1. ANWARUL HAQ, C. J.-This appeal, by the leave of the Court, is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, Quetta Circuit, dated the 27th of January, 1971, by which a revision petition filed by the respondents against the judgment of the District Court, Quetta, for the recovery of their wages, was accepted, and the order of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Quetta, as Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, was restored.
2. The respondents 1 to ,15 were employed as workmen in a Coal Mine owned and managed by a firm working under the name and style of S. M. Rahman & Co. The respondent No. 16 Syed Matiur Rehman was ifie sole proprietor of this business ; but in February; 1972, he entered into a partnership with the present appellant Syed Muhammad Hassan for the running of the business.
3. The respondents workmen had claimed Rs. 12---000 as wages for the period October, 1961 to February, 1962. On the 15th of May, 1962, the matter was referred to arbitration at the instance of the: appellant Syed Muhammad Hassan, and by means of an award of the same date the Firm undertook to pay the sum of Rs. 12,000 to the respondents as their wages.
4. As the Firm did not honour its commitment to the workmen, and instead resorted to a lock-out, the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) intervened,, and effected a settlement on the 6th of June, 1962, under which both the Firm and the appellant accepted liability for the amount involved. However, even this commitment was also not honoured, with the result that the workmen were obliged to file an application before the learned Senior Civil Judge under section 15 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The claim was allowed by the Authority by its order dated, the 31st of May,, 1965.
5. The Firm as well as- the new partner Syed Muhammad Hassan filed an appeal under section 17 .Of the Act, which was allowed by the learnedDistrict Judge, Quetta, by his judgment dated the 4th of November, 1965, on the ground that the application presented by the workmen before the Authority was barred by time ; and that Syed Muhammad Hassan was not liable for the amount due to the workmen, and the award and settlement were not binding on him.
6. Aggrieved by this judgment of the District Court: the workmen invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, and their revision petitiod was accepted by a learned Judge on the ground that the delay in filing the application had been properly condoned by the Authority in terms of the proviso to subsection (2) of section 15 of the Act ; and that the present appellant Syed Muhammad Haiisan was estopped from repudiating his liability under the award and the settlement for the reason that he bad himself undertaken to meet this liability, even though the wages related to a period before he had joined the partnership. The learned Judge also repelled a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the revision petition, holding that as the District Court was subordinate to the High Court, the revision petition was maintainable under-section 115.Of the Civil Procedure Code..
7. The main ground on which leave to appeal was granted in this case, and which has been argued before us by the learned counsel for the appellant, is that as the order of the Authority under section 15 of the Act was final; subject only to the appellate jurisdiction of the District- Court under section 17(c) of the Act, such finality could not be inteffered with by the High Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. It. Was also argued at the Bar that, in any case, the District Court while hearing an appeal under the Act,, could not be regarded as being subordinate to the High Court, as the subordination indicated and defined in section 2(4) and section 3 of the Civil Procedure Code is only for the purposes of that Code,.And does not extend to the jurisdiction otherwise exercised by the District Court under different statutes. 1n support of these. Submissions the learned counsel has referred us to a large number of decided cases, namely, Debidutt Ditbe v. Central India Electrical Supply Co. (1), The Manager, The Spring Mills Ltd. v; G. D. Amberkar and another (2), Jogendra Nath Chatterjee & Sons v.. Chandreswar Singh (3), Rajkumar Miils Ltd., Indore v. Inspector, Payment of Wages, Madhya Bharat, lndore (4), G. T. Darn and others v. Manager, Ahmedabad Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (5), Wajahat A.I Hasnfe v. Mst. Ghozala (6), Sher A.I v. Manager, P. I. D. C. (7), Mst. Farlda Parween v. Qadeeruddin Ahmad Siddiqi (8),, Mst. Tehseen Akhtar v. Afahmood--ul- Hassan (9) and Syed Shamim Ahmad v: Mst. Rlaz.Fatimu (10)..
8. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant do not support him.. In the cases of Debidutt Dube, The Manager, The Spring Mills Ltd., Jogendra Nath Chatterjee and Rajkumar Mills Ltd., Indore, the view has been expressed that wizen an appeal is provided for under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act to the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country; and consequently its orders and decrees are subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.
(1) AIR 1945 Nag. 244(2) AIR 1949 Both. 188 .
(3) AIR 1951 Cal. 29(4) AIR 1955 Madh. Bh; 6C
(5) AIR 1955 Brim. 460(6) PLD 1970 Lah. 641
(7) PLD 1970 Q uetta 85(8) ' PLD 1971 Kar. 118
(9) PLD.1971 Lah: 875(10) PLD 1975 Kar. 449 In G. T. Daru and others, this view was not dissented from, but it was observed that as a matter of practice it would' be better that all decisions under the Payment of Wages Act should be challenged under Article 247 of the Indian Constitution, and not in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, as although such a revision may be preferred, yet in the exercise of this revisional jurisdiction the High Court may have to interfere with the order of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, which would not be permissible as the Authority is not a Court subordinate to the High Court. It appears to us, therefore, that this case is not an authority for the view that no revision lies to the High Court from the decision of the District Court acting in appeal under section 17 of the Act. The observations of the learned Judges were intended more for the purpose of regulating the practice of the Court, rather than deciding a ,question of law against the prevailing trend of judicial decisions noticed in the preceding paragraph.
9. Sher A.I and others, the question before the Court was whether the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act was a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, and it was answered in the negative. This judgment does not deal with the question whether the appellate order of the District Court was subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. Such being the case, the learned Judge in the High Court has rightly distinguished this case in .The judgment under appeal.
10. The cases of Wajahat A.I Hasnie, Mst. Farida Parween, Mst. Tehseen Akhtar and Syed Shamim Ahmad, relate to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of orders made by the Family Courts and the appellate orders made by the District Court under the Family Courts Act, and it has been held that as the application of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code has been specifically excluded from application to proceedings under the Family Courts Act, the High Court would not have any revisional jurisdiction under section :15 of the Code. It would be seen that these decisions proceed on the interpretation of -the provisions of the particular statute under which the subordinate Courts concerned were functioning, and, accordingly, these judgments cannot be extended to apply to cases arising under the Payment of Wages Act.
11. From a review of the precedent cases cited before us, we are of the vie that the learned Judge in the High Court has rightly held that the appellate order made by the District Court under the Payment of Wages Act was amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The term "District Court" has not been defined in the Payment of Wages Act, and, accordingly, it has to be given its ordinary connotation, as indicated in the GeneralA Clauses Act and in the Civil Procedure Code, according to which it is aCourt subordinate . To the High Court. The argument that there is a finality attaching to the order of the Authority under section 15 of the Act suit only to the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court under section 17 of the Act, does not advance the case any further, as such finality only means that the order of the Authority can be challenged only by way o appeal to the District Court and not otherwise ; but there is no such limitation in respect of the appellate order made by the District Court a ordinarily constituted, in which capacity it is subordinate to the High Court.
12. As to the merits of the case, the learned counsel for the appellant was not able to persuade us to take a view different from the one adopted by the High Court. From the facts already narrated by us in an earlier part of this judgment, it becomes abundantly clear that the appellant had himself agreed to be bound by the award earlier made in favour of the respondents. On that ground alone, he would be estopped from repudiating his liability at this late stage.
13. For all these reasons, the appeal fails - and is hereby dismissed, with no order as to costs.