' JAVED IQBAL, J.--- This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment, dated 22-11- 2006 whereby the revision petition preferred on behalf of petitioner has been dismissed.
2. Precisely stated the facts of the case as enumerated in the judgment impugned are to the effect that "one Ghulam Yasin was the owner of land measuring 7 Kanals, 10 Marlas situated in the limits of village Paroa, District D.I. Khan and he sold it to Muhammad Zahid for an ostensible sale price of Rs,45,000 vide sale Mutation No,2675 attested on 21-4-1993. The sale was pre-empted by Haji Muhammad Afzal who instituted pre-emption suit in the Civil Court at D.I. Khan. Muhammad Zahid vendee submitted his written statement and contested the suit mainly on the ground that the pre- emptor had not fulfilled the requirements of "Talb-i-Muwathibat" and "Talb-i-Ashhad" in accordance with the provisions of section 13, N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987". After completion of necessary formalities and recording the evidence pro and contra the suit was decreed by the learned Civil Judge, D.I. Khan by means of judgment and decree dated 30-11-2001 which was dismissed on appeal by the learned District Judge D.I. Khan vide judgment, dated 31-10-2003 which was assailed before the learned High Court by way of revision which has been dismissed vide judgment impugned, hence this petition.
3. Mr. Zaheer Ahmad Qadri, learned Advocate Supreme Court entered appearance on behalf of petitioner and contended that the legal and factual aspects of the controversy have not been appreciated in its true perspective which resulted in serious miscarriage of justice. In order to substantiate the said contention it is pointed out that the provisions as enumerated in section 13(3) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 have been misinterpreted and misconstrued. It is also argued that the petitioner has fulfilled the requisite Talbs in accordance with law and merely on the basis of hypothetical considerations a wrong conclusion has been arrived at by the learned High Court which is not in consonance with the evidence which has come on record. It is also argued that it was not necessary to mention the date, time and place qua performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat in the plaint and on this account the suit could not have been dismissed.
4. We have carefully examined the contentions as agitated on behalf of petitioner in the light of relevant provisions of law and record of the case. The prime contention of learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of petitioner that it was not necessary to mention the date, time and place qua the performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat in the plaint seems to be devoid of merit and is not in consonance with the dictum as laid down by a Larger Bench of this Court while resolving the said controversy in case Pir Muhammad v. Faqir Muhammad PLD 2007 SC 302, relevant portion whereof is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:-- "(4) It is observed that great emphasis and importance is to be given to this word in making of Talb-i-Muwathibat and it is necessary that as soon as the pre-emptor acquired knowledge of the sale of pre-empted property he should make immediate demand for his desire and intention to assert his right of pre-emption without the slightest loss of time. According to the dispensation which has been reproduced hereinabove after performing Talb-iMuwathibat, in terms of section 13(2) of the Act, the pre-emptor has another legal obligation to perform i,e, making of Talb-iIshhad as soon as possible after making Talb-i-Muwathibat but not later than two weeks from the date of knowledge of performing. Talb-i-Muwathibat, therefore, the question can conveniently be answered by holding that to give full effect to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of section 13 of the Act, it would be mandatory to mention in the plaint date, place and time of performance of Talb-iMuwathibat because from such date, the time provided by the statute i,e, 14 days under subsection (3) of section 13 of the Act shall be calculated. Supposing that there is no mention of the date, place and time of Talb-i-Miwathibat then it would be very difficult to give effect fully to subsection (3) of section 13' of the Act, and there is every possibility that instead of allowing the letter of law to remain in force fully the pre-emptor may attempt to get a latitude by claiming any date of performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat in his statement in Court and then on the basis of the same would try to justify the delay if any, occurring in the performance of Talb-i-Ishhad. It is now a well-settled law that performance of both these Talbs successfully is sine qua non for getting a decree in a pre-emption suit. It may be argued that as the law has not specified about the timing then how it would be necessary to declare that the mentioning of the time is also necessary. In this behalf, it is to be noted that connotation of Talb-i-Muwathibat in its real perspective reveals that it is a demand which is known as jumping demand and is to be performed immediately on coming to know of sale then to determine whether it has been made immediately, mentioning of the time would be strictly in consonance with the provisions of section 13 of the Act. This Court in the case of Rana Muhammad Tufail v. Munir Ahmed and another PLD 2001 'SC 13, declined to grant leave to appeal maintaining the judgment of the learned High Court as there was four hours delay in making the Talb-i-Muwathibat from the time of receiving the knowledge of the sale. In the case of Mst. Sundri Bai v. Ghulam Hussain 1983 CLC 2441 High Court of Sindh, held the delay of 1-1/2 hours in making Talb-i-Muwathibat to be fatal to the scheme of Shufa when the pre-emptor was residing on the first floor while the purchaser /respondent was residing on the ground floor of the same building. In another case of Mst. Kharia Bibi v. Mst. Zakia Begum and 2 others 2007 SCMR 515 -this view was endorsed.
(5) Now we would consider the two judgments pronounced by this Court by larger Benches of equal strength in the cases of Haji Noor Muhammad v. Abdul Ghani and 2 others 2000 SCMR 329 decided on 27-10-1999 and Altaf Hussain v. Abdul Hameed 2000 SCMR 314 decided on 15-11-1999, wherein the consensus was that in view of the law of pleadings, it is not necessary to give the details including the date, place and time of performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat. With utmost respect it is observed that while expressing the above view this Court did not take into consideration in detail the importance and implication of the word immediate as has been provided in Explanation I to section 13 of Act 1991 otherwise there was every possibility of arriving at the view which we are intending to take in this case. However, we agree and endorse the view taken in both the judgments that there is no necessity of mentioning the names of witnesses because then it would be a departure from the ordinary law of pleading as provided in Order VI, Rule 5, C.P.C. As evidence is not required to be noted in the pleadings and only necessary details are to be furnished for the purpose of making out a prima facie case to establish that a cause of action has accrued for invoking the jurisdiction of the Court for the redressal of grievance.
Subsequently, a number of judgments were delivered including in the cases of Haji Muhammad Saleem v. Khuda Bakhsh PLD 2003 SC 315 and Fazal Subhan and 11 others v. Mst. Sahib Jamala and others PLD 2005 SC 977, wherein it was held that furnishing the date and time and place in the plaint is necessary to establish the performance of Talb-iMuwathibat. Therefore, we endorse the view taken in the judgments and approve that a plaint wherein the date, place and time of Talb-i- Muwathibat and date of issuing the notice of performance of Talb-i-Ishhad in terms of section 13 of the Act is not provided it would be fatal for the pre-emption suit."
5. We are of the considered view that without disclosure of such factors i,e, date, time and place it would not be possible to determine as to whether Talb-i-Muwathibat was in fact performed in accordance with law or otherwise? It is worth-mentioning that the factor of time to be mentioned in the plaint is otherwise necessary because time when Talb-iIshhad was performed has to be counted from the date of Talb-iMuwathibat. Besides that the petitioner could not substantiate his claim by adducing cogent and concrete evidence. The evidence led to substantiate Talb-i- Muwathibat is vague and sketchy and has rightly been discarded by the learned District Judge, determination whereof has been upheld by the learned High Court vide judgment impugned, relevant portion whereof is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:-- "(5) Even otherwise the evidence produced by the pre-emptor-petitioner is also not indicating that Talb-i-Muwathibat was performed in accordance with the provisions of N.-W.F.P. Preemption Act, 1987. The testimony of the Pre-emptor (P.W.7) with regard to performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat is inconsistent with the statement of the alleged informer Haqnawaz (P.W.8). The pre-emptor alleged in his statement that Haqnawaz (P.W.8) had informed him about the sale transaction on 27-4-1993 at 9/10 a.m. And that at the same time he performed Talb-eMuwathibat in the presence of the informer. On the contrary, the alleged informer (P.W.8) deposed that he had informed the pre- emptor at noon. Further deposed that in fact at noon time he had gone to the house of pre-emptor and told him about the sale transaction. In view of the above contradiction regarding time of Talb- i-Muwathibat the petitioner's version as to performance of Talbs could not be relied upon. It appears that Talb-iMuwathibat was not at all performed according to the requirements of law.
(6) Since the pre-emptor-petitioner had not mentioned the date, time and place of Talb-i- Muwathibat in his plaint and the evidence produced by him was also not establishing the performance of Talbs in accordance with the provisions of section 13, N.-W.F.P.' Pre-emption Act, 1987, the learned District Judge had rightly dismissed the suit. The impugned judgment is not suffering from any illegality or material irregularity calling for interference by this Court in revision.
This revision petition being without substance is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs."
' No illegality or irregularity could be pointed out on the basis whereof leave to appeal could be granted. The petition being devoid of merit is dismissed and .