'ABDUL SATTAR GORAYA, J.---By means of this revision petition, the judgment and decree, dated 18- 5-2001 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Wazirabad and that of the learned trial Judge, dated 26-5-2000 have been brought under challenge.
2. Facts in brief are that the petitioner filed a suit for possession through preemption on 20-12-1995 alleging therein that the suit-land, detail whereof has fully been given in the plaint, was owned by Muhammad Ali who sold it out to Maqsood Ahmad-defendant through Mutation No,1684 for consideration of Rs,1,00,000. It was stated that the said transaction in fact, had taken place for an amount of Rs,72,000 but the said amount was fictitiously shown with a view to defeat the pre- emptive right of the petitioner. The plaintiff came to know of the sale transaction on 16-12-1995 through Abdul Sattar son of Nathay Khan and where-after he performed Talb-i-Muwathibat disclosing his intention to pre-empt the sale transaction and it was followed by notice of Talb-i- Ishhad. The averments incorporated in the plaint were emphatically denied being incorrect. As many as seven issues were framed by the learned trial Judge including one of relief. The suit was dismissed on 26-5-2000 and appeal taken against the said judgment and decree also dismissed on 18-5-2001.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that both the Courts below misread and misinterpreted the evidence available on the record and non-suited the petitioner for insufficient reasons. Also argued that necessary Talbs were performed but the evidence has been excluded from consideration.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent defended the judgments and decrees for almost the same reasons which weighed with the learned Courts below. It has been added that this is a case of concurrent finding of fact and cannot be interfered with in revision.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gave conscious thought to the submissions made at the bar.
6. To conclude the issue, para. No,3 of the plaint is relevant which in terms provides that the suitor gained knowledge on 16-12-1995 through Abdul Sattar son of Nathay Khan resident of Bharoki Cheema; Whereafter he made a jumping demand in presence of the witnesses and declared his intention to pre-empt the sale transaction. In paragraph No,3 of the plaint, names of the witnesses have not been shown. Time has not been given as to when and at what time, he gained knowledge through Abdul Sattar son of Nathay Khan. Bare reading of para. No,3 of the plaint regardless of the witnesses whatever they had said or deposed in the evidence alone is sufficient to non-suit the petitioner. Issue has been conclusively settled by the apex Court in Mian Pir Muhammad and another v. Faqir Muhammad thfough L.Rs, and others (PLD 2007 Supreme Court 302) and Muhammad Iqbal v. Ali Sher (2008 SCMR 1682). Operative part of the judgment of Muhammad Iqbal's case, supra is reproduced hereunder:-- "(5) It may be noted that the judgment relied upon by the learned High Court reported as Altaf Hussain v. Abdul Hameed alias Abdul Majeed through Legal Heirs and another 2000 SCMR 314, was dissented in the case of Mian Pir Muhammad (ibid). Of the latest law on the subject, it was necessary for the plaintiff to give particular's of date, time and place in the plaint of making Talb-i- Muwathibat, which details are comprehensively lacking in his plaint, therefore, the trial Court was justified to dismiss respondent's suit on the basis of findings on Issue No,2.
(6) As regards the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent, suffice it to say, that a litigant cannot be allowed to improve his case in the evidence which was not set-up in the pleadings. It is settled law that a litigant had to first plead facts and pleas in pleadings and then to prove the same through production of evidence. Admittedly, the respondent failed to give the details in the plaint about the date, time and place of performance of Talb-iMuwathibat and thus he could not be allowed to prove his case through production of witnesses, which was not pleaded in the plaint. As a matter of fact, the learned trial Court after examining the pleadings of the parties should not have allowed the respondent to lead the evidence on the facts not alleged by him in plaint and even if the evidence was allowed to be recorded, it should not have been considered as evidence in the case by the Appellate Court and the learned High Court. The stance of the learned counsel is devoid of any consideration."
7. Sufficient evidence has been brought on the record and what to talk of B other evidence, bare perusal of the plaint would discernibly shows that the performance of Talabs was not proved within the standard and mode fixed by section 13(1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. Pre-emption being a feeble right, formalities for its exercise and enforcement of that right should be strictly B construed and observed and departure from the same and in absence of any proof for performance of the Talabs, the suit would merit dismissal. Necessary consequences provided by section 13 ibid will surely follow. I am fortified in my view by Muhammad Suleman v. Shaukat Ali (2009 SCMR 678) and Mst. Saleem Akhtar v. Chaudhry Shauk Ahmed (2009 SCMR 673).
8. The judgments and decree of both the Courts below are rich in detail; each and every aspect of the matter ahs been dealt with very carefully; evidence available on the record has been scanned.
No misreading and non-reading has been pointed out in the impugned judgments. Interference in the concurrent findings of fact is not possible until it is established that the judtgments of the Court below suffer from misreading or jurisdictional defect or there was some illegality or irregularity which has the vitiative effect. No point of the like nature was raised during the course of the arguments. Reference may be made to Allah Ditta and 5 others v. Mst. Rasoolan Bibi through Legal Heirs and 6 others (PLD 2006 Lahore 693).
9. For whatever has ben stated above, no case for interference is made-out. The petition has no merit and the same is accordingly dismissed. There shall be, however, no order as to costs.