SARDAR MUHAMMAD IQBAL, J.----Muhammad Yar was survive by the petitioner, his son; Mst. Raj Bibi, widow; and Mst. Sardar Bibi, a daughter, Mst. Raj Bibi is the step-mother of Muhammad lqbal, petitioner, and Mst. Sardar Bibi is his step-sister. They succeeded to the estate of the deceased under the Muslim Law. The respondents became owners of 316 Kanals 19 Marlas of land in village Kokhara, 102 Kanals 2 Marlas in village Bhatti, and 107 Kanals 10 Marlas/526 Kanals 11 Marlas in village Mohammad Shah, Tehsil Vehari, District Multan. The Assistant Collector, Grade 11, sanctioned mutation No. 8 on the 29th January 1969,. Of the land aforementioned, in favour of the petitioner, on the basis that the respondents had orally gifted away the same to the petitioner. On an application made by the respondents that the mutation had been sanctioned without any information to them and fraudulently to defeat them of their rights, the learned Commissioner, Multan Division, after hearing the petitioners cancelled the mutation by order dated the 28th July 1969. The petitioner challenged in revision the order of the learned Commissioner, but failed before the learned Member, Board of Revenue, on the 26th August 1969. This is a petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1962, to challenge the aforementioned orders of the Revenue authorities.
2. It is contended by the learned counsel that the mutation was sanctioned on the 29th January 1969 and the respondents, if they felt aggrieved, should have preferred an appeal within thirty days to the Collector as provided in clause (a) of sub--section (1) of section 162 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, and since they failed to prefer the appeal it was not competent for the Collector to have invoked his revisional jurisdiction under section 164 of the Act.
3. Under subsection (2) of section 164 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 "A Commissioner or Collector may, at any time, of his own motion or on an application made to him within ninety days of the passing of an order, call for the record of any case pending before, or disposed of by, any Revenue Officer under his control." The existence of the right of an appeal is not a bar for the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. A revising authority may not ordinarily exercise that power when another remedy is available in law. However, if he decides to exercise his revisional jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that an, aggrieved person has the right of an appeal available to him, his action being within the ambit of law, cannot be questioned as one without lawful authority. In certain cases of grave miscarriage of justice or where an order is without jurisdiction, it is in fact just and proper that the authority should exercise its revisional powers to save a person of the agony of multiplicity of proceedings.
4. It was next contended that the learned Commissioner exercised the jurisdiction on the application of the respondents and since he was not acting in the exercise of his suo motu jurisdiction, the application merited rejection, being barred by limitation having been made beyond 90 days of the passing of the order. The respondents' application was accepted and the order of the Assistant Collector was set aside in revision on the finding that the mutation itself was procured by fraudulent means. Fraud vitiates even the most solemn proceedings. The period of limitation in such a case does not run. It was observed in Punjab Province v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1956 FC 72), by Chief Justice Muhammad Munir: "As regards the objection that the suit is barred by time, all that is necessary to say is that the assessment being void and the tax, not having been paid no question of limitation arises." In law an order, however independent the tribunal or authority making it and however exclusive its jurisdiction, is a nullity if it be proved that it was obtained by fraud, and in appropriate cases it is the' duty of the authority that has seisin of the case to recall suo motu an order procured by fraud. Even the proceedings that follow from an order obtained by fraud are void. It was so held in Grindlay's Bank Ltd. v. Murree Brewery Co. Ltd (PLD 1954 Lah. 745),
5. Learned counsel then argued that the learned Member, Board of Revenue, and the Commissioner, have not properly I appraised the statements made by the witnesses before the Enquiry Officer who had stated that the respondents had personally appeared before the Assistant Collector. This hardly furnishes a ground for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 98 of the 1962-Constitution. The Revenue Authorities, moreover, in proceedings for sanctioning mutation do not act as arbiters of the rights of the parties and a decision in mutation proceedings is not a decision as to the title of the parties They sanction mutations to keep their record in order and up-to---date. In Nirman Singh v. Rudra Partap Narain Singh (AIR 1926 P C 100), it was held by the Judicial Committee that mutation proceedings are not judicial proceedings in which title to and proprietary rights in immovable property are determined but that "they are much more of the nature of fiscal enquiries instituted in the interest of the State for the purpose of ascertaining which of the several claimants for the occupation of certain denominations of immovable property may be put into occupation of it with greater confidence that the revenue for it will be paid." Same view was expressed in Mst Rasulan Bibi v. Nand Lal (AIR 1930 All. 521), and was relied on in Ram Sarup Rat v. Charitter R.I (AIR 1927 All. 338). An entry by virtue of the mutation is, therefore, not the basis of title. The person in whose favour such an entry is made cannot take advantage of the same to claim a title against any person. A person adversely affected by such an entry can, notwithstanding the mutation, maintain that he is vested with the right and have his- right declared in a civil suit. In the circum--stances, when the mutation does not create a title in favour of somebody and also does not adversely affect the rights of any person, the party aggrieved by such an entry cannot say that he is an aggrieved person within the meaning of Article 98. It is only when a person has been adversely affected in a right which is vested in him that he can maintain a petition under Article 98.
The petitioner claims to be the donee of the property and it is the factum of the gift which was given effect to by the Assistant Collector who sanctioned the mutation. The right, if at all, was created in favour of the petitioner by the gift and not by the fact that the mutation had been sanctioned.' If in a particular case it is proved that no gift was made, the fact that a mutation on the basis of an alleged gift is sanctioned, can be of no avail to the person claiming any right on the basis of such a gift The mutation being dependent upon the existence of the gift, it becomes ineffective on a finding that there was no gift. Likewise, if a gift, in fact had been made but the Revenue Authorities refused to sanction the mutation, the order of refusal cannot effect the validity of the gift. The Court can give effect to it in spite of the refusal of the Revenue authorities. The mutation is thus not a proof of the gift nor a refusal to sanction the mutation a proof of the fact that a gift had not been made. The Assistant Collector, has, under the Land Revenue Act, been given the power to sanction mutation, whose action is subject to the incident of appeal and revision. If the order of mutation is set aside in appeal or revision, it only means that the Revenue authorities refused to sanction the mutation. Since it does not affect the right of a person in the property which he claims on the basis of a transaction for which he sought the mutation to be sanctioned, he does not have a locus standi to file a petition under Article 98.
6. Furthermore, a petition under Article 98 is competent only if there is no other adequate alternate remedy available to the person invoking this extraordinary jurisdiction. In a case where a person is aggrieved by an order of a Revenue Officer, it is open F to him to challenge the mutation proceedings on the regular side of the civil Court. In Umar Said v. Faiz Muhammad Khan (PLD 1961 Pesh. 110) Kayani, C. J., observed: "We are however, familiar with the ordinary resort to a civil Court after a mutation has been effected, when a question of title arises." In this view of the matter also, the petition is not competent.
7. For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the petition in limine.