1. ' This order will dispose of IInd Appeals Nos. 363/78 and 473/78. The parties in both these appeals are common and in respect of both the premises which are subject-matter of these appeals, the first appellate Court granted ejectment on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement of respondent.
2. ' The respondent in the above cases, who is the landlady of the premises applied for eviction of the appellants on the ground of default and personal requirements. The ejectment applications were dismissed by the Rent Controller on both the grounds but on appeal the first appellate Court granted ejectment in both the cases on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement . Of respondent. The appellants have challenged in these appeals the order of first appellate Court granting their ejectment on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement of respondent. The learned counsel for the appellants has contended before me that the ground of personal and bona fide requirement as stated in the ejectment application related to the requirement of the grand children and daughter-in-law of respondent's deceased son and as such the application for ejectment on the ground of their requirement was not maintainable. It is further contended by the learned counsel that in so far the requirement of respondent was concerned there was sufficient evidence on record to show that the present accommodation in her occupation was sufficient to meet her requirement. It is also contended on behalf of the appellants that the applications filed by the respondent were mala fide inasmu ch as both after and prior to the filing of these applications some premises in the same building fell vacant which were let out by the respondent to other person and at least one premises was still in occupation of respondent at the time the ejectment applications were filed in Court. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that the needs expressed by the respondent should not be confined strictly to her personal requirement but should be liberally construed so as to include the requirement of the gland children of the respondent specially in the circumstances of the present case. It is however conceded by the learned counsel for the respondent that if the needs in respect of the grand children of the deceased son of respondent is excluded from the perview of the requirement expressed by the respondent then the present accommodation in occupation of the respondent was sufficient for her personal need. The requirement expressed by the respondent it is contended by the counsel, in the present cases, for accommodating her grand children should be construed as the needs of the family of respondent in the circumstances of the case. In order to appreciate the point involved in the cases it is necessary to examine the allegation of personal and bona fide requirement made by the respondent in the ejectment cases. In Rent Case No, 77/75 the personal and bona fide needs were expressed in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the application as follows:- "(5) That the applicant is a strict purdahnashin .Vidow and does not appear in public and stays at home. She was looked after by her only son Abdul Baqui son of Ghulam Mohiuddin, who died recently.
(6) That as the existing accommodation with the applicant consisting of only one room is inadequate, she cannot put the children of her son Abdul Baqui with herself and his five other family members in the same room. The applicant requires the said premises in good faith for the occupation of herself and her grand children genuinely.
3. ' Similarly in the other Rent Case No, 78/75 the personal requirement of the respondent is expressed in paragraph 3 of the application as under :- "(3) That as the existing accommodation with the applicant consisting of only one room is inadequate she cannot put the children of her son Abdul Baqui with herself who has one wife 2 sons and 2 daughters in the same room. The said son of the applicant resided in another building which is far away from the house of the applicant. The applicant requires in good faith the said house for occupation of herself and her grand children genuinely."
4. ' The respondent's attorney before the Controller stated on oath that the respondent is looking after the children and the widow of her deceased son Abdul Baqui after the death of her son and thus the total number of the respondent's family is 7 in number. The respondent is presently living in only one room while the accommodation in occupation of appellants in each of the above cases consist of one room each. It has come in the evidence that the bath-room and W. C. Is common to the accommodation occupied by the respondent and the appellants. It is true that in the evidence it has also come that some of the premises in the building fell vacant during pendency of the applications for ejectment which were let out to other persons but all such premises were on the upper floors of the building while the respondent is occupying the premises on the ground floor of the same building an the premises in occupation of appellants are also on the ground floor. In these circumstances the need expressed by the respondent for occupying these premises for personal need appears to be reasonable. There is no doubt that landlady had the sole prerogative to select any of the premises out of several premises awned by her for her own use and occupation. The landlady in the present case is an old woman of 60 years of age and therefore her desire to occupy the premises on the ground floor in preference to the premises on the upper floors of the same building cannot be described as either unreasonable or mala fide. It is however,, to be seen, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants, whether the application for ejectment filed against the appellants on the ground that the premises were needed by the respondent to accommodate the grand children of her deceased son was within the purview of the provision of section 13 (3) (a) (i) (a) of the Ordinance. It is contended by the learned counsel that the expression his children used in the section cannot be extended so as to include the grand children of the landlord. In support of his contention the learned counsel has relied upon the case of Muhammad Zahoor v. Ch. Saleh Muhammad. In the above-cited case the ejectment of tenant was granted by Rent Controller which was confirmed by the first appellate Court on the ground that the premises were required by the landlord to accommodate his grand children who wanted to stay in the premises in connection with their studies. However in 2nd appeal the learned Single Judge set aside the order of ejectment on the ground that the application for eviction on the ground of use and occupation of the premises by the grand children of landlord was not maintainable under section 13(3) (a) (i) (a) of the Ordinance. The above case cited though supports the contention of the learned counsel but is distinguishable. In that case the landlord did not want the premises to accommodate the grand children with himself as part of his family but wanted the same as a separate and independent accommodation for them. In my humble view while considering the personal and bona fide requirement of the landlord, the same cannot be confined strictly to the landlord's personal need only but such requirement is to be liberally construed so as to include the requirement of such other members of the family of landlord who were either dependent on the landlord for such accommodation or who under the circumstances have become a part of his family and are dependent for that purpose on him. In the case of Adam Ali Hassan v. Arbab Bhai, it was held by a Division Bench of erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan while repelling the contention of the appellant in that case that an application on the ground of personal and bona fide requirement of the landlady under section 13(3) (a) of the Ordinance cannot be filed on the ground of requirement of her ailing husband, that such an application is maintainable and the requirement expressed by the landlady was within the purview of the law.
5. The relevant passage appears at page 438 of the report of that case as follows :- "In our view, such a construction of the expression "for his own occupation" would lead to absurd results. We think that this expression embraces not only the needs of the owner, but also the needs of his family. The words "or for the occupation of any of his children" merely relate to situation where an owner desires to provide independent and separate residence for his married or grown- up children. We are supported in our view by the provisions of sub-clause (b) of clause (i) of subsection (3) which enables a landlord to apply for eviction of the tenant if 'he is not occupying another residential building, suitable for his needs at the time"
6. ' Mr. Fakhruddin was unable to convince us that the expression "needs" here is restricted to the individual and personal requirements of the landlord, independently of the needs of his family."
7. ' I am, therefore of the view that in a case where the landlord applies for vacation of the premises on the ground that he wanted to provide independent and separate residence for his grand children, such an application will not be maintainable under section 13 (a) (i) (a) of the Ordinance as such requirements of the landlord does not fall within the purview of that section. However, where landlord expresses his need for personal requirement and in support of that plea it is urged that he wanted to provide the accommodation to the grand children of one of the deceased son or daughter who are dependent on the landlord after death of his son then the situation will be substantially different and in such a case the requirement of the landlord is to be viewed with the object whether in such a condition the requirements expressed by the landlord were these of his family members. In the case before me it has come in evidence that before institution of the case the respondent on 230 May, 1973 through her Advocate served a notice on the appellants asking them to vacate the premises on the ground that she being a Pardanasheen lady was looked after by her son Abdul Baqi who was residing elsewhere and that she needed the accommodation in occupation of the appellant to accommodate her son Abdul Baqi who had a family consisting of wife, two sons and two daughters with herself. However, when the application was filed in Court the admitted position on record is that her son Abdul Baqi had died and the requirement was, therefore, in these circumstances expressed by the landlady with regard to sons, daughters and the widow of her deceased son Abdul Baqi. It was admitted by the opponent and all his witnesses1 2 that one of the grand sons of landlady who is College-going boy was already residing with the respondent and it is also in the evidence of the attorney of the respondent that the family of the deceased Abdul Baqi is being looked after by the applicant after the death of Abdul Baqi. In these circumstances, in my view the need expressed by the landlady/respondent could be legitimately described and considered as the need of her family. In the present circumstances of the case it cannot be urged that the family of the landlady should be construed only as consisting of herself. Admittedly the landlady is a widow and her only son Abdul Baqi had died and therefore in such circumstances in my view no exception can be taken for treating the grand children of her only deceased son Abdul Baqi as part of the family of respondent specially in the circumstances when it has come in evidence that these children of her deceased son are looked after by her. It was not a case where the landlady was trying to obtain vacation of the premises for providing an independent and separate accommodation for her grand children. The evidence on record disclose that the accommodation was required by the landlady to accommodate the grand children of her deceased son as members and part of her family. The first appellate authority was therefore, justified in reversing the order of the Rent Controller on the plea of bona fide and personal requirement and granting the ejectment of the appellants from the premises on that ground.
8. ' In view of above discussion I feel no reason to interfere with the order of the first appellate authority and dismiss these appeals. However as the appellants had succeeded before the Court of first instance the parties shall bear their own costs in these appeals. The appellants are allowed four months time to vacate the premises in their occupation. PLD 1980 Lab. 125 PLD 1967 Kar. 437