RASHIDA ASAD J.----Through the instant Appeal, the appellant. Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Defence and others have challenged the judgment and decree dated 20.08.201 1 and 26.08.201 1, respectively , passed by the learned Appellate. Court in Civil Appeal No. 192 of 2010, whereby the First Appeal was allowed and judgment dated 30.07.2010 and Decree dated 31.07.2010, passed by the Trial Court, was set aside and consequently suit of the respondent was decreed as prayed.
2. Briefly stared relevant facts of the case, as stated by the respondent, are that late Wadero Arz Muhammad was his grandfather , who died about 40-45 years back at Hyderabad Sindh, leaving behind his only son namely Wadero Muhammad Bukhsh, father of the respondent, who also died about 20-25 years back at Hyderabad. Sindh leaving the respondent as his sole surviving heir. It is further stated that Goth Wadero Isma il Kalhora, which is in existence since the days of Kalhora Rulers in Sindh , was named after Wadero Muhammad Ismail, the brother of Wadero Arz Muhammad. The said Wadero Muhammad Ismail died during the lifetime of Wadero Arz Muhammad but the Goth was continued to be known as Wadero Arz Ismail. It is further stated that grandfather of the respondent Wadero Arz Muhammad, the predecessor of the respondent owned and. possessed agricultural land as described in the plaint; that Khata pertains to the period from 1907-1908 to 1912-1913 continues as the mutation in the name of the father of the respondent and thereafter the respondent has not been made by the concerned revenue authorities, despite repeated request. It is further stated that the subject land to the knowledge of the respondent had been in occupation of his predecessor . It is stated that the appellants (herein) have forcibly , illegally , without any authority from the respondent occupied the subject land and have been giving yearly lease of the subject land to various persons from time to time. It is further stated that after obtaining copies of the relevant record in May and August 1992, the respondent had been approach ing appellants from time to time with a request to cancel the lease of the subject land as the same belongs to the respondent but they did not respond, and are continuing with the illegal acts. Therefore, the respondent filed suit for declaration, permanent injunctio n and possession against the appellants.
3. In written statement, appellants denied the version of the respondent and took the plea that subject land is Government land, under the management of Ministry of Defence as evident from the General Land Register (GLR), maintained by the Military Estate Officer. It is further stated that portions of the subject land used to be given on lease to different persons fora period of four years by the appellant No.2 as representative of the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Defence and the subject land is in possession of appellant No.3, which is A-1 land and is in active use of Army and presently the same is in use of Sindh Regimental Centre and the respondent has no concern with the subject land. It is further stated that the respondent has managed the insertion of his name in Deh Form III in collusion of revenue department. It is further stated that any entry made in the revenue record regarding the subject land is not relevant and has no authenticity and validity as the subject land is the cantonment land and the entry made in GLR is to be treated as valid, entry . Therefore, the appellants prayed for dismissal of suit.
4. From the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the trial Court: i) Whether the suit filed by the plaintif f is not maintainable in law? ii) Whether no cause of actions had ever accrued to the plaintif f for filing the suit? iii) Whether the plaintif f, by virtue of inher itance from his grand-father Wadero Arz Muhammad, is the owner of the suit land bearing Survey Nos. 329 (5-16 acres), 330 (2-26 acres), 331 (2-21 acres); 333 (3-15 acres), 334 (3,22 acres), 343 (2-01 acres), 349 (3- 30 acres), 350 (1-07 acres), 351 (2-32 acres), 352 (2-23 acres), 353 (3-32 acres), 354 (2-32 acres) and 355 (4-18 acres) total area 49-21 acres, situated at Deh Narejo, Taluka Latifabad, Tapo Giddue Bundar , Hyderabad, Sindh? iv) Whether the suit land is the land of Government of Pakistan under the management of Ministry of Defence? v) Whether the entries made in Revenue and other records in respect of suit land in the name of Wadero Arz Muhammad, predecessor of the plaintif f, are not authentic or valid? vi) Whether the entries in General Land Register (GLR) maintained by Military Estate Officer are legal, authentic and could be relied upon for the purpose of ownership? vii What should the decree be?
Thereafter , the respondent examined himself, P.W Muhammad Hassan, P.W Amjad Ali, Record Keeper of Taluka Mukhtiarkar Hyderabad, P.W Shah Ali, Tapedar and produced certain documents. Muhammad Aslam the Deputy Military Estate Officer Hyderabad was examined on behalf of the appellants, who produced certain documents. By judgment dated 31.10.1994, the learned trial Court decreed the F .C. Suit No. 352/1992.
5. Against the said Judgment dated 31-10-1994 and Decree dated 06-11-1994 , the appellants filed Civil First Appeal No. 48 of 1994 in this Court, which was, after amendment in. law, transferred to the learned District Judge, Hyderabad and was renumbered as Civil Appeal No. 289 of 2002. Along with said appeal, an application under Order XLI, Rule 27 CPC for additional evidence was filed. By Judgment and Decree dated 27-05-2003, the learned Additional District Judge allowed the said appeal, remanded the suit for further evidence and fresh decision after framing the following three additional issues the said appeal:- i) Who was late W adero Arz Muhammad and who are his legal heirs? ii) Whether late Wadero Arz Muhammad or his successors had become the owner of the land in accordance with the provisions of Section 184 of the Land Revenue Act? If yes, whether the appellants/defendants had lawfully acquired the land for the purposes of Cantonment Board? iii) Whether the suit is time barred?
6. In the said appeal, the appellants filed an application under Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C. for review of the said Judgment dated 27-05-2003, winch was dismissed by order dated 26-01-2006, against which, the appellants filed Revision Application No. 46 of 2006 in this Court, which was also dismissed by Order dated 17-03-2006.
7. After remand, the respondent examine d three witnesses namely (1) hal Bux (Exhibit 48), who did not produce any document, (ii) Yar Muhammad (Exhibit 125) and (iii) Ali Nawaz (Exhibit 126) and closed his side. On the other hand, the appellants examined three witnesses namely (i) Akhtar Ali (Exhibit 182), (ii) Mahmood" (Exhibit 189) and
(iii) Nazimuddin (Exhibit 220), who produc ed documents as Exhibits 221 to 225 and then the appellants closed their side.
8. By judgment dated 30-07-2010 and decree dated 31-07-2010, the learned Senior Civil judge dismissed the said suit of the present respondent. The respondent assailed the said judgment and decree by filing Civil Appeal No.192 of 2010 before the learned District Judge, Hyderabad. By impugned judgment dated 20-08-201 1 and decree dated 26-08-201 1, the learned District judge allowed the said Appeal of the respondent. Against the said judgment and decree, the appellants filed this Second Appeal in this Court.
9. Heard the learned deputy attorney general for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondent and also perused record with their assistance. Both the counsel have also filed written arguments, with permission of the Court.
10. Mr. Hamayoon Khan learned deputy attorney general appearing on behalf of the appellants made the following submissions:- That the impugned judgment of the learned District Judge is in violation of mandato ry visions of Order XLI, Rule 31, C.P.C. for the reason that the learned District Judge has not recorded his findings on issues and no cogent reason has been given to defer the judgment of the learned Senior Civil Judge and further the impugned judgment is based upon un-pleaded case, assumptions, surmises and conjectures, which is not permissible in law. In this regard reliance is placed on (i) 1985 CLC (Lahore) 1780, (ii) PLD 1989 SC 568, (iii) 1992 CLC (Karachi) 1022 and (iv) 1996 SCMR 669 . ii. That this Court can decide the entire controversy in this appeal itself, when the entire material is available on record and no further evidence is required by virtue of Order XLI, Rule 24, C.P.C. In support of such contention, he has placed reliance on (i) PLD 1965 SC 434, (ii) 1993 SCMR 216, (iii) 2002 SCMR 767, (iv) 2007 SCMR 307 and
(v) 2008 SCMR 428 . iii. That as per Order VI, Rules 2, 4 and 9, C.P.C., the respondent was required to plead the particulars of his ancestors and the contents of title documents to prove his ownership by way of inheritance, which the respondent failed to plead except mere plea, which is fatal to his case. Reliance is placed on (i) 1991 CLC (Karachi) 752, (ii)
2004 MLD (Lahore) 923 and (iii) 2017 CLC (Sindh) 1090.
That as per Order VII, Rule 14 and Order XIII, Rule 1, C.P.C., the respondent was bound to file copies of the title documents with his plaint on the basis of which he filed the instant suit for declaration of title but the same were neither filed with the plaint nor produced on the first date of hearing. By virtue of the mandatory provisions of Order XIII, Rule 1, C.P.C., the respondent was required to produce all documentary evidence on the first date of hearing and consequently the said documents cannot be produced in evidence without permission of Court as contemplated under Order VII, Rule 18(1) and Order XIII, Rule 2, C.P.C. Reliance is placed on (i) 1990 SCMR 964,
(ii) 1991 SCMR 1935 , (iii) 1999 SCMR 951, (iv) PLD 1994 Lahore 298, (v) PLD 2005 Karachi 1, (vi) 2009 MLD (Karachi) 1279 and (vii) 2017 CLC (Sindh) 1090. v. That the respondent has demolished his own case as he has made certain admissions during his evidence before the trial Court. Moreover , the documents produced in evidence by the respondent (Exhibits 49 to 54) were neither proved nor relevant for the decision of ownership of respondent. However , Deh Form VI1 (Exhibit 52) shows that the suit land is the Governme nt land; on the other hand, the documen ts produced in evidence by the appellants (Exhibits 63 to 84 and 91 to 97) proved that the suit land is Government land. Therefore, the respondent is bound by his own admissions and is estopped from resiling his admission by taking summersault. Reliance is placed on (i) PLD 1964 SC 572, (ii) PLD 1969 Quetta 13, (iii) 1989 CLC (Quetta) 1819 and (iv) 2017 CLC Note 195 p.219. vi. That as per Articles 117, 118 and 122 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, heavy burden was on the shoulders of the respondent to prove his affirmative case of ownership through cogent and reliable evidence, which was in his special knowledge but he miserably failed to prove the same; it is also well settled principles of law that party approaching Court for grant of relief would have to discharge his own burden and stand on his own legs to succeed and could not avail benefit of any weakn ess in the case of opposite party . He relied upon case of 2010 SCMR 1630 . vii. That as per Rules 3, 4 and 5 of the Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1925, the Military Estates Officer of the Cantonment has the exclusive authority to prepare and maintain a General Land Register (GLR) of all lands in the Cantonment Area with powers of mutations. Therefore, Sindh Board of Revenue has no authority to keep record of rights of the properties in the Cantonment Areas, hence, the documents of mutation (Exhibits 49 to 51 and 54) ate illegal, unlawful, null and void having no legal ef fect whatsoever . viii. That when there is conflict between general law and special law, then, the special law would prevail. That Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967 is the general law, whereas, Cantonment Act, 1924 and Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1925 are Special Laws, hence latter would prevail. In this regard he placed reliance on (i) 1989 SCMR 824 and (ii) 2007 SCMR 298 . ix. It is further stated that entry by virtue of mutation is not the basis of title, therefore, the person in whose favour such entry is made, cannot take advantage of the same to Claim a title over the property , thus, mere entries in the record of rights do not establish title. Reliance is placed on (i) PLD 1964 Peshawar 159, (ii) PLD 1970 Peshawar 141, (iii) PLD 1970 Lahore 614 and (iv) 2001 SCMR 338 . x. That as per Rules 6, 7 and 8 of the Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1925, for the purpose of General Land Register (GLR), lands in the Cantonment Area are classified in three classes "A", "B" and "C" and lands of classes "A" and "B" have been divided. xi. That as per sections 172, 173 and 174 of Government of India Act, 1935, all lands and buildings were declared to be vested in Government. xii. That in the Year 1937, Government of India, Defence Department, issued Order New Delhi dated 01-04-1937, wherein, it is mentioned that for the purposes of Section 172 (1) (a) of Government of India Act, 1935, the Governor General in Council is pleased to clarify that in the Cantonments specified in the Schedule hereto annexed, all the land now vesting in His Majesty which are classified as "A"(2), "B"(3), "B"(4) and "B"(5) under Rules 7 and 8 respectively of the Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1925, and entered as such in the General Land Administration Rules, Register of Mutations prepared and maintained for the Cantonment under Rules 3 and 4 of the said Rules and delineated in the classification plans of the Cantonment with the exception of those lands specified in Defence Department Notification No. 234 dated 01-04-1937 have been retained by the Governor General in Council for future use for purposes hereafter be the purposes of the Federal Government. It is also clarified that the specified Cantonments are those Cantonments, for which Notifications are issued. Accordingly , Notification dated 04-05-1933 issued by the Government shows the boundary pillars of Hyderabad Cantonment, wherein, the suit land is situated between the boundary Pillars Nos. 24 and 25. As per General Land Register (GLR), the suit Land is Defence Land having classification "B-4" owned by the Federal Government. xiii. That after the Government of India Act, 1935, Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1925, were repealed by Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1937. As per Rule 3, Military Estates Officer is required to prepare a General Land Register (GLR) of all lands in the Cantonment. As per Rule 4, for the purpose of GLR, the lands are classified in two classes "A" and "B". As per Rules 5 and 6, the lands classes "A" and "B" have been divided. As per Rule 15, sale of land is prohibited, wherea s, Rules 16 and 17 provide for lease of the land for minimum period of 30 years and for that purpose application should be submitted to Military Estate Of ficer in the printed form. xiv. The learned counsel also referred an identical case bearing F.C. Suit No. 86 of 1976, filed by Lakha Dino and others against the Government of Pakista n and others for declaration and injunction in respect of the land situated in Deh Fouji Ghat in Cantonment Area. This suit was dismissed by the Trial Court and against such dismissal Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1987 was allowed by the first Appellate Court. Thereafter , Government of Pakistan and others filed Civil Revision No. 50 of 1988 in this Court, which was dismissed by judgment dated 27-10-1988. Against said dismissed Civil Appeal No. 23-K of 1989, filed by the Government of Pakistan and others, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan was allowed by Judgment, dated 19-05-1991. Reliance is strongly placed upon the findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in paragraphs 8 to 1 1 of the said Judgment. xv. By relying upon cases reported in (i) PLD 1947 Privy Council. 322 and (ii) PLD 1950 (W.P) Lahore 295, it is further contended that burden was on the respondent to prove that the instant suit is within time and cannot be dismissed under Section 3 of the Limitation Act; that the respondent has failed to prove that the instant suit was filed within the period of limitation; on the contrary , upon the admissions of the respondent in his pleadings and evidence, it is proved that the instant suit is time-barred and fit to be dismissed on such ground. xvi. That the respondent had knowledge that the appellants were leasing out the suit land to various persons by executing lease deeds during the lifetime of his father , who died 20/25 years back from the date of filing of instant suit but neither the respondent nor his father had filed suit for cancellation of the said lease deeds though the respondent was required to file suit for cancellation of the said lease deeds within three years as stipulated in Article 91 of the Limitation Act and also the respondent has not claimed relief of cancellation of the said lease deeds in the instant suit. In this regard, reliance is placed on (i) 2006 YLR (Lahore) 1090, (ii) 2015 YLR (Sindh)
1569 and (iii) 2017 YLR (Sindh) 1691. xvii. That as per Article 120 of Limitation Act, suit for declaration of ownership has to be filed within six years; that the respondent neither filed any suit against the Revenue Authorities regarding mutation of his name nor filed any suit for declaration of his ownership and possession against the appellants within six years. Therefore, the instant suit is hopelessly time-barred. He has relied on (i) 2003 CLC (Karachi) 1521, (ii) 2010 SCMR 1630 , (iii) 2010 YLR (Lahore) 3002 and (iv) 2016 MLD (Lahore) 1723 . xviii. That as per Article 142 of the Limitation Act, suit for possession has to be filed within twelve years; though, the respondent is not entitled for the benefit of Article 142 as his main relief is for declaration of ownership, for which, limitation is six years as per Article 120, even then, if he should be given benefit of Article 142, the instant suit for possession is time-barred as it was filed 20/25 years after the death of his father . Reliance is placed upon MLD 2003 Karachi 162 . xix. By placing reliance on (1) PLD 2011 Karachi 426, (ii) 2015 SCMR 380 ; (iii) 201 7 YLR (Peshawar) 229, (iv)
201 7 YLR (Sindh) 1691 and (v) SBLR 2018 Sindh 396, it is further contended that under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, Court is bound to dismiss time-barred suit as the provisions of Section 3 are mandatory; that apart from the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, it is the bounden duty of Court to notice the question of limitation irrespective of the fact whether the question had been agitated or not. Reliance is placed upon (i) PLD 2002 SC 403 and (ii) 2009 YLR (Karachi) 451 . xx. That it is a settled law that period of limitation once started running would not stop and once full period of limitation expired, then, there would be no revival of cause of action afresh. Relian ce is placed upon (i) PLD 2006 Karachi 593 , (ii) PLD 2006 Karachi 621 and (iii) 2007 YLR (Karachi) 2215 . xxi. That it is a well settled principle of law that Law of Limitation cannot be considered merely formality or technicality but the same is required to be observed and taken into consideration being mandatory in nature. In support of this submission, the learned counsel relied on (i) PLD 2015 SC 212 and (ii) PLD 2016 SC 712 . xxii. That apart from this, the instant suit is also barred by the doctrine of Estoppel as the respondent was aggrieved person and the Fore he had a right rather a duty to object thereto to safeguard his right, which he failed to do so far a long period of more than 20 years and hence the respondent has waived his right and is now estopped by his own conduct and long silence to file the instant suit. Reliance is placed upon PLD 2015 SC 212 .
11. On the other hand, Mr . Zaheeruddin Leghari, the learned Counsel for the respondent submitted as follows: -
(a) That the Judgment of the learned District Judge is in accordance with the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 31, C.P.C. as the learned District Judge has framed points for determination and then recorded his findings which are proper and he rightly set aside the judgme nt of the learned Senior Civil Ridge which is not required to be interfered in Second Appeal.
(b) That Ownership of the respondent has been proved by documentary evidence (Exhibits 49 to 54), which is record of rights and presumed to be true unless rebutted by the appellant. He has placed reliance on case law reported in ( i) PLD 1964 SC 329 , (ii) 1991 SCMR 1369 and (iii) 1990 SCMR 725 .
(c) That Entries in record of rights and Jamabandi have got presumption of corre ctness until and unless rebutted otherwise such old record cannot be rejected. In this regard, reliance is placed on (i) 2009 YLR (Peshawar) 1516
(ii) 1989 SCMR 1563 and (iii)PLD 1984 Peshawar 278 .
(d) That General Land Register (GLR) does not create or determine question of title but merely maintains record of transaction between the parties. Neither any proof of allotment of acquisition of the land in favor of the appellants has been produced nor cancellation of the entry of the predecessor of respondent has been produced by the appellants.
(e) That written statement filed by the appellants was verified only by deputy military estate officer Hyderabad, who had no authority on behalf of appellants Nos. 1 and 3 to file written statement, therefore, the same cannot the considered as written statement of the appellants Nos. 1 and 3.
(f) That every entry in revenue record and General Land Register (GLR) and every lease of the land creates a fresh cause of action therefore, the instant suit is not time-bared. Even otherwise, question of limitation is a mere technicality and the Court is required to decide matter on merits and not on the basis of technicalities. He placed reliance on (i) PLD 1986 Supreme Court 35, (ii) PLD 1992 Supreme Court 822, (iii) PLD 1992 Lahore 89 and (iv)
12. The first point for determination in this appeal is, whether the Judgment of learned District Judge was in accordance with the mandatory provisions of Order XLI, Rule 31, C.P .C.
13. Order XLI, Rule 31, C.P.C., provides that the Judgment of the Appellate Court shall state the points for determination, decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. The legislature has laid down these conditions so that either the Second Appellate Court or the Revisional Court should be in a positi on to find out the track traversed by the Appellate Court. Therefore, it is the duty of the first Appellate Court to discuss oral and documentary evidence, law applicable to the instant matter and then record its findings. I have very carefully gone through the judgment of the learned District Judge. Strictly speaking and with due respect to the learned District Judge, the impugned judgment is not a judgment within the meaning of Order XLI, Rule 31, C.P.C. The learned District Judge has completely ignored the evidence available on the record and judgment dated 19-5-1991 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in identical case. Apart from this, no reasons have been recorded to differ with the judgment of the learned Senior Civil Judge but the entire judgment is based upon the un-pleaded case, assumptions, surmises and conjectures, which is not permissible in law and hence the impugned judgment is fit to be set aside. I, therefore, allow this appe al and set aside the impugned judgment and decree, while respectfully relying upon the judgments reported as (i) 1985 CLC (Lahore) 1780, (ii) PLD 1989 Supreme Court 568, (iii) 1992 CLC (Karachi) 1022 and (iv) 1996 SCMR 669 .
14. After setting aside the impugned judgment, there are two options left for me either to remand the First Appeal to the learned District Judge for re-hearing or to decide the entire controversy in this appeal instead of remand, also considering the long pendency for about 28 years of this case. Under Order XLI, Rule 24, C.P.C., this Court is empowered to decide the entire controver sy is this appeal when the entire evidence is available on record which is sufficient to establish the case. I am fully fortified in this view by the case-law reported in (i) PLD 1965 Supreme Court 434, (ii) 1993 SCMR 216, (iii) 2002 SCMR 767 and (iv) 2007 SCMR 307. Accordingly , I proceed to decide the entire controversy in this appeal.
15. Issues Nos.3, 4, 5, 6 and amended two issues (1 and 2) are issues of fact, therefore, first I will deal with these issues and then legal issues.
16. So far as Issues Nos.3, 4, 5, 6 and amended Issues Nos.1 and 2 are concerned, the initial burden was on the shoulders of the respondent to prove his ownership of the subject land. In plaint, the particulars and details of the family (ancestor of respondent) have neither been pleaded nor any authentic document of title in proof of ownership has been filed. Under Order VI, Rules 2 and 4, C.P.C., the respondent was required to plead particulars of his ancestors and title documents to prove his ownership by way of inheritance, which have not been pleaded except a mere plea, which happens to be fatal to his case. My view is supported by case-law reported in 1991 CLC (Karachi 752).
17. As per Order VI, Rule 9, C.P.C., the respondent was required to state the contents of the documents relating to the ownership by way of inheritance as briefly as possible in the plaint, which the respondent failed to state and hence it is again fatal to his case. My view is supported by case-law reported in 2004 MLD (Lahore) 923.
18. Now I discuss the oral evidence of the respondent and his witnesses. PW-1 Muhammad Hassan (Exhibit 41) in his examination-in-chief stated that father of the respondent died about 25 years back and his grandfather died about 40-50 years back. He further stated that Goth Wadero Ismail Kalhoro is in existence for the last over hundred years. He deposed that portion of land is in occupation of respondent while other portion is occupied by appellant No.3. However , further deposed that the land does not belong Government or any other person except the respondent. In his cross-examination, he admitted that some portion of the land is leased out by the Defence Authority to various persons and remainin g land is in possession of Army . He further admitted that he is resident of Goth Ismail Kalhoro, which is adjacent to the subject land and he is not residing on the suit land. He further deposed that he cultivates a small portion of respondent's land and does not pay any amount of Dhal, however , states that the amount of Dhal is being paid by respondent. He admitted that on an area of about 8-10 acres of subject land, cultivation is being done and 30-35 acres is in possession of the Army . The evidence of this witness neither supports the respondent nor reliable for the reasons that his evidence is hearsay and he is interested witness.
19. Now coming to the evidence of respondent himself (PW-2- Exhibit 48), who demolished his own case in his examination-in-chief, the relevant portions are reproduced as under:- "My grand-father Araz Muhammad expired about 50 years back. About 25 years back my father had expired."
"The land has been shown in the name of my grand-father Arz Muhammad. I also produce Deh Form VII as Ex.52.
In Exh.52 viz. Deh Form VII Cantonment Board has been shown the owner of the suit land which is un-attested entry with regard to ownership of the Cantonment. Presently the suit land is in my occupation. There is an area of about 15 acres of suit land which is in possession al Cantonment Board where now Sindh Regimental Center is situated. The Regimental Center has been built without my permission and is illegal construction. The Military Estate Officer used to lease out the suit land to the private persons and used to charge lease money for use of themselves. I repeatedly asked them to vacate the suit land but they refused to vacate it."
"My father has tried to mutate the suit land in his name but could not succeed. Being only legal heir of my father , I tried my level best to change Khatta in my name but failed."
In cross-examination, the respondent made certain admissions, the relevant part of his cross-examination is re- produced as under:- "It is a fact that I and my predecessor-in-interest are not having sale deed, lease deed, exchange deed or gift deed regarding the suit land The total area of suit land is 49 acres and 21 ghuntas. I am not paying the land revenue of the suit land,"
"I cannot give the date and year of death of my grand-father . I do not remember the year and date of death of my father . My grand-father has not obtained heir ship certificate. Voluntarily says that at the time of his death there was no provision of heir ship certificate. My father has also not obtained any heir ship certificate. Still I have not obtained heir ship certificate".
"It is a fact that in Form VII of Deb and Form VIII there are no entries in my name and so also my father and grand- father ."
"15-16 acres suit land is in possession and occupation of the defendants since last 25/30 years. We have neither given any notice to the defendants nor filed any suit for possession of the portion of the suit land from the defendants prior to the present suit.
"My father and grand-father have claimed ownership over suit land but orally ."
"I do not know that whether the defendants are leasing out the suit land since 1942 as I was born in the year 1950."
"I have applied for mutation of Khatta in my name in May/August 1992. Again says that about years back I had applied for change of Khatta in my name. When I applied for change of Khatta it was in my knowledge that some portion of suit land is in occupation of defendants. I have not applied for change of Khatta along with death certificate of my father nor heir ship certificate."
20. PW-3 Amjad Ali (Exhibit 57) in his examination-in-chief stated that he is Record Keeper of Taluka Mukhtiarkar Hyderabad and he has brought register Alif-Jim of Deh Narejo Taluka Hyderabad. He further stated that the original register Alif-Jim contained entries in the name of Arz Mohammad Ghulam Hyder Kalhoro as owner . However , in his cross-examination he stated that be cannot say that according to Exhibit 49 the subject land is of Government land as it is the function of Tapeadar to explain the position. He has admitted that Exhibit 49 does not show the name of owner but occupant and his share and Form VII shows the name of the owner . He further admitted that he has brought only register Alif Jim for the year 1912 as others were not summoned. The evidence of this witness does not support the respondent.
21. PW-4 Shah Ali (Exhibit 58) Tapeadar of Deh Narejo Taluka Latifabad Hyderabad Tappo Giddu Bander deposed that he brought register VII of Deh Narejo Taluka Latifabad, Hyderabad and in the record, the survey numbers 329 to 334 and 343, 344, 349 and 355 are shown in the name of Cantonment Hyderabad but it does not bear the signature of any officer. Exhibit 52 is certified true copy issued by his office with the signature of Mukhtiarkar Latifabad, Hyderabad. In his cross-examination, he admitted that in our register Alif record, there is no signature of any competent officer". He admitted that he has not received any application for the change of ownership from Cantonment Board to private owner . The evidence of this witness does not support the respondent but on the contrary goes against the respondent.
22. After remand of the instant matter , respondent again examined himself and two witnesses namely (i) Yar Mohammad and (ii) Ali Nawaz.
23. In second round, the respondent failed to lead any specific evidence and to produce any title document.
However , he made certain admissions in his cross-examination. The relevant parts of his cross-examination are reproduced as under:- "I have documents i.e. Form No. Alif, Jim and Dal. It is incorrect to suggest that we have no title document in respect of the suit land. I cannot say on what basis of which document, the entry in the name of Arz Muhammad was kept in Form No. Alif, Jim and Dal. V ol. says that it was made on the basis of documents."
"It is correct that I am not holding any entry in the Revenue Record in my name or my ancestors prior to 1992."
"It is correct that prior to 1992 no certified true copy of the documents in respect of the suit land has been obtained by me or my ancestors. I have filed the present suit with claim over the area of 49-21 acres. It is correct that we have sough relief of possession in the suit in respect of entire area of suit land admeasuring 49-21 acres. I do not know if the father of Arz Muhammad was owner of the suit land."
"I do not know that my father moved an application before Revenue Authority to change the Khatta in respect of suit land after death of my gland-father Arz Muhammad. I had applied before Revenue Authorities for change of Khatta after the death of my father . I had moved several applications to Revenue Authorities for 15/20 years but they did not take any action. I do not remember the exact date of my first application for the said purpose and date of last application moved by me before Revenue Authorities."
"It is correct that my father or myself had never filed succession application before any court so also heirship certificate."
"It is correct that my name or the name of my ancestors had not been entered in Form No. VII-A and Form No. VII- B of the Record of Rights. It is correct that neither price of land paid by my ancestors nor it was granted to them.
Vol. says that the suit land was allotted to my ancestors on the basis of possess ion. It is correct that I have no allotment order to show that on the basis of possession, the suit land was allotted to my ancestors. I do not know if the record pertaining to suit land is mentio ned in G.L.R. It is correct to suggest that the defendants are leasing our the portion of the suit land. It is incorrect to suggest that it was being leased out since 1936. It is incorrect to suggest that we have not raised any objection for the leasing of the property . It is correct that we have not filed any suit before the court."
"I do not know whether the Military Land is assigned different survey numbers in GLR and the Revenue Land have different survey numbers."
24. PW-Yar Mohammad (Exhibit 125) during second round of litigation has admitted that the subject land is within the limits of Cantonment Area and there is an office of Sindh Regiment Centre and at present the subject land is in possession of Sindh Regiment Centre.
25. PW-Ali Nawaz Tapedar/City Surveyor in Revenue Department (Exhibit 126) deposed that Exhibit 49 show the entries Deh Form VI to the years 1909 to 1913 of the subject land Exhibit 50 shows the ownership of Arz Mohammad. Exhibits 51/1 to 51/14 are Otaras showing the ownership of Arz Mohammad. Exhibit 52 is Form VII, entries shown with red ink means that it is not mentioned in the village form that who had sold and purchased the subject land and under whose authority . However , during his deposition he admitted that the previous counsel of the respondent introduced him with the respondent in the court for giving evidence. He admitted that he had seen the documents Exhibits 49, 50, 51/1 to 51/14, 52, 54 and 63 to 76, which have already been produced by the respondent and he had given evidence on the basis of these documents, which were shown to him by the said learned advocate in his office. He further admitted that he had not verified the said documents from the concerned office. He was unaware about the provision of law, under which agricultural land governed before 1967 so also in which register the record of Cantonment land and Form Alif, Jim and Dal are being maintained. He also did not know that Form Alif, Jim and Dal are not in existence after enforcement of Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967. He then admitted that now the record of rights, is being maintained under the Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967. He admitted that under Sindh Land Revenue Act, 1967, the ownership document is Form VII-A and Form VII-B. He also admitted that he had seen the site of the subject land when the previous counsel of respondent brought him there.
He stated that he is unaware of Exhibits 63 to 76. The evidence of this witness neither supports the respondent nor reliable for the reasons that his evidence is hearsay and he is interested witness.
26. The learned counsel for respondent also relied upon the following documents as documentary evidence which have been perused by me. Exhibit 49 is, Form III Numbershumari for the period from 1907 to 1913. Firstly , it is not a record of rights but it is a form to make entry of all the papers including letters pertaining to record of rights vouchers, assessment bills and all miscellaneous papers in this register (Reference can be made to Sindh Village Manual, re-produced edition. 2012-remarks on Village Form-III at page 52). Secondly , it pertains to the period from 1907 to 1913 and therefore irrelevant in as much as Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1925 came into effect from 1925 and as per Rules 3, 4 and 5. of the said Rules, the Military Estates Officer of the Cantonment is the exclusive authority to prepare and maintain General Land Register (GLR) of all lands in the Cantonment Area with further powers of mutation.
27. Exhibit 50 is Deh Form Alif and Jim for the period from 1907 to 1913. Firstly , it is not a record of rights but it is a form, which is, neither mentioned nor described under any Act or Rules or under Sindh Village Manual. Secondly , it pertains to the period from 1907 to 1913 and therefore irrelevant for the reason stated hereinabove.
28. Exhibits 51/1 to 51/14 are Field Book s of the subject land, which clearly show the ownership of Government in the manner "Milkeeiat-Sarkari" and status of the predecessor of respondent as "Khatedar", which does not mean owner .
29. Exhibit 52 is Deh Form VI, which is, in fact, a record of rights and it will remain unaltered forever , which shows ownership of Cantonment and not the predecessor of respondent and hence goes against the respondent and support the appellants.
30. Exhibits 53/1 to 53/9 are photographs, which have neither been proved nor disclosed reason for their production by the respondent and hence irrelevant and immaterial for the decision of the instant matter .
31. Exhibit 54 is Deh Map of the subject land but the purpose of its production has not been disclosed by the respondent and hence irrelevant and immaterial for the decision of the instant matter .
32. Now to discuss the legal aspect of the instant matter , I have thoroughly examined documents and relevant law and come to the conclusion that Record-of-Rights depends upon legal and valid title document and mere entry in the Record-of-Rights without the basic foundation of mother entry or legal and valid title document is nothing but nullity in law .
33. The law regarding Record of Rights was first enacted in Act IV of 1903, which was repealed and incorporated in Chapter X-A of the Sindh Land Revenue Code, 1879 (Sections 135-A to 135-L) but the lands and buildings in Cantonments do not come under the provisions of Record of Rights with effect from 21-05-1915 vide G. R. R. D.
(Government Resolution, Revenue Department) 4196 of 21-05-1915. Reference can be made to the History at pages 722 and 723 of Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (3rd Edition 1946 by K.S. Gupte) and Chapter X-A of the Sindh Land Revenue Code, 1879 (Sections 135-A to 135-L) and Standing Orders of the Revenue Department (Applicable in Province of Sindh) reprodu ced by Hamid Ali and Zaka Ali (Standing Order No. 17, Record of Rights at Page 373).
34. At this stage, it is necessary to clarify that the Land Revenue Law is not applicable to the Cantonment Areas.
The procedure for the lands under the Cantonment Area is prescribed in the Cantonment Land Administration Rules and the Cantonment Act and thus the lands in Cantonment Areas do not fall under the provisions of the Land Revenue Law. Reference can be made to pages 183 and 723 of Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (3rd Edition 1946 by K.S. Gupte).
35. As per Rules 3, 4 and 5 of the Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1925, the Military Estates Officer of the Cantonment is the exclusive authority to prepare and maintain a General Land Register (GLR) of all lands in the Cantonment Area with powers of mutations.
36. In the year 1935, Government of India Act, 1935 came into force and as per Sections 172, 173 and 174, all lands and buildings were declared to be vested in Government.
37. Thereafter , the Government of India Act, 1935, Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1925, were repealed by Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1937.
38. As per Rule 3 of Cantonment Land Administration Rules, 1937, Military Estate Officer is required to prepare a General Land Register (GLR) of all lands in the Cantonment area with powers of mutations.
39. In the year 1937, Government of India, Defence Department issued Notification New Delhi dated 01-04-1937; the relevant part of which is reproduced as under: - "No. 233--For the purposes of Clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 172 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Governor General in Council is pleased to certify that in the Cantonments specified in the schedule hereto annexed, all the lands now vesting in His Majesty which are classified as "A"(2), "B"(3), "B"(4) and "B"(5) under clause (2) of Rule 7 and clauses (3), (4) and (5) of Rule 8 respectively , of the Cantonment Land Administration Rules and entered as such in the General Land Register and the Register of Mutations prepared and maintained for the Cantonment under Rules 3 and 4 of the said Rules and delineated in the classification plans of the Cantonment, with the exception of those lands specified in Defence Department Notification No. 234 dated the 1st April 1937, have been retained by the Governor General in Council for future use for purposes which will be hereafter be the purposes of the Federal Government."
It is further clarified that the specified Cantonments are those Cantonments, for which Notifications are issued.
Accordingly , Notification New Delhi, the 1st April 1937 issued by the Government shows the boundary pillars of Hyderabad Cantonment wherein, the subject land is situated between the boundary pillars.
40. In view of the above discussion, it has become clear that with effect from 01-04-1937, the subject land was declared Government land. Now for the sake of arguments, though it has not been proved by the respondent, that if the subject land was the property of respondent's predecessor then it was the right of the respondent's predecessor to either claim the subject land from the Government or at least compensation for the acquisition of subject land but nothing was claimed at the relevant time.
41. As pet General Land Register (GLR) the subject land is Defence Land having classification "B-4" owned by the Federal Government.
42. Accordingly , Sindh Board of Revenu e has no authority to keep Record of Rights of the properties in the Cantonment Area after 1915 and thus Exhibits 49, 50 and 52 ate irrelevant and immaterial and do not give any benefit to the respondent.
43. It is well settled principle of law as laid down in various reported Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan and High Courts of Pakistan that mere entry without title documents in the Record of Rights is nullity in law. It is also well settled principle of law that an entry by virtue of the mutation is not the basis of title and therefore the person in whose favour such entry is made, cannot take advantage of the same to claim a title against any person. Reliance is placed upon PLD 1970 Lahore 614, AIR 1928 Bombay 269 (DB) and PLD 1964 Peshawar 159.
44. Hence, on the basis of mutation, nobo dy can become the owner nor there is a presumption of title in his favour .
Reliance is placed upon (i) PLD 1970 Peshawar 141, (ii) 1985 CLC (Karachi) 2238, (iii) PLD 1994 Supreme Court 245, (iv) 2001 SCMR 338 and (v) 2005 CLC (Karachi) 1937.
45. It is pertinent to mention here that there was an identical case viz. F.C. Suit No. 86 of 1976, filed by Lakha Dino and others against the Government of Pakistan and others for declaration and injunction in respect of the land situated in Deh Fouji Ghat in Cantonment Area. The said suit was dismissed by judgment 08-12-1986 by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Hyderabad. An appeal against said judgment, filed by Lakha Dino and others, was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge, Hyderabad, by judgment dated 21-10-1987. Against the said judgment dated 21-10-1987, Civil Revision, preferred by the Government of Pakistan and others in this Court was dismissed by judgment dated 27-10-1988. Against the said judgment dated 27-10-1988, Civil Appeal No. 23-K of 1989 was filed by the Government of Pakistan and others before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was allowed by Judgment dated 19-05-1991. The findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan contained in paragraph Nos. 8 to 1 1 are respectfully reproduced as under:- "8. We may observe that the respondents were the plaintif fs in the suit. They had sought declaration that they were the owners of the land and, therefore, the burden of proof was on them to prove their title. In para 8 of their plaint, they have relied upon the extract from the revenue record (deh form No. 1) for the year 1909, Wherein Government has been mentioned in Column No, 4, which indicates the nature of the land and in Column No.8, the Government has been shown as Khatedar , whereas under the Remark Column 25, the respondents' ancestors have been shown as cultivators. No document has been produced by the respondents for the period from 1910 to 1923-24 in order to indicate that during this period, the status of their ancestors was altered from that of cultivators to that of owners. The respondents have produced extract from Deh Form VI from the revenue record for the years 1924-25 to 1934-35 , wherein ...............
9. In the instant case, if we read the above extract from Deh form I of the year 1909 with the extracts from the field book for the years 1875, 1877, 1884 and 1885, it becomes evident that the land was Government Land in as much as observed hereinabove, the responden ts have not produced any document from the period 1910 to 1923-24 to indicate that the status of their ancestors was changed from being cultivators into owners We may also observe that even otherwise, the simpliciter entrie s in the revenue record do not provide foundation of title in the property , but they are mere items of evidence to prove the title as has been held by this Court in the case of Muhammad Bakhsh v . Zia Ullah and others (1983 SCMR 988 ).
10. We may also observe that from 1935-36 upto the date of filing of the suit which was filed on or about 10-04- 1976 for a period of 40 years, no document has been produced by the responden ts to indicate their title. We are inclined to hold that, on the basis of the above state of evidence on record, the learned Additional District Judge has in fact misread the evidence and recorded findings of fact which are not supp orted by the material on record.
The High Court failed to take notice of the above material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Additional District Judge warranting interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C.
Since the burden of proof was on the respondents, it was not even necessarily for the appellants to have produced any evidence as the respondents had failed to discharge the above burden. It was not even necessary for the learned Additional District Judge or the High Court to have referred to the evidence produced by the Appellant.
11. We would, therefore, allow the above appeal and set aside the Judgments/Decrees passed by the learned Additional District Judge and the learned Judge in chambers, and would resto re the Judgment/Decree of the learned Senior Civil Judge, dismissing the respondents' suit. However , there will be no Order as to Costs."
46. As per Articles 117, 118 and 122 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, heavy burden was on the shoulders of the respondent to prove his affirmative case of ownership through cogent and reliable evidence, which was in his special knowledge but he miserably failed to prove the same. It is also well settled princip le of law that party approaching Court for grant of relief would have to discharge his own burden and stand on his own legs to succeed and could not avail benefit of any weakness in the case of opposite party . Reliance placed on the case-law reported in 2010 SCMR 1630 .
47. Under the law, the respondent by his conduct is estopped to resile from his admissions by taking somersault.
Reliance is placed upon the case-law reported in (i) 1989 CLC (Quetta) 1819 and (ii) (2017 CLC Note 195, p.
219).
48. In view of the law and cases referred to above and particularly judgment dated 19-05-1991 in Civil Appeal No. 23-K of 1989 (Government of Pakistan and others v. Lakha Dino and others) passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, it is not necessary for me to discuss written statement and evidence of the appellants when the respondent has miserably failed to prove his af firmative case.
49. So far as the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondent, that the impugned judgment of the first Appellate Court was in accordance with the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 31, C.P.C. is concerned, he has failed to satisfy me as to how the said judgment fulfilled the requirements of Order XLI, Rule 31, C.P.C. and therefore his contention is devoid of force in view of my discussion in supra paragraphs.
50. The next contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the ownership of the respondent has been proved by documentary evidence (Exhibits 49 to 54) has no force in view of my above discussion. Moreover , the next submission of learned counsel for the respondent regarding entries in record of rights and Jamabandi, which according to him have got presumption of correctness until and unless rebutted, otherwise, such old record cannot be rejected. In order to substantiate his submission, he placed reliance on the case law reported as (i) PLD 1964 Supreme Court 329, (ii) 1991 SCMR 1369 , (iii) 1990 SCMR 725, (iv) 2009 YLR (Peshawar) 1516, (v) 1989 SCMR 1563 and (vi) PLD 1984 Peshawar 278. In my humble view, the ease law reported in PLD 1964 Supreme Court 329 and 1991 SCMR 1369 are completely on a different point and therefore the same are not at all applicable to the instant matter . So far as the principle of law laid down in the case-law reported in (1) 1990 SCMR 725, (ii) 2009 YLR (Peshawar) 1516, (iii) 1989 SCMR 1563 and (iv) PLD 1984 Peshawar 278 is concerned, there is no cavil with the settled principle of law that revenue record and Jamabandi have got presumption of correctness, unless and until rebutted but this principle of law is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant matter for the reasons already stated in above paragraphs.
51. The next contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that General Land Register (GLR) does not create or determine question of title but merely maintains record of transaction between the parties has no force for the reasons already stated in above paragraphs.
52. The next contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that neither any proof of allotment of acquisition of the subject land in favour of the appellants has been produced nor cancellation of the entry of the predecessor of respondent has been produced by the appellants has devoid of force for the reasons already stated in the above paragraphs.
53. So far as the next contention of the learned counsel for the respondent in respect of verification of written statement is concerned, that the same was verified only by deputy military estate officer Hyderabad, who had no authority on behalf of the appellants Nos. 1 and 3 to file the same, therefore, the said written statement cannot be considered as written statement of the appellants Nos. 1 and 3. Order VI, Rule 1, C.P.C. defines the word "Pleading" means plaint or written statement. Order VI, Rule 14, C.P.C. provides regarding pleading to be signed and Order VI, Rule 15, C.P.C. provides regarding verification of pleadings. It is nowhere prairie that all the parties should have signed and verified the pleadings but one party out of several parties can sign and verify the pleadings. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is misconceived and untenable in law. Apart from this, since the respondent being the plaintif f has failed to prove his affirmative case, there is no need to discuss written statement or defence evidence for the reasons already stated in above paragraphs.
54. Sum up of above discussion is that Issue No. 3 is answered that the respondent is not the owner of the subject land, Issue No. 4 is answered that the subject land is the land of Government of Pakistan, Issue No. 5 is answered that the entries made in revenue record in respect of the subject land in the name of the predecessor of respondent are not authentic and relevant and hence invalid, Issue No.6 is answered that the entries in General Land Register
(GLR) are legal and valid, amended Issue No.1 has not been proved by the respondent by any documentary evidence and amended Issue No.2 is answered that late Wadero Arz Muhammad or his successors had not become the owner of the subject land in any manner whatsoever .
55. So far as Issues Nos. 1 and 2 and amended Issue No. 3 are concerned, the initial burden was on the shoulders of the respondent to prove that the instan t suit is filed within time and cannot be dismissed under Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Reliance can be placed upon the case-law reported in (i) PLD 1947 Privy Council 322 and (ii) PLD 1959 Lahore 295 .
56. The respondent has failed to prove that the instant suit was filed within the period of limitation. On the contrary , upon the admissions of the respondent in his pleadings and evidence, it is proved that the instant suit is ex-facie time barred and fit to be dismissed on the ground of limitation under Section 3 of the Limitation Act.
57. Admittedly , the respondent had knowledge that the appellants were leasing out the disputed land to various persons by executing lease deeds durin g the lifetime of his father , who died 20/25 years back prior to filing of instant suit but neither the respondent nor his father filed suit for cancellation of the said lease deeds though the respondent under the law was required to file suit for cancellation of the said lease deeds within three years as stipulated in Article 91 of the Limitation Act. Even, the respondent has not claimed relief of cancellation of the said lease deeds in the instant suit. Reliance is placed upon the case-law reported in (i) 2006 YLR (Lahore) 1090, (ii)
2015 YLR (Sindh) 1569 and (iii) 2017 YLR (Sindh) 1691.
58. As per Article 120 of the Limitation Act, suit for declaration of ownership was to be filed within six years.
Reliance is placed upon the case-law reported in (i) 2003 CLC (Karachi) 1521, (ii) 2010 SCMR 1630 , (iii) 2010 YLR (Lahore) 3002 and (iv) 2016 MLD (Lahore) 1723.
59. Admittedly , the respondent neither filed any suit against the Revenue Authorities regarding mutation of his name nor filed any suit for declaration of his ownership and possession against the appellants within six years. The instant suit, admittedly , is filed after 20/25 years of the death of the respondent's father , which is hopelessly time barred.
60. As per Article 142 of the Limitation Act, suit for possession has to be filed within twelve years. Reliance is placed upon the case-law reported in PLD 2003 Karachi 162 .
61. Though, the respondent is not entitled for the benefit of Article 142 of the Limitation Act as his main relief is for declaration of ownership, for which, limita tion is six years as per Article 120 of the Limitation Act, even then, if he should be given benefit of Article 142 of the Limitation Act, the instant suit for possession is time barred as it was filed after 20/25 years from the death of the father of the respondent.
62. Under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, the Court is bound to dismiss time barred suit as the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act are mandatory . Reliance is placed upon the case-law reported in (1) PLD 2011 Karachi 426,
(ii) 2015 SCMR 380 , (iii) 2017 YLR (Peshawar) 229, (iv) 2017 YLR (Sindh) 1691 and (v) SBLR 2018 Sindh 396 .
63. Apart from the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, it is the bounden duty of the Court to notice the question of limitation irrespective of the fact whether the question had been agitated or not. Reliance is placed upon the case-law reported in (i) PLD 2002 Supreme Court 403 and (ii) 2009 YLR (Karachi) 451. It is a settled law that period of limitation once started running would not stop and once full period of limitation expired, then, there would be no revival of cause of action afresh. Reliance is placed upon the case-law reported in (i) PLD 2006 Karachi 593, (ii) PLD 2006 (Karachi) 621 and (iii) 2007 YLR (Karachi) 2215 . It also well settled principle of law that law of limitation cannot be considered merely formality or technicality but the same is required to be observed and taken into consideration being mandatory in nature. Reliance is placed upon the case-law reported in (i) PLD 2015 Supreme Court 212 and (ii) PLD 2016 Supreme Court 712.
64. Thus, it is proved that, the instant suit is time bared and fit to be dismissed.
65. Apart from this, the instant suit is also barred by the Doctrine of Estoppel as the respondent was aggrieved person and therefore, he had a right rather a duty to object thereto to safeguard his right, which he failed to do so for a long period of more than 20 years and hence the respondent has waived his right and is now estopped by his own conduct and silence to file instant suit. Reliance is placed upon the case-law reported in PLD 2015 Supreme Court 212.
66. Sum up of above discussion is that amended Issue No. 3 is answered that the instant suit is time-barred, Issue No. 1 is answered that the instant suit is not maintainable in law and Issue No. 2 is answered that no cause of action had accrued to the respondent for filing the instant suit.
67. The upshot of above discussion is that the above appeal is allowed and judgment and decree of the learned District Judge is set aside and judgment and decree dated 30.07.2010 and 31.07.2010 respectively of the learned Senior Civil Judge is restored, consequently the instant suit of the respondent is dismissed.