This revision application arises from a judgment passed by 1st Addl. District Judge, Karachi in exercise of his appellate jurisdiction whereby the earlier decision of Civil Judge, 2nd Class, Karachi was set aside.
2. The facts in brief are that plaintiff/respondent Muhammad 1zharul Haq Qureshi filed a suit for declaration and injunction in the Court of the Civil Judge, 2nd Class against the petitioner P. I. A.
Corporation for declaration and in, unction that he could not be suspended from service on the ground of any misconduct nor could a departmental enquiry he held against him for such misconduct and he should be allowed to resume his duties. That a mandatory injunction be issued to the P. I. A. C. Not to implicate the plaintiff/respondent on false and frivolous allegations because the plaintiff/respondent had 10 years record of service to his credit. Learned Civil Judge while deciding interlocutory application under Order XXXIX, rules l and 2, C. P. C. And also an application under Order VII, rule 11, C. P. C. Found that the defendant P. I. A. C. Had followed the proper procedure under the Service Code and they bad the full authority to hold enquiries against the employees and since the plain--tiff as a worker could seek remedy for his grievance under section 25-A, of the I. R. O. Before a Junior Labour Court his remedy under sections 42 and 56 of the Specific Relief Act was barred and the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
3. Against this order the plaintiff'/respondent preferred an appeal to the District Court and the same was heard and decided by the Ist Addl. District Judge, Karachi. The learned Addl. District Judge came to the conclusion that the civil Court had jurisdiction to grant temporary injunc--tion as prayed as otherwise the worker would suffer an irreparable loss and a civil suit under the Specific Relief Act was not barred. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the order of the Civil Judge, 2nd Class ,was set aside. The defendant P. I. A: C., have accordingly moved this revision application under section 115, C. P. C. Against the order of the 1st Additional District Judge.
4. The respondent had entered service of the P. I. A. As a peon and he was thereafter promoted as an Assistant Technical Librarian. It has been disputed that he came within the definition of worker under the I. R. O. The P. I. A. C. Under the service rules could enquire into the charges of misconduct against any of its employees and could after hold--ing a departmental enquiry dismiss them is accordance with the rules. Such procedure is also provided in the Standing Orders Ordinance (Orders 12 and 15). Any person aggrieved would bring his grievance to the notice of the employer under section 25-A of the I. R. O. And if the employers did not satisfy his grievance then he could approach the Labour Court for relief.
5. It has been argued by Mr. S. A. Sarwana, Advocate for the applica--nts that where the rights of any person are declared and guaranteed under a special enactment and special form is provided for relief in such case rights are infringed then the ordinary Courts would have no jurisdic--tion to deal with any matter concerning the infringement of such rights. Mr. Sarwana has relied upon PLD 1964 SC 673 in support of his contention. It was observed in the judgment by Hamoodur Rehman, J., as he then was as under :- "This is another aspect of the matter which does not appear to have received consideration in the High Courts, namely, as to whether where action producing the same result in pith and substance is possible under two different statutes upon the same grounds, it would not be legitimate to hold that action should hive appropriately been taken under the special statute dealing specially with the subject --matter by expressly specifying the grounds upon which action can be taken and providing a special method of action rather than under a general statute particularly, whether the special statute provides a more beneficial remedy or method of taking action. In such circumstances I have no hesitation in holding that where a special statute dealing with a special subject created special liabilities has also provided a special remedy or procedure for the enforcement of that liability then in order to bring about the result contemplated by that statute for the breaches of its provisions recourse should be had to that statute and to no other statute."
6. In PLD 1978 Kar. 612 it was observed by my learned brother Z. A. Channa, J. That where a statute creates a right and also provides machinery for its enforcement resort must be had to procedure prescribed in statutes creating right for its enforcement and jurisdiction of civil Courts would be barred in such matters. This principle was based on several decisions under the common law. In PLJ 1976 Kar. 278(?) it had been similarly observed that Where special tribunals had been appointed under a common Act to determine the questions as to rights created under that Act, then the jurisdiction of civil Courts could be deemed to be excluded not only by express words but also by implication.
7. The above decisions would apply to the case of the plaintiff/ respondent also seeking remedy against are apprehended wrongful dismissal. It is not open to the plaintiff to stop the employer from holding a depart mental enquiry into his misconduct nor could the plaintiff ask for h' re- instatement against an order of suspension duly passed by the employ under the rules of service.
The remedy for a worker lay under section 25-A of the I. R. O. And for this purpose special jurisdiction vested in the Labour Courts. The civil Courts could not accordingly adjudicate on such matters, there being special forum provided for redress of such grievances of the workers.
8. It has also been pointed out by Mr. Sarwana that a declaration could not be sought in respect of rights and liabilities under a contract o service under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act as that section applied only to a legal character or status apart from a contract. The legal character or status denotes a character or status conferred by law and not one created by a contract. The rights and liabilities under the service contract could not, therefore, form the subject-matter of a declaratory suit under the Specific Relief Act. Reference has been made to a decision reported in Burma Eastern Ltd. v. Burma Eastern Employees' Union (PLD 1967 Dacca 190).
9. The plaintiff'/respondent could thus proceed under section 25-A of the I. R. O. If he felt in any.
Manner aggrieved and since this was a matter which could be looked into by the Labour Court, he could not file a suit in the ordinary civil Court under the Specific Relief Act.
In the result the judgment of the 1st Additional District Judge, Karachi is set aside and the original order of the Civil Judge, IInd Class is affirmed.
The revision application is accordingly allowed.