' This revision petition arises out of a suit for possession through specific performance of the contract dated 16-3-1977 filed by Muhammad Rafiq and Muhammad Shahbaz, respondents Nos.1 and 2 against the present petitioner and Mst. Habiba, respondent No,3, herein. The trial Court decreed the suit vide its judgment and decree dated 5-5-1984.
2. The petitioner filed an appeal on 10-6-1984 in the Court of the learned District Judge, Faisalabad, which was entrusted to the learned Additional District Judge, for disposal. On 23-4-1985, the appellate Court directed the petitioner/appellant to annex Appendix 'G' with the memo of appeal subject to payment of costs of Rs,
50. The amended memo of appeal was to be filed within one week. As the printed form was not available, the same was prepared by hand and the necessary columns were filled in. However, the Appellate Court observed that the column relating to valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction was not contained in Appendix 'G' and proceeded to reject the memo of appeal under Order XLI rule 3, sub-rule (1) of the C.P.C. With costs, vide judgment dated 3-61985.
3. Against the order dated 3-6-1985, the petitioner preferred R.S.A. (not numbered) in this Court on 2-12-1985. It may be mentioned that the petitioner had applied for a certified copy of the impugned order on 31-8-1985 and obtained the same on 7-9-1985. The appeal was drawn up on 1-12-1985 but actually filed on 2-12-1985. The High Court office raised as many as 11 objections including the one about the competency of the R.S.A. On 5-2-1986 and returned the appeal on 3-3-1986. It was received back by the clerk of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Thereafter, it was re-filed on 16- 2-1987 as a revision petition. The revision petition was admitted to regular hearing on 4-4-1987.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that originally, the R.S.A. Was mistakenly filed. Under the law, a revision petition was competent against the impugned order. He further submitted that no limitation was prescribed for filing a revision petition. However, the Limitation Act itself was applicable to such petitions. Therefore, the revision petition could be filed within a period of three years under Article 181 of the Limitation Act. In this connection, he placed reliance on Muhammad Saleh v. M/s. United Grain & Fodder Agencies (PLD 1964 SC 97) and Rehmat Ali v. Allah Ditta (PLD 1989 Lah. 64). He further submitted that in Appendix 'G', contained in the C.P.C., there was no column about the value for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction. Hence, the omission to fill in the said columns could not result in rejection of the memo of appeal. He urged that refusal to interfere in the impugned order which was patently illegal would amount to perpetuate injustice. He placed reliance on Malik Shamas Din and Brothers v. The Income-Tax and Sales Tax Officer and another (PLD 1959 Lahore 955) and Azad J. & K. Government v. Shaheen Timber Trading Corporation (PLD 1965 Azad J & K 9). Lastly, he urged that the petitioner had never acquiesced in the impugned order. He had been vigilantly pursuing the case throughout. At the High Court level, he had engaged a senior counsel of considerable repute for challenging the impugned order. He should not suffer for mere technicalities. According to the learned counsel, the Courts lean in favour of adjudication of matters on merits. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 and 2 urged that right from the beginning, the conduct of the petitioner has been contumacious and negligent. Initially, he had applied for a copy of the judgment dated 3-6-1985 with a delay of about two months and twenty-eight days. He obtained the copy on 7-9-1985 and filed the appeal with a delay of about two months and twenty-six days. The office raised objections on 5-2-1986 and the appeal was returned on 3-3-1986. It remained lying in the office of the learned counsel till it was re-filed on 16-2-1987. He further submitted that till the assignment of a number by the office, no appeal was registered on the record of this Court. He placed reliance on Chintapatla Venkatanarasimha Ram Chandra Rao and others Petitioners (AIR 1933 Madras 358). He further urged that the revision petition suffered from unexplained laches and merited dismissal on this ground alone. He placed reliance on Manager, Jammu & Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v.
Khuda Yar and another (PLD 1975 SC 678), Najam-udDin v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and others (1981 SCMR 540), Karamat Hussain and others v. Muhammad Zaman and others (PLD 1987 SC 139) and Federation of Pakistan through the Manager, Pakistan Railways v. Muhammad Sadiq (1987 CLC 1631). He further submitted that although there were no columns in Appendix 'G' (contained in the C.P.C.) regarding valuation for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction, the same were duly contained in forms prescribed by this Court and published in the High Court Rules and Orders Vol. VI, Part I-A. Hence the Court below had rightly rejected the memo of appeal. In reply, adopting the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that there was no appeal till the assignment of a number by the office. Hence, all steps taken in the R.S.A. Including the objections by the office were equally incompetent and a mere exercise in futility. He further urged that the revision petition could be filed within a period of three years and the petitioner was entitled to wait till the last day of the period of limitation. He also pointed out that the columns in Appendix `G' were duly filled-in by the learned counsel for the petitioner. However, in the columns relating to the value of the appeal for purposes of jurisdiction, which was Rs, 12,000, the petitioner's learned counsel mistakenly wrote the words" {{URDU TEXT}}A in the relevant column. In fact, a separate column about the court-fee was duly filled in showing the same to be Rs,1,200. Hence, it could not be said that the value of the appeal for purpose of jurisdiction was not given in Form 'G'.
5. Under the law, no specific period for filing a revision petition in the High Court, is prescribed. An appeal is filed in the High Court within a period of 90 days provided under Article 156 of the Limitation Act. A practice had developed to file a revision petition in the High Court within the period prescribed for an appeal and to furnish some explanation if the revision petition was filed beyond the said unprescribed period. This practice was the product of abundant caution without there being any statutory requirement to institute the revision petition within a period of 90 days. The period of limitation was once prescribed when Article 162-A was added in the Limitation Act but the same was deleted on 3-8-1965. By deleting the said Article, the legislature clearly intended to leave the field open for enabling the litigants to seek redress in appropriate cases within the limits laid down under section 115 of the C.P.C. The revision petition instituted by a party is nothing but an application which can be filed within a period of three years as provided under Article 181 of the Limitation Act. If filed within a period of three years a revision petition can neither be held to be time-barred nor one suffering from laches. This question was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Saleh v. M/s. United Grain and Fodder Agencies (PLD 1964 SC 97).
It was held in the said case that there was no limitation fixed for filing a revision petition and that the only Article which could be applicable was Article 181 of the Limitation Act. The relevant portion is reproduced below:- "The Limitation Act does not provide for any period of limitation for an application for revision. The only Article which could be applicable was the residuary Article 181 which provides a limitation of three years for an application, but even that Article will not stand in the way of exercise of revisional power, for these powers can be exercised suo motu."
' In Khuda Yar's case, an objection was raised that the revision petition filed in the High Court beyond a period of 90 days from the date of the impugned order merited dismissal unless there was satisfactory explanation for the delay. It was also urged that even if no period of limitation was prescribed, the revision petition should have been filed within a reasonable time.
' The Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to refer to the various authorities cited by the learned counsel for the respondents in the said case and observed as under:-- "The principle laid down in these authorities is that the revision petition filed beyond the unprescribed limitation of 90 days could also be entertained if the Court was satisfied as to the reasons for the delay."
' However, the Court did not agree with the said principle and repelling the objection pertaining to limitation held that the Court was under no obligation to consider the question of limitation because no rule was framed by any High Court prescribing limitation for revision. The relevant portion from the said judgment is reproduced below: "Since the Limitation Act is not applicable to a revision, the Court was under no obligation to consider the question of limitation, more so, when the point was never raised by the Caveator before us. It may also be relevantly mentioned in this context that no Rule has been framed by any High Court under its rule-making powers prescribing limitation for revision. It is a well-known principle of the administration of justice that no litigant should be made to suffer at the hands of the Court. We have, therefore, no hesitation in overruling the objection taken on the ground of limitation."
' It may be added that in Khuda Yar's case, the revision petition was filed in the year 1972 challenging various orders passed on 6-3-1969, 11-1-1971, 14-7-1971 and 2-11-1971 and was entertained overruling the objection on the ground of limitation. A similar question was considered by this Court in Rahmat Ali's case, wherein after discussing the case-law it was held that no period for filing revision petition under section 115 of the C.P.C. Was laid and that the delay alone was not sufficient to dismiss the revision petition. Najam-ud-Din's case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents is distinguishable because it relates to a writ petition which was returned on an objection by the office and re-filed after a delay of two years. Admittedly, a constitutional petition can be dismissed for laches as laid down in a large number of cases.
6. In the present case, the impugned order was passed on 3-6-1985. The petitioner applied for certified copy on 31-8-1985 which was delivered to him on 7-9-1985. Originally R S A was drawn up on 1-12-1985 and filed in the High Court on 2-12-1985. The office raised an objection on 5-2-1986 regarding bar of limitation. The memo. Of appeal was returned to the learned counsel on 3-3-1986 and was refiled as revision petition on 16-2-1987. Thus calculating from the date of the impugned order the revision petition was filed after about one year and eight months. Even if the time spent for obtaining the copies is not excluded the revision petition cannot be held to be barred by time.
Initially the memo of appeal was not even registered in the office because the R.S.A. Was barred by time. Hence as held in the case of Chintapatla Venkatanarasimha Ramchandra Rao and others (AIR 1933 Madras 358), the appeal was not filed on the record of this Court. The revision petition would be deemed to have been instituted on 16-2-1987 because the petitioner had not sought conversion of Memo of Appeal into a revision petition prior to 16-2-1987, demonstrates that the petitioner did want to apply for certified copies on 31-8-1987, obtained the same on 7-9-1987 and handed over its papers to a fairly senior advocate of this Court who filed R.SA. On 2-12-1985. The petitioner cannot be blamed for not filing a revision petition in the High Court or for filing it after about 20 months of the date of the impugned order. The learned counsel for the petitioner who originally filed the R.SA. Would have been careful and vigilant in the matter. However, the revision petition was still filed within the period of three years as laid down in the residuary Article 181 of the Limitation Act relating to filing of applications. Hence there is no substance in the preliminary objection which is hereby repelled.
7. Coming to the merits of the case the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that a hyper technical view was taken by the appellate Court in rejecting the memorandum of appeal. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the printed form 'G' was not available and the petitioner had got a handwritten form prepared and annexed to the appeal before the learned District Judge. The petitioner's learned counsel mistakenly wrote words " the column meant for the jurisdictional value. In fact the column about court-fee was different which was duly filled in by showing value for purposes of court-fee to be Rs,12,000. Hence the appellate Court wrongly held that the column pertaining to value for purposes of jurisdiction was not filled in. At any rate the error, if any, ought to have been got corrected and the appeal decided on merits. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents urged that the mandatory provisions of the law were not complied with and the Court was justified in rejecting the memorandum of appeal. There is considerable force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The relevant provision about form of appeal is Order XLI, rule 1 of the C.P.C., which is reproduced below: "(1) Every appeal shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant or his pleader and presented to the Court or to such officer as it appoints in this behalf. The memorandum shall be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from and (unless the Appellate Court dispenses therewith) of the judgment on which it is founded
(2) The memorandum shall set forth, concisely and under distinct heads, the grounds of objection to the decree appealed from without any argument or narrative; and such grounds shall be numbered consecutively."
Rule 3 of Order XLI pertains to rejection or amendment of memorandum which is also reproduced for ready reference: "(1) Where the memorandum of appeal is not drawn up in the manner hereinbefore prescribed, it may be rejected, or be returned to the appellant for the purpose of being amended within a time to be fixed by the Court or be amended then and there.
(2) Where the Court rejects any memorandum, it shall record the reason for such rejection.
(3) Where a memorandum of appeal is amended, the Judge, or such officer as he appoints in this behalf, shall sign or initial the amendment."
' The memorandum of appeal has to conform to Appendix 'G' contained in the schedule of the C.P.C. (page 1049 of the C.P.C. By Aamer Raza A Khan, Sixth Edition 1989). According to the said form the appellant has to give name of the Court before whom the appeal is filed, the parties' names, the date of the decree appealed from, suit No, and the grounds of objection to the impugned decree. Thus the memorandum of appeal ought to contain the party names, name of the Court before which the appeal was filed, the date of the decree of the trial Court, the suit No, and the grounds of objection against the decree appealed from. Moreover the memo. Of appeal has to be signed by the appellant or his pleader and has to be accompanied by the decree appealed from and the judgment, Court on which it is founded (unless dispensed with by the appellate Court). The memorandum of appeal, if not drawn up in the manner prescribed in the C.P.C. Can be either rejected or returned to the appellant for being amended within a time to be fixed by the Court or be amended then and there in the Court. The memorandum of appeal in the present case was correctly drawn up in the form prescribed in the C.P.C. The word, "hereinbefore" contained in rule 3 has reference to the provision of rule 1 of Order XLI of the C.P.C. Hence the memorandum of appeal can be rejected for any omission on the part of the appellant to comply with the provisions of Order XLI rule 1 of the C.P.C. And not otherwise. If the omission is of minor nature as for example, the absence of signature of the appellant or his pleader on the memo of appeal on the date of the decree appealed from or any other omission of the similar kind it should be got corrected by the Court then and there without returning the memo of appeal for making the necessary amendment.
In the present case the petitioner had filed the appeal in accordance with the provisions of Order XLI rule of the C.P.C. And provided the necessary information required in the form (Appendix `G') published in the Schedule of the C.P.C. The minor error in the 8th column of Form 'G' pertaining to the jurisdictional value of the appeal was hardly sufficient to warrant rejection of memo. Of appeal.
The petitioner had duly filled in the 5th column pertaining to the value for purposes of court-fee which was Rs,1,200. Actually in the 8th column the value for purposes of jurisdiction was given as Rs, 12,000 but atop the said column the words {{URDU TEXT}}were mistakenly written. Such a minor error ought to have been got corrected and the memorandum of appeal amended then and there under the direction of the appellate Court. A Court of law should ordinarily refrain from taking a hypertechnical view in respect of procedural requirements of the law. It should not permit the procedural technicalities to become stumbling blocks in the way of administration of justice and should liberally exercise its discretion to remove such hurdles with the object of deciding the cases on merits.
In view of the above discussion I allow this revision petition, set aside the impugned order dated 3- 6-1985 and remand the case to the learned District Judge, Faisalabad for decision of the appeal on merits in accordance with the law.
' The learned District Judge may either hear the appeal himself or entrust the same to any other Addle: District Judge.