' EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, J.---This petition for review has arisen out of the judgment of this Court dated 20-2-2012 whereby petition for leave to appeal and CMA for amendment in plaint were dismissed.
' Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that where law permits amendment in pleading in view of the provision contained in rule 17 of Order VI, C.P.C., a prayer therefor cannot be declined summarily without attending to the circumstances necessitating it. If such amendment, the learned counsel submitted, is'not allowed, the very purpose, this provision was enacted for, would stand defeated. The judgment of the Court, the learned counsel maintained, in view of this essential aspect of the case suffers from an error which is not only palpable but writ large on the face of the record and thus calls for its review.
2. We have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and have gone through the relevant law.
3. While hearing the above appeal we also dealt with this aspect by holding as under:-- S. As it has been settled in the case of Mian Pir Muhammad (supra) that mentioning of particulars as to date, time and place of making talabs are sine qua non for a successful pre-emptory action, their failure would always invariably be fatal. The appellants failing to mention these particulars in the plaint had to face the music for this omission. They were thus, rightly non-suited. Learned counsel in this state of things asked for amendment in the plaint by contending that appellants could not be expected to foresee the necessity of mentioning these particulars at the time of launching such action, which occurred as back as 1993. This contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is also devoid of force as the particulars as to date, time and place being essential for pre-emptory action were required to be mentioned in the plaint under the Law of Pleadings.
Such omission could not be ,allowed to be made up when it proved fatal and in consequence thereof a right accrued to the respondent. When seen in this background the view taken by the High Court appears to be correct. We, therefore, while dismissing the appeal also dismiss the application for amendment in the plaint."
' A look at the above quoted paragraph would reveal that ' necessity of mentioning all these particulars has not emanated from the case-law but B by the statute itself. In the case of Mian Pir Muhammad and another v. Faqir Muhammad. Through L.Rs and others (PLD 2007 SC 302), this Court while discussing the rationale behind mentioning these particulars held as under:- "4. It is observed that great emphasis and importance is to be given to this word in making of Talb-i-Muwathibat and it is necessary that as soon as the pre-emptor acquired knowledge of the sale of pre-empted property he should make immediate demand for his desire and intention to assert his right of pre-emption without the slightest loss of time. According to the dispensation which has been reproduced hereinabove after performing Talb-i-Muwathibat in terms of section 13(2) of the Act, the pre-emptor has another legal obligation to perform i,e, making of Talb-i- Ishhad as soon as possible after making Talb-i-Muwathibat but not later than two weeks from the date of knowledge of performing Talb-i-Muwathibat, therefore, the question can conveniently be answered by holding that to give full effect to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of section 13 of the Act, it would be mandatory to mention in the plaint date, place and time of performance of Talb-iMuwathibat because from such date, the time provided by the statute i,e, 14 days under subsection (3) of section 13 of the Act shall be calculated. Supposing that there is no mention of the date, place and time of Talb-i-Muwathibat then it would be very difficult to give effect fully to subsection (3) of section 13 of the Act, and there is every possibility that instead of allowing the letter of law to remain in force fully the pre-emptor may attempt to get a latitude by claiming any date of performance of Talb-iMuwathibat in his statement in Court and then on the basis of the same would try to justify the delay if any, occurring in the performance of Talb-i-Ishhad. It is now a well-settled law that performance of both these Talbs successfully is sine qua non for getting a decree in a pre-emption suit, it may be argued that as the law has not specified about the timing then how it would be necessary to declare that the mentioning of the time is also necessary. In this behalf, it is to be noted that connotation of Talb-i-Muwathibat in its real perspective reveals that it is a demand which is known as jumping demand and is to be performed immediately on coming to know of sale then to determine whether it has been made immediately, mentioning of the time would be strictly in consonance with the provisions of section 13 of the Act. This Court in the case of Rana Muhammad Tufail v. Munir Ahmed and another (PLD 2001 SC 13), declined to grant leave to appeal maintaining the judgment of the learned High Court as there was four hours delay in making the Talb-iMuwathibat from the time of receiving the knowledge of the sale. In the case of Mst. Sundri Bai v. Ghulam Hussain (1983 CC 2441)(sic) High Court of Sindh, held the delay of 1-1/2 hour, in making Talb-i-Muwathibat to be fatal to the scheme of Shufa when the pre- emptor was residing on the first floor while the purchaser/respondent was residing on the ground floor of the same building. In another case of Mst. Kharia Bibi v. Mst. Zakia Begum and 2 others (C.A. 1618 of 2003) this view was endorsed."
4. Why the earlier judgments rendered in the cases of Haji Noor Muhammad v. Abdul Ghani and 2 others (2000 SCM R 329) and Altaf Hussain v. Abdul Hameed alias Abdul Majeed through Legal Heirs and another (2000 SCM R 314) were not considered as of binding force has also been answered in paragraph 5 of the judgment rendered in the case of Mian Pir Muhammad v. Faqir Muhammad (Supra) which reads as under:--
5. Now we would consider the two judgments pronounced by this Court by larger Benches of equal strength in the cases of Haji Noor Muhammad v. Abdul Ghani and 2 others (2000 SCMR 329) decided on 27-10-1999 and Altaf Hussain v. Abdul Hameed alias Abdul Majeed through Legal Heirs and another (2000 SCMR 314) decided on 15-11-1999, wherein the consensus was that in view of the law of pleadings, it is not necessary to give the details including the date, place and time of performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat. With utmost respect it is observed that while expressing the above view this Court did not take into consideration in detail the, importance and implication of the word immediate as has been provided in Explanation I to section 13 of Act 1991 otherwise there was every possibility of arriving at the view which we are intending to take in this case. However, we agree and endorse the view taken in both the judgments that there is no necessity of mentioning the name of witnesses because then it would be a departure from the ordinary law of pleading as provided in Order VI, Rule 5, C. P. C. As evidence is not required to be noted in the pleadings and only necessary details are to be furnished for the purpose of making out a prima facie case to establish that a cause of action has accrued for invoking the jurisdiction of the Court for the redressal of grievance. Subsequently, a number of judgments were delivered including in the cases of Haji Muhammad Saleem v: Khuda Bakhsh (PLD 2003 SC 315) and Fazal Subhan and 11 others v. Mst. Sahib Jamala and others (PLD 2005 SC 977), wherein it was held that furnishing the date and time and place in the plaint is necessary to establish the performance of Talb-i- Muwathibat. Therefore, we endorse the view taken in the judgments and approve that a pliant wherein the date, place and time of Talb-i-Muwathibat and date of issuing the notice of performance of Talb-i-Ishhad in terms of section 13 of the Act is not provided it would be fatal for the preemption suit."
' In the case of Fazal-ur-Rehman v. Khurshid Ali and another (2012 SCM R 635) we, while discussing the binding force of the judgments mentioned above observed as under:-- "10. The main reason for dissenting from the earlier judgments rendered in the cases of Haji Noor Muhammad v. Abdul Ghani and 2 others and Altaf Hussain v. Abdul Hameed alias Abdul Majeed through Legal Heirs and another (supra), according to the paragraphs reproduced above was that they were rendered without considering in detail the importance and implication of the word "immediate" as has been mentioned in Explanation I to section 13 of the Act. These judgments, therefore, could not be treated as precedents having binding force. Such judgments being rendered in derogation of an important part of the provision as mentioned above were per incuriam and as such lost their binding force. Therefore, reference to the cases of The Province of East Pakistan v. Dr. Abdul Aziz, Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee and Ardeshir Cowasjee v.
Karachi Building Control Authority [KMC] would not have any perceptible relevance to the case in hand. Needless to say that only that judgment has a binding force which has been rendered after considering all the conceivable aspects of the relevant law."
5. Quite apart from this since a pre-emption case under the latest dispensation is more like a criminal case and a plaint in the former is almost like an F.I.R. In the latter, no omission however, fatal it may be, can be allowed to be supplied by means of amendment. In case it is done by means of amendment, it would open room for additions, afterthoughts and improvements which would go ad infinitum. Neither the pre-emption nor the criminal case with this modus operandi would admit of an end in the mundane existence of the parties. We, therefore, have committed no error much less patent on the face of the record by declining the prayer for amendment of plaint and dismissing the appeal of the petitioner.
6. For the reasons discussed above, this petition being without, substance is dismissed. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.