1. ' AJMAL MIAN, J.-This petition is directed against the orders dated 16-4-1980 and 7-5-1980 passed by the learned Labour Court No, 6 at Hyderabad, and the learned Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal at Karachi respectively, in application No, 213//9 and Appeal No, HYD-300/80 respectively maintaining the dismissal of the petitioner from the Service by the respondent No, 3.
2. The facts leading to the filing of the above petition are that the petitioner was working in the capacity of a driver in the establishment of the respondent No, 3 with effect from 2-1-1979 and was confirmed as such by an order dated 17-1-1979. The petitioner was served with a charge-sheet dated 15-8-1979 alleging therein that the petitioner drew the bus to the residence of the Project Manager and then to the bungle of the Deputy Commissioner, Thatta, thereby committing offences under clause (g) subsection (3) of the Standing Order 15 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The above charge-sheet was replied to by the petitioner on 18-8-1979. After that the respondent No, 3 appointed an Inquiry Officer by a letter dated 22-8-1979 who fixed the date of inquiry as 23-8-1979. After the conclusion of the inquiry the , petitioner was served with a second show-cause notice dated 28-8-1979 which was replied to by the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner was dismissed by an order dated 1-9-1979. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the above dismissal order filed an application under section 25-A of the I. R.
3. 0., 1969, which was dismissed by the learned Labour Court No, 6 by the aforesaid impugned order dated 16-4-1980. Against which the petitioner filed an appeal, which has also been dismissed by the aforesaid order dated 7-5-1980 by the learned Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi. The petitioner, therefore, has filed the present petition in Order to assail the above two orders.
2. (a) In support of the above petition Mr. Hamid Siddiqui, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged the following contentions
(i) that both the Courts failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by virtue of section 25-A(5) of the I. R. O.;
(ii) that the dismissal order was against the principles of natural justice.
(b) Reverting to the first contention, it may be observed that the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the case of Crescent Jute Products Ltd., Jaranwala v. Afohomed Yakoob etc., in which inter alia it was held that by virtue of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, the Labour Court can go behind the dismissal order and see for itself whether on facts and in the circumstances of the case dismissal order was or was not justified both on merits as well as on law.
4. In or view the impugned -orders are in consonance with the law enunciated in the above Supreme Court case. It may be pertinent to mention that the petitioner in reply to the charge-sheet admitted the fact that he had taken the bus to the residence of the Project Manager and from there to the bunglow of the Deputy Commissioner, but the plea taken by him was that he was forced to drive the bus by the workers present in the bus Union. The learned Labour Court has considered this aspect and has observed that there was no evidence on the record in support the petitioner's above averment. The learned Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal has also considered the above aspect, and on the basis of the testimony of Mr. Izhar Ahmed, Assistant Manager (Electrical) and Mr. Niaz Hussain Assistant (Administration) who were travelling in the bus in question came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not compelled to drive the bus as alleged by him. There is a concurrent finding of the two Courts on the above question of fact This concurrent finding of fact cannot be interfered with by this Court in A the exercise of the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution.
(c) Reverting to the second contention that the dismissal order was itself against the principles of natural justice, it may be observed that Mr. Hamid Siddiqui has urged that the Inquiry Officer was appointed on 22-8-1979 and whereas the Inquiry was started on 23-8-1979. Mr. Hamid Siddiqui, in support of the above contention, has referred to the case of Indian Supreme Court, namely, Kharda & Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, in which it was observed that an Industrial Tribunal is competent to interfere with the dismissal order of a workman, if the requirements of a fair and proper domestic inquiry are not fulfilled. In the instant case the petitioner was given notice of the inquiry. He, for the reason known to him, decided not to participate in the inquiry, though he submitted his replies to the two show-cause notices. It may again be observed that the fact that he had taken the bus to the residence of the Project Manager of the respondent No, 3 and from there proceeded to the bungalow of the Deputy Commissioner, 1 hatta has been admitted by him in his reply. The burden of proof to justify the above illegal act was on the petitioner, which he failed to discharge. Both the Courts below have examined the record of the Inquiry Officer and after having examined the same have sustained the order of the dismissal. In or view there has not been any violation of the principles of natural justice merely because of the fact that the Inquiry Officer was appointed on 22-8-1979, who fixed the date of inquiry on 23-8-1979.
5. ' In view of the above discussion the above petition fails and is dismissed In limine. PLD 1978 SC 207 1964 L L C 160 revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.