1. This civil revision raises three legal points for determination; period of limitation prescribed for filing of a revision petition in the High Court; in default of express prescription of specific period of limitation by the statute, the practice followed by the Court as regards the limitation-period for filing of the revision petition before it; power of the Court to entertain the revision petition beyond the unprescribed period of limitation and rule of laches applicable to it. Fourth point touched on the merits of the case for interference in revisional jurisdiction.
2. A brief reference to the facts of the case shall assist proper perception of the points requiring decision in it. Plot No. 318/13 situated at Ghulam Muhammadabad, Faisalabad was jointly auction- purchased by Abdul Ghafoor and Allah Ditta. Each held a half share of it. Abdul Ghafoor was alleged to have agreed for the sale of his half-share in the plot for a sum of Rs.10,000 to Khadim Hussain on 28-5-1973. Agreement for sale was simultaneously reduced in writing between them.
3. Agreement to sell was Exh. P.1 and the receipt showing payment of the sale price in it was Exh.P.2.
4. Possession of a portion of the plot was allegedly delivered by Abdul Ghafoor to Khadim Hussain. As the sale under the agreement did not materialize, Khadim Hussain plaintiff instituted a civil suit for specific performance of agreement to sell against Abdul Ghafoor in the Civil Court at Faisalabad on 27-7-1981. Abdul Ghafoor defendant resisted the suit on number of pleas. The trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit on 19-11-1987, and appeal preferred from the decree of the trial Court by the plaintiff was dismissed on 28-3-1991 by learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad.
5. Thereupon, a revision petition was presented in this Court on 21-12-1993. Office raised an objection on account of bar of limitation. Learned counsel tried to meet it by saying that Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was applicable to the revision petition which prescribed a period of three years for it and, therefore, it was instituted in time. Consequently, the revision petition was placed before the Bench for hearing.
6. First point for decision would be, whether Limitation Act, 1908 prescribed any period of limitation for filing of the revision. Learned counsel argued that residuary Article 181 of First Schedule of Limitation Act, 1908, which prescribed a period of three years, applied to the filing of revision petitions in the High Court and relied upon the cases in Thakur Chandra Pratap Singh v. Thakur Bindeshwari Prasad Singh and another AIR 1942 Oudh 340, Muhammad Swaleh and another v. Messrs United Grain and Fodder Agencies PLD 1964 SC 97, Ghulam Akhtar v. Sardar and 5 others PLD 1987 Lahore 613, Mubarik v. Abdul Rashid 1989 CLC 324 (Multan Bench), Haji Muhammad Islam v. Muhammad Rafique and 2 others 1991 CLC 84 (Lahore). In the last case, a learned Single Judge of this Court observed: "The revision petition instituted by a party is nothing but an application which can be filed within a period of three years as provided under Article 181 of Limitation Act. If filed within a period of three years, a revision petition can neither be held to be time---barred nor one suffering from laches". In taking this view, the learned Judge referred to and relied upon the case of Muhammad Swaleh v. Messrs United Grain and Fodder Agencies PLD 1964 SC 97. Learned counsel for the petitioner heavily relied upon this observation for attracting Article 181 of the Limitation Act to the filing of the revision petition and submitted that the instant case was instituted well within time.
7. As against this view, there is a large number of cases holding that Limitation Act made no provision for an application for revision but it was the usual practice of the Courts not to entertain petitions for revision filed beyond ninety days prescribed for filing of an appeal to the High Court. In this behalf, cases in Mahant Goswa mi Krishnadevanand Ramji v. Mahant Kapildeo Ramji AIR 1942 Patna 251, Sampatlal Keshan and others v. Baliprasad and others AIR 1950 Assam 6, Nani Lal De and others v. Tirthalal De and others AIR 1953 Calcutta 513, Sant Ram v. Mt. Amrawati and others AIR 1953 Bilaspur 9, Ramchandra v. Pannalal AIR 1954 Rajasthan 191, Nannulal v. Radha Kishan AIR 1956 Bhopal 16, Rohtas Industries Ltd. And another v. P.N. Gour, Receiver of Muth Hills and others AIR 1957 Patna 16, Sher A.I alias Sk. Sher A.I v. Sk. Masud and others AIR 1959 Calcutta 457, Gordhansingh and others v. Suwalal and Kalyanbux and others AIR 1959 Rajasthan 156. The practice of almost all the High Courts was to entertain applications in revision only if they are filed within three months of the date of the order sought to be revised. In the case of Manager, Jammu and Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar PLD 1975 SC 687 (at page 698) it was held that no limitation was prescribed by Limitation Act, 1908 or by any rule in the High Court Rules and Orders (Lahore) for filing revision petition under section 115, Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, the High Court could entertain petitions even beyond the formal unprescribed period of ninety days, if satisfied as regards delay in filing the petition. It was expressly ruled that Limitation Act provided no rule of limitation for filing of revision petition in the High Court. In Rehmat A.I v. Allah Ditta and others PLD 1989 Lahore 64, Muhammad Qayyum, J. Also took the same view. In Musharaf Sultana v. Fazal Hussain 1992 CLC 1394 (Lahore), I also subscribed to the same view. Rule deducible from the above case law clearly favoured the proposition that no period of limitation was prescribed in the Limitation Act for exercise of its power of revision by the High Court. Nonetheless, ninety days period as a rule of practice was insisted upon for observance by the High Court. Any delay beyond this period was required to be explained by the party invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the Court. However, unprescribed period of limitation did not affect the power of the High Court to suo motu interfere in revision for undoing miscarriage of justice. In India, in the Limitation Act, 1963, the Legislature provided a period of ninety days in Article 131 of the Act for exercise of powers of revision under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Obviously, the predecessor Act had not prescribed any period for an application for revision. In my view, therefore, Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was clearly inapplicable for an application for revision under section 115, Civil Procedure Code.
8. The other question related to- the principle of laches. The revision petition was filed in this Court on 21-12-1993. The judgment sought to be revised in it was dated 28-3-1991. Certified copies of the record annexed with the Civil revision were obtained in the month of April, 1991. Nonetheless, filing of the civil revision in the High Court was delayed till 21-12-1993. There was no explanation worth the name for causing inordinate delay in the filing of the civil revision. In Ahmad Sheikh v. Paris Museum AIR 1959 Jammu and Kashmir 76, it was observed that although the Legislature had not prescribed any period of limitation within which the revision application should be filed yet it has been the uniform practice of this Court and also of the other Indian High Courts that the revision application should be filed without delay within the period prescribed for filing an appeal unless some good reasons are shown for the delay in filing the revision application. Reliance for this view was placed on the rulings in G.I.P. Railway v. Kunj Behari Lal AIR 1926 Allahabad 228, Kailash and Brothers v.
9. Durga Parshad AIR 1933 Lahore 175, Kesho Prasad Singh v. Mohendra Prasad AIR 1933 Patna 582. As said above, no explanation was given for the much delayed filing of civil revision in this Court. There were no special circumstances either in the case for the High Court to overlook and condone this extraordinary delay of more than two years and eight months. Civil revision was, therefore, hit by gross laches. The revision petition, therefore, merited dismissal on this score also.
10. At this stage, it may be appropriate to make a reference to the civil suit instituted by Abdul Ghafoor and Abdul Rashid for possession of the property in dispute from Khadim Hussain. On contest, the suit for possession was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs on 19-11-1987. On appeal by Khadim Hussain defendant, the judgment of the trial Court was maintained on 28-3-1991 by Additional District Judge, Faisalabad. The judgment and decree given in appeal in the suit for possession affirming those of the trial Court were not assailed further. Consequently, those attained finality under the law.
11. As regards merits of the civil revision, it has none. Both the Courts below on appreciation of evidence led at the trial found that agreement to sell respecting the property in dispute between Abdul Ghafoor and Khadim Hussain and payment of consideration under it were not satisfactorily proved and consequently dismissed the suit for specific performance instituted by Khadim Hussain against Abdul Ghafoor. Agreement to sell is dated 28-5-1973. It is Exh. P.1 on file. Receipt Exh. P.2 showed payment of the sale price in the sum of Rs.10,000 by Khadim Hussain to Abdul Ghafoor.
12. Exh.P.1 was scribed by Muhammad Siddique petition-writer P.W.3. On his own admission, parties were not personally known to him. Further, sale consideration was not paid in his presence. Thumb- impression of Abdul Ghafoor on Exh.P.1 was smudged. Rustam A.I P.W.1 was a marginal witness of the sale agreement EXh.P.I. His testimony in cross-examination was a clear volte-face from his statement given in in-chief examination regarding execution of Exh.P.1 and payment of sale price in the sum of Rs.10,000. Statement by Muhammad Iqbal P.W.2 further belied the case set up in the plaint by the plaintiff. An agreement and the receipt allegedly executed by Abdul Ghafoor in favour of Muhammad Iqbal handed over by the latter to Khadim Hussain were not brought on the file. It was common ground that Khadim Hussain had not paid the sale price in the sum of Rs.10,000 to Abdul Ghafoor. Khadim Hussain himself did not appear in the witness-box. His son Shabbir Hussain acted as his attorney and gave his statement as P.W.4 on 12-11-1987. His statement did not advance the case set up in the plaint. In fact, it contradicted the version stated in the plaint. In rebuttal, agreement to sell with Khadim Hussain and receipt of consideration from him were denied. Upon this view of the record, the lower Courts found against the plaintiff. In my opinion, record was correctly read by them for non-suiting the plaintiff. On the existing record, there was no scope for a different view.
13. As a result of the above, civil revision is dismissed in limine on account of laches and for want of merit in it.