1. DORAB PATEL, J.-The dispute in these two petitions relate to an evacuee property in Ramnagar,, Lahore. And, the only admitted fact is that the property was rightly divided by the Settlement authorities into two houses. However, when Settlement operations began, after litigation which is not relevant by an undated order (to which we will refer as the undated order) a Deputy Settlement Commissioner transferred eastern, portion of tile property to the mother of the petitioner in C. P.
2. 1080 of 1975 (to whom we will refer as the petitioner). By the same order, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner rejected tire claim of the respondents in this petition (to whom we will refer as the respondents) and we may also point out that the respondents have filed C. P. 417 of 1975. The Deputy Settlement Commis--sioner, therefore, directed that the western portion of the property should be disposed of by earmarking. Further, litigation in the Settlement Department followed as the petitioner's mother tried to obtain the transfer of the entire property, and for the purpose of this petition it is sufficient to state that the respondents were successful in obtaining an order for the transfer of the western portion in their favour. Next, as the petitioner's mother died, the eastern portion of the property devolved on him. Then in the sixties, there was litigation between him and the respondents in the Settlement Department about the demarcation of tire property and the apportionment of the land between him and the respondents. The details of this protected litigation are not relevant and it would be sufficient to state that on the remand of the case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner upheld the claim of the petitioner by his order dated 7-11-1970. We shall refer to this order as the demarcation order. It was unsuccessfully challenged by the respondents in an appeal, but they filed a revision against the dismissal of their appeal and the revision was allowed on 24-11-1973. Therefore, the petitioner filed a writ petition in the Lahore High Court and he based his case inn the writ petition on the undated order. He also sought the enforcement of the demarcation order and the writ was allowed by a learned Judge of the High Court with the observation that the order of the Settlement Authorities dated 24-11-1973 in favour of the respondents "did not make sense".
3. The respondents then filed a review of tire judgment of the learned Judge, who allowed it partially with the following observations on 12-12-1975 :- "The only point that has now been brought to my notice during the arguments is that there is no separate staircase for access to the portion transferred to Nazim Ali and Khadim Hussain. If that be the case then the staircase existing in the house shall be used commonly by the transferees to the extent that it is necessary to do so to reach the portion transferred and not beyond that.,"
4. The petitioner is aggrieved by this order of 12-12-1975 and has therefore filed his petition for leave.
5. The respondents on the other hand, have filed their petition for leave both against the judgment of 11-4-1975 and against the order of 12-12-1975, and it would be convenient to dispose of their petition first.
6. We pointed out that in setting aside the order of 24-11-1973, the learned Judge observed that this order "did not make sense". We have examined the order of 24-11-1973 and we fully agree with the view of the learned Judge, and we may point out here that Mr. Mahmood Hassan was also not able to advance any arguments in defence of this absurd or6er of 24-11-1973 therefore, C. P. 417/75 is dismissed.
7. We now turn to the petition filed by the petitioner against the learned Judges order of 12-12-1975 reviewing his own judgment. The only effect of this review order was that the respondents were given the right to use the common staircase of the property in order to reach the upper floors of the "house" transferred to them. Mr. Shaukat vehemently submitted that the order of 12-12-1975 was illegal, because the judgment of the learned Judge did not contain any error apparent on the record. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that this submission is correct, we do not think that it is a fit case for the grant of special leave.
8. The entire case of the petitioner rests on the undated order. Mr. Shaukat of Course attempted to persuade us to hold that the undated order had to be read with the demarcation order which entitled the petitioner to the exclusive use of the staircase. We are unable to agree with this submission, because the Settlement authorities could not, .In demarcation proceedings, transfer to the petitioner any portion of the property which had not been transferred to him under the undated order and/or under the P. T. O. Issued to him. The P. T. O. Has not been produced. And, on the other hand, although the undated order is a very slipshod order, it does state that the two portions of the property had "independent doors, entrance, stairs, etc.". But, it is very clear from the plans produced by both the parties that the property did not have two staircases. It had only one staircase which according to Mr. Shaukat had been transferred to the petitioner under the demarcation order. But, as we explained, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner was not competent to transfer to the petitioner in the guise of a demarcation order any portion of the property or any entitlement which had not been given or transferred to him under the undated order. And, the undated order does not state that the only staircase of the property was transferred to the petitioner. Additionally the division of the property into two houses has become final and was not challenged by either of the parties. But. It is also obvious that the property would not have been divided by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner into two houses if he had intended to give the exclusive use of the staircase to one of the two transferees, therefore, although the undated order is ambiguous, it cannot be to mean that the only staircase of the property had been transferred to the petitioner.
9. However, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument, that the ambiguity in the said order can be construed in the petitioners favour as claimed by Mr. Shaukat, the result would be a total dead- lock. It would be impossible for the respondents to have access to the upper floors of their "house".
10. Therefore, on the assumption that the staircase had been transferred to the petitioner what is fatal to his case before us is that it was he and not the respondent, who had filed the writ petition and in seeking the transfer of the staircase exclusively to himself, he was seeking the aid of the Court for an extremely unjust claim. But, as observed by Hamoodur Rehman, C. J., in Raunaq Ali v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1973 SC 236), a writ petition is a discretionary remedy the object of which "is to foster justice and right a wrong. Therefore, before a person can be permitted to invoke this discretionary power of a Court it must be shown that the order to be set aside had occasioned some injustice . . . . If it does not work any injustice to any party, rather it cures a manifest illegality, then the extraordinary jurisdiction ought not to be allowed to be invoked". The petitioner's case is hit by these observations and so even on the assumption that his claim is supported by the ambiguity in the said order, he was not entitled to the issue of a writ for the enforcement of a claim, which would lead only to injustice. And, by reviewing his own order, the learned Judge merely brought his judgment into line with the law declared by this Court. Mr. Shaukat, therefore, submitted that the learned Judge was not entitled to review his order, but we would not examine this argument, because in the circumstances discussed, it is not a fit case for the grant of special leave.
11. In the result both the petitions are dismissed.