KARAM ELAHBB CHAUHAN, J.-Muhammad Yaqub (respondent No. 1) was employed as a Tally Clerk in the Crescent Jute Products Limited Jaranwala (hereinafter called the petitioner/employer). The employer dismiss--ed Muhammad Yaqub from service on 19-11-1972. He filed an application which was accepted on 12-2-1973 by the Junior Labour Court and his dismissal was held to be illegal for want of giving him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself due to non-supply of the inquiry report. The employer filed an appeal which was dismissed so far as the declaration regarding the illegality of dismissal order was concerned but was partly accepted by holding that the consequent re-instatement of the employee would not make him eligible to claim "back-benefits".
It appears that thereafter Muhammad Yaqub was re-instated in service.
2. However, the employer again issued a show-cause notice to Muhammad Yaqub on the same allegations which were the subject-matter of his earlier dismissal. The show-cause notice this time was accompanied by a copy of the relevant inquiry report. The matter was contested depart-- mentally but without any success as the employer dismissed Muhammad Yaqub on 29-12-1973 on the charge or charges of disobedience of certain orders issued to him by his superior or superiors.
Muhammad Yaqub again filed an application in the Junior Labour Court but without any success as the same was dismissed by the said Court on 21-5-1974. Muhammad Yaqub then filed an appeal which was accepted by the Punjab Labour Court on 11-7-1974. The appellate Court set aside the order of the Junior Labour Court and held that the employer had led no evidence to show as to what was the kind of disobedience, whose order or orders were disobeyed and how and when. It was, further held that the employer made no effort to satisfy the Court that there was actually any disobedience on the part of the employee. After giving this finding the Punjab Labour Court set aside the impugned dis--missal order and directed re-instatement of the employee with effect from 29-12-1973 namely the date of his dismissal. The employer feeling aggrieved filed a Writ Petition being No. 1337/1974 but without any success as the same was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court on 9-5-1978. It was pleaded before the learned Single Judge that the Labour Court could not go behind the dismissal order so as to examine the . Relevant facts afresh and that its jurisdiction was limited merely to see whether the relevant formalities in the matter of dismissal had been complied with or not. In other words, it was contended, that the Labour Court could not assess the facts so as to form its own opinion regarding the innocence or guilt of an employee. The learned Single Judge did not accept this plea and held that the field of scrutiny by the Labour Court was very wide and that he could examine the facts for himself and was not bound by the factual assessment of the domestic authorities. The employer has come up in a petition for special leave to appeal.
3. The first point argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner/ employer was that in the instant case before the institution of an application in the Junior Labour Court, Muhammad Yaqub employee had not issued any "grievance notice" as required by the relevant law on the subject with the result that due to the lack of this "condition precedent" the application of the employee could not have been entertained by the said Court. We have asked the learned counsel as to whether this plea was taken in any of the Labour Courts or even in the High Court. His answer was in the A negative. In this state of affairs it is not proper to allow the learned counsel to take up this plea of fact for the first time in this Court. We hold accordingly.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner/employer then argued that it was not necessary on the part of the employer to satisfy the Labour Court that actually there existed a cause for dismissing the employee.. His precise sub--mission was that this was a matter which was to be left o the satisfaction of the employer and all that be had to show was that he had dismissed the employee after taking proper proceedings and that he was not required to justify his dismissal on the merits of the case before the Labour Tribunal. It was argued that in this way even if the employer produced no evidence to prove any actual default on the part of the employee, the Labour Court could not declare the dismissal order to be invalid. The contention bas no merit. In subsection (5) of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordi--nance XXIII of 1969, it is laid down that "in adjudicating and determining a grievance under subsection (4); the *(Labour Court) shall go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circum--stances of the case." From the language of the statute hereinbefore reproduced it is clear that the Labour Court has the jurisdiction to go behind a dismissal order and to see for itself as to whether on the facts and in the circumstances a of the concerned case it was justified or not, both on merits as well as law. The words "shall go into all the facts of the case" are a clear guide with regard to the wide scope of the enquiry which a Junior Labour Court undertakes under section 25-A. These words indeed have been used with a purpose and have to be given full effect so as to achieve the result desired. These words show that when a case is brought before a Junior Labour Court, the scope of enquiry is wider than for example the scope of a Tribunal examining only the legality of an order impugned before it. The words "shall go into all the facts of the case" clearly signify that the Junior Labour Court has full and complete powers to enter even into questions of fact and to arrive at its own conclusions regardless of there being no illegality of procedure in C the domestic proceedings. By use of these words the intention of the Legis--lature appears to provide a double check, one in the form of a domestic enquiry to be held by an employer and the other in the form of a judicial determination by the Junior Court itself. In other words the intention of subsection (5) of section 25-A appears to provide another forum in determin--ing the grievance afresh after considering the facts on which any impugned dismissal is based. If that was not so, then there was no occasion for using the words "shall go into all the facts of the case", which, in our view, define the jurisdiction of the Junior Labour Court as a tribunal of fats, with regard' to the matters which may have been dealt with by the domestic tribunal or the employer. Therefore, if the Legislature in its wisdom has chosen the words of far-reaching consequence, we do not see how their meaning can be whittled down and the provision construed in a limited sense as it (for example) the Junior Labour Court was hearing a second appeal within the meaning of section 100, C. P. C. Or a revision under section 115, C. P. C. The reason is also not far to seek, because, as pointed out earlier, it was intended to provide a forum to check against arbitrary, capricious, and camouflaged dismissals. It is here where the employer in this case made the mistake and led no evidence to prove justification of the order passed by him on merits. In the absence of any relevant evidence the appellate Court was thus justified in accepting the appeal of the employee by holding that his dismissal had not been shown to be warranted on the factual plane. He held that it had not been proved on record as to what was the misconduct or disobedience of Muhammad Yaqub, when and towards whom. The officer or officers whose orders bad been disobeyed were not produced and nor the relevant orders themselves which had allegedly been violated or disobeyed. If the Punjab Labour Court in appeal, in view of the above facts and circumstances held that the justification for dismissal of the employee had not been proved by placing any evidence on record and that the dismissal order could not consequently be sustained just in vacuum there was nothing wrong in that verdict and the High Court was similarly fully justified in finding no fault in the order impugned before it in the exercise of its writ jurisdic--petition under Article 199 of the Constitution. The result is that this petition has no merit and is dismissed. s. A. H.
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