1. NASIM HASSAN SHAH, J.-This judgment will dispose of the above-noted matters as the question of law involved in all of them. Is common,. Namely, whether the High Court was justified in refusing to treat the second appeals filed by the appellants/petitioners in the High Court as revisions and disposing them of accordingly. This question has arisen in the following circumstances By the Law Reforms Ordinance XIl of 1972 an amendment, inter alia was made in section 102 of the C. P. C. To the following effect :- "For section 102, the following section shall be substituted, namely- "102. No second appeal in certain cases.-No second appeal shall lie.-
(a) in any suit for the nature cognizable by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed five thousand rupees ; and
(b) in any other suit, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed two thousand rupees."
2. This Court in the case of Ilahi Bakhsh and others v. Mst. Bilqees Begum (PLD 1985 SC 393) opined that according to the provisions of section 18 of West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 (Ordinance II of 1962), the forum appeal is to be decided according to the value of the subject- matter fixed in the original suit with the result that irrespective of the amount for which the decree was ultimately passed the appeal would lie to the High Court or the District Judge according to the value of the original suit. It was observed in this judgment that "the said Ordinance did not provide anywhere that the forum of appeal is to be determined on the basis of the sale price or the market value of the land" and further that the forum of appeal was to be determined on the basis of the value of the original suit. It was also observed that even where the value of the suit was fixed notionally, the same value would determine the forum of appeal. In short, the conclusion arrived at was that the value for purposes of jurisdiction in the matter of appeal was to be the same as that given in the plaint.
3. All the learned counsel appearing for the appellants/petitioners have conceded that as a consequence of the amendment made by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, and the legal position explained by this Court in the case of Ilahi Bakhsh, the second appeals filed in the High. Court in all these matters were not competent because the value for jurisdiction of the suit given in the original suit in all these matters was less than Rs. 2,000. The case of the appellants/petitioners before us, however, is that in all these matters the High Court should have treated the aforesaid second appeals as revisions and proceeded to dispose them of accordingly. The learned Judge in the High Court, however, instead of doing so held that as the regular second appeals were "incompetent valuationwise" and that since there was no obligation in law to convert the said appeals into revisions especially when a revision was "only a privilege and n,)t a right" and that the intention of the legislature in making the amendment in section 102, C. P. C. Was to discourage litigation in matters of small valuation. He accordingly declined to convert the said appeals into revision petitions and proceeded to dismiss them as incompetent.
4. In support of these appeals before us reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in the case of The Thal Engineering Industries Ltd. v. The Bank of Bahawalpur Ltd. And another (1979 SCMR 32.Wherein it was observed that a Court should lean in favour of adjudication rather than stifling proceedings on technicalities and on Abdul Aziz and others v. Sheikh Abdur Rahim and others (PLD 1984 SC 164), where the same principle was reiterated and conversion of a second appeal to a revision permitted.
5. On the other hand, the respondents relied upon this Court's decision in Lehrasab Khan v. Mst. Aqil- un-Nisa (1985 SCM R 1034), where the order of the High Court refusing to convert second appeal into a revision was not interfered with and the petition for leave to appeal was .Refused. In doing so the Court observed :-- "The plea that the High Court may allow a prayer for converting a second appeal into a revision is correct. But whether it should grant such a prayer or not in the given circumstances of a case is a matter of judicial discretion. In this case, the learned Judge was not persuaded to exercise his discretion in favour of the petitioner. This is not such a matter which would warrant interference by this Court."
6. The last-mentioned judgment does not appear to be of much assistance to the respondents because this Court refused to interfere with the girder of the High Court on the ground that in the facts and circumstances of that case the learned Judge had, after considering the circumstances thereof, refused to exercise his discretion to convert the second appeal into a revision.
7. The appellants do not dispute that the power of the Court in this respect is discretionary but submit that it is a judicial discretion and. Has to be exercised reasonably, fairly and properly. In the instant cases, the learned Judge refused to consider the merits of any case while considering the request for conversion of the second appeal into a revision because of his opinion that a revision was not a remedy as of right but only a privilege which may or may not be conceded to a litigant and on account of his further opinion that the intention of the legislature was to put an end to litigation and discourage litigants from approaching the High Court in cases where the jurisdiction value of the suit was less than Rs. 2,000.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for both sides and considered the matter and are of the opinion that the aforesaid view of the High Court is not correct.
9. In Haji Abdullah Khan and others v. Nisar Muhammad Khan and others (PLD 1965 SC 690) this Court observed "that it is the duty of the Court itself to apply the law. A party is not bound to engage a counsel. Whatever law becomes applicable on the admitted or proved facts, law has to be given effect to whether or not it has been relied upon by a party".
10. Thus, if the second appeal that is brought before the High Court exhibit certain features which demonstrate that it falls within the scope of inter--ference under section 115, C. P. C., the Court should exercise its jurisdiction under the said provision of law. It hardly needs saying that the Court will be in a position to examine this aspect of the matter only if it considers the facts of each case and this can only be done if the appeals are treated as revisions whereafter the question can be examined by the High Court whether the Court subordinate to it has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise its jurisdiction so vested or acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. True, the exercise of this jurisdiction by the High Court is discretionary but that does not mean that a revision is not a right but only a privilege. A privilege is some particular benefit or advantage conferred on a person or a class of persons which other citizens do not enjoy; while a right is some benefit conferred on a person by virtue of a given law. Here, the provisions of section 115 of the C. P. C. Confer on every person who has litigated before a Court subordinate to the High Court the right to assert before the latter that the decision rendered by the subordinate Court against him is liable to correction under its revisional jurisdiction. Indeed where the conditions for the exercise of revisional jurisdiction are satisfied the High Court should itself interfere. Of course, it may in certain circumstances, in exercise of its judicial discretion, refuse to exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner such as where the petitioner has approached the Court, without reasonable cause, with undue delay or his conduct has been contumacious or because of the existence of some other special circumstances which disentitle him from relief. But the mere fact that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction is discretionary does not mean that it is a privilege. Even the Writ Jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts by the Constitution is discretionary. But the right to apply for a writ is certainly not a privilege. On the contrary, it is one of the most valuable rights that can be conferred upon a citizen.
11. In the cases before us the second appeals were filed within the period of limitation and at a point of time when there was some controversy as to the rule to be applied for ascertaining the jurisdictional value of suits of the kind involved in these appeals. This controversy was settled only recently by the pronouncement of this Court in Ilahi Bakhsh and others v. Mst. Bilqees Begum. We, therefore, consider that the High Court should have allowed conversion of the second appeals filed by the appellants into revisions and then proceeded to see whether interference was called for in the judgment passed by the Court subordinate to it, in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 115, C. P. C.
12. The Appeals bearing Nos. 135 of 1985, 136 of 1985, 198 of 1985, 6 of 1986, 220 of 1986, 346 of 1986, 334 of 1986, 347 of 1986, 349 of 1986, 350 of 1986 will be allowed. Civil Petition No. 309-R of 1985 in which the respondents have been heard, is converted into an appeal and also allowed. All these matters shall stand remanded to the High Court for considering whether in the exercise of its judicial discretion these matters should not be converted into revisions and if so, whether in the circum-- stances of. Each case any interference is called for in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
13. The appeals succeed in the above terms but the parties, however, are left to bear their own costs.
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