This is a Second Appeal filed by the appellant/tenant challenging the impugned order dated 16-10- 1978 of the III Rent Controller, Karachi, allowing Rent Case No. 1205 of 1972 filed by the respondents/landlords and ordering ejectment of the appellant and the impugned order dated 12- 9-1981 of the IV Additional District Judge, Karachi, dismissing First Rent Appeal No. 595/78 filed by.
The appellant. The Rent case was filed by both the respondents on the ground of personal use of respondent No. 2 who is the daughter of respondent No. 1.
2. I have heard Mr. Niaz Ahmad Khan, learned counsel for the appellant, in support of the present Second Appeal. The rent application was filed by both the respondents (father and the daughter) before the Rent Controller on 18-5-1972 on the ground that the house in question was required by respondent No. 2 (the daughter) bona fide for her own use. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that respondent No. 1 (the father) was the landlord of the appellant and not respondent No. 2 (the daughter) and as such the Rent Application could not be allowed on the; ground on which the same was filed. In this connection, reference may be made to para. 4 of the Rent Application filed by the two respondents which is to the effect that the house in question was "let out to the opponent (appellant) by the applicant No. 1 (respondent No. 1) on behalf of applicant No. 2 (respondent No. 2)". By para. 4 of his written statement, the appellant has admitted para. 4 of the Rent Application. It .Is, therefore, an admitted position that the house in question was let out to the appellant by respondent No. 1 on behalf of respondent No. 2. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant was not the tenant of respondent No. 2, in the circumstances, has no substance. Further, if any such pie had been raised in the written statement filed by the appellant before the Rent' Controller, an issue would have been framed and a finding given by the Rent Controller thereon. Admittedly, no such plea was raised in the written statement and no issues was asked to be framed on behalf o the appellant on this question. Learned counsel- in this connection relied upon the case of Muhammad Israil v. Amritalal PLD 1961 Dacca 25and Faquir Muhammad v. Mullah Mahmood PLD 1973 Quetta 1. These authorities are not relevant and do not support the contention of learned counsel for the reasons already mentioned, namely, the admission of the appellant in para. 4 of his written statement and not taking up this point specifically in the pleadings and not asking for an issue to be framed on this point. . ,
3. It is next contended that respondent No. 1, the father, had not filed any power of attorney in this case. I find from the record of the Rent Controller in this case that the Rent Application had been signed by both the, respondents, they being applicants Nos. I and 2 therein, and vakalatnama was also given by both the respondents to their Advocate. Evidence in this case has been given by respondent No. 1 before the Rent Controller not only as an applicant in that case but also as the father of respondent No. 2. Even otherwise no question was put in the cross-examination of respondent No. 1 regarding the power of attorney. "There is no substance in this contention.
4. The other contention of learned counsel for .The appellant is that ate the time the evidence was given by respondent No. 1, respondent No. 2 was in London and, therefore, the Rent Application should have been dismissed. In this connection, the statement of respondent No. 1 was that respondent No. 2 had gone to London temporarily and this evidence has been believed by the two Tribunals below and I have not been persuaded by learned counsel for the appellant to interfere with this concurrent 'finding 'if fact. In any case, I find it difficult to accept the contention that if a rent application on the ground of personal use is filed in 1972 and it takes several years for decision of such an application, the applicant must throughout remain in Karachi where the Rent Application has been filed and if the applicant goes out temporarily for a certain period, the rent application on the ground of personal bona fide use is liable to rejection.
5. The next contention raised by learned counsel is that respondent No. I had asked for enhancement of rent and had also asked that if the appellant wanted he could buy the property in question and, therefore, the Tribunals below should have come to the conclusion that the house was not required by respondent No. 2. The Tribunals below have dealt with this contention by observing that respondent No. 1 bad asked the appellant initially to raise the rent if he was not willing to vacate, so that from the higher rent another house could be rented out by respondent No. 2, and that if the appellant was not ready to vacate the premises he may buy the same to that from the proceeds thereof another house could be purchased for use by respondent No. 2.
According to me, the view taken by the Tribunals below in this behalf is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. I am not inclined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the two Tribunals below on this question.
6. The last contention raised by Mr. Niaz Ahmad Khan is that the social and economic conditions and the principles of Shariah as well should have been kept into consideration by the Tribunals below while deciding the Rent Application filed by the respondents. According to learned counsel, respondent No. 2 comes from a rich family and therefore, she must-have been married to a rich person, and in the circumstances it could not be believed that the husband of respondent No. 2 had no house of his own. The con--tention has no merit. Just because respondent No. 2 comes from an affluent family, a presumption cannot be raised that her husband must be owning a residential property. It is the case of respondents that the house in question is the only house of respondent No. 2 and that neither she nor her husband own any other house. It was then contended - by learned counsel that according to Shariah, it is the responsibility of the husband to maintain hi wife and in the circumstances, a Muslim married lady cannot file a Rent Application for ejectment of the tenant on the, ground that she requires the premises, for her use. On the record, it has been established, and it has been believed by the two Tribunals below, that the house in question was the only property of respondent No. 2 and that she and her husband were living in a rented house and that slid required this - house for her bona fide personal use. In the face of this position. On record the two Tribunals below have come to the correct conclusion.
7. 1 see no merit in this Second Appeal which is dismissed in limine. The appellant is, however, granted time till 28-2-1982 to vacate the premises.