This revisional application under section 115, Civil Procedure Code at the instance of Muhammad Bashir one of the plaintiffs in the suit is brought from the concurrent decisions of learned trial Court and appellate Court dismissing the suit.
2. Concisely, the facts are that Muhammad Bashir petitioner, Mubarik Ali and Muhammad Idrees since deceased, were employed in the Steel Shop of Pakistan Railways, Mughalpura, Lahore. They were on 8-6-1966 discharged from service after necessary enquiry on the charge of theft said to have been committed by them on 28-1-1956. Appeal to challenge the impugned order was dismissed by the authority concerned. Thereafter, suit was filed for a declaratory decree that order of the discharge of the plaintiffs from service was illegal, void, etc. Upon the ground, inter alia, that finding of Enquiry Committee was not based on the facts on record. In view of the contention raised in this petition, it will be unnecessary to refer to the remaining grounds of attack against legality of the impugned order. Muhammad Idrees died during pendency of the suit and his legal representatives were brought on record whose names were, however, subsequently deleted in consequence of the finding that cause of action did not survive the deceased, and his legal representatives could not continue with the suit. The defendants --respondents contested the suit denying the entire allegations made by the plaintiffs that the order was passed without enquiry or proceedings in the enquiry were not held in accordance with relevant rules etc. Or the findings of guilty against the plaintiffs were not based on facts. Both sides led evidence on the relevant issue: "Whether order of discharge of the plaintiffs dated 8-6-1966 is illegal and void." The suit was dismissed on 16-11-1974. Appeal against the judgment of learned trial Court was accepted by an Additional District Judge on 30-6-1975 with the observations: From perusal of whole evidence on the record I smell fishy in the enquiry conducted by the respondent-defendant and the appellants/ plaintiffs should not be condemned unheard ....
In view of the above observations and in the interest of justice I remand the case with the direction that learned trial Judge should decide the case afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the above discussion".
The order of remand which was not easily intelligible was otherwise also not supported by facts nor in law. The suit was again dismissed by learned trial Judge with the findings that the plaintiffs had failed to establish any illegality in the proceedings for enquiry. The plaintiffs had not been given notice of rejection of their explanation to the preliminary charge. This omission however did not materially affect the case of the plaintiffs nor constituted an illegality in the conduct of the enquiry proceedings. Learned trial Judge also observed that the findings in the enquiry against the plaintiffs were based on weak circumstantial evidence which was not sufficient to answer the charge against the plaintiffs. However, this aspect of the matter could not be taken into consideration as Court was not competent to go into merits of the findings. Reliance in this behalf was placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in Muhammad Shamim v. M/s. Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited (1975 SCMR 46). Consequently, the suit was dismissed. Appeal against the judgment of trial Court was also dismissed as indicated in the opening lines of this order. Learned Court of appeal also relied on the same authority to endorse the view of learned trial Judge that Civil Court cannot sit in appeal against the order of executive authorities.
3. Learned counsel says that in view of statement of Abdul Jaw (P.W. 2) a witness of the plaintiffs and the statement of Muhammad Bashir, petitioner himself he was not advised to challenge the unanimous findings of the two lower Courts that enquiry proceedings were not vitiated with any illegality which could justify annulment of the order, which otherwise was also not possible in law.
Findings of facts even though erroneous are ordinarily binding in revision unless found to be patently unjust or based on non-consideration of material evidence on record. Learned counsel however maintained that in view of a clear finding by the trial Court that evidence examined in the enquiry against the plaintiffs was insufficient to prove the charge levelled against them which was not disturbed or dissented from by the Court of appeal the suit should have been decreed in favour of the plaintiffs. Civil Court was competent to pronounce on merits of findings of enquiry. Reliance was placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in Crescent Jute Mills v. Muhammad Yaqoob (PLD 1978 SC 207) and on a Division Bench case of High Court Karachi in Textile Corporation of Pakistan v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal etc. (1983 PLC 721). 1 am afraid, the precedent cases do not help learned counsel in advancing the contention. Supreme Court had held with reference to the provisions in subsection (5) of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969) which laid down that Labour Court (which was a Court of appeal) "shall go into all the facts of the case" and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case", that Labour Court has the jurisdiction to go behind a dismissal order and to see for itself as to whether or not on the facts and in the circumstances of the concerned case it was justified or not both on merits as well as in law. The words "shall go into all the facts of the case" are a clear guide with regard to wide scope of the enquiry which a Junior Labour Court undertakes under section 25-A.
These words indeed have been used with a purpose and have to be given full effect so as to achieve the result desired. Junior Labour Court had full and complete power to enter even into question of fact and to arrive at its conclusion regardless of there being no illegality in the domestic proceedings. High Court Karachi had on the authority of this judgment held that Labour Court (which as indicated above was a Court of appeal against the orders of employers) could go into facts of the case to check against arbitrary and capricious dismissals. The power of Civil Court in such suits is entirely different from that of Court of appeal which is Court of fact as well as of law.
Jurisdiction of Civil Court was confined only- to the examination of legality of the orders of domestic tribunals or executive authorities and was certainly not co-extensive with appellate jurisdiction so as to scrutinise merits of the order and substitute its decision which appears to it to be correct for the decision of the Enquiry Officer. This view is also supported by the observations made in the judgment of Supreme Court referred to above, that the words "shall o into all facts of the case" show that when a case is brought before a Junior Labour Court, the scope is A wider than for example the scope of a tribunal examining only legality of an order. Impugned before it (underlining is mine). Both Courts below had correctly relied on the judgment in Muhammad Shamim v. Messrs Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited (1975 SC _M R 46) that the question whether the plaintiffs committed the theft or not was a question of fact and could only be enquired into by the Enquiry Officer. The case stands concluded rightly by the concurrent decisions of two lower Courts and no case at all was made out for interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
Dismissed in limine.