' This judgment will dispose of the Labour Appeals Nos, 6 and 7 of 1983 filed by Zonal Chief Habib Bank Ltd. Against Muhammad Yousaf Kakar son of Sultan Muhammad, Muhammad Rauf and Gul Muhammad, the General Secretary, President and Vice-President respectively of Habib Bank Employees Union (Regd.) and also the Labour Appeals Nos, 2 and 3 of 1984. The Labour Appeals Nos, 2 and 3 of 1984 arise on of the orders passed by the Presiding Officer declaring the stay orders suspending the impugned orders in Labour Appeal No,6 and 7 of 1983 as having become infructuous in law because the appeals were not finalized within the period of 20 days as prescribed under section 38(8) of I.R.O.
1969. The facts and law points involved in all the above appeals being common they have been heard together.
2. The respondents had filed separate grievance applications under section 25-A I.R.O. In the Court of the Presiding Officer 1st Labour Court, Quetta and had challenged the orders of termination of their services passed by the Zonal Chief of the Appellant-Bank. It was alleged therein that during the pendency of the complaint under section 16 read with section 53 I.R.O. Filed against them by the management/ officers of the Habib Bank Ltd. The services of the respondents could not be legally terminated and the action taken against them is the result of victimization against the office-bearers of the Union. The services of Muhammad Yusuf were terminated on 21-1-1982 while those of Muhammad Rauf and Gul Muhammad on 31-12-1981. The orders were also got published in the "Daily Newspapers" Quetta by the Appellant/ Bank.
3. The Presiding Officer Labour Court vide his orders dated 15-9-1983 set aside the orders of termination of respondents' services passed by the Zonal Chief Habib Bank Ltd. And ordered their re-instatements with all back benefits "within 7 days from the order." The present Appeal No, 6 is against Muhammad Yousaf respondent while in Appeal No, 7 the respondents are Muhammad Rauf and Gul Muhammad. The appeals were admitted and the operation of the impugned order was stayed by my predecessor Labour Appellate Tribunal on 21-9-1983 and later on confirmed on 10-3-1984. Since the appeals could not be decided within twenty days of its being passed the respondents approached the Labour Court who declared that "the stay order granted by the Learned Labour Appellate Tribunal Baluchsitan stands vacated. Consequently the direction made by this Court as per its decision dated 15-9-1983 is, therefore, liable to be complied with by the respondent, as directed therein subject to decision in appeal."
' The appellants approached the Labour Appellate Tribunal Baluchistan Quetta once again and these two appeals have been registered as L.A.No,2 and 3 of 1984 and shall be disposed off also by this judgment.
4. 1 have heard Mr. Basharatullah, Advocate for the appellant and Mr. Munawar Ahmad Mirza for the respondents. Mr. Basharatullah the learned counsel for the appellant has raised the following grounds:-
(a) That no grievance notice has been served on the appellants, the application under section 25- A I.R.O. Was, therefore, not maintainable.
(b) That the subsequent tender of the copy of the telegram before the Labour Court is not proof of the document.
(c) That the telegram sent on 18-1-1982 was before the termination order and the grievance applications filed were therefore, pre-mature as the requisite period prescribed under section 25-A I.R.O. Had not elapsed.
(d) That the Departmental action can be taken even during the pendency of the criminal case or simultaneously.
(e) That the observation of the Labour Court that the respondents were prejudiced because they being ignorant of the english language in which the enquiry proceedings were conducted before the enquiry officer is not legally justified.
(f) Similarly the observation of the learned Presiding Officer that since the workers were office- bearers of the Union their dismissal during the pendency of the complaint under sections 15 and 53 of the I.R.O. Amounted to victimization is not justified.
(g) That the Labour Court has unjustifiedly re-appraised the evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry.
5. On the perusal of the record it is found that the possible objection now being advanced against the maintainability of the application under section 25-A I.R.O. Has been taken care of by the learned Labour Court in these words:- "The application admittedly has been filed before the expiry of the prescribed period of 15 days. In view of the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal Punjab reported in 1980 PLC 568 (a) the application has either to be returned to the applicants or be kept pending till such time, the prescribed period of 15 days is expired. I, therefore, keep the application pending."
' A Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Karachi Ram v. Jarnail Singh AIR 1923 Lah. 590 wherein the same type of objection was raised has expressed in these words:- "The plea that the suit was premature is technically correct, but it will serve no useful purpose to compel the plaintiff to start the case denovo. In Sita Ram v. Ram Chandara 44 1 C Page 863 it was held in a suit for money where the money became payable to the plaintiff after the institution of the suit, the Court should pass a decree and not compel the plaintiff to institute another suit for the purpose."
' A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Valluru Appalasuri and others v. Sasapa Khannamma Nayuralu AIR 1926 Mad. 6 (12) has also held:- "That events that happened, even after the filing of the suit, including those that add to the title of the plaintiff, may be taken notice of has been established by several cases. (Their Lordships have quoted the cases which are not necessary to be repeated in this judgment).
There are number of cases in which it has been held than even a premature suit can be continued after maturity although initially the suit may be susceptible of being thrown out as being premature.
' In Baj Din and another v. Din Muhammad and 2 others PLD 1972 Lah. 567 it has been pointed out by Aftab Hussain J, that "there is no law or principle of law that a suit which was not competent on the date when the part of cause of action arose, would remain incompetent even after the removal of the Bar against the suit."
' The controversy has now been set at rest by the Supreme Court in Mst. Amina Begum's case PLD 1978 SC 220 and it has been observed:- "Indeed in our considered opinion a discretion is vested in this behalf in the Courts to be judicially exercised in proper cases in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, to shorten litigation, and to do complete justice between the parties and mould the relief according to the altered circumstances in the larger interest of justice."
6. No particular form or procedure has been prescribed by section 25-A for its compliance in this respect. The intimation which brings to the "notice of the employer the grievance of the workman would be sufficient. The object of bringing the grievance to the notice of the employer is to provide him an adequate opportunity to consider the grievance of the worker/employee and redress the same, if found justified or entitled, before approaching the Labour Court. In other words this opportunity is given to the parties to avoid litigation and to mutually settle their dispute outside the Court, if possible.
' If during the said period of 15 days the employer had redressed the grievance of the worker, the grievance petition would be rendered infructuous and would be disposed of as such. The application filed by the respondents herein contained the following averments which are relevant and are reproduced:- "2.That on 18-3-1981 the respondent filed a false and fabricated complaint under section 16 read with section 53 of I.R.O. In this Honourable Court against the applicant alongwith two others namely Muhammad Rauf, President and Gul Muhammad, Vice-President of the Bank Union respectively, which is pending for adjudication in this Honourable Court.
3. That some 15/16 days ago, termination orders of us were issued by the respondent, later on the termination order of the applicant was withdrawn by the respondent on the verbal instructions that the applicant should tender unconditional apology the same offer was refused to be accepted as the applicant did not commit any misconduct as alleged against him.
4. That it would not be out of place to mention here that the applicant has already filed a complaint under section 15 read with section 53 of I.R.O. 1969 in this Honourable Court in this regard which is pending for adjudication.
6. That after having come to know about his termination order, the applicant then sent a grievance notice under section 25-A of I.R.O. 1969 to the respondent through express telegram on 18-1-1982, but no reply of the same has been received as yet, hence this application."
' In the instant case there is nothing to show that the employer wanted to settle the dispute with the workers outside the Court and that adequate opportunity was not given to them in this behalf. The petitioners have opposed the claim of the workers inside as well as outside the Court, therefore, no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the appellant by filing a premature petition. The allegations contained in paras. 2, 3, 4 and 6 have been substantiated through evidence produced before the Labour Court. The copy of the telegraphic notice issued by the respondents on 18-1-1982 alongwith the postal receipt therefore, is on record at page 78 and 79 of the file of the Labour Court.
The stand of the appellant has been that the telegram could not be held to be a notice as it was issued 3 days prior to the termination order. This plea in view of what has been observed above is of no consequence. I have therefore, no hesitation in repelling the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant raised in support of the grounds mentioned in paras. 4(a), (b) and (c) above.
7. The observation f the Labour Court in support of the objection of the applicants before him is established through the admission of Abdul Razzak Tareen the Zonal Chief when he appeared in Court. It is in these words:- {{URDU TEXT}} ' The prejudice is apparent on the face of the record. The entire enquiry proceedings was finalized very hurriedly. The workmen are definitely not conversant with the English language in which the proceedings were recorded.
8. The pendency of the complaints/counter-complaint is not denied even by the management and the existence of the demands of the Union which was being represented by the respondents herein, being office-bearers, does not require any proof since it is an admitted feature of the case.
Mr. Basharatullah, Advocate himself while putting his case before me has traced the history of the dispute and this is borne out by the report of the Enquiry Officer which forms part of the record of the Labour Court. The observation in this behalf made by the Labour Court in these words:- "Plain reading of section 47 of the I.R.O. 1969 prohibits dismissal of office-bearers of the union when conciliation proceedings or proceedings before the Labour Court was pending. In this Court complaint Case No, 7 of 1981 was ending which was in respect the fences misconduct alleged to have been committed by the applicants during negotiations upon the charter of demands."
I do not find any cogent reasons to differ with the Labour Court that in view of the pendency of the proceedings (Case No,7 of 1981) the order of termination services passed against the office- bearers of the Union was not justified in law. The grounds mentioned in paras. 4(d), (e) and (f) thus stand answered.
9. There remains to be considered the contention of Mr. Basharatullah that the Labour Court has unjustifiedly re-appraised the evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry and relied on Pakistan Petroleum Workers Federations Case PLD 1961 SC 479. The reliance is misplaced in the instant case as the proceedings have been instituted in the instant case under I.R.O. Promulgated in 1969 and the provision contained in section 25(5) of I.R.O. Does authorise the Labour Court to go into all the facts of the case. This provision has escaped the notice of Mr. Basharatullah, the same is reproduced:- "Section 25(5) I.R.O. Reads:- ' In adjudicating and determining a grievance under subsection (4) the Labour Court shall go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case."
' The Supreme Court of Pakiskan has considered this provision in Crescent Jute Products Ltd's. Case PLD 1978 SC 207. I can do no better than to quote the observations contained at page 209 of the - report:- "4. Learned counsel for the petitioner/employer then argued that it was not necessary on the part of the employer to satisfy the Labour Court that actually there existed a cause for dismissing the employee. His precise submission was that this was a matter which was to be left to the satisfaction of the employer and all that he had to show was that he had dismissed the employee after taking proper proceedings and that he was not required to justify his dismissal on the merits of the case before the Labour Tribunal. It was argued that in this way even if the employer produced no evidence to prove any actual default on the part of the employee, the Labour Court could not declare the dismissal order to be invalid. The contention has no merit. In subsection (5) of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance XXIII of 1969, it is laid down that "in adjudicating and determining a grievance under subsection (4), the Labour Court shall go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case". From the language of the statute hereinbefore reproduced it is clear that the Labour Court has the jurisdiction to go behind a dismissal order and to see for itself as to whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the concerned case it was justified or not, both on merits as well as law. The words "shall go into all the facts of the case" are a clear guide with regard to the wide scope of the enquiry which a Junior Labour Court, undertakes under section 25-A. These words indeed have been used with a purpose and have to be given full effect so as to achieve the result desired. These words show that when a case is brought before a Junior Labour Court, the scope of enquiry is wider than for example the scope of a Tribunal examining only the legality of an order impugned before it. The words "shall go into all facts of the case "clearly signify that the Junior Labour Court has full and complete powers to enter even into questions of facts and to arrive at its own conclusions regardless of there being no illegality of procedure in the domestic proceedings. By use of these words the intention of the legislature appears to provide a double check one in the form of a domestic enquiry to be held by an employer and the other in the form of a judicial determination by the Junior Court itself. In other words the intention of subsection (5) of section 25-A appears to provide another forum in determining the grievance afresh after considerating the facts on which any impugned dismissal is based. If that was not so, then there was no occasion for using the words "shall go into all the facts of the case", which, in our view, define the jurisdiction of the Junior Labour Court as a Tribunal of facts, with regard to the matters which may have been dealt with by the domestic tribunal or the employer. Therefore, if the Legislature in its wisdom has chosen the words of far-reaching consequence, we do not see how their meaning can be whittled down and the provision construed in a limited sense as it (for example) the Junior Labour Court was hearing a second appeal within the meaning of section 100 C.P.C. Or a revision under section 115, C.P.C. The reason is also not far to seek, because, as pointed out earlier, it was intended to provide a forum to check against arbitrary, capricious, and camouflaged dismissals."
In view of this authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court which is binding on all Courts in Pakistan there is no merit in the contention of Mr. Basharatullah that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to re-appraise the evidence. The contention is, therefore repelled.
' Keeping in view the provisions of section 25(5) I.R.O. The evidence brought on record is now to be assessed. The evidence on behalf of the appellants consist of the statement of witnesses and the report of the enquiry officer. The allegations against the respondents as contained in the "show- cause notice, dated 13-4-1981" which forms the basis of the termination order are that they tried to upset the normal Banking business on 15-3-1981 when they visited the Jinnah Road Branch, Quetta of Habib Bank and instigated the employees working in the Branch to go slow and that used filthy language and threatened with dire consequence when the Branch Manager intervened. It was mentioned in the notice that "since the above acts constitute serious misconduct, you are called upon to show cause as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against you." (What action was contemplated was not intimated). The witness Ghulam Hussain (D.W. 1) admitted in the cross- examination before the Labour Court:- {{URDU TEXT}} ' The enquiry report also contains the same version. The report says that "on cross-examination by Yousaf, Mr. Ghulam Hussain stated that they had not asked the staff to work during office Hours".
D.W.2 Zahoor Ahmed was posted as Manager in the Liaquat Bazar Branch w,e,f, November 1976 to June, 1982 therefore, could say nothing about the incident allegedly occurred on 13-4-1981 in the Jinnah Road, Branch, Quetta. D.W.3 Abdul Rub Abbassi is the person on whom the management banks too much. But this witness has acted as prosecutor on behalf of the Bank during the domestic enquiry and had cross-examined the witnesses produced by the respondent. He is, therefore, an interested person. He himself had been proceeded for misconduct by the Bank. Even this witness has said:- {{URDU TEXT}} It has rightly been contended by the counsel for the respondents that this is a case of no evidence.
The finding of the learned Presiding Officer in the face of the evidence (referred above) has rightly come to the finding that the management (the appellant) has failed to establish the misconduct against the respondent herein by any cogent and convincing evidence. I have also examined the evidence in the instant cases and concur in the findings of the learned Labour Court and hold that there is no tangible evidence to support the orders of dismissal of respondents.
' The upshot of the above discussion is that there is no force in the appeals accordingly I dismiss the Labour Appeals Nos, 6 and 7- of 1983 with costs. The orders of the Presiding Officer Labour Court Quetta passed in Application No,5 and 6 of 1983 therefore, maintained and the orders of termination of the respondents services are set aside. The respondents shall be re-instated with all back benefits within seven days hereof. In view of the above the Appeals Nos, 2 and 3 of 1984 filed by the appellants are also disposed of as the orders of my predecessor dated 10-3-1984 had lost its force and had become infructuous in view of the provisions contained in section 38(8) of the I.R.O. And stand vacated.