' NAZIR AHMAD BHATTI, J.--The facts of this writ petition are very simple. Saadat Khan, petitioner herein, was employed as a cook on 13-10-1984 on daily wages by the Pearl Continental Hotel, respondent No, 3 herein. His services were dispensed with on 20-7-1985 as no longer required. The petitioner challenged the order of termination of his service before the Labour Court by an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court after recording evidence of the parties, by order dated 15-12-1985, accepted the application and ordered the reinstatement of the petitioner with full back benefits and wages. Feeling aggrieved by this order the respondent No, 3 filed an appeal before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal which accepted the appeal by order dated 13-1-1986 and set aside the order of the Labour Court. Still feeling aggrieved the petitioner filed the writ petition in hand.
2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties who have also led us through the record of the case.
3. The main argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner against the impugned order of the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal was that the petitioner had put in more than nine months of service when his services were dispensed with and according to classification given in Standing Order No, 1 of the Schedule to the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) the petitioner had become a permanent workman because he was engaged on work of a permanent nature likely to last more than nine months and had satisfactorily completed the probationary period of three months in the same occupation. It was contended that the employment of cooks by the respondent No, 3 was a work of permanent nature and when the services of the petitioner were terminated he had already put in more than nine months of service which shows that he had satisfactorily completed the probationary period of three months and that under the provisions of Standing Order 12 of the Ordinance his services could not be terminated in the manner in which the same had been done by the respondent No,
3. He has drawn our attention to clause (3) of Standing Order 12 according to which the services of a workman cannot be terminated except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken and it was contended by him that in the order of termination of service of the petitioner no reason was specified.
4. The minute perusal of the order of termination of service of the petitioner will show that his services were no longer required. We have considered this aspect of the matter very anxiously and we are of the opinion that the factum that the services of the petitioner were no longer required was also a reason for termination of his service. In arriving at this conclusion we draw benefit from the provisions contained in clause (1) of Standing Order 12 of the Ordinance which clearly lays down that for terminating employment of a permanent workman for any reason other than misconduct one month's notice shall be given either by the employer or the workman or one month's wages calculated on the basis of average wages earned by the workman during the last three months shall be paid in lieu of notice. It shall thus be seen that the services of a permanent workman can be terminated if no longer required but then he has to be given a one month's notice or his wages as aforesaid in lieu of the notice.
5. From the impugned judgment of the learned Appellate Tribunal we find that he was of the opinion that the petitioner was not a permanent workman and that he being employed on daily wages his services could be terminated at any time when no longer required. We have also anxiously considered this aspect of the matter very thoroughly and we do not find ourselves in agreement with the learned Appellate Tribunal for the simple reason that according to the definition of a permanent workman given in clause (b) of Standing Order 1 of the Ordinance the petitioner had acquired the status of a permanent workman. However, this aspect does not call for any interference in the impugned order of the learned Appellate Tribunal for the reason that he had exclusive jurisdiction in the matter and the mere fact that he arrived at a wrong conclusion would not attract our Constitutional jurisdiction. There is a wealth of case law on the point that a forum having exclusive jurisdiction can decide a matter rightly or wrongly and the mere fact that the exclusive forum has arrived at a wrong conclusion would not give rise to the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court.
6. For our own reasons and the reasons given in the foregoing paragraphs we find that there is no error of exercise of jurisdiction on the part of the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal. However, There is still one more aspect of the case. As a permanent workman the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of a one month's notice for termination of his service under clause (I) of Standing Order 12 of the Ordinance and since that notice was not given to him he is, therefore, entitled to be paid one month's wages calculated on the basis of average wages earned by him during the last three months and the respondent No, 3 is liable to "When we speak of a person having a right, we must necessarily refer to a civil right, as distinguished from elemental idea of right absolute. We must have in mind a right given and protected by law, and a person's enjoyment thereof is regulated entirely by the absolute, nothing but chaos could result."
8. Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani also relied upon the case of Mushtaq Hussain Shah v. Riaz Muhammad Hazarvi PLC 1978 Kar. 612 wherein ZA. Channa, J. (as he then was) held that:- "In my humble view, the right to registration by a Trade Union having been conferred by the I.R.O., has also liability to cancellation of registration under certain circumstances, and the statute having provided the authorities by which and the mode in which registration was to be granted or cancelled, the right or the liability cannot be enforced in any other manner or through any other forum."
' In the reported case trade union had been registered by Registrar of Trade Unions under section 8 of the I.R.O. But before the grant of registration to the said union respondent No, 1 filed a suit in the Civil Court for declaration that rival union was not entitled to registration and injunction for restricting its registration. While repelling the arguments of the learned counsel for respondent No, 1 that under the I.R.O. No right was conferred upon respondent No, 1 to apply for cancellation, reference was made to section 10 of I.R.O. And it was observed by the learned Judge that 'it was open to respondent No, 1 to approach the Labour Court to direct the Registrar to cancel the registration of the applicant if its registration by the Registrar was in contravention of the provisions of the I.R.O.' The trend of discussion in the above case shows that when act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in specific manner performance cannot be.Enforced in any other manner.
9. Reference was made in that case to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Abul A'la Maudoodi v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1964 SC 673, wherein it was observed:- "I would have no hesitation in holding that where a special statute dealing with a special subject created special liabilities as also provided a special remedy or procedure for the enforcement of that liability then in order to bring about the consequences contemplated by that statute for the breaches of its provisions recourse should be had to that statute and not to any other statute."
10. The learned Labour Court while rejecting the application of the appellant had relied upon the case of Riaz Hussain Shah and 23 others v. Punjab Labour Court No, 2 and others PLD 1977 Lah. 316 wherein it was held that:- "Objection to Constitution of Union being repugnant certain rules can only be taken note of by Registrar who can lodge a complaint with Labour Court under section 10 but Labour Court cannot take up such issue suo motu but can direct Registrar to cancel registration."
11. Reliance was also placed by the learned Trial Judge on the case of National Bank of Pakistan People's Federation v. N.I.R.C., Islamabad PLD 1975 Kar.
320. A Division Bench of High Court at Karachi held:- "The certificate of registration granted to a Trade Union cannot be cancelled otherwise than in manner laid down under section 10."
12. The learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani also relied upon an unreported decision of this Tribunal in Appeal No, HYD-249 of 1988 Messrs Abbasien International v.
Abbasien International Workers Union, wherein this Tribunal holding the respondent to be illegally constituted directed Registrar of Trade Unions, Hyderabad to cancel the registration of Trade Union forthwith.
13. Mr. Mehmood Abdul Ghani also referred to a decision of this Tribunal in the case of Mehran Cotton Ginning Factory Employees' Union v. Registrar of Trade Unions 1983 PLC 698. In that case the Registrar had filed the complaint under section 10 of the I.R.O. Before the Labour Court for cancellation of the registration of Trade Union which was granted by the Labour Court. In appeal this Tribunal held that the direction of Labour Court for cancellation of registration of Trade Union was justified. Obviously this reported case is distinguishable as the Labour Court had been moved by the Registrar, as provided under section 10 of I.R.O.
14. Under section 3(a) right is conferred upon the workers to establish and join associations of their own choosing. Under clause (b) of the same section similar right is conferred upon the employers to establish and join associations of their own choosing. The association formed by the workers is known as Trade Union and is regulated by the I.R.O. However, there appears no provision under the I.R.O. Regulating associations formed by the employers. Section 8 provides for registration of Trade Union by Registrar and section 10 provides for cancellation of registration in certain cases. The right to form the Trade Union is a right specially conferred upon the workers and, therefore, in my opinion, the right, if B any, to have the registration cancelled under section 10 would also devolve upon the workers and not upon the employer.
15. No doubt under the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance the employer has got right that no illegal strike be called in his Organization. The question is whether that right could so extend, that employer could seek for cancellation of the registration of Trade Union under section 10 of the I.R.O. Section 46-A provides for procedure in the case of illegal strike or lock-out. Under subsection
(3) the Labour Court could direct that such strike be called off and if the order of the Labour Court is contravened then under subsection (7) the Labour Court may order dismissal of any of the striking workers and if the Court comes to a finding that registered trade union has abated or committed commission of such contraventions, the finding shall have the effect of cancellation of the registration of such trade union. Thus, the right of the employer against the trade union, which calls or abates an illegal strike, can be enforced under section 46-A only and in accordance with the procedure laid down therein. As laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Abul Maudoodi, if special statute creates special liability and provide special remedy, the remedy can be enforced in accordance with that provision only.
16. The relevant portion of section 10 of the I.R.O. May be reproduced under:- "10. Cancellation of registration.--(1) The registration of a trade union be cancelled if the Labour Court so directs upon a complaint in writing made by the Registrar that the trade union has--
(i) contravened or has been registered in contravention of, any of the provisions of this Ordinance or the rules; or
(ii) contravened any of the provisions of its Constitution; or
(iii) made in its Constitution any provision which is inconsistent with this Ordinance or the rules."
17. The only provision of the Ordinance which the respondent union is alleged to have contravened is alleged commission of illegal strike in violation of sections 25 and 28 of I.R.O. Under the 1.R.O. The Registrar of the illegal (sic) and, therefore, on that ground he cannot file any application for cancellation of the registration. This power is vested in the Labour Court under section 46-A(3) to hold any strike illegal and as pointed out subsection (7) provides for cancellation of registration.
18. In none of the cases referred to above there was direct question under issue as to whether a Labour Court could direct the Registrar of Trade Unions in case of illegal strike to file a complaint for cancellation of trade Union under section 10. However, in' the unreported case of Abbasien International v. Abbasien International Workers Union--Appeal No, HYD-249 of 1988 this Tribunal had allowed the appeal of the establishment against illegal registration by the Registrar and ordered cancellation of registration. With due respects it may be pointed out that neither the Labour Court nor the Tribunal has got suo motu power to order cancellation of the registration of Trade Union unless there is complaint in writing under section 10 by the Registrar. Even in the present case the appellant had not moved the Labour Court for cancellation of registration but moved only for direction to the Registrar to file such complaint.
19. There can be no doubt that where special liability is created and right of remedy is specifically provided by specific provision of special statutes such right and liability can be enforced only in accordance with such specific provisions of that statute. As pointed out above neither the Registrar could hold any strike to be illegal nor can the employer enforce his right against illegal strike through the Registrar by forcing him to move application for cancellation. In cases of illegal strike procedure is specifically laid down in section 46-A which also provides for cancellation of registration of trade union. The right of the employer, if any, can be enforced in accordance with the procedure laid down in section 46-A only.
20. In the aforesaid case of Mushtaq Hussain Shah v. Riaz Muhammad Hazarvi PLD 1978 Kar. 612, the observations were made by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, where the move for cancellation of the registration of Trade Union was made by the workers and not by the establishment. Furthermore the ground therein was that when one Union was already registered other Union could not be registered. The facts of the reported case are quite distinguishable from the facts of this case and what has been held therein is that he cancellation can be made only in accordance with section 10 and in no other 'ay.
21. This application before the learned Labour Court for directing the agistrar to move for cancellation of Trade Union on the ground of illegal strike in my opinion, misconceived and has been rightly rejected by the learned boor Court.
22. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.