Nawab Syed RAUNAQ ALI ETC vs CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND

1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.-These fourteen appeals arise out of two judgments of the former High Court of West Pakistan. The first was delivered by a Division Bench at Lahore dismissing thirteen Writ Petitions and the other was delivered by a learned Single Judge at Karachi in Writ Petition No. 8 77/R of 1963 dismissing the writ petition in limine.

2. These appeals which raise common questions of law and are based on more or loss similar facts were heard in three batches at Lahore and Karachi, as different sets of learned counsel appeared for the appellants in these appeals. As the questions of law raised are the same, these appeals will be disposed of by this judgment in which I propose first to deal with the common questions of law and then apply the conclusions reached by me on these common questions to the facts of each case.

3. The appellants in all these cases were formerly residents of the State of Hyderabad (Deccan) but they migrated to Pakistan on different dates and filed claims here under the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act (III of 1956). The object of this Act was to provide for the registration and verification of claims of displaced persons in respect of the properties left behind by them in India.

4. The Act, therefore, empowered the Central Government to appoint, by notification in the official Gazette, Claims Commissioners, Additional Claims Commissioners, Deputy Claims Commissioners and Claims Officers to act under the general superintendence and control of the Government and to discharge the duties imposed upon them by or under the Act (vide section 3).

5. The scheme of this Act was that claims were to be first registered with a Registering officer appointed under the Act and then they were to be verified by holding an enquiry by a Claims Officer or a Deputy Claims Commissioner in the first instance. Thereafter an appeal was provided from an order of a Claims Officer to the Deputy Claims Commissioner and from the order of a Deputy Claims Commissioner to the Additional Claims Commissioner. Then a general power was given to the Claims Commissioner to suo motu call for the record of any case decided by a Claims Officer a Deputy Claim a Commissioner or an Additional Claims Commissioner, in order to satisfy himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order, but he could not revise or modify the same without first giving an opportunity to the person affected of being heard. The Claims Commissioner and the Additional or the Deputy C13ims Commis--sioner were also given the power to review their own orders within the prescribed period after giving notice to the patties. Subject to these provisions, however, subsection (5) of section 7 of this Act gave finality to the orders of the Claims Commissioner, the Additional Claims Commissioner, the Deputy Claims Commis--sioner and the Claims Officer and granted them immunity from being called in question in any Court.

6. By section 12, the jurisdiction of the civil Courts was also taken away with respect to any matter, with regard to which the Claims Commissioner or any of his subordinate officers was granted power to take action under the Act. In fact, all actions taken under the Act in good faith by any authority or any Government were saved by section 13 from any kind of challenge by any kind of suit, persecution or other legal proceeding.

7. Under subsection (3) of section 2 of this Act, a "claim" was defined as "the assertion of a right to the ownership of, or to any interest in, property which has been treated as evacuee property or of which a displaced person has otherwise been deprived, under any law for the time being in force in India or in any area occupied by India, except Assam, West Bengal, Tripura and Manipur".

8. By subsection (2) of this section, "property" was defined as follows :- "(2) "Property" means-

(2) Any immovable property situated within the limits of a Corporation, a Municipal Committee, a Notified Area Committee, a Town Area Committee, a Small Town Committee, a Sanitary Committee and a Cantonment as those limits existed on the 15th August 1947;

(b) Industrial concerns such as factories slid workshops outside the limits referred to in clause (a) above and sites there of;

(c) Land situated outside the limits referred to in clause (a) above and occupied or let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture including-

(i) The sites of buildings and other structures on such land;

(ii) A share in the profits of an estate or holding;

(iii) Any dues or any fixed percentage of land revenue payable by an inferior land-owner to a superior land-owner;

(iv) A right to receive rent; and

(v) Any right of occupancy;

(d) Substantial houses, shops and godowns outside the limits referred to in clause (a) above, provided their present value in each case is not less than rupees ten thousand; and

(e) Any other property or class of property which the Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare to be property for the purposes of this act."

9. Under the rules framed under section 18 of this Act, Forms were provided for submission of claims, and these Forms were of five different kinds set out in five Schedules. The First Schedule related to properties in urban areas other than industrial Concerns, the Second related to properties in rural areas, the Third related to industrial concerns, the Fourth related to agricultural lands and gardens in urban areas, and the fifth related to agricultural properties in areas other than Punjab, Delhi, etc. All the appellants claimed inter alia to have left behind in, India Jagirs of various kinds comprising agricultural lands said to have been granted to them by the Nizam which, according to them, came within the definition of "property" given under the Act (III of 1956) and filed claims under Schedule V. The Claims Authorities were doubtful about the correctness of this contention. Hence, on the 7th of April 1958, a notification was issued adding a new Schedule V-A in the proviso to sup- rule (2) of the Registra--petition of Claims (Displaced Persons) Rules, 1955. This Schedule V-A was to the following effect :- "SCHEDULE V-A (For Jagirs/Fauji Jagirs with or without Muafi benefits or Jagirs and Muafees in the form of hereditary assignment of land revenue or rent and maintenance allowance payable by rte Ruling Princes or their Governments to their dependents).

10. Situation-

(a) Village.

(b) Police Station.

(c) Tehsil/Taluka.

(d) District.

(e) Province/State.

11. Whether it was:

(a) jagir with proprietary rights in land with or without Muafi benefits, or

(b) Fauji Jagir consisting of land with or without Muafi benefits, or

(c) Hereditary assignments of rent or land revenue, or Maintenance allowance payable by the Ruling Princes/ State Governments to their dependents."

12. The appellants, who had already filed their claims, thereafter got their claims under Schedule V converted into claims under Schedule V-A and those who had not filed any claim under Schedule V filed their claims under Schedule V-A. Unfortunately, further complication was created a little later when Martial Law was imposed in the Country in October 1958. Soon after came provisions for land reforms in the shape of Martial Law Regula--petition No. 64 which was promulgated on the 7 of February 1959, and gazetted on the 3 of March 1959. By paragraph 21 of this Regulation, all Jagirs, of whatever kind and by whatever name described, subsisting immediately before the commencement of this Regulation, stood abolished and the right, interest or estate granted, assigned, released, created or affirmed by such Jagirs reverted to Government free from any encumbrance or charge. Sub-paragraph (6) of this paragraph also provided that no Jagir shall be created after the commencement of this Regula--petition. After the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation No. 64, the Claims Commissioner, it is said, issued a circular in May 1959, advising all Claim Officers to treat claims filed under Schedule V-A as claims under Schedule V and to verify the same, accordingly, although the last date for the filing of claims had expired, even according to the appellants, on the 30th of September 1958.

13. The Government itself, on the 25 of September 1959, issued another Notification being S. R. O. 466 dated 25th of September 1959, which was gazetted on the 2nd of October 1959, rescinding the earlier Notification No. F. 2(12)/55 Clms. Dated 7 April 1958, whereby Schedule V.A had been added to Rule 3 of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Rules, 1955. But before this rescission was gazetted, the claims of the appellants were verified by the Deputy Claims Commissioners and entitlement certificates were issued to them.

14. Then came Martial Law Regulation No. 84 of 1950 on the 28 of December 1960. Under this Regulation, all displaced persona, who had submitted a claim, were required to file a written statement relating to all the true facts of such claims and such statements were thereupon toth rd th th th replace their original claims. Further verification or re-verification of claims was stopped and the Chief Settlement Commissioner was to prepare a fresh scheme for verification or re verification of claims on the basis of the record, and on such re-verification, under this Scheme, fresh allotments would be made and earlier allotments were to stand cancelled or modified. Transfers made in respect of allotments already made were declared void to the extent of the area which, on verification or re-verification under the Scheme prepared under this Regulation, were found to be in excess of the entitlement of the person.

15. This contemplated that records will be available from India for the purposes of verification, but unfortunately this did not happen A Scheme was, however, prepared by the Chief Settle--ment Commissioner which unfortunately did not contemplate compensating any displaced person in respect of jagirdari nights. The highest rights proposed to be compensated under Martial Law Regulation No. 84 were zamindari rights.

16. As Records-of-Rights ultimately were not made available by India, Martial Law Regulation No. 84 was amended by Martial Law Regulation No. 89. The claims contemplated to be re-verified under both these Regulations were claims filed under Schedules IV and V under the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Rules, 1955, and by this last Regula--petition a graduated scale of entitlement was laid down. In other words, all persons having claims of more than 1500 produce Index units were to receive only a portion of their claims ranging from 30% to 10% in accordance with the magnitude of the produce index units claimed. The higher the claim, the lower was the percentage of entitlement. Fresh entitlement certificates were to be issued on this new scale and fresh allotments were to be made on the basis thereof. Excess areas were to be surrendered, and to vest in the Government. This Regulation, however, did not, by reason of the provisions of paragraph 13 thereof, apply to claims in respect of the lands situated in the territories of the States of Jammu & Kashmir, Hyderabad, Junagarh, Manavadar, Mangrol, Sardargarh, Bantva and Sultanabad then in occupation of India.

17. Lastly came Martial Law Regulation No. 91 on the 25 of September 1961, which further amended Martial Law Regula--tions Nos. 84 and 89. The amendments brought in by this Regulation are not relevant for the purpose of these appeals, as the exclusion of the provisions of the Regulation No. 89 for scaling, down were not applicable to the appellants who had filed claims in respect of lands situated In the territories of the State of Hyderabad. The original Martial Law Regulation No. 84 was applicable and they had all filed written statements in accordance with that Regulation.

18. It was in this state of affairs that on various dates in 1963 the Officer on Special Duty, Central Record Office, Lahore, issued notices to each of the appellants to show cause as to "why the entitlement certificate issued in your favour be not cancelled". The ground given for the issuance of such notices was that the verification orders in these cases verifying the claims of the appellants under Schedule V were, according to Notification No. S. R. O. 466, dated 25-9-1959, without jurisdiction, as, after the cancellation of the Notification of the 7th of April 1958, the scope of the term "property" could not be extended to cover cases of Jagir and muafee lands.

19. Most of the appellants showed cause in writing and maintain--ed that their claims related to interests in land which had been treated as evacuee property In the State of Hyderabad and, there--fore, they were entitled under the Registration of Claims (Dis--placed Persons) Act (III of 1956) to lodge such claims and to have the same verified in accordance with law. They called upon the Officer un Special Duty to withdraw the said notices, but as he failed to do no, they invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962.

20. The main contention put forward on their behalf was that, since their claims had been duly verified in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act (III of 1950, entitlement certificates had been issued by the Central Record Office and allotments of land made on the basis of such certificates, the verifications had acquired a finality under theth provisions of the said statute and they could not now be reopened by anyone-certainly not by the Officer on Special Duty as he had no power to sit on appeal over the decisions of the Claims Authorities.

21. They further maintained that, since their verifications had been completed before the rescission of the notification of the 7 of April 1958 by SRO-466 published is the Gazette, Extraordinary on the 2nd of October 1959--, the rights that had already vested in them could not be taken away retrospectively by another notification.

22. According to them, the verifications were also in accordance with law, because, Jagirs, whatever their nature might be in other parts of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent, were of such a nature in Hyderabad State that they certainly conferred very valuable interests in land which were also transferable as well as heritable subject only to the formal approval of the Nizam.

23. On behalf of the Officer on Special Duty, on the other hand, --it was argued that he had every jurisdiction under paragraph 8 of the Supplementary Rural Scheme No. 1, framed under the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act (XLII of 1956), to verify and check entitlement certificates issued by the Central Record Office even after their issuance and to cancel the same if It is found that the certificates had not been lawfully issued. According to the Officer on Special Duty; the Claims Commissioner had no jurisdiction, after the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation No. 64, to direct that the claims filed under Schedule V-A should be treated as claims under Schedule V and verified accordingly. Such verification was, accordingly, a nullity in the eye of the law and he was entitled to ignore such verification and cancel all entitlement certificates issued on the basis of such an incompetent verification.

24. It is furthermore contended on behalf of the Officer on Special Duty that it is manifest from the notification issued on the 7 of April 1958, that claims in respect of Jagirdari rights could not have been preferred under Schedule V. It is for this precise reason that Schedule V-A was added and, therefore, when Jagirs of all kinds, no matter how created or by what name described, were abolished by Martial Law Regulation No. 64, the Claims Commissioner had no jurisdiction at all to say that nevertheless jagirdari rights were rights or interests in the land which could be verified under Schedule V.

25. The High Court entered upon an examination of the nature of Jagirdari rights in Hyderabad State and came to the conclusion that the rights conferred by the Nizam did not create any interest in the land itself. It was merely a grant of a personal right to receive certain profits from the laud and no more. They were not heritable, for, after the death of each grantee, the grant as resumed and a re-grant was made to one of the heirs, only if one was found to be worthy of holding the grant. The Jagir did not, however, descend according to the law of succession, for, it was open to the ruler not to renew the grant in favour of an heir who was not, according to the ruler, deserving of the grant.

26. The High Court also upheld the contention of the Officer on Special Duty that the verifications were wholly without jurisdiction after the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation No. 64 on the 7th February 1959 and, therefore, a nullity in the eye of law. The Claims Commissioner was held not to be entitled to direct the verification of claims filed under Schedule V-A as claims under Schedule V.

27. All the Writ Petitions were, accordingly, dismissed.

28. Leave was granted in these cases to consider whether the High Court was right in taking the view that the orders passed by the Claims Commissioners' Organization verifying the claims of the appellants were a nullity in law, or could be said to have been made without jurisdiction, in view of the findings of the Claims Commissioners' Organization that the Jagirs, in respect of which claims were filed, came within the extended definition of "proper--ty" under the Notification of the 7th of April 1958.

29. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants have contended that Martial Law Regulation No. 64 only abolished Jagirs situated in Pakistan but did not, and. Could not, have theth th effect of abolishing Jagirs left behind in India. The appellants were not given Jagir rights in Pakistan in lieu of Jagirs left behind in Hyderabad but were allotted lands like other displaced persons coming over from India. Martial Law Regulation No. 64 would not, therefore, have the effect of automatically cancelling the Notification of the 7th of April 1958, which was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-clause (e) of clause (2) of section 2 of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956, and read as follows :- "No. F. 2(12)/55-Clms., 7th April 1958 (Gazette Extra-ordinary, 9th April 1958).-In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-clause (e) of clause (2) of section 2 of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1 956 (III of 1956), the Central Government is pleased to declare the following classes of property to be property for the purpose of the said Act, namely :-

(1) Jagirs consisting of proprietary rights in land with or without muafi benefits.

(2) Fauji Jagirs consisting of land with or without muafi benefits.

(3) Jagirs and Muafees in the form of hereditary assignments of rent or land revenue granted by the Government.

(4) Assignments of rent or land revenue.

(5) Maintenance allowances payable by the Ruling Princes or their Governments to their dependents."

30. This clause (e), quoted earlier, gave power to the Central Government to enlarge the definition of "property" given in the above-mentioned Act by declaring under a notification in the official Gazette "any other property or class of property" which should be dealt with as "property" for the purposes of this Act. Martial Law Regulation No. 64 did not say that Jagirs left behind In India were not to be treated as property in Pakistan.

31. Again the Notification No. SRO-466, although dated the 25 of September 1954, was not published in the Gazette till the 2 of October 1959, and, therefore, carne into effect from that date It could not possibly cancel the Notification of the 7 of April 1958, with retrospective effect and, therefore, all verifications made before that date acquired finality by reason of the provisions of section 7 of the Act of 1956 and could only be revised, altered, modified or cancelled thereafter by a Claims Commissioner under tile provisions of subsection (3) of section 7 of the said Act. In the present cases, the verification orders were made by a Deputy Claims Commissioner. An appeal lay from this order to an Additional Claims Commissioner, but no such appeal was taken. Entitlement certificates, according to the verification orders, were issued and in some case even allotments were made before the cancellation of the Notification published on the 2 of Octo--ber 1959. If any doubt was felt even thereafter with regard to the validity of these verification orders, revisions could have been taken before the Claims Commissioner and mistakes, if any, corrected; but the Officer on Special Duty, it is contended, could not sit on appeal over the Claims Authorities.

32. The Officer on Special Duty is not an officer specified either tinder the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act (XLII of 1956) or the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956 or the Rehabilitation Settlement Schemes framed under the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act, 1956. His name appears for the first time in the Supplementary Rural Scheme No. 1 in 1957 when allotments were decided to be made to displaced persons in lieu of claims verified under Schedule V of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956. The procedure adopted then was that the Rehabilitation Commissioner, West Pakistan would first invite applications within a specified period for allotment of lend under this scheme in Form QPR-1 from claimants whose claims had been verified. The claimants were required to attach a certified copy of the order of verification passed by an officer of the Claims Organization along with their applications for allotment. On receipt of such applications, they were to be sorted out district --wise and linked with the relevant Interim Relief Scheme Entitle--ment slips in Form IR-IV and then entered in the Entitlement Register in Form QPR- 1V. Thereafter, a third "checking of the details" mentioned in the applications and the relevantth nd th nd verification orders wall to be made, and only after that Entitlement Certificates In Form QPR-V were to be issued In triplicate. In cases where the verification order was silent about the nature of any of the rights of the claimant over any land, the details furnished in the application of the claimant in that behalf were to be accepted. Then, if the verified claim was in excess of 20,000 produce index units, it was to be reduced by 50 percent and in no case was any allotment to be made in excess of 36,000 produce index units. Now, in this connection, paragraph 8 of Part 11 of the Supplementary Scheme No. 1 provided that the Form QPR-V was to be signed by an officer not below the rank of Tehsildar and the Officer on Special Duty (Central Record Office) was to check some of these certificates "before or after issue" and initial the office copy of the same in token of his having done so. Then followed instructions for determining the scales of allotment in respect of different kinds of rights, the method for determining the produce index units per acre of soil left in India, the classification of the soil, the conversion of the verified area abandoned into standard acres in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Rehabilitation Commissioner and then conver-- sion of the standard acreage according to the classification of the soil into produce index units in accordance with the tables laid down and the entering thereof in Form QPR-V after taking into, consideration the maximum scale of allotment prescribed.

33. If any claimant was dissatisfied with the area given to him in the QPR-V Form, he was given the right, by paragraph 15-A, to file an objection along with the Entitlement Certificate issued in his favour to the Officer on Special Duty for re-verification. In this connection, the provisions of paragraph 17 of the Supplementary Rural Scheme No. 1 are significant. This paragraph reads as follows: -- "In the case of a claim under Schedule V of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956, which is totally reject--ed, or where the area verified is less than 25 percent of the area claimed, the Claims Commissioner shall be required to forward to the Officer on Special 'Duty (Central Record Office) a certified copy of the order within 15 days of the passing thereof. This order will be entered in register in Form QPR-VII and will be linked up with the relevant entry in the register in Form IR-III. The Officer on Special Duty (Central Record Office) will take im--mediate action to get IR-IV back from the local authorities of the district concerned, who will also be required a Form QPR--V-II, or QPK-IX, as the case may be, to cancel or reduce; the allotment already made. In the case of cancellation, Form IR-IV will be returned to the Central Record Office with a note to that effect for record. In the case of reduction in the area, the local authority concerned will record a note to th.3t effect on the relevant Form IR-V and after due reduction his been effect--ed, will intimate the Officer on Special Duty (Central Record Office) the fact of his having complied with the above instructions.

34. All instructions from the Central Record Office under the provisions of this paragraph shall be complied with by the-- local authorities within one month of the receipt thereof."

35. It will be observed from this that the Officer on Special Duty (Central Record Officer) had no right to cancel an allotment, for, after getting the IR IV Form back, he had to send out QPR-VII and QPR-IX Forms to the District Rehabilitation Authorities con--cerned to cancel or reduce the allotment already made. The District Authorities, after making the cancellation or the reduc--petition, as the case may be, were then to intimate to the Officer on. Special Duty the fact of their having complied with the above: instructions.

36. Paragraph 25 of this Scheme further shows that the Officer on Special Duty has no power even to transfer a claim from one district to another, but he is to be only informed of the transfer made so as to enable him to make the necessary entries in the relevant registers.

37. Reading these provisions as a whole, the question does arise as to whether the provisions of paragraphs 6 to 8, on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the Officer on Special duty, did vest the Other on Special Duty with the power either to correct a verification order or to cancel it or even to treat it as a nullity. The Officer on Special Duty, even if equal in status to a Claims Commissioner, could not normally have the right to sit on appeal over another authority having exclusive and final jurisdiction in the matter, as had been given by the Registra--petition of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956 to the hierarchy of Verifying Officers appointed thereunder. I can find nothing in the Supplementary Rural Scheme No. I to vest the officer on Special Duty with such a power. All that the Officer on Special Duty could perhaps do, in such circumstances, was to refer the case back to the Claims Commissioner to consider whether he would, in exercise of his powers under subsection (3) of section 7, revise the verification order.

38. Reference is also made to a decision of this Court in the case of Syed Abdul Rehman v. Settlement, Rehabilitation & Claims Commissioner (PLD 1966 SC 362), where it was observed as follows: - "Similarly under the Scheme framed under Martial Law Regulation No. 84 he was required to file a written statement in Form M. R.-1. Along with the Form QPR-V and after due checking an Entitlement Certificate was issued under Form M. R.-V. The entitlement of a claimant was worked out thus under the schemes. In other words they provided machinery for the purpose of allotment of land verified under Schedule V of the Act. The officers under the Scheme have no power to question the legality or propriety of the verifica--petition order. It therefore cannot be said that by mere issue of an Entitlement Certificate the verification order would become final."

39. This observation was made, because, a revision from the Verification Order itself, was pending before the coming into force of Martial Law Regulation No. 84. Hence, since the Entitlement Certificate was to be issued on the basis of the Verification Order and the Verification Order was under challenge, the mere issuance of an Entitlement Certificate in the meantime did not give a finality to the Verification Order, even under the Martial Law Regulation No. 84, because, the said Regulation was "never intended to confer any finality on such orders which were under appeal or revision."

40. It has to be pointed out that the Officer on Special Duty. Central Record Office, again, came into the picture under a Scheme framed, under Paragraph 5 of Martial Law Regulation No. 84 of 1960, for the verification and re-verification of claims, in January 1961. Under thin Scheme, the "Officer on Special Duty was the Officer in charge of the Central Record Office (Rural) attached to the Settlement & Rehabilitation Organization, or any officer specially empowered by the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner in this behalf". Again, the Officer on Special Duty was required to verify the written statements filed by claimants and r the Martial Law Regulation No. 84 with the records prepared by his officers, then work out the entitlement, enter the written statements in Form MR-IV register and issue an Entitlement Certificate in Form MR-V. II on such verification a claimant was not found to be entitled to any land, then also a nil certificate had to be issued and copies of such certificates were to be sent to the Districts in which the claimants held allotments, to be adjusted there by the District Authorities, i.e the Deputy Settlement Commissioners in the Districts.

41. If anyone was dissatisfied with the result of the verification given In Form M R-V, he was entitled to file an objection before the Officer on Special Duty within six months of the filing of the written statement or three months of the issuance of Form MR-V, whichever was later. Such objections were to be entered in register MR-VI and acknowledged in Form MR-III. Any claimant, who did not receive the acknowledgment in M R-III, was to inform the Chief Settlement Commissioner in writing within fourteen days of the date on which the objection was sent by him. The claimant could, in such circumstances also apply to the Settlement Commissioner dealing with the objection for the issuance of an interim status quo order, and then the objections were to be heard "by one or more senior officers of the rank of Settlement Commissioner" and after such hearing, the result of the scrutiny was to be sent to the Officer on Special Duty, if a re-calculation became necessary. A supplementary Entitlement Certificate in Form MR-V, had to be issued if the entitlement was increased. On the other hand, if the entitlement was reduced as a result of the scrutiny, then the Officer on Special Duty was required to collect the original copies of Form MR-V from the claimant concerned and the Districts concerned and then to cancel the same including the copy kept in his office and issue a revised certificate in Form MR-V. The finality under this scheme attached again to the order of the Settlement Commissioner on the objection.

42. This too will show that the Officer on Special Duty was merely an officer entitled to check the details and to see that the Entitlement Certificate conformed to the Verification Order. He had no jurisdiction to correct, alter or modify the Verification Order itself or to cancel any allotment of land.

43. The claim of the respondent, therefore, that the power to verify and check given by Paragraph 8 of the Supplementary Rural Scheme No. 1 or Martial Law Regulation No. 84 also empowered the Officer on Special Duty to check the correctness of the Verification Order itself, does not appear to be well- founded. The power to verify and check was a subsidiary funct on entrusted with the Officer on Special Duty in order to insure that the elaborate schemes for the classification of the soil and the working out of the produce index units had been properly carried out by the officers of the Central Record Office in accordance with the Verification of orders and the applications and/or written statements filed by the claimants for allotments.

44. On principle too it would be an unusual proposition that In spite of the fact that the law gave exclusive jurisdiction to another set of officers or authorities to decide a question finally, yet the finality attached by law to such a decision could be taken away by another officer or authority of a subordinate or even of equal status indirectly in the guise of implementing the orders which had already received finality.

45. If authority is needed for this proposition, one may refer to a decision of the Court of Appeal in England in the case of The Queen v. The Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income-tax (L R (1888) 21 QBD 313) This was an appeal from an order of the Queen's Bench Division discharging a Rifle calling upon the Commis--sioners fur Special Purposes of the Income-tax to show cause as to why a mandamus should not issue commanding them to make orders for re-payment to the Cape Copper Mining Company Limited, of certain overpaid income-tax. What had happened In that case was that in March 1887, the company had applied to the Income-tax Commissioners for the City of London for certificates under the Income-tax Statutes for the repayment of Income-tax alleged to have been overpaid during the assessment years 1883-84, 1884-85 and 1885-86. The Income-tax Commis--sioners enquired into the claim and granted a certificate for each year. The Company then went up to the Commissioners for Special Purposes for the order of repayment. The latter refused to issue the repayment orders for the years 1883-t4 and 1884-85 on the ground that the certificates for those years had been granted "without jurisdiction". The Divisional Court discharged the Rule; but on appeal, the decision of the Divisional Court was reversed, the Rules was made absolute and a mandamus was directed to be Issued to the Commissioners for Special Purposes to issue the orders of repayment. Lord Esher, Master of the Rolls, enunciated the principle thus: - "When an inferior Court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the Legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will he held that they had acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of the things, which may exist. The Legislature may intrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the Legislatures are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the Legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the faces, including tie existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of' their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction."

46. It will be observed that the learned Master of the Rolls took the view that, since the Commissioners for the City of London bad been given the jurisdiction finally to determine whether the discovery and proof of the profits have fallen short of the sum computed within the period specified in the section of the law, that decision bad to prevail and the Commissioners for Special purpose could not go behind it.

47. The ratio of the decision, therefore, appears to be that where finality is given to the decision of a certain body which has also the jurisdiction to decide finally facts upon which is own jurisdiction is founded, that decision cannot be called in question it any other collateral proceeding by another tribunal or body of limited jurisdiction.

48. On behalf of the respondent, reliance has been sought to be placed on another decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Re: Ripon (Highfield) Housing Order, 1938 ((1939) 3 A E R 548). This matter, came before the Court by a special proceeding under section 2(if) of Schedule It of the Housing Act, 1935, for the quashment of an order of confirmation granted by the Minister concerned in respect of a compulsory acquisition of lands by a local authority. Under this provision, such an order could be called is question only on the ground that it was not within the powers given by the Act. Section 75 of this Act provided as follows: - Nothing In this Act shall authorise the compulsory acquisi--petition-----of any land which . . . . .

49. Forms part of any park, garden or pleasure ground, or is otherwise required for the amenity or convenience of any house."

50. 'The property sought to be acquired in that case consisted of a large house with 35 acres of land surrounding it. The owner of the property known as "Highfield House" contended that the land proposed to be acquired formed part of a park land, garden, and pleasure ground and was required for the amenity or convenience of Highfield House. It was, therefore, not acquirable under section 75 of the Housing Act of 1936. The Divisional Court took the view that since there was evidence upon which the Minister could have arrived at his decision, there was no usurpation of jurisdiction and the proceeding must, therefore, fail. The Court of Appeal, however, took a different view and quashed the order of the Minister after re-considering the, evidence and holding that the land was a part of a park within the meaning of section 75 of the Act of 1936. Luxmoore, L. J.

51. Observed as follows: - "The first and most important matter to bear in mind is that the jurisdiction to make the order is dependent on a finding of fact, for, unless the land can be held not to be part .Of a park, or not to be required for amenity or convenience, there is no jurisdiction in the borough council to make, or in the Minister to confirm, the order. In such a case, it seems almost self-evident that the Court, which has to consider whether there is jurisdiction to make or confirm the order must be entitled to review the vital finding on which depends the existence of the jurisdiction relied upon. If this were not so, the right to apply to the Court would be illusory. There is, however, ample authority that the Court is entitled so to act, for the point has been considered in a number of cases. It is sufficient to refer to Bunbury v. Fuller (1853) 9 Exch. III. In that case Coleridge, J. Delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, said, ------it is a general rule that no Court of limited jurisdiction can give itself jurisdiction by a wrong decision on a point collateral to the merits of the case upon which the limit to its jurisdiction depends; and however its decision may be final on all particulars making up together that subject- matter which, if true, is within its jurisdiction, and however necessary in many cases it may be for it to make a preliminary inquiry, whether some collateral matter be or be not within the limits, ,yet upon this preliminary question its decision must always be open to inquiry in the superior Court.

52. Then, to take the simplest case-suppose a Judge with jurisdiction limited to a particular hundred, and a matter is brought before him as having arisen within it, but the party charged contends that it arose in another hundred, this is clearly a collateral matter independent of the merits. On its being presented, the Judge must not immediately forbear to proceed, but must inquire into that preliminary fact and for the time decide it, and either proceed or not with the principal subject- matter according as he finds on that point; but this decision must be open to question, and if he bas improperly either forborne or proceeded on the main matter in consequence of an error on this, the Court of Queen's Bench will issue its mandamus or prohibition to correct his mistake.

53. As in Bundbury v. Fuller, and also in R. v. Bradford (1908)--1 K B 365, so also in the present case, the decision on the question whether or not the particular land is part of a park preliminary to the exercise of the jurisdiction to make and confirm the order conferred by the Housing Act, 1936, section 75, and is, therefore, open to review in this Court."

54. Learned counsel for the respondent has no doubt relied on this case for the proposition that a Court of limited jurisdiction like that of a Claims Authority could not give itself juris4 diction on a point collateral to the merits of the case upon, which the limit of its own jurisdiction depended. In such circumstances, in spite of the finality given to its decision, it mush always be open to enquiry in a superior Court (the underlining is mine). What the learned counsel, however, overlooks is that this right is given only to a superior Court and not to another Court or tribunal of limited jurisdiction.

55. Therefore, this decision does not support the proposition that the Officer on Special Duty could have treated the Order of Verification passed by the Claims. Organization as a nullity in the eye of the law.

56. Tribunals, which either act in an administrative capacity or do not possess inherent jurisdiction are not competent to-- disregard any order passed by them even on the ground that it was obtained by fraud. Vide All Iqtidar Shah v. Custodian (PLD 1964 Lah. 274). It follows that such tribunals of limited jurisdiction cannot also-- treat the order of another tribunal of limited but exclusive jurisdiction as a nullity.

57. It was, however, open to the High Court, if the Verification. Order was itself challenged there, to go behind the order and to see whether the jurisdictional facts had been correctly determined by the Claims Organization, namely, as to whether the claim filed was in respect of property or that it was a claim at all because, unless it was a claim in respect of property within the meaning of the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act 1956, the Claims Organization could certainly have no jurisdiction to verify the claim. But this the Officer on Special Duty could not do. If the latter felt that the Claims Organization had overlooked any particular fact upon which its own jurisdiction, depended, then it could only refer the matter back to the Claims Commissioner to revise or review the order as the case may be, if considered fit. The Officer on Special Duty, however, could not himself sit on judgment over the verification order and decide for himself as to whether it should been effect to or not by the issuance of an appropriate Entitlement Certificate. I am, therefore, in agreement with the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that the officer on Special Duty clearly acted in excess of his jurisdiction. But this does not mean that the High Court in the Writ Jurisdiction could not have considered the validity of the verification itself, because, even if the Officer on Special Duty acted in excess of his jurisdiction, the High Court in its discretion, could have refused to intervene on the ground that the Verification order itself was without jurisdiction and a nullity in the eye of the law.

58. The appellants have, on the other hand, contended, firstly, that the High Court could not do so in a proceeding in which the verification order was itself not directly under challenge and, secondly, because the order of the, Claims Organization was not; without jurisdiction.

59. "The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that then order of the High Court, dated 28 June 1963 is a nullity Inasmuch as it confirmed a special resolution by which certain conditions in the Memorandum of Association were changed contrary to the provisions of sections 10 and 12 of the Com--panies Act. We are unable to accept this contention. Even assuming that the resolution was passed in contravention of sections 10 and 12 a distinction has to be made between an illegal decision and a void decision. By no stretch of imagi--nation, even if the contention of Mr. Abdullah that the order was contrary to the provisions of sections 10 and 12 of the Companies Act were to be accepted, it can be urged that: the order is a nullity. At the highest it is an illegal order but not a void order. The Court had jurisdiction to confirm the deletion of the original clauses 4 and 7 of the objects and if in so doing it either misinterpreted or ignored any provision of the law, the order cannot be said to be void. An illegal order has to be avoided by challenging it in proper proceedings and until it is set aside, it cannot be ignored."

60. This is no doubt correct, but it is also now well-established that where an inferior tribunal or Court has acted wholly without jurisdiction or as Rubinstein puts it in his book on "jurisdiction and Illegality" taken any action "beyond the sphere allotted to the tribunal by law and. Therefore, outside the area within which the law recognizes a privilege to err", then such action amounts to "usurpation of power unwarranted by law" and such an act is nullity: that is to say, "the result of a purported exercise of authority which has no legal effect whatsoever". In such a case lit is well- established that a superior Court is not bound to give effect to it, particularly where the appeal is to the latter's discre--tionary jurisdiction. The Courts would refuse to perpetuate, in such circumstances, something which would be patently unjust unlawful.

61. An order in the nature of a writ of certiorari or mandamus is a discretionary order. Its object is to foster justice and right a wrong. Therefore, before a person can be permitted to invoke this discretionary power of a Court, it must be shown that the order sought to be set aside had occasioned some injustice to the parties. If it does not work any injustice to any party, rather it cures a manifest illegality, then the extraordinary jurisdiction ought not to be allowed to be invoked.

62. This principle has been followed consistently in England both In the case of a Writ of mandamus as well as a Writ of mandamus. As stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 11, at page 106 "the Court will not, by mandamus, order some--thing which is impossible of performance by reason of the cir--cumstances that the doing of the act would involve a contraven--petition of law" nor will a mandamus issue "in order to effect what amounts to an evasion of a statute".

63. Relying on this principle, the Court of Appeal in England, in the case of Reg v. Eastbourne Corporation (1900) 83 L T R 338), refused to grant a mandamus to compel a local authority to approve plans of a pro--posed building, because, the plans clearly contravened the provi--sions of the Public Health (Buildings in Street) Act, 1888, and obedience to the mandamus "would be the approval of plans which would be In contravention of the law of the land".

64. Similarly, in the case of The Queen v. The Eastern Counties Railway (1843) 12 L J R 271), Coleridge, J.

65. Refused to issue a mandamus to direct a Railway company to issue a fresh precept for the summoning of another jury to asses damages, because, on an earlier precept, a jury had already been summoned and damages assessed under a law which provided that the verdict of the jury was to be "final and conclusive". The learned Judge was of the view that in such cir--cumstances, to direct the company to issue a fresh precept, would amount to an evasion of the statute.

66. The same principle is followed in the case of a certiorari. The English Courts have refused to grant this writ even where grounds are made out for its issuance if or) benefit could arise from granting it. Thus in the case or The Queen v. Lord New---borough ((1869) L R 4 Q B 585) Lush, J. Observed: -th "It is in the discretion of the Court to grant or to refuse a certiorari, and it is not a matter of right. As the order has been acted on, the money paid, and the account allowed, we think we ought not to do anything to re-open these proceedings."

67. The law has been summed up well by H. M. Seerval in his book on the "Constitutional Law of India" at page 618, where he says that "even where a Court has the power to issue a writ of mandamus or certiorari, the Court will not do so, if, to grant these writs works injustice in a broad sense".

68. Acting on this principle, a writ of certiorari has been refused by the Courts in the following cases because to grant it would have bad the effect of allowing the technicality of the law to cause unjust enrichment which it was the policy of the law to avoid or would have resulted in the confirmation of a certificate obtained wrongly be suppressing material facts or would have sustained an order of allotment which the petitioner had obtained by suppres--sion of material facts within his knowledge or would have resulted in perpetuating an injustice which bad been done to the respon--dents by an incorrect order passed against them or would result in perpetuating a manifestly illegal order or would debar the taxing authorities from initiating proceedings because the requisite time for such initiation had expired.

69. It is unnecessary to refer to all the suthoritie4 cited by the learned author in support of the above illustration, but I may refer to one; namely in the case of Abdul Majid v. The State Transport Appellate Authority (AIR 1960 Pat. 333) where the position was in pan material. The Court refused to grant relief under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution and refused to set aside au impugned order of an Appellate Authority, because, that order had itself set as, be an earlier order, which had no validity due to want of juris--diction as by setting aside the subsequent order the Court would be "countenancing and perpetuating an illegal act".

70. This brings me to the consideration of the next question, namely, as to whether the orders of the Claims Authorities verifying the claims of the appellants were without jurisdiction and nullities. The High Court has found them to be so, firstly, because, in the opinion of tie High Court suit, the Claims Commissioner bad no jurisdiction to direct Claims Officers to treat claims filed under Schedule V-A as claims under Schedule V and to verify the same accordingly, after the last date for filing of the Forms under Schedule V had expired; and, secondly, because, the High Court took the view that Jagirs were not rights or interests in property at all and, therefore, under the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act III of 1956, no claims in respect of Jagirs could have been at all verified.

71. With regard to the first ground on which the High Court has held the Verification Orders to be without jurisdiction, learned counsel for the appellants have contended that the High Court has not kept in mind the distinction between acts done wholly without jurisdiction and the mistaken application of law in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It is contended that the Claims Officers had the jurisdiction to pronounce upon the validity of claims flied asserting a right to the ownership of, or to any interest in, property which bad been treated as evacuee property in India or of which a displaced person had otherwise been deprived under any law for the time being in force in India.

72. As to what is "property" is defined in the Act Itself. Clause (e) of subsection (2) of section 2 gives to the Central Government the right to add to the definition by declaring any other property or clans of property not specified in the earlier Clauses of this subsection to be property for the purposes of this Act by a notification in the official Gazette. This notification was issued on the 7 of April 1958.

73. Including Jagirs and muafis within the category of properties defined in the Act, and until this notifi--cation was cancelled on the 2 of October 1759 it was not open to anyone to say that Jagirs are not property within the meaning of the Act. Up to the cancellation of the aforesaid notification, the claims others had, therefore, every jurisdiction to verify the claims head by the appellants, and even it they had done so erro--neously or misinterpreted the law in doing so, it cannot be said that they had acted without jurisdiction. th of April 1958, and, therefore, the appellants had further more acquired a vested right under theseth nd Verification Orders, of which they could not be deprived retrospectively by the cancellation of the notification, because, a notification can never operate retrospectively.

74. As regards the circulars of the Claims Commissioner, issued in April and May 1959, the Circular Letter No. Jagirs/59/13616 issued by the Claims Commissioner, Pakistan on the 10 of September 1959 (vide page 114 of the Paper Book in Civil Appeal No. 9/67), it is pointed out, clearly explains that these circulars merely directed that claims in respect of Zamindari or tenancy rights filed under Schedule V-A should be treated as claims under Schedule V and should be verified as such, "leaving other rights in the nature of Jagirs or muafis in the form of assignment of rent or land revenue". There was noting irregular or illegal in this circular, and it cannot be said that the acts of the Claims Authori--ties in so treating the claims were a nullity, because, zamindari and tenancy rights did, in any event, come within the definition of "land" given in clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 2 of the Act of 1956 (Act III of 1956).

75. PLD 1963 SC 704) this Court took the view that admission of inadmissible evidence or the improper allocation of onus or even misinterpretation of the provisions of a statute would not necessarily render the Impugned order without lawful authority, because, "the proposi--petition is indisputable that when there is jurisdiction to decide a particular matter then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the decision without jurisdiction"

76. Again in Muhammad Swaleh v. United Grain & Fodder Agencies (PLD 1964 SC 97I) it was laid down this "by merely showing there--fore that an order passel was in violation of some provision of law or procedure the conclusion that the order is a nullity would not follow, It shoal: further be shown that there was such a violation of some statutory provision or principle of natural justice as would render the proceedings coram non judice."

77. It is no doubt true that there is a clear distinction between an act wholly without jurisdiction and an act done in the improper exercise of that jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction to decide, then as it has often been said there is jurisdiction to decide either rightly or wrongly, and merely a wrong decision does not render the decision without jurisdiction. To amount to a nullity, an act must be non-existent in the eye of lain; that is to say, it must be wholly without jurisdiction or performed in such a way that the law regards it as a mere colourable exercise of jurisdiction or unlawful usurpation of jurisdiction. In the present cases, the Verification Orders cannot be said to be without jurisdiction and a nullity in this sense, inertly because of the circulars of the Claims Commissioner, Pakistan, directing the Claims Officers to treat claims for zamindaris and tenancy Interests in claims filed under Schedule V-A as claims under Schedule V, leaving out Jagirs and muafis. If the Claims Officers had misinterpreted these instructions or misapplied them and treated even Jagirs and moats as claims in respect of properties under Schedule v, then they had no doubt decided wrongly but not without jurisdiction. I am, therefore, unable to agree that on this ground the Verification Orders could be treated as a nullity.

78. The next ground, however, is more substantial. If, as pointed out in the circular of the 10 of September 1959, the verification of claims under Schedule V-A had been totally suspended by Circular No. Jags/59/1510 dated 19 January 1959, then the verification of claims in respect of Jagirs not involving zamindari, or tenancy rights in the face of this bar would be clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the Claims Officers, even though the notification of the 7 of April 1958 enlarging the definition of "property" under section 2 of Act III of 1956 had not been cancelled till then. The Claims Officers below the claims Commissioner had to work under the general superintendence and control of the Claims Com--missioner. They could not, therefore, disregard his instructions. If they did so or gave themselves jurisdiction by wrong interpretation of those instructions the High Courts would be entitled to go behind their decisions as pointed out earlier and declare them to be nullth th th th and void even though another tribunal of limited jurisdiction was not entitled to treat such decisions as nullities.

79. The High Court was, therefore, in my view, in any event entitled to consider whether the Jagirs, in respect of which the claims had been verified, were confined to claims filed under Schedule V-A in respect of zamindari or tenancy rights in land. The High Court has come to the conclusion that Jagir rights are not rights in rem at all but rights in personam simpliciter arid, therefore, unless it was objectively established that the claims were in respect of lands or interests in land, they could not have been verified at all under Act III of 1956. This was a jurisdictional fact, in respect of which the Claims Authorities could not claim any final jurisdic--petition. They could not, by an erroneous decision, give themselves jurisdiction to verify such claims, as, a purely administrative tribunal, which is empowered to pass an order if certain circum--stances exist, has no jurisdiction to determine those circumstances, because, the objective existence of those circumstances is an essential condition of the validity of its order, as was pointed out by this Court in the case of Muhammad Jamil Asghar v. The Improvement Trust (PLD 1965 SC 698). It was held in the said case that the orders of the Settlement Officers transferring a property would be without jurisdiction "if the property was in fact not evacuee property and was not vesting in the Central Government".

80. In such circumstances, the Settlement Authorities could not grant to themselves any jurisdiction to deal with it by merely holding that it was evacuee property. Such orders would always be liable to challenge in Courts of general jurisdiction and certainly in superior Courts on the ground that they had no jurisdiction with regard to the property transferred at all.

81. On the same reasoning a Claims Commissioner or a Claims Officer could not give himself jurisdiction to verify a claim by wrongly holding that the claim was in respect of property within the meaning of Act III of 1956.

82. Learned counsel for the appellants have contended that even if this be so, the High Court was wrong in taking the view that a Jagir in the State of Hyderabad, Deccan, was not "property" within the meaning of clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 2 of the said Act. This necessarily necessitates an examination into the nature of such Jagirs in Hyderabad, Deccan.

83. The High Court, relying on the classification given in the report on the Administration of His Exalted Highness the Nizam's Dominions for the year 1331 Fasli (October 1921 to October 1922), compiled by Hyder Nawaz Jang the then Finance Member of the Nizam, and published by the Nizam's Government in May 1925, took the view that, since none of the appellants In these cases held Paigah or Al-Tamgha Jagirs, tie Jagirs held by them were non-hereditary and conferred no right on them other then the enjoyment of the usufruct for life only.

84. Thereafter, referring to The Imperial Gazetteer of India) Volume XIII, and the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ramchandra Mantri v. Venkatrao (1 L R 6 Bom. 598), the High Court came to the conclusion that, since no other authority to the contrary had been shown, Jagirs of the kinds held by the appellants created "no permanent or quasi-permanent interest in the land whether it was in possession of cultivators or tae Jagirdars themselves." Therefore, the verification of the claims of the appellants under Schedule V in accordance with the instructions issued by the Claims Commissioner for the trans--ference of claims filed under Schedule V-A to Schedule V and their verification as such were without lawful authority and a "complete nullity in law", as the Claims Commissioner had no power either to enlarge the definition of "property', or to admit a claim after the expiry of the last date for the submission of claims.

85. It is true that in the earlier decisions starting from 1827, with the case of the East India Company v.

86. Syed Ally and others (7 M I A 555), which dealt with the case of a grant originally made by the, Nawabs of Carnatic as an Al-Tamgha Inam, the Judicial Committee --of the Privy Council did hold the view: - "That although the language of the grants might seem to convey a proprietary interest in the soil, yet tile grantees confessedly possessed no such interest, the subject matter of the grant being a mere Jagir, or portion of public land revenue, together with the Government powers of collecting the same-----------------------------------------------------------------the grants, therefore, being of the nature above-mentioned must, according to the character and usage of the Indian Government, be determinable, if not at pleasure, at least upon the death of the granting Sovereign, or the change of dynasty."

87. The facts of this case were that all grants granted by the Nawabs of Carnatic had been resumed by the East India Company and in some cases perwannahs or sanads were subsequently issued re-granting the jagirs. In these circumstance, in a suit filed by the heirs of a deceased Jagirdar for the declaration of their shares in such a re-granted Jagir, the Privy Council took the view that the re-grant of a Jagir was a sovereign act and that the re-grant, in the case before it, was clearly for life only. Therefore, the other heirs of the original grantee had no right, title or interest in this Jagir, nor could the Courts in Madras enter into an examination of the validity of such a sovereign act.

88. It is interesting, however, to note that the Privy Council itself in this case conceded: - "That the laws and usages of Muhammadan States respecting grants of jaghires, the nature of Altumghah grants, the precise estate and interest conveyed by such grants, and the powers of resumption or revocation belonging to the sovereign grantors, were matters respecting which there was no sufficient evidence on which the Court below could make the decrees, appealed against, and that the Court ought to have directed issues, in order to ascertain the facts, and especially the laws and usages of the Carnatic, and ought not to have decided a question of such magnitude and of so much novelty and perplexity without granting such issues."

89. It will thus be seen that in the above-mentioned case, though there are some general observations with regard to the nature of Jagirs under the Muslim Rulers of India, the matter was not directly in issue, for, the Privy Council proceeded on entirely different considerations.

90. Next, in 1867, in the case of Krishnara' v Ganesh v. Rangra' v (4 BHCR (ACJ)), while considering as to whether an inamdar could alienate the Land which formed part of his roam for any period exceeding the term of his life, Westropp, J. (as he then was) made the general observation that "Sanadi grants in Inam, saranjam, jagir, wazifa, wakf, devasth'an and sevasth'an, are, generally speaking, more properly described as alienations of the royal share in the produce of land i.e. Of land revenue, than grants of land, although in popular parlance, and in this judgment, occasionally so-called", "Upon a review of all of the authorities, I think that lands hold in roam, and especially altamgha roam, such as those the subject of this suit, free from any condition as to prospective service, and unfettered by any religious or charitable or other trust, and not specially restricted to the family of the grantee, are alienable. I cannot hold that the words of inheritance contained in the Farman of 1771 amount to any such restriction, Either express or implied. If it were intended that the inam-i- altamgha thereby granted, and which 1 may observe, seems to have been the highest class of estate known on this side of India, were either to be inalienable, or, if alienated, nevertheless to revert to the imperial grantor or his successors upon the failure of issue male, or general issue of the original grantee, it would have been very easy to say so in the Farman of 1771. I should, however, have been surprised to find any such restriction in a grant of imam-i-altamgha, unburdened by any condition as to service, or by any trust, and solely dictated by a desire to benefit the grantee. It would have been inconsistent with, and in derogation of, the nature of such a grant, which usually confers an estate hereditary, transferable and irresumable. We ought not, unless constrained by force of an overruling context, to endeavour to wrest from language, customarily employed by the natives of India, in their most simple and ordinary conveyances, to import perpetuity of estate a meaning so narrow and so highly technical as that which the appellant asks us to give to the' grant in this case cannot find a syllabic, in the context of the Farman of 1171, indicating that the words of inheritance were employed in any other than their normal sense."

91. The other learned Judge (Tucker, J.), constituting the Bench did not agree with all these general observations but agreed with the conclusion, as, in his view, "the alienability of land granted as jagir or inam must be governed by the terms of each particular grant; and that no general rule can be laid down with respect to lands granted under these appellations".

92. Then, in 1875, in the case of Ravi Narayan Mandlik v. Dadaji Bapuji Desal (I L R 1 Bom. 523), Westropp J., who had by then become Chief Justice, reaffirmed his previous view that: "lf words are employed in the grant, which expressly or by necessary implication indicate that Government intends that, so far, as it may have any ownership in the soil, that ownership shall pass to the grantee, neither Government, nor any person subsequently to the date of the grant deriving under Government, can be permitted to say that the ownership did not so pass."