' NASIR ASLAM ZAHID, J.---The above appeal arises out of judgment dated 24-9-1997 (corrected/ reviewed by order dated 26-2-1998) of the Lahore High Court whereby revision petition filed by the respondents was allowed setting aside the concurrent judgments of the two Courts below in favour of the plaintiff (predecessor-in-interest of the present appellants). Leave was granted by the order dated 22-4-1999 as follows:-- "This petition has been filed by petitioner Altaf Hussain (plaintiff/ pre-emptor seeking leave against the orders dated 26-21998 and 24-9-1997 of the Lahore High Court allowing the revision petition filed by the respondents-vendees. We have heard the arguments of Mr. Muhammad Shahzad Shoukat, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the petitioner and Sh. Naveed Shehryar, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the respondents on caveat.
2. The pre-emption suit filed by the petitioner was decreed by the trial Court on 19-3-1994 and the appeal filed by the petitioner was also dismissed by the Appellate Court on 12-10-1994. However, by the impugned orders of the High Court, revision filed by the respondents-vendees has been allowed mainly on the ground that Talab-i-Muwathibat was not properly alleged in the plaint and only a general statement was made by the plaintiff that immediately on learning about the sale transaction he made declaration the same evening. According to the High Court, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to lead evidence regarding the date and time when he learnt about the sale transaction or the place where he got knowledge about it without specifically pleading the same in the plaint. It was further held that the mere general assertion in the plaint was not sufficient compliance of the provisions of section 13(1) of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1991. For the aforesaid reasons the concurrent findings of the trial Court and the Appellate Court were set aside by the High Court in revision and the suit of the pre-emptor was dismissed.
3. There appears to be some conflict on the above question in the decisions of this Court. Decisions against the view taken by the High Court in this case which have been cited are:--
(i) Amir Jan v. Ghulam Muhammad (PLD 1997 SC 883);
(ii) Abdul Malik v. Muhammad Latif (1999 SCM R 717);
(iii) Qadar Gul v. Moembar Khan (1998 SCM R 2102).
' Decisions cited before us which support the view of the High Court taken in this case are:--
(a) Khani Zaman v. Shah Hussain (PLD 1998 SC 121);
(b) Shafi Muhammad v. Muhammad Hazar Khan (1996 SCM R 346).
4. All the aforesaid decisions are by Benches comprising two Judges of this Court. We are of the view that an authoritative judgment on the point in issue is required by a larger Bench.
5 Leave is accordingly granted. Office is directed to place this case before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for seeking orders for hearing of this appeal by a larger Bench."
' We have heard Mr. Muhammad Shahzad Shoukat learned Advocate Supreme Court for the appellants and Mr. Munir Peracha learned Advocate Supreme Court for the respondents.
2. The question on which leave was granted in this appeal has recently been considered and decided on 27-10-1999 by a Full Bench comprising 5 Judges of this Court in Civil Appeal No,1004 of 1999 (Haji Noor Muhammad v. Abdul Ghani) in which several judgments of this Court including Khani Zaman v. Shah Hussain and others (PLD 1998 Supreme Court 121) and Shafi Muhammad v.
Muhammad Hazar Khan and others (1996 SCM R 346) were considered confirming the principles enunciated in Muhammad Ilyas v. Ghulam Muhammad and another (1999 SCM R 958). The following view was confirmed and reiterated by the Full Bench:- "We confirm the view taken earlier by this Court that the pleadings may refer to the material facts but the law does not require the pleadings to contain gist of all the facts and names of witnesses of the plaintiff and that the suit for pre-emption is not an exception to such general principle, which is well established in, our jurisprudence.
' We are, therefore, unable to endorse the view taken in the impugned judgment of the High Court that the requirements of Talab-eMuwathibat cannot be fulfilled unless details, particulars, date, time and place are also specifically mentioned in the plaint and the names of the persons in whose presence such Talab is made is also mentioned therein."
' In the judgment in case of Haji Noor Muhammad v. Abdul Ghani, it was further observed as follows:-- "In the instant case, plaintiff had specifically referred in the plaint to the two Talabs having been made. The plaintiff could not be non-Suited merely on the ground that other details of time and place of the Talabs, and names of witnesses, etc. Had not been specifically mentioned in the plaint.
It may be added that in case defendants/respondents had any difficulty in filing their Written Statement, they could apply to the trial Court for further and better particulars by filing an appropriate application under Order VI, Rule 5 of C.P.C. No such request was made by the respondents and they filed their written statement without taking any plea therein that they had been prejudiced on account of any details or particulars having not been given in the plaint."
3. From the perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court it is found that the plaintiff was non-suited by the High Court on the ground that the plaintiff could not be allowed to lead evidence regarding date and time when he learnt about the sale transaction or the place where he got knowledge about it without specifically pleading the same in the plaint and for such conclusion reliance was placed on Shafi Muhammad v. Muhammad Hazar Khan and others (supra). As observed, Shafi Muhammad v. Muhammad Hazar Khan and others (supra) was also considered by the Full Bench in case of Haji Noor Muhammad v. Abdul Ghani, where, on careful analysis, the case of Shafi Muhammad v, Muhammad Hazar Khan was found to be distinguishable as in that case concurrent findings of the two Courts below confirmed by the High Court were not interfered by this Court on the ground that the plaintiff therein had failed to make the first two Talabs.
4. Mr. M. Munir Peracha learned Advocate Supreme Court for the respondents/vendees, however, argued that on merits also the High Court had decided the revision in favour of the respondents and on merits the impugned judgment does not call for interference. We find no merit in this contention. Firstly, leave was not granted on this point. In any case, on the question of fact of making the two Talabs the concurrent findings of the two Courts below passed in favour of the plaintiff on evidence adduced before the trial Court were not liable to interference in revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. The concurrent findings of the two Courts below are not set aside on account of any patent illegality or perversity. No misreading or non-reading of evidence was pointed out except a passing reference to the evidence of P.W.1 Luqman Hussain. It may be reiterated that the High Court set aside the concurrent findings on the ground that date, time and place, when and where the plaintiff learnt about the sale transaction, were not specifically pleaded in the plaint, on which ground plaintiff could not be non-suited. On merits also no illegality or material irregularity in the concurrent judgments of the two Courts below had been pointed out.
5. On the scope of interference in revision under section 115, C.P.C., reference can be made to the following principles reiterated in Abdul Hakeem v. Habibullah (1997 SCM R 1139):-- "The High Court while examining the legality of the judgment and decree in exercise of its power under section 115, C.P.C. Cannot upset a finding of fact, however, erroneous it may be, on reappraisal of evidence and taking a different view of the evidence. Such findings of facts can only be interfered with by the High Court under section 115, C.P.C. If the Courts below have either misread the evidence on record or while assessing or evaluating the evidence have omitted from consideration some important piece of evidence which has direct bearing on the issues involved in the case. The findings of facts will also be open to interference by the High Court under section 115, C.P.C. If the approach of the Courts below to the evidence is perverse meaning thereby that no reasonable person would reach the conclusions arrived at by the Courts below on the basis of the evidence on record."
' The High Court, in fact, re-assessed the entire evidence on record and then discarded the conclusions of the Courts below as they were found inconsistent with his own assessment of evidence. This process of examination of evidence for upsetting a concurrent finding of fact in exercise of powers under section 115, C.P.C., in our view, is neither permissible nor warranted by law.
As earlier pointed out by us, interference with a finding of fact by the Courts below by the High Court in exercise of its provisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. Could only be justified if such finding is found to be suffering from misreading of evidence or non-consideration of important and material evidence or the finding is the result of perverse appreciation of evidence on record. A wrong or erroneous conclusion on a question of fact by the Courts below is not open to interference by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. We may also mention here that the High Court while examining a concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Courts below in exercise of the jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. Has to attend to the reasons given by the Courts below in support of such finding and misreading, non-reading or perverse appreciation of evidence has to be discovered in the reasoning's of the Courts below to justify interference in exercise of its provisional jurisdiction."
' In the present case, none of the following legal or other infirmities in the concurrent findings of the two Courts below in favour of the plaintiff were noted in the judgment or pointed out by learned counsel for the respondents:--
(i) The lower Courts exercised jurisdiction not vested in them.
(ii) The lower Courts failed to exercise any jurisdiction vested in them.
(iii) They acted in the exercise of their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
(iv) Misreading or non-reading of material evidence on record which had a direct bearing on the issues involved.
(v) Findings were perverse.
(vi) Findings could not be reached on the evidence on record.
' In the circumstances, the High Court erred in interfering in revisional jurisdiction with the concurrent judgments of the Trial and the Appellate Courts.
6. As a result this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment, dated 24-9-1997 (as corrected/ reviewed by order dated 26-2-1998) of the Lahore High Court is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.