason or the other from attending the Court and, therefore, the non-examination of Fakhruddin weakened the case for personal requirement of Fakhruddin and, therefore, the view of the two Courts below cannot be said to be completely incorrect."
26. 'On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent firstly relied upon Muhammad Sharif's case (supra). 'It was held by the Honourable Supreme Court as under:- "The only ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner before us was that respondent's son Farooq Sultan, for whose benefit the petitioner was sought to be ejected from the shop in question, never appeared as a witness in support of the assertion that the same was required for his use. The learned counsel contended that the petitioner was thus deprived of the opportunity of testing the truth of the afore-mentioned assertion.
27. 'We feel that the contention is devoid of force. There is no requirement of law that the person for whose benefit the premises is required to be vacated must be produced in support of the ejectment application. All that has to be seen in the present case is whether enough evidence has been brought on record by the applicant to sustain a finding of the requirement of the premises for the personal use of his son. "
28. 'In Dilshad Muhammad's case, ejectment was prayed on the ground of personal need and it was argued that the landlady had not been able to prove that she needed the shop in dispute in good faith for personal requirement. In the ejectment application she had stated that she needed the shop in question for her personal use, but in her statement before the Court she took a stand, namely, that she required the shop for use of her son which was admittedly pursuing business in Karachi and also he was not examined although eviction was being sought for his benefit. The Honourable Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that non-appearance of son of the landlady was not fatal to the claim of the respondent and also held that she required the shop in good faith for use and occupation of his son.
29. 'In Zahoor Din's case (supra), ejectment was sought on the ground that premises was needed for use of the son but the name of the son was not disclosed. The Honourable Supreme Court held as under: "As to the objection raised on behalf of the respondent that the son for whose marriage the extra accommodation was needed, was not examined as a witness, suffice it to say that there is no such requirement in law, and the effect of the omission will have to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. The burden on the landlord is to prove his bona fide requirement, and this burden he can discharged by leading evidence, which need not necessarily include the son concerned as a witness."
30. 'In Muhammad Iqbal's case (supra), the issue in question was dealt in the following words: "It was submitted by Mr. Z. U. Ahmed that the examination of the son was necessary in this case although he stated that examination of the person for whose benefit a premises is required will depend on the facts of each case and it could not or has not been laid down as a rule by the superior Courts that to establish the bona fide need such person must be examined. But we are of the view that bona fides of landlady's son could be established through the evidence of another person which has been amply done in this case by examining the husband and attorney of the landlady. Precedents are not lacking in support of this proposition. In the case of Dilshad Muhammad v. Mst. Zubaida Begum 1981 SCMR 895 this Court held that appearance of the son of the landlady was not fatal to the claim of the respondent and that the landlady on the circumstances amply established that she required the shop in good faith for the use and occupation of her son. In the case of Zahoor Din v. Mirza Ayub Baig 1981 SCMR 1081 the premises was required by the landlord for the use of his son going to be married. It was held that law does not require examination of landlord's son concerned as a witness. It may be relevant here if the relevant observations are quoted below: "As to the objection raised on behalf of the, respondent that the son for whose marriage the extraaccommodation was needed, was not examined as a witness, suffice it to say that there is no such requirement in law and the effect of the omission will have to be determined in the facts and circumstances of each case. The burden on the landlord is to prove his bona fide requirement, and this burden he can discharge by leading evidence which need not necessarily include the son concerned as a witness."
31. 'Reference may also be made to Ghulam Qadir v. Tehamtullah PLD 1979 Lah. 382 wherein it was held that the failure of landlord's son to appear as a witness was of little consequence in the circumstances of the case. This case was cited with approval in Zahoor Din's case (supra). In the present case the husband and attorney of the landlady was examined, who could speak from his knowledge about the requirement of the son of the landlady. Nothing was suggested in the cross- examination to the effect that the son did not want to leave his job in the Steel Mill for better prospect. On the facts of the present case it was admitted position, as shown above, that Azizur Rehman, son of the respondent, is working as Operator in the Steel Mill. Therefore, if the landlady wants her son to be established in a business instead of remaining employed, then how it could be said that such a requirement lacks bona fides. It was then urged that Azizur Rehman was getting a monthly salary of Rs,2,600 and he might not get even that much income from the business of Lathe Machine and Workshop. A Court cannot be a judge in such a matter. It is judgment of the party which matters. If he leaves his job in order to better his prospects but, unfortunately, he is unable to do so, he suffers. No other person, including the tenant, could question such a decision. "
32. 'In Syed Jan Muhammad's case (supra), the contention was noticed in the following words:- "4. The only ground urged by Haji Shakil Ahmad, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing on behalf of the appellants before us was that the appearance of the sons of the landlords in the witness-box was not a sine qua non for the proof of the bona fide need of the landlords. In support of this proposition, the learned counsel has rightly placed reliance on three authorities of this Court:
(1) M. Muhammad Sharif v. M.S.Sultan 1981 SCMR 844, (2) Muhammad Nasar v. Muhammad Arshad and another 1981 SCMR 894 and Zahoor Din v. Mirza Ayub Baig 1981 SCMR 1081."
33. ' And thereafter it was held as under: "We reiterate the principle enunciated in the precedents of M. Muhammad Sharif, Muhammad Nasar and Zahoor Din (supra) that there is nothing in the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979) against grant of eviction of the tenant of the landlord on the ground of the latter's bona fide need for his or his son/sons bona fide requirement of the demised premises if the son/sons have not been examined in Court. "
34. 'In Bismillah Begum's case (supra), it was held that non-disclosure of name of the son may not be fatal to the very requirement projected by the landlord.
35. 'Regarding whether nature of business should be specified or not, learned counsel for respondent firstly relied upon Haji Muhibullah's case (supra). It was observed as under: "This Court has already held that there is no legal requirement on the part of the landlord to disclose the nature of the business he intends to conduct in the premises, for which he has made an application seeking possession. "
36. 'In Juma Sher's case (supra), it was held as under: "There is no legal requirement that the landlord in seeking ejectment of the tenant from a commercial premises on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement must disclose the nature of the business which he intended to start .In the premises. Similarly, it is also not necessary for a landlord to prove his personal and bona fide requirement of commercial premises that he must possess experience in the trade or business which he intends to set up in the premises after eviction of his tenant. If this argument is accepted, then a landlord, howsoever, genuinely he may require a commercial premises for his personal requirement cannot succeed if he does not possess experience of a particular business or trade."
37. 'It may be relevant to note here that in Juma Sher's case Tohid Khan's case was referred where evidence included statement by the landlord that he had no particular business in mind but had ideas about what business he should start. The last case on this point relied upon by the learned counsel was Muhammad Iqbal's case (supra) and law was laid down in that case in die following words: "The landlord is not bound to mention the name of business in his statement as he keeping in view his financial position, margin of profit and the chance of success, may select any suitable business after obtaining the possession of promises and therefore, in absence of choice of the business the bona fide personal need is not effected. The law has provided sufficient safeguard for the tenant under section 17(6) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 wherein it is provided that if the landlord after obtaining the possession of premises on the ground of personal need, does not occupy the same within a period of one month, the, - tenant is entitled to ask for restoration of the possession. "
38. Above survey of the case-law indicates the position in law to be as under:-
(1) It is not essential that name of the son for whose benefit the premises is sought to be vacated be mentioned either in the pleadings or even in the evidence.
(2) It is not essential that the son be produced as witness in the Court.
(3) It is not essential that nature of the business be specified.
(4) However it is essential and I imperative for the landlord to establish his bona fides.
39. In the present case the landlord has clearly stated that he is an old man and a disabled person. All his sons are in the United States and he wanted one of his sons to come back and establish a business in the demised premises and also to look after old man in his twilight years. The fact that he did not disclose name of the son would not be material. The fact that he did not disclose nature of business his son would start would also not be material. Is he not an old man? Is he not a disabled person? Is it not reasonable and bona fide for an old father to desire that one of his sons should come, have a mean of livelihood and then help the father take his last steps towards his grave? Certainly the requirement is bona fide. It is not mere whim or fancy: it is a genuine need.
40. 'Learned counsel for the petitioners emphasized two aspects. Firstly, son Shahab came, filed his affidavit and went back to United States. This eviction application was filed in 2002. Affidavit-in- evidence of said Shahab was filed and then it was withdrawn on 3-11-2003 and it is submitted by the learned counsel for petitioners that said Shahab went back. Now it is almost six years since that day. If Shahab had stayed in Pakistan, he would have waited six years, at least, for the matter to be decided and the premises to be vacated. Would it be reasonable to except him to stay on and on waiting for the case to be decided? The counter-point by Ms. Minhas, Advocate was that no question was asked in the cross-examination as to why said Shahab went back and as to why no question was asked whether any of the sons wanted to come back to Pakistan to help the father and look after him in his old-age. The second aspect on which Mr. Rizvi, laid a considerable degree of emphasis was para-8 of his written statement and his argument was that no question in his cross- examination was asked regarding this particular para. A reading of the para, which para has been quoted above, indicates that it was admitted by the present petitioners that the landlord is an old and disabled person and is unable to move. However his emphasis was that sons are doing their own business in United States A and none of them would prefer to come back to Pakistan to start a business here. Purely by business logic, Mr. Rizvi, Advocate is perfectly right. Who would like to leave United States and return to Pakistan. But then there may be things which go beyond business logic and one of such things is duty of son to his father. Therefore only on the ground that the sons are in the land of opportunity called the United States and would therefore not like to come back, to Pakistan is not sufficient to belie bona Tides of the landlord. As far as other aspects stated in this para are concerned, learned counsel frankly conceded that none of other premises have fallen vacant after filing of the present ejectment application. Reliance by learned counsel on Muhammad Mujibur Rahman's case (supra) is of no help to him. In that case it was held that an assertion made by a witnesses, if not challenged in the cross- examination would be deemed to have been accepted. Even if all that was stated in para-8 as to facts is accepted the landlord's case would still be not dislodged.
41. 'Last ground submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that ejectment application was filed on three grounds. All three were rejected by Rent Controller and two of the three grounds were also rejected by the Appellate Court, according to learned counsel for petitioners, it established mala fides of the landlord. I am afraid, I cannot agree with it. In Dilshad Mohammad's case (supra) impairment was one of the grounds besides present bona fide need. Application was rejected on the ground of impairment and still allowed by the Supreme Court on the groupd of bona fide persons need. In Zahoor Din's case (supra) all the three grounds taken by the landlord are the same as were taken in the present case. Ejectment application, after remand, was dismissed by both the Courts. The Honourable Supreme Court did not even examine the question of default and decided the matter only on the question of bona fide personal need. Therefore' mere fact that a landlord has raised a number of grounds in his ejectment application and grounds other than personal bona fide need are rejected by the Courts below, it does not, ipso facto, mean that ground of personal need is not bona fide.
42. 'It was contended by the petitioner that respondent wanted to let out the premises on higher rent.
43. 'As far as question of mala fides is concerned I may in this regard refer to section 15 (A) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 and this section gives a complete answer and a good remedy against such unscrupulous landlord. The said section is in the following words: "15. Application to Controller.-(1) Where a landlord seeks to evict the tenant otherwise than in accordance with section 14, he shall make such application to the Controller. [1] be specified in the order, if he is satisfied that:
(a) handed over the possession of the premises to some other persons;"
44. 'In Mst. Zubeda's case (supra), an apprehension was expressed by the tenant that landlord wanted to get the premises vacated so that he can let it out to some one else on higher rent. The High Court observed as under: "Sufficient protection has been postulated in section 15-A of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 which in the event of use of premises other than personal use not only postulates punishment for the landlord but also provides an effective mechanism for restoration of the possession to the evicted tenant before the Controller who would be entitled to exercise such authority on due consideration of the facts. Since the law provides an alternate and effective remedy to defuse the impression of the respondent, I think the apprehension is not well-founded in the present state of circumstances. Perhaps in appropriate cases, Controller would be justified to order restoration of possession even at interlocutory stage of the proceedings by an interim order should the landlord adopted delaying tactics."
45. Therefore as far as this aspect is concerned the petitioners shall have sufficient remedy available to him if after the premises is vacated the landlord does not start his business.
46. 'Petitioners have been in the premises since 1982. It is a business premises and livelihood for the petitioners depends upon their business. Therefore it would not be appropriate to order eviction forthwith. Petitioners must be given sufficient time to arrange their alternate premises and reorder their business. At the same time son of the landlord would also need sufficient time to wind-up his affairs in the United States and return to Pakistan. The landlord and his son would also need sufficient time to plan their business. I, therefore, while dismissing this petition order that the petitioners/tenants shall not be evicted from the premises before the December 31, 2010. However it shall be subject to the petitioners paying rent for each quarter in advance by the 10th day of first month of each quarter. If the tenants fail to pay rent in time as stated above or if the tenants do not hand over vacant physical possession by December 31, 2010, the landlord shall be entitled to get the premises vacated without any further order, with police assistance and with permission to break open the locks.