{{page cut}} ' This revision petition arises out of a suit for possession through pre-emption, filed on 28-8-1985 by the plaintiff/petitioner seeking to pre-empt the sale of land made by Mst. Bashir Begum in favour of respondents and one Muhammad Sabir of an area measuring 100 Kanals 2 Marlas, situate in Chak.
No,341/WB Tehsil Lodhran, District Multan, hrough Mutation No,44 sanctioned on 29th August, 1974.
The superior light of pre-emption was claimed on the ground that the petitioner s owner in the estate while- the respondents were strangers.
' The suit was conceded by one of the vendees, Muhammad and was decreed against him to the extent of his share on 18th ry, 1978. The respondents Nos. 1 and 2, however, contested by filing a written statement which led to the framing of 11 issues Nos.1 to 7 were conceded by the respondents Nos.1 and 2, so was the sale price of Rs,65,000. The contest between the parties was thus confined to Issue No,8 relating to superior right of pre-emption. The learned trial Court on 27th of July, 1979 decreed the suit filed by the petitioner holding that he had superior right of pre-emption as against the respondents.
3. This decree and judgment of the learned trial Court was challenged by the respondents by filing an appeal before the District Judge, Multan which was heard by Malik Shahbaz Khan, Addl. District Judge, Multan. Notwithstanding the fact that all other issues had been given up by the respondents before the learned trial Court, the learned Addl. District Judge allowed them to raise the plea of limitation and held that the suit was barred by time, as according to the learned Addl. District Judge, limitation in the present case was to be computed from the date when the possession was obtained by the respondents which was found to be 28th of August, 1974. The learned Addl. District Judge, further held that the suit had been valued for the purpose of court-fee and jurisdiction at a ridiculously low amount at the time of its filing; that the conduct of the petitioner was contumacious and mala fide and as such he should not be granted time to make up the deficiency in the court-fee. On these two findings the appeal was accepted by the learned Addl.
District Judge. These findings have been assailed by the petitioner in this revision petition.
4. Both the grounds which prevailed with the learned Addl. District Judge for acceptance of the appeal are wholly untenable. The suit in the present case was filed on 28th of August, 1975 during the summer vacations. Even if, according to the findings of the learned Addl. District Judge, the limitation ran from the date of delivery of possession i.e, 28th of August, 1974, the petitioner was entitled under the law to file the suit on the first day of reopening of the Court, i.e, 1st September, 1974. The suit, therefore, having been filed on 28th of August, 1974, could not have been held to be barred by time. The learned counsel for the respondents, when confronted with this situation, was not in a position to defend the judgment of the learned trial Court.
5. The other question, regarding the deficiency of court-fee at the time of filing of the suit, stands conclusively decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Siddique Khan and 2 others v.
Abdul Shakoor and another (PLD 1984 SC 289). It has been authoritatively laid down that the plaintiff is entitled as of right to an opportunity to make up the deficiency in payment of court-fee which should be quantified by the Court and if during the time allowed by it, the deficiency is made up, the plaintiff cannct be non-suited. In the present case, it is not denied that the deficiency of court-fee was made up within the time granted by the trial Court. Consequently, both the reasons which prevailed with the learned Addl. District Judge, are not well-founded and his findings in this respect are not sustainable.
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7. The learned counsel for the respondents has, however, raise an objection that the revision petition was not within time and, any case, it suffers from laches and undue delay. It was pointed by the learned counsel that the petitioner had earlier filed No,414/82, which was dismissed for non- prosecution on September, 1982 and the application for restoration of the also dismissed on 9-10- 1982. Subsequently this revision petition was filed on 7-11-1982. The learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of the period spent by him in prosecuting the earlier revision petition or the application for restoration. On these basis it was contended that the present revision petition which was filed after 4 months and 22 days, is barred by time and is liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation.
8. {{{PAGE CUTT}} In the alternative, it is contended that since the revision petition was filed beyond the period of 90 days from the date of the decree of the trial Court, the same suffers from laches and should be dismissed as such, especially when no explanation for the delay beyond 90 days has been furnished by the petitioner. The learned counsel placed reliance upon Aziz Din and another v. Qadir Bakhsh and 2 others (PLD 1987 Lah. 119) and Manager, Jammu and Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khudayar and another (PLD 1975 SC 678).
7. In my view, the contention of the learned counsel, as regards limitation is wholly unfounded. It is well-settled that there is no limitation prescribed for filing application for revision under section 115, C.P.C. It may be of advantage to state that at one time, an amendment was introduced in the Limitation Act in the form of Article 162-A which provided for 90 days limitation for filing the revision petition. However, this amendment was subsequently withdrawn. This clearly manifests the intention of the Legislature not to fix a particular period of time during which the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be attracted.
8. The other objection of the learned counsel that the revision suffers from laches, is, equally devoid of force. It was contended by him in this behalf that revision petition having been filed after 90 days, the petitioner should have explained each and every day's delay and in the absence of such an 'explanation the revision was liable to dismissal. In this context, it is of importance tc first of all appreciate the nature of the revisional jurisdiction and its scope. In the recent case of Karamat Hussain and others v. Muhammad Zaman and others (PLD 1987 SC 139), their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with section 115, C.P.C. Were pleased to observe that this provision conferred upon every person who has litigated before a Court subordinate to the High Court, the right to assert before the latter that the decision rendered by the subordinate Court against him is liable to correction under its revisional jurisdiction. It was further observed that revision is a right of party and not a matter of mere privilege or procedure. This true legal position with regard to the nature of right of revision has to be borne in mind before denying any person the right to move the High Court for the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
9. As already mentioned, there is no limitation provided in the Limitation Act for filing the revision nor have any rules been framed by the High Court in the exercise of its rule-making power providing limitation for filing revision petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Khuda Yar's case, (supra) wherein after taking notice of the authorities before them, it was observed that "the principle laid down in these authorities is that the revision petition filed beyond unprescribed period of 90 days could also be entertained if the Court was satisfied as to the reasons for the delay. On the strength of these observations, it was contended that if the revision petition is not filed within 90 days, this fact by itself is sufficient, in the absence of any explanation, for rejection of the petition. However, the learned counsel while making this submissions has lost sight of the subsequent observations in the same paragraph at page 698 to the following effect:-- "....It may also be relevantly mentioned in this context that no rule has been framed by any High Court under its rule-making powers prescribing limitation for revision. It is a well-known principle of the administration of justice that no litigant should be made to suffer at the hands of the Court. We have, therefore, no hesitation in overruling the objection taken on the ground of limitation."
' It is interesting to note that in the precedent case, their Lordships interfered notwithstanding the fact that the orders challenged in the revision were passed as far back as 6th of March, 1969, 11-1- 1971, 14-7-1971 and 2-11-1971 while the revision petition was filed in 1972. It thus becomes clear that the mere fact that a period of 90 days expired would not be by itself sufficient for non-suiting the petitioner in a revision petition.
10. The contention of the learned counsel that if each day's delay beyond the period of 90 days, is not explained, the revision petition on this ground alone, should be dismissed, is not acceptable. In making this submission the learned counsel has failed to kept the distinction between the laches and limitation in mind. Unlike limitation, delay simpliciter is no ground for dismissal of a cause unless it amounts to laches and is so inordinate or undue that to grant relief to one party would work injustice on the other. While dealing with the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction, which is akin to revisional jurisdiction, the Supreme Court in the recent case of Pakistan Post Office v.
Settlement Commissioner (1987 SCMR 1119) was pleased to observe that:-- "...There is absolutely no justification to equate laches with statutory bar of limitation. While the former operates as a bar in equity, the latter operates as a legal bar to the grant of remedy. Thus, in the former, all the dictates of justice and equity and balance of legitimate rights are to be weighed; in the latter, subject to statutory relaxations in this behalf, nothing is left to the discretion of the Court. It is a harsh law. Thus, passage of time per se brings the statute of limitation in operation, but the bar of laches does not deny the grant of right or slice the remedy unless the grant of relief, in addition to being delayed, must also perpetuate injustice to another party. It is also in this very context that the condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act will be on different harder considerations than those in a case of laches. For example, while it is essential to explain and condone the delay of each day vis-a-vis statutory limitation, there is no such strict requirement in cases of laches..........................
' Similar view was taken by this Court in Writ Petition No,255/84 Majidan Khanum v. District Judge, Vehari (1984 CLC 3270) and in the case of Muhammad Yusuf and another v. District Judge Gujranwala and another (PLD 1982 Lah. 690).
11. In Karamat ,Hussain's case referred to above, their Lordships were pleased to observe that the High Court may in certain circumstances in the exercise of its judicial discretion refuse to exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner, where the petitioner has approached the Court without reasonable cause with undue delay or his conduct was contumacious because of the existence of such other circumstances which disentitle him for relief. It was further observed that "indeed where the conditions for the exercise of revisional jurisdiction are satisfied the High Court should itself interfere. In the present case, second revision petition was filed after 41 months of the impugned order. During this period of time the petitioner had invoked the jurisdiction of. This Court by filing a revision which was, however, dismissed due to non-prosecution. It is, therefore, obvious that the petitioner has neither acquiesced nor accepted the correctness of the order challenged by him.
The learned counsel for the respondents has not been able to point out the prejudice which has been caused to the respondents by not filing the revision petition within 90 days as contended by him The petitioner cannot therefore, be non-suited on this ground alone especially when the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court have been found to be without any legal basis whatsoever and contrary to law. To allow such a decision to remain in the field would tantamount to perpetuating injustice which cannot be allowed to prevail. The reliance of the learned counsel on Aziz Din's case is not apt as in the precedent case the revision had been filed after 11 years of the impugned order which was considered to be inordinate in the circumstances of that case.
' For the foregoing reasons, this revision petition is accepted and the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge is set aside and that of the trial Court restored. No order as to costs.