This revision petition is directed against the judgment dated 14-9-1982 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Vehari, whereby he accepted the appeal of the respondents and rejected the application of the petitioners instituted by them under section 12(2), C.P.C. Before learned Civil Judge 1st Class, Vehari against the decree dated 1-6-1981 on the grounds that they were neither judgment-debtors nor his successors-in-interest.
2. Brief facts of the case are that Mst. Sakina Bibi respondent No.5 was allottee of 4/21 share out of land measuring 299 Kanals and 10 Marlas situated in Chak No.33/KB, Tehsil Burewala, District Vehari, who through an agreement dated 6-2-1980 agreed to sell the same to the petitioners for a sum of Rs.73,000. She received a sum of Rs.55,000 as advance money from them and delivered the possession of the land in question to them. The balance of Rs.18,000 was payable at the time of registration of the sale-deed. Subsequently respondents Nos.5 and 6 in a mala fide manner in order to wriggle out from the legal obligation got instituted a suit for possession through specific performance through respondents Nos. l to 4 wherein respondents Nos.5 and 6 made a consenting statement whereupon decree, dated 1-6-1981 was passed in their favour. The petitioners were not made party in the aforementioned suit, who on coming to know about this decree filed on application under section 12(2), C.P.C. In the Court of Civil Judge, Vehari on 15-6-1981 alongwith an application for grant of temporary injunction which was allowed by him vide order dated 28-2-1982 restraining the respondents from interfering in possession of the petitioners. They filed an appeal against the order of learned Civil Judge before learned District Judge, Vehari who vide impugned order dated 14-9-1982 accepted the appeal, set aside the order, dated 28-2-1982 and rejected the petitioners' application under section 12(2), C.P.C. Pending before the learned trial Judge.
3. The petitioners instead of challenging the aforesaid judgment of learned Additional District Judge in High Court filed a suit for declaration before learned Civil Judge, Vehari on 16-9-1982.
Alongwith the suit they filed an application for temporary injunction which was rejected by learned trial Judge on 24-11-1983. This order was assailed through appeal on 27-11-1983 before learned District Judge, Vehari. Presuming that the suit in its present form was not maintainable, the petitioners withdrew it with permission to file a fresh one. The petitioners thereafter filed the instant revision petition in this Court on 20-8-1984 against the original order dated 14-9-1982, which was admitted to regular hearing as back as on 16-1-1985.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in view of law declared by the Honourable Supreme Court in Ch. Jalal Din v. Mst. Asghari Begum and another 1984 SCMR page 586 the petitioner under section 12(2), C.P.C. Was maintainable although petitioners were not the judgment-debtors. On the question of limitation he submits that there is no limitation for filing a revision petition under section 115, C.P.C. In this behalf he has referred to Muhammad Swaleh etc. v.
Messrs United Grain and Fodder PLD 1964 SC 97 and Messrs Pakistan PharmaceLA!Ical Products Ltd.
And 4 others v. Karachi Building. Control Authority 1986 CLC 581.
5. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand has raised preliminary objection that this revision is hopelessly barred by time and is not maintainable. He has relied upon Khadim Hussain and others v. Mst. Fazlan Bibi and others 1997 MLD 411 and Binyameen and 3 others v. Chaudhry Hakim and another 1996 SCMR 336, and others referred hereinafter.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. There is no cavil with the proposition that the application filed by the petitioners under section 12(2), C.P.C. Was maintainable. Their lordships of the Supreme Court have in Ch. Jalal Din's case 1984 SCMR 586 distinguished the judgment of Lahore High Court reported as Muhammad Ilyas v. Azhar Hafeez Sheikh and others PLD 1981 Lah. 353 and have approved the judgment of Peshawar High Court in Abdur Rauf and others v. Abdur Rahim Khan PLD 1982 Pesh. 172 wherein it was laid down as under:-- "It is obvious that in section 12(2), C.P.C. The word 'person' and not the judgment-debtor or his successor-in-interest or the word party to the suit have been used, thus it would not be permissible to import into that provision of law something which has not been mentioned therein. It appears that the law-maker has purposely used the word person. Had the intention of the law-maker been to restrict the right of filing the application under section 12(2), C.P.C. Only to the judgment-debtor or his successor-in-interest or a person who was party thereto, then nothing was easier for the law-maker to have said so. If the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted then the very purpose behind enacting the aforesaid provision of law would be frustrated because then a person not being a judgment-debtor or his successor-in--interest or a party to the suit, although his right may have been jeopardized by the decree obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, shall be obliged to undergo the exercise of filing a suit for the purpose because a number of cases can be visualised in which fraudulent decrees are obtained in order to cast clouds on the legal rights of their opponents."
7. In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court, the petition under section 12(2), C.P.C. Filed by the petitioners was maintainable and had erroneously been dismissed by the learned Appellate Court vide the impugned order.
8. The objection of the learned counsel for the respondents that the revision petition is hopelessly barred by time is fatal to the present petition. The petitioners have filed this revision petition on 20- 8-1984 against the impugned judgment dated 14-9-1982 after about two years. As a practice a revision petition after 90 days cannot be entertained unless satisfactory explanation is furnished for the delay beyond the said period. Admittedly petitioners have not submitted any application under section 5 of the Limitation Act nor any explanation has been furnished for delay of about two years in filing the instant petition. They instead of challenging the order of learned Appellate Court in this Court preferred to institute a civil suit and wasted the time before the improper form. It has been held by the Honourable Supreme Court in Binyameen and 3 others v. Chaudhary Hakim and another 1996 SCMR 336 that:-- "No period of limitation was provided at the relevant time yet Revisional Court was duty bound to have examined whether in face of laches of five years, it ought to have exercised its discretion in favour of respondent-conduct of respondent is proceeding with case up to argument stage without any objection and resorting to file revision application after five years, completely underlined his mala fides and intention to prolong litigation against minors. Such conduct of respondent disentitled him from seeking remedy by filing revision..."
9.Similarly it was laid down in Elahi Bakhsh v. Muhammad Asam etc. PLD 1992 Lah. 349 that:-- "Revision petition should be filed within unprescribed period of 90 days. Delay should be satisfactorily explained in case revision petition is filed beyond this unprescribed period. Revision petition filed one year after passing of order without an application under section 5 of Limitation Act, 1908 or explanation for delay would merit dismissal as hopelessly time-barred. "
10. In case reported as Muhammad Mian v. Syed Shamimullah and 2 others PLD 1993 Kar. 146, a revision petition filed after lapse of over 12 months without furnishing justification for such delay was held to be incompetent as having been filed beyond reasonable time and accordingly dismissed.
11. In Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Muhammad Arshad and others 1992 CLC 2216 it was held by this Cburt that revision filed after ninety days could not be entertained unless satisfactory explanation was offered for delay in filing thereof. In this case the judgment of Supreme Court in Muhammad Swaleh etc. v. Messrs United Grain and Fodder Agencies PLD 1964 SC 1997 was considered and not relied upon on account of changed view of Supreme Court referred hereunder. An unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Feroze Khan etc. v. Zaman Ali etc. (Civil Revision No. 154-D of 1985) and Manager, Jammu and Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and others PLD 1975 SC 768 were also considered, therein it was held by the Supreme Court that although no limitation has been prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1908 or by any rule embodied in the High Court Rules and Orders for filing of a revision petition yet the High Court could entertain a revision petition even beyond the normal unprescribed period of 90 days if it is satisfied as regards delay in filing the revision petition.
12. The latest view of the Supreme Court in entertaining a revision after 90 days is based on the satisfactory explanation for the delay but where no such explanation is forthcoming the petition has to be dismissed as barred by time.
13. Last but not the least in Khadim Hussain and others v. Mst. Fazlan Bibi and others 1997 MLD 411 (Lahore) it has been laid down that:-- "No period of limitation is prescribed in Limitation Act, 1908 for exercise of power of revision by High Court. Ninety days' period as a rule of practice, however, is insisted upon for observance by High Court. Any delay beyond such period is required to be explained by party invoking revisional jurisdiction of Court. Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is, therefore, inapplicable for application for revision under section 115, C. P. C."
The revision petition in the aforesaid case having been filed after delay of morel than 2 years without any special circumstances justifying such delay and for condoning the same having been furnished was held to be hit by gross laches and dismissed.
14. The perusal of the aforementioned judgments clearly shows that present revision petition having been filed after about two years against the impugned 4 order without any satisfactory explanation thereof and even without any application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is hopelessly barred by time and is not maintainable to be considered on merits.
15. For the above reasons, this petition is dismissed as hopelessly barred by time. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.