1. DORAB PATEL, J.-We heard and allowed this appeal in the absence of the 1st respondent on the 14th of October, 1980, therefore, he has filed this application under Order XVI, rule 6 (hereinafter called the said rule) of the rules of this Court, and his prayer in this application is that the appeal should be reheard, because he had received notice of its hearing in Lahore, on the night of the 13th of October, 1980. Now, if the respondent received the Court's notice so very late through no fault of his own, the notice was not a proper notice under Order XX, rule 2 of this Court's rules. And, if his restoration application is not allowed, he will suffer on account of the negligence of this Court office in not sending him a proper notice. That would be an. Abuse of the process of the Court, because it is a funda--mental principle of our jurisprudence that the litigant should not suffer on account of the mistake or negligence of the Court.
2. But according to Mr. Fazle Hussain, the rules of this Court which have been framed for regulating the procedure of this Court, do not contain any provision which would permit us to restore to regular hearing an appeal which had been decided ex parte on account of a mistake of the Court.
3. The plea is difficult to understand, because as observed by Bose, J., in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah AIR 1955 SC 425procedure means something designed to facilitate justice and further its endsnot a thing designed to trip people up. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the said rule. It reads:-
6. Nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.
4. Now, as we observed, "a litigant should not suffer on account of the mistakes or errors of the Court, and the corollary of this principle is that the Court should have the inherent power to correct its errors. The said rule only clarifies in terms that this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the. Process of the Court."
5. There is no ambiguity about .These words, and if the respondent's plea be true, he has brought his case within the meaning of the said rule.
6. Additionally, the said rule was not framed for first time by this Court. It is almost verbatim reproduction of section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code and of section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, and these two sections (which in turn are in pari materia with each other) have been part of our procedural laws for generations, so that there is no ambiguity about them, because they have been repeatedly construed by the superior Courts. Thus, for example, taking first, section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Indian Supreme Court held in Keshardeo Chamaria v. Radha Kissen Chamaria and others (AIR1953SC23that a Court could in the exercise of its powers under section 151 recall an order passed by it without notice to the parties concerned. Next, as to section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, this Court held in Gulzar Hassan Shah v. Ghulam Murtaza and 4 others (PLD1970SC335that a Court was competent under section 561-A to recall an order passed by it without notice to the parties concerned. However, as this judgment was pronounced long after the rules of this Court had been framed in 1956, the case-law on section 561-A before 1950 would be more relevant. We say 1950 and not 1956, because the said rule was originally enacted as rule 6 of Order L11I of the Federal Court Rules of 1950. And on the repeal of those rules by this Court's Rules of 1956, the same provision was re-enacted in the present rules as the said rule.
7. (1)AIR1953SC23 (2)
(3) AIR 1924 Mad. 640 (4) AIR 1925 Lah. 554
(5) AIR 1949 All. 176(6)
8. Now, section 561-A was promulgated by the Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act of 1923, and In re: T. Somy Naidu (AIR 1924 Mad. 640) the Madras High Court held that a Court could rehear a case under this section if it had been decided without notice to the accused, because in such a situation, there was no previous valid adjudication to bar a hearing on the merits. The same view was taken by the Lahore High Court in M. Parbati v. Prem Sukh (AIR 1925 Lah. 554and by the Allahbad High Court in Chandrika v. Rex (5). And, it is of interest to note that the Calcutta High Court had taken the same view even before the promulgation of section 561-A in Raja Bali v.
9. Emperor (AIR 1919 Cal. 409) and held that a Court had the inherent power to rehear n case which has been decided without hearing the accused. There--fore, even on the footing that there is some ambiguity in the said rule these judgments would be relevant to the construction of the said rule, and they support the respondent's plea.
10. However, according to Mr. Fazle Hussain, this Court could not rehear an appeal on any ground whatever because this would destroy the principle of the finality of the judgment and learned counsel appeared to think that this submission was supported by Article 188 of the Constitution.
11. This article reads :- "188. The Supreme Court shall have power, subject to the provisions of any Act of Parliament and of any rules made by the Supreme Court, to review any judgment pronounced or any order made by it."
12. This article has not been enacted in order to curtail the powers of this Court but only in order to confer a power of review on the Court, and it is signi--ficant that even this power -has been expressly made subject to "any rule made by the Supreme Court", therefore, it is very clear that this article has no relevance to the construction of the said rule. However, the question of the finality of judgments is another matter. The principle that a judgment becomes final after it has been pronounced is so fundamental a principle of our jurisprudence that it cannot be curtailed by an appeal to the concept of a Court's inherent powers, the more so, as we should not extend those inherent powers to matters which fall under the rules framed by this Court.
13. Now, one of the rules framed by this Court, which is relevant to the respondent's plea is rule 2 of Order X. This rule reads :- "2. Subject to the provisions contained in Order XXVI a judgment pronounced by the Court or by a majority of the Court or by a dissenting Judge in open Court shall not afterwards be altered or added to save for the purpose of correcting a clerical or arithmetical mistake or an error arising from any accidental slip or omission."
14. We may pause to point out that this rule is similar to section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and as we would not extend our inherent powers to a situation covered by a rule of this Court, the point for determination is whether this rule is a bar to our power to rehear an appeal which has been heard ex parte on account of a mistake of the Court. In our opinion, this rule is no bar to the rehearing of an appeal, because as was observed by Odgers, J., in Somu Naidu's case, the bar to the rehearing of a case by provisions such as section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is attracted only when there has been a valid adjudication of the case before the Courts and in the instant case if the respondent's plea be true, the judgment pronounced by us on the 14th October, was not a valid adjudication within the meaning of rule 2 of Order X. But there is no other rule, which is relevant to the question of the rehearing of a matter decided ex parte by the Court, therefore, the application was rightly filed under the said rule, and the next point for determination is whether the respondent has made out sufficient cause. For the rehearing of the appeal.
15. Mr. Fazle Hussain bad sent notice of the filing of the petition for leave to the respondent by registered post on the 14th of June, 1980, and the respondent has admitted the receipt of this notice. Similarly, the Assistant Registrar of this Court had informed him by a letter dated the 13th of July, 1980 that leave had been granted by this Court, and the respondent was directed by this notice to comply with the interim order passed by the Court for the deposit of .Rent pending the hearing of the appeal. The respon--dent admits the receipt of this letter and indeed he complied with the direction for the deposit of rent in this notice. But as he did not appoint an Advocate-on- Record to represent him when the appeal was fixed for hearing the Court sent the usual notice for the hearing of the appeal directly to him and the period of notice was reasonable. However, after the despatch of this notice, the respondent appointed his Advocate-on-Record, and we are constrained to observe here that if he had not been so negligent in the appointment of an Advocate-on-Record, he would have had no difficulty in appearing before us when the appeal against him was heard. Be that as it may, as we observed, the notice sent to him was reasonable, therefore. We observed that we could not understand, how it reached him on the night of the 13th of October, 1980. The respondent's only reply was that he had been re-transferred from Bahawalnagar to Lahore and that he had not informed the Court of his change of address. As he ha not informed the Court of his change of address, and as the notice sent by this Court has not been produced before us, we can only observe that if the notice reached the respondent late on the night of the 13th o October, 1980, this was the result of his own negligence in not informing the Court of his change of address. Therefore, the respondent has failed to make out sufficient cause for the restoration of the appeal to regular hearing and it is on this ground that we dismissed his application under the said rule.
16. The respondent has also filed an application for interim relief, pending the hearing of his appeal, but as his application under the said rule is dismissed, this application too fails and is dismissed.