1. ' The respondent Manzoor Ahmad, a son of Mst. Sakina Bibi, a predeceased daughter of the propositus Allah Din, was not granted his share of the inheritance, due to him under section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and two mutations relating to the inheritance of Allah Din having been sanctioned in the names of his two surviving daughters, the present petitioners, in the years 1965 and 1969 respectively in Tehsils Gujrat and Phalia where the deceased had left landed property, he filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction on 10-9-1979. The suit was contested, among others, on the pleas that it was not maintainable in that form and was also barred by time. These pleas were set down in issues Nos. 5 and 8 respectively. Learned trial Judge decided under issue No. 5 that form of suit was correct in so far as it was not hit by the proviso to section 42 of the Specific Relief Act because, while appearing as D.W.1, Mst. Rasool Bibi has admitted him to be in possession of some of the land in suit. However, under issue No. 8, he held his suit to be time-barred under Article 120 of the Limitation Act and consequently dismissed the same.
2. In the appeal filed thereagainst, a learned Additional District Judge reversed the trial Court's finding on issue No.8 and holding his suit to be within time, for the reason that he is in possession of some of the suit land, decreed it on 18-3-1985. Two principal defendants have now come up to this Court in revision.
2. Learned counsel argues that since the suit land is situated in two different tehsils and whereas the respondent has been held to be in possession, at best, of some of the land situated in only the village where he himself resides, therefore, he cannot be in possession of the land situated in the other village and, thus, his suit for declaration brought 10 to 15 years after the attestation of the mutations of inheritance was liable to be dismissed as time-barred under Article 120 of the Limitation Act but it has been wrongly decreed in absence even of a prayer made for possession of the land. He, however, does not dispute the relationship of the plaintiff who is a nephew (sister's son) of the two principal defendants and so has also been found concurrently by the two Courts below. Contentions of the learned counsel are simply misconceived and are liable to be repelled for more than one reason. Firstly, the mere fact of the entry in the mutation or revenue records having been made adverse to the plaintiff who has been found to be in possession of at least some of the suit land, cannot render his suit time-barred. In Muhammad Umar v. Nawab Din and others 217 P L R 1914, where it was found that some of the land in dispute was in possession of the plaintiff and the other in possession of the defendants and some tenants attorned to the plaintiff and some to the respondent, it was held, by following two earlier cases, that a suit for declaration to the effect that the mutation of the land effected in favour of the defendant shall be null and void as against the plaintiff, was maintainable. In Ghulam Muhammad Khan and others v. Samundar Khan and others AIR 1936 Lah. 37 (D.B.), it was held:-- "A suit for declaration in respect of an entry made in record of rights filed under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, read with section 45 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, is governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act, the cause of action in all such cases would accrue when the plaintiff feels aggrieved and not from date of entry."
3. ' In the above case, following the case of Bhagwan Bakhsh Singh v. Sant Parshad 54 I.C. 317, it was further held:-- "Where a person continues in possession of proprietary rights in spite of an adverse entry appearing in the revenue papers, no question of limitation arise."
4. ' Again in Gul Khan v. Said Hassan Shah and others PLD 1968 Pesh. 148 it was held:-- "As the revenue records are merely evidence of title and do not create or extinguish the same, it is obviously not necessary for the plaintiffs to first take proceedings for the setting aside of those entries in order to obtain a declaration of their title or possession of the property."
5. ' Then, in Muhammad lqbal v. S.A.M. Khan, Member, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore and 3 others PLD 1970 Lah. 614, a Division Bench, after review of a number of cases, held:-- "An entry by virtue of the mutation is, therefore, not the basis of title. The person in whose favour such an entry is made cannot take advantage of the same to claim a title against any person. A person adversely affected by such an entry can, notwithstanding the mutation, maintain that he is vested with the right and, have his right declared in a civil suit."
6. ' This case was then followed by another Division Bench in Mst. Kaniz Fatima and 3 others v.
7. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 5 others PLD 1973 Lah.
8. 495.
9. 'Secondly, as mentioned already, the plaintiff-respondent is the son of a predeceased daughter of the propositus and had inherited him under section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, VIII of 1961, C alongwith his two daughters, the petitioners herein. As such, they are co-sharers in the land in suit. In Beli Ram and others v. Munshi and others AIR 1934 Lah. 456, it was held:-- "The possession of one co-sharer must be deemed to be the possession of the other co-sharers and it is for the co-sharer in possession, in order to defeat the title of the absentee co-sharer or his descendants, to prove that by some overt act he constituted his possession into an adverse possession to the other co-sharers, an overt act of which such co-sharer had knowledge. "
10. ' In Saad Ullah Khan and 6 others v. Mir Piayo Khan and 14 others PLD 1970 Pesh. 150 a Division Bench held as under:-- "Claimants being co-sharers and entitled to the privileges of co-sharers, can claim to have been in possession of the property through the other co-sharer."
11. 'Therein, it was also held that all heirs who are entitled to inherit the property according to Shariat, should be treated as entitled to claim as co-sharers because it is a well-known proposition of law that the possession of one co-sharer enures for the benefit of other co-sharers also, unless there is ouster. A Division Bench of this Court in Hakim v. Mst. Ghulam Jannat and others AIR 1917 Lah. 73 held:-- "For a suit for declaration, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show that he is in exclusive possession of the property in suit. Joint possession is sufficient."
12. 'This being the law, nothing really turns upon the fact that the respondent-plaintiff may be in possession of some only of the lands in one village and not in those of the other. Since the petitioners and respondent No. 1 are co-sharers in the land in dispute and his ouster has not even been pleaded by the petitioner, therefore, the possession held by either of them will be on behalf of the other as well. There can be no question of either the form of this suit being defective or its being otherwise barred by time. Contentions of the learned counsel are consequently repelled.
13. ' There is no force in this Civil Revision is, therefore, dismissed in limine.