' NAIMUDDIN, J.--We propose to dispose of these two appeals by this common judgment. Appeal No. 698-K of 1990 is directed against the judgment of the Sindh High Court dated 25-11-1989 passed in Appeal No. 974 of 1986, whereby the High Court allowed the appeal of the respondent/landlady and set aside the order of the Controller dated 21-9-1986 dismissing the application for eviction of the appellant from a shop premises. Civil Appeal No.699-K of 1990 is from the judgment of the High Court dated 25-11-1989 passed in appeal No.975 of 1986, whereby the High Court also allowed the appeal of the respondent/landlady and set aside the order of the Controller dated 21-9-1986, dismissing the application for eviction of the appellant from a shop premises.
2. Brief facts are that the respondent/landlady filed two rent cases against the two appellants on the ground of personal bona fide need of her son Azizur Rehman, who wants to start business of lathe machine and mechanical workshop for which he was fully trained. These two applications were resisted by the appellants in the above two appeals. The Controller by two separate orders of even date dismissed the applications. Against the orders the respondent filed aforesaid two First Rent Appeals which were allowed by a learned Single Judge of High Court, as stated above, by the two impugned judgments. The reason which weighed with the Controller in dismissing the application was that the landlady had not examined her son Azizur Rehman for whose benefit the respondent sought ejectment of the appellants from the two shops. Therefore, bone fide requirement had not been proved. However, on appeal the High Court in the impugned judgment passed in F.R.A. No. 974 of 1986, after reviewing the evidence recorded and considering the various points raised with regard to bona fide observed as follows:-- "It is an admitted position that Azizur Rehman son of the appellant is working as Operator in the Steel Mills. The assertion of the applicant that her son Azizur Rehman is well versed in operating Lathe Machine has not been denied. There is nothing on record to show that the applicant or her son are in possession of any other commercial premises. Admittedly Munawar Khan husband of the applicant has retired from service and the applicant has other children apart from Azizur Rehman. Therefore, anxiety on the part of the applicant to start Lathe Machine and Workshop in the demised shop and the other shop occupied by other tenant in order to supplement her income so that she may be able to give better education to her children appears to be quite genuine. It is the right of the landlord to sue his/her property for getting better income in order to live comfortable life. The evidence of the husband/attorney of the appellant has not been shaken in any way in cross-examination. So far the ground of personal requirement was concerned, the mere fact that Azizur Rehman is working in the Steel Mill at present will not show that the applicant does not require the premises in question for setting up Lathe Machine and Workshop bona fide in the same, through her son Azizur Rehman."
3. We have heard Mr. Z.U. Ahmed for the appellants and Mr. S.M. Zaki for the respondent.
4. Mr. Z.U. Ahmed has raised two-fold contentions before us: (i) that the examination of the son of the respondent was necessary in order to question bona fide requirement of the two shops by the son of the respondent, and (ii) that the shops could not be used for industrial purposes as the plot was leased out by the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation for commercial purposes.
5. It was submitted by Mr. Z.U. Ahmed that the examination of the son was necessary in this case, although he stated that examination of the person for whose benefit a premises is required will depend on the facts of each case and it could not or has not been laid down as a rule by the Superior Courts that to establish the bona fide need such person must be examined. But we are of the view that bona fides of landlady's son could be established through the evidence of another person which has been amply done in this case by examining the husband and attorney of the landlady. Precedents are not lacking in support of this proposition. In the case of Dilshad Muhammad v. Mst. Zubaida Begum (1981 SCM R 895) this Court held that appearance of the son of the landlady was not fatal to the claim of the respondent and that the landlady in the circumstances amply established that she required the shop in good faith for the use and occupation of her son. In the case of Zahoor Din v. Mirza Ayub Baig (1981 SCM R 1081) the premises was required by the landlord for the use of his son going to be married. It was held that law does not require examination of landlord's son concerned as a witness. It may be relevant here if the relevant observations are quoted below: "As to the objection raised on behalf of the respondent that the son for whose marriage the extra- accommodation was needed, was not examined as a witness, suffice it to say that there is no such requirement in law and the effect of the omission will have to be determined in the facts and circumstances of each case. The burden on the landlord is to prove his bona fide requirement, and this burden he can discharge by leading evidence, which need not necessarily include the son concerned as a witness."
' Reference may also be made to Ghulam Qadir v. Rehmatullah (PLD 1979 Lah. 382) wherein it was held that the failure of landlord's son to appear as a witness was of little consequence in the circumstances of the case. This case was cited with approval in Zahoor Din's case (supra). In the present case the husband and attorney of the landlayd was examined, who could speak from his knowledge about the requirement of the son of the landlady. Nothing was suggested in the cross- examination to the effect that the son did not want to leave his job in the Steel Mill for better prospects. On the facts of the present case it was admitted position, as shown above, that Azizur Rehman, son of the respondent, is working as Operator in the Steel Mills. Therefore, if the landlady wants her son to be established in a business instead of remaining employed, then how it could be said that such a requirement lacks bona fides. It was then urged that Azizur Rehman was getting a monthly salary of Rs,2,600 and he might not get even that much income from the business of Lathe Machine and Workshop. A Court cannot be a judge in such a matter. It is judgment of the party which matters. If he leaves his job in order to better his prospects but, unfortunately, he is unable to do so, he suffers. No other person, including the tenant, could question such a decision.
6. As regards the submission that the shops could not be used for industrial purposes as the plot was leased out by Karachi Metropolitan Corporation for commercial purposes, it may be stated that the submission is misconceived for a variety of reasons: Firstly; to term the carrying on business of Lathe Machnie and workshop as "industrial use" is wrong because we see daily while passing through roads that Lathe Machines are installed in shops where small steel parts are prepared or repaired. Secondly, the tenant cannot object to such a use. If the landlord uses a premises for a purpose which is not allowed by the lease of the land on which the shop is constructed, it is for the lessor to object and seek his remedy for breach of covenant, if any.
7. However, we have noticed that the respondent applied for two shops separately without specifying in either application that one shop would not be sufficient for her son's need. It was stated at the bar that the shops are 6 'X 9' each and the measurement of Lathe Machine will be '6- 8' in length. However, since there is no evidence on record that the respondent needs both the shops, we can, at this stage, allowed her to have possession of only one shop. We gave choice to the respondent and her advocate stated that she would prefer to have shop which is subject- matter of Civil Appeal No.699-K of 1990. We would accept her choice.
8. Now, therefore, presently the respondent has established need for one shop only, therefore, we allow Civil Appeal No. 698-K of 1990 and dismiss Civil Appeal No.699-K of 1990. But, this will be subject to two conditions: (1) In respect of the shop which is subject-matter of Civil Appeal No. 698- K of 1990 the respondent shall be free to make a fresh application, if her son's need is not satisfied by obtaining the possession of shop which is subject-matter of Civil Appeal No. 699-K of 1990. If such application is made, it shall be. Decided on its own merits in accordance with law. (2) The appellant in Civil Appeal No.699-K of 1990 is allowed, by consent, one year's time to vacate the shop premises and hand over its possession to the respondent and also deposit monthly rent in Court, failing both or either the appellant in that appeal shall be liable to be evicted forthwith without any notice. The rent in arrears and the current monthly rent, if any, shall be deposited by.
The 10th of next month. So will be future rent till the possession of the shop is delivered on expiry of one year. The parties are left to bear their own costs.