1. HAZIQUL KHAIRI, J: --This Constitutional petition under Article 199 of Islamic Republic of Pakistan is directed against the finding/order, dated 30-4-1992 passed by the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman), respondent No.1 herein, directing the Chairman of the petitioner as well as Ministry of Defence (Aviation Division), Government of Pakistan, respondent No3 to give all benefits to Mr. Qamaruzzaman, an ex-employee, respondent No.2 with effect from the date of his illegal termination of service till the date of order along with Rs. 3,000 as compensation for injustice done to him for gross maladministration.
2. The facts leading to the filing of this Constitutional petition are that respondent No.2 Qamaruzzaman was the Director Customer Services of the petitioner but his services were terminated by the petitioner vide letter, dated 11-1-1981 with immediate effect "as his services were no more required by the Corporation." After many years, the Government of Pakistan vide Notification dated 20-5-1989 constituted a Review Board for the purpose of reviewing the cases of employees of industrial and commercial establishments set up, managed or controlled by Government who were removed or dismissed from employment under a Martial Law Regulation or as a result of conviction by a Summary Military Court or otherwise purely on political grounds, as the case may be. The notification reads as follows: .
3. "GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN MINISTRY OF LABOUR, MANPOWER AND OVERSEAS PAKISTANIS (LABOUR DIVISION)
4. Islamabad, 20th May, 1989.
NOTIFICATION
1. No. L.R.17(6)/88: --The President has been pleased to constitute a Review Board for the purpose of reviewing the cases of employees of industrial and commercial establishments set up, managed or controlled by -Government who were removed or dismissed from employment under a Martial Law Regulation or as a result of conviction by a Summary Military Court or otherwise purely on political grounds, as the case may be.
5. 2.The Review Board shall comprise the following:.
6. (1)Chairman, National Industrial Relations Commission. Chairman (2)Syed Rizwan Hussain, Central Labour Advisor, Labour Division Member
(3) A representative of the Administrative Ministry responsible for the administration of the .
7. Establishment to which the employee belongs Member 3.The Review Board shall take up review of cases, after inviting applications from the affected persons and make its recommendation; after examining the available record and affording to the applicants at opportunity of being heard.
8. 4.Any employee of an industrial or commercial establishment referred to in the first paragraph of this notification who was removed. o dismissed from employment under a Martial Law Regulation or as s result by conviction by a Summary Military Court or otherwise purely on political grounds, as the case may be, may submit a review petition to Review Board by the 31st May, 1989.
5. The National Industrial Relations Commission shall be responsible for all administrative and financial matters relating to the Review Board.
9. (Fazal Karim Khan)
10. Deputy Secretary.
11. On 31-5-1989, the respondent No.2 made an application to the Review Board with the prayer that termination of his service, dated 11-1-1981 may be declared as nullity in law and consequently he may be reinstated with effect from 1'.-1-1981 with all back benefits. The petitioner made appearance before the Review Board on 23-9-1989 and 28-9-1989 and contested the complaint. As per averments made in the petition, the Review Board had verbally announced its decision recommending to the Federal Government to give retirement benefits to respondent No.2. On the 5th November, 1990 respondent No.2, submitted an application to the petitioner for settlement of his claim as per the decision of the Review Board but since the petitioner had not received a copy of decision in writing, no action was taken by them. It wars in September, 1991 that respondent No.2 made a complaint against the petitioner to the Wafaqi Mohtasib respondent No. 1 praying that the decision, dated 28-9-1989 of the Review Board may be ordered to be implemented by the petitioner. In reply, the petitioner filed the following objections:--- "(a)that the complaint made by the complainant falls outside the province of this institution inasmuch as it is hit by the provisions of Article 9 of P.O.1 of 1983 (Order of Establishment of Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib); (b)that the services of the complainant were validly terminated on 11 July, 1981 by the competent authority; (c)that the Review Board was primarily constituted to review the cases of MLR 52 affectees only and the, petitioner's case being a normal one could not be gone into by the Review Board; (d)that high powered committee constituted by P.IA. Management considered the case of complainant along with other cases but complainant was not recommended for re-employment due to the reason that the complainant was to attain the age of superannuation of 60 years in October, 1991. As regards the compensation/benefits to the complainant, the same, it is submitted, cannot be allowed in view of the P.IA. Management policy."th On 3-2-1992., 26-2-1992 and 17-3-1992 the complaint came up for hearing before the learned respondent No.1, who on 30-4-1992 passed the following order: "21. For the view, I have taken in the matter while accepting the complaint of the complainant I hold that the Review Board vide its findings, dated 28-9-1989 did in fact recall the retirement order of the complainant and made direction that full back benefits shall be paid to the complainant from the date of retirement including retirement benefits till the day the order was made by the Review Board. 1, therefore, direct Chairman PIAC, Karachi and Ministry of Defence (Aviation Division) that the petitioner may be given all benefits by virtue of the order/finding in his favour from the date of illegal termination till the order is made. The Agency complained against shall also pay an amount of Rs.3,000 as compensation to the complainant R for injustice done to him through gross maladministration on its part. I also recommend that an inquiry may be launched with regard to the non-availability of file with immediate effect. The results may be conveyed to me within one month from the date of issue of this finding."
12. In addition to objections enumerated at (a) to (d) the petitioner has raised the following additional grounds against the impugned order of the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib, respondent No.1. (e) The complaint was not made on solemn affirmation. (f) The learned Wafaqi Mohtasib could not have entertained the complaint of the respondent No.2 later than three months under Article 10(3) of P.O.
13. No.1 of 1983 from the day on which respondent No.2 first had the notice of his grievance. A complaint filed beyond time could only be entertained by him if he was of considered opinion that special circumstances had existed within the meaning thereof, otherwise the entire proceedings before him were without lawful authority. (g) The learned Wafaqi Mohtasib acted without lawful authority to have given retrospective applicability to the President's Order No.1 of 1983 (hereinafter called P.O. No.1 of ' 1983) as the personal grievance of respondent No.2, dates back to notice dated 11-1-1981 when he was relieved of his services, whereas P.O. No.1 of 1983 came into force on the 24th January, 1983 and the complaint was filed on 23-9-1989. (h) The Review Board was created for a limited purpose and for a limited period and its only power was to make recommendations to the Federal Government and is neither binding on it nor on the petitioner. (i) Respondent No.2 being an employee of the petitioner, the principles of Master and Servant were applicable, which fact the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib had failed to take notice of. (j) The institution of the Wafaqi Mohtasib cannot be turned into an executing Court for recommendations of the Review Board.
14. As to grounds enumerated at (e), (f) and (g), neither Mr. Mehmood Alam, General Manager (Legal) who addressed us first nor Mr. Amjad Hussain, Advocate who took over from him pressed them at all. However, the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib in regard to them has made clear observations and in the circumstances we need not dilate upon them.
15. At the time of hearing, Mr. Mansoor Ahmed Khan, learned counsel for Wafaqi Mohtasib and M/s. IA.
16. Hashmi and Qazi Mehfooz learned counsel for respondent No.2 had raised a preliminary objection as to the ,inaintainability of the petition itself, firstly, as the petitioner had failed to exhaust the remedy available to him against the impugned order under Article 32 of P.O. No.1 of 1983 to the effect that "Any person aggrieved by a decision or order of the Mohtasib may, within thirty days of the decision or order, make a representation to the President, who may pass such order thereon as he may deem fit" and secondly there was a clear bar under Article 29 of P.O NO of 1983 to Jurisdiction or Court questioning amount others the validity of any action taken or order made by the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib. In reply, the contentions of Mr. Amjad Hussain, learned counsel for petitioner were three-fold which were duly supported by Mr. Ikram Ahmed Ansari, learned Deputy Attorney-General for Pakistan. In the first place no decision, order or judgment was passed by the Review Board in law. Secondly even if there was such an order, it related to personal grievance of respondent Not in respect of his service with the petitioner and is barred under clause (2) of Article 9 of the P.O. No.1 of 1983 read with paragraph (4) of Notification, dated 20-5-1989. Lastly, it was argued that even if there was no bar neither the order of the Review Board nor of the learned Waraqi Mohtasib was binding on the petitioner.
17. These jurisdictional questions would be relevant if there had been a decision or order given by the Review Board, which is now seriously questioned by learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Deputy Attorney-General. Suffice to state that only in exceptional circumstances, the High Court will inquire into disputed questions of acts in its Constitutional jurisdiction. The stand taken by the petitioner and the Federal Government respondent No.3 that there was no decision or order given by the Review Board is rebutted by the record itself. Here reference may be made to Annexure to the petition being the affidavit of Sheikh Azizur Rehman, Advocate for the petitioner, before the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib stating that the case was finally decided by the Review Board.
18. In para.7 of the petition, it was also stated by the petitioner `that notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the application, dated 31st May, 1989, the Review Board heard the said application on 23rd September, 1989 and on 28th September, 1989 and verbally announced that it would make a recommendation to the Federal Government to the effect that retirement benefits may be extended to the respondent No.2. However, according to the information of the petitioner a written recommendation to this effect was never made by the Review Board to the Federal Government".
19. Similarly in para. 5(iii) of impugned order which contains the objections raised by the petitioner before the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib, the petitioner had admitted that `PIA does not repudiate that there was decision in favour of the complainant in terms of the complaint'.
20. Thus, the petition and its annexures clearly reveal that there was a decision or order given by the Review Board as aforesaid in favour of respondent No.2 but the same was not in writing and not signed. According to learned counsel for the petitioner an order or judgment unless in writing and signed is no judgment in terms of section 2(9), C.P.C. Which states that "judgment" means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order". This position was disputed by learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 and 2 according to whom the provisions of C.P.C. Are not applicable to any special tribunal constituted for a limited purpose such as the Review Board and secondly the decision once announced and communicated even though verbally shall he deemed to have been given and should be Given due effect to. In support of their contention, learned counsel placed reliance on Somesundran v. Subremanian, AIR 1926 Privy Council 136 and Firm Gokal Chand Jagan Nath v. Firm Nandramdas Atmaram AIR 1988 Privy Council 292. Reference was also made to Evacuee Trust Property Board v. Hameed Elahi PLD 1981 SC 108 and Lal Din v. Abdul Waheed, PLD 1988 Supreme Court 664 none of which has any relevance to facts of the present case.
21. In Somosundram v. Subramanian, AIR 1926 Privy Council 136 Lord Atikan who wrote the judgment while other Judges agreeing with him held as follows: "Legal judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation. There are serious pronouncements, for the most part by the judicial officer of the State, touching the rights of disputes of subjects, bringing home to those subjects what the rules of justice required and are enforceable, if need be, by the forces of the State. Moreover, when once pronounced they cannot be lightly set aside."
22. In Firm Gokal Chand Jagan Nath v. Firm Mandramdas Atmaram, AIR 1988 Privy Council 292, the judgment was pronounced 'by one Judge whereas the other agreed with him. The former before signing the judgment went on leave which was signed by the latter. An objection was raised by the appellant's counsel that under Order 41, rule 31, a judgment of the Appellate Court has to be in writing, to be pronounced and dated by the Judges concurring therein. It was observed: "Rule 31 of Order 41 does not say that if its requirements are not complied with, the judgments shall be a nullity. So startling a result would need clear and precise words. Indeed, the rule does not even state any definite time in which it is to be fulfilled. The time is left to be defined by what is reasonable. The rule from its very nature is not intended to affect the rights of parties to a judgment. It is intended to secure certainty in the ascertainment of what the judgment was. It is a rule which Judges are required to comply with for that object. No doubt in practice Judges do so comply, as it is their duty to do. But accidents may happen. A Judge may die after giving judgment but before he has had a reasonable opportunity to sign it. The Court must have inherent jurisdiction to supply such a defect. The case of a Judge who has gone on leave before signing judgment may call for more comment, but even so the convenience of the Court and the interest of litigants must prevail. The defect is merely an irregularity not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court and is no ground for setting aside the decree."
23. On the basis of admitted position and record before us there is no doubt whatsoever that the order/decision of the Review Board was oral but made in the presence of the parties, and further it could not be reduced into, writing and signed. There is also no controversy as to relief granted by the Review Board to the respondent No.2. The contention that the decision of the Review Board being not in writing and not signed is no decision in law cannot sustain as it would lead to injustice and perpetuate Lordship upon respondent No.2 for no fault of his. The decision/order of a Review Board even though oral was free from ambiguity and otherwise ascertainable and in the circumstances must be given effect to as if it was a decision/order in writing duly signed.
24. Now we propose to examine the jurisdictional questions first as to the maintainability of the complaint before the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib raised by the petitioner and thereafter as to the maintainability of this Constitutional petition against the impugned order of the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib raised by learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 and 2.
25. Mr. S. Amjad Hussain duly supported by the learned Deputy Attorney-General Mr. Ikram Ahmed Ansari urged before us that in the face of express bar as contained in Article 9(2) of P.O. No.1 of 1983, the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of respondent No.2 which was in the nature of personal grievance relating to his service with the petitioner. It was stated that the petitioner is a statutory body having come into existence by virtue of P.IA.
26. Corporation Act, 1956 and is an agency within the meaning of Article 2(a) of P.O. No.1 of 1983. The services of respondent No.2 were terminated by the Managing Director of the petitioner and were duly rectified by the Board and in this regard a resolution was also passed at the 120th meeting of the Board. Pursuant to this decision, the respondent No.2 had also received his three months' salary without any objection. There was also no question of his political victimization so as to bring his case within the ambit of the Review Board constituted under the said Notification, dated 20-5-1989.
27. However, in order to examine the question in hand, it would be useful to reproduce Article 9 and Article 11 of the P.O. No.1 of 1983 as follows:--- "9Jurisdiction, functions and powers of the Mohtasib.---(1) The Mohtasib may on a complaint by an aggrieved person, on a reference by the President, the Federal Council or the National Assembly, as the case may be, or on a motion of the Supreme Court or a High Court made during the course of any proceedings before it or of his own motion, undertake any investigation into any allegation of maladministration on the part of any Agency or any of its officers or employees: Provided that the Mohtasib shall not have any jurisdiction to investigate or inquire into any matters which---
(a) are sub judice before a Court of competent jurisdiction for judicial tribunal or board in Pakistan on the date of the receipt of a complaint, reference or motion by him; or
(b) relate to the external affairs of Pakistan or the relations or dealings of Pakistan with any foreign State or Government; or
(c) relate to or are connected with, the defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, the military, naval and air forces of Pakistan, or the matters covered by the laws relating to those forces.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1), the Mohtasib shall not accept for investigation any complaint by or on behalf of public servant, or functionary concerning any matters relating to the Agency in which he is or has been, working in respect of any personal grievance relating to his service therein.
28. (3)For carrying out the objectives of this Order and, in particular for ascertaining the root causes of corrupt practices and injustice the Mohtasib may arrange for studies to be made or research to be conducted and may recommend appropriate steps for their eradication.
29. (4)The Mohtasib may set up regional offices as when and where required.
30. 11Recommendations for implementation: --(1) If, after having considered a matter on his own motion, or on a complaint or on a reference by the President, the Federal Council or the National Assembly, or on a motion by the Supreme Court or a High Court, as the case may be, the Mohtasib is of the opinion that the matter considered amounts to maladministration, he shall communicate his findings to the Agency concerned---
(a) to consider the matter further;
(b) to modify or cancel the decision, process, recommendation, act or omission;
(c) to explain more fully the act or decision in question; .
(d) to take disciplinary action against any public servant of any agency under the relevant laws applicable to him;
(e) to dispose of the matter or case within a specified time;
(f) to take action on his findings and recommendation to improve the working and efficiency of the Agency within a specified time; or
(g) to take any other step specified by the Mohtasib.
31. (2)The Agency shall, within such time as may be specified by the Mohtasib, inform him about the action taken on his recommendations or the reasons for not complying with the same.
32. (3)In any case where the Mohtasib has considered a matter, or conducted an investigation, on a complaint or on a reference by the President, the Federal Council or the National Assembly or on a motion by the Supreme Court or a High Court, the Mohtasib shall forward a copy of the communication received by him from the Agency in pursuance of clause (2) to the complainant or, as the case may be, the President, the Federal Council, the National Assembly the Supreme Court or the High Court.
33. (4)If, after conducting an investigation, it appears to the Mohtasib that an injustice has been caused to the person aggrieved in consequence of maladministration and that the injustice has not been or will not be remedied, he may, if he thinks fit lay a special report on the case before the President.
34. (5)If the Agency concerned does not comply with the recommendations of the Mohtasib or does not give reasons to the satisfactions of the Mohtasib for non-compliance, it shall be treated as `Defiance of Recommendations' and shall be dealt with as hereinafter provided."
35. In support of his contention learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Deputy Attorney- General placed heavy reliance on National Bank of Pakistan, Karachi v. Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman), Karachi PLD 1992 Kar. 339 in which an employee of the petitioner had challenged the award of punishment to degradation to lower pay and to debar him from promotion for next two years. The petition was accepted by the Lahore High Court and the impugned order of the petitioner was declared to have been passed without any lawful authority and of no legal effect and was set aside. The petitioner thereupon filed a petition for leave to appeal before he Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan which was granted but finally the appeal was dismissed. The employee instead of agitating the matter before the Supreme Court or High Court filed a complaint before the Wafaqi Mohtasib seeking implementation of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, who made a direction accordingly. This order was being challenged by the petitioner Bank, on the ground that the petition was barred under clause (2) of Article 9 of P.O. No.1 of 1983. It was held, inter alia, by a Division Bench of this Court that "once the matter is found pertaining to the personal grievance of service, the jurisdiction of Wafaqi Mohtasib is ousted even though the matter may have been finally decided" and that the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib is not legally competent to take upon himself the function of executing Court in such matters.
36. Next case cited was of Muhammad Aslam Khan v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1983 Karachi 41 in which the Acting Wafaqi Mohtasib took the view that the appointment of the petitioner to the post of Associate Professor was highly irregular, which post may be re-advertised and filled in accordance with law. In pursuance of this direction, the Secretary, Ministry of Health, Government of Pakistan issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner, who aggrieved by the ex parte action of the learned Acting Wafaqi Mohtasib filed the Constitutional petition. It was held by a learned Division Bench of this Court that there is nothing in Article 11 of. P.O. No.1 of 1983 to entitle Wafaqi Mohtasib to recommend termination of services of a public servant."
37. Lastly, reference was made to the case of International Cargo Handling Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Port Bin Qasim Authority, PLD 1992 Karachi 65 in which despite the bar contained under. Section 29 of P.O. No.1 of 1983 it was held that "no doubt the jurisdiction of Courts is barred, inter alia, in respect of any decision or order made including order of injunction or stay, by the Mohtasib but where the order from the face of it is repugnant to law under which it was made or suffers from want of jurisdiction, a Court may invoke its inherent jurisdiction vested in it under law so as to prevent injustice done to an aggrieved person".
38. As stated earlier, the petitioner had raised the question of want of jurisdiction of the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib before him to which it was observed by him that "The complainant's case, pure and simple is that the judgment of Review Board against PIC and Ministry of Defence (Aviation Division) dated 28-9-1989 needs to be implemented but the same is being refused to him. It is a clear 'maladministration' and this institution is clothed with the competence to look into it". While interpreting Article 9(2) of P.O. No.1 of 1983, it was observed by him: "The reading of the Article shows that the Wafaqi Mohtasib shall not accept for investigation any complaint by a person relating to his service, whereas the instant case is neither a service matter nor any investigation is solicited regarding his service. The complainant only wants me to look into 'maladministration' of the Agency and certainly I am clothed with power to look into. The objection thus stands overruled."
39. These observations require closer examination. According to us the crux of the matter is whether the complaint of respondent No.2 before the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib was such as to require investigation of a grievance relating to his service with the petitioner. It may be recalled that the Office of the Wafaqi Mohtasib was established to deal with matters relating to mal administration of agency. Such agency in terms of Article 2(1) would mean a Ministry, Division, Department, Commission or Office of the Federal Government or a statutory corporation or other institution established or controlled by the Federal Government but does not include the Supreme Court, the Supreme Judicial Council, the Federal Shariat Court or a High Court Article 9111 defines ac to who may refer matters relating to maladministration of any agency or any of its officers or employees and the proviso thereto specifies under sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) that where the matter is sub judice, relates to external affairs of Pakistan or is connected with Defence of Pakistan etc., the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib shall neither have the jurisdiction to investigate nor to inquire it. Similarly, clause (2) of Article 9 of P.O. No.1 of 1983 is non obstante clause and although it has no nexus with the, proviso to clause (1) it clearly bars the powers of the functionaries and the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib to take cognizance of a service matter of a public servant and at the same time debars the public servant to file a complaint in respect thereof if in either case it involves investigation into the matter. The view taken by the learned Judges of the High Court of Sindh in PLD 1992 Kar339 that the jurisdiction of Wafaqi Mohtasib is ousted even though the 8 matter may have been finally decided and that 'Wafaqi" Mohtasib is not legally competent to take upon himself the function of executing Court" was the correct view as in that case the public servant wanted to get the order of the High Court and Supreme Court implemented through the Wafaqi Mohtasib both of which among others are clearly excluded from the definition of `agency' as given in section 2(1) of the P.O.
40. No.1 of 1983. Further, these Courts are invested with power to execute their orders and judgments which power may or may not be available with an agency.
41. We also do not agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the decision of the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib is simply advisory which may be disregarded by the agency. In case of defiance of recommendation, he may under Article 12 refer the matter to the President who may, in his discretion direct the agency to implement the recommendation and inform the Mohtasib accordingly.
42. Here it is also pertinent to note that the only function of the Wafaqi Mohtasib is not confined to carry out investigation on a complaint. Under Article 11 which relates to recommendations for implementation to be made by the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib, he has first to form an opinion whether a matter referred to him relates to maladministration and if so to give findings to the agency concerned in terms of sub-clauses (a) to (g) of clause (1) of Article 11 thereof. These findings may not necessarily involve any investigation on his part. For instance under sub-clause
(a) the direction would be to consider the matter further or under sub-clause (b) to dispose of the matter or case within a speed time. In Ballantine's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, page 662, `investigation' inter alia means "In a more complete sense, an inquiry, H judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters". Under clause (3) of the Article il he has to consider a matter or conduct an investigation from which it can safely be inferred that every case before him does not require investigation. It is well ' known rule in interpretation of statutes that no word 'or clause should ordinarily be rejected as superfluous, void or insignificant (King v. Berchet, QBD 245) We are therefore of the clear view that in the context of the casein hand the finding/order of the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib does not involve investigation by him as contemplated under clause (2) of Article 9 of the P.O. No.1 of 1983 and there is nothing in it touching the legality or otherwise of F order of dismissing/relieving the respondent No.2 of his services and, therefore, the same is not without jurisdiction.
43. Here we would also like to observe that the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Nazim Ali v. Mustafa Ali, 1981 SCMR 231, had held that even where the petitioner has a claim but its enforcement would lead only to injustice, the provisions of Article 199 being discretionary could not be invoked. Reference may also be made to Rownaq Ali v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, PLD 1973 SC 236; Sheikh Muhammad Amin v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, 1987 SCMR 56; Gul Muhammad and others v.
44. The Additional Settlement Commissioner, 1985 SCMR 491 and Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Saifullah,1988 SCMR 1996 in this regard.
45. Having come to the conclusion that the impugned order of the learned' Wafaqi Mohtasib was not without jurisdiction, the question would be, as posed by the learned counsel for Wafaqi Mohtasib and respondent No.2 whether the petitioner could have invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan without availing the remedy provided under Article 32 of P.O. No. 1 of 1983 it will be seen that under this Article "Any person aggrieved by a decision or order of the Mohtasib may within thirty days of the decision or order, make a representation to the President, who may pass such order thereon as he may deem fit". Further, there is a clear bar of jurisdiction of Courts under Article 29 to question among others as to the validity of any action taken by the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib. In the case of International Cargo Handling Company (Pvt.),, Limited, supra, it was held that where the order of the Wafaqi Mohtasib "from the face of it is repugnant to law under which it was made or suffers from want of jurisdiction, a Court may invoke its inherent jurisdiction vested in it under law so as to prevent injustice being done to an aggrieved person". This decision was made in a suit but in a similar situation the principles spelt out therein will apply with greater force in Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. The petitioner has not availed the remedy under Article 32 of P.O. No.1 of 1983 nor the petitioner was able to show that the order of the learned Wafaqi Mohtasib was without jurisdiction.
46. Hence the petitioner could not be permitted to agitate the various grounds urged by them before us. It may also be added here that the petitioner has not challenged the vires of the Notification, dated 20-5-1989 whereby the Review Board was constituted but submitted to its jurisdiction which had taken cognizance of the complaint of respondent No.2 on political grounds.
47. While parting with the case we may state that the petitioner for reasons best known to them have neither made the .Review Board nor the National Industrial Relations Commission as party to this petition. The latter were made responsible for all administrative and financial matters relating to the former as per Article 5 of the Notification, dated 20-5-1989.
48. In the result, the petition is dismissed with costs.