' This judgment shall dispose of the following writ petitions which arc directed against the same Notifications and in which common questions of law and facts arise.
' Writ Petitions Nos. 7443, 8320, 8321, 8322, 8323, 8324, 8325, 8326, 8327, 8328, 8329, 8330, 8331, 8332, 8290, 8291, 2549 of 1989 and Writ Petitions Nos.1904 and 2959 of 1990.
2. By Notification dated 8th December, 1989 (Annexure 'B' to this petition), the Collector acting under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 notified that the land measuring 14 Kanals 10 marlas 10 sq. Ft. Situate at Jail Road, Lahore bearing Khasra No,78 of revenue estate Mozang was likely to be acquired at public expenses for the educational purpose by Education Department, Government of Punjab. No action in pursuance of this notification was taken by the respondents till 5th September, 1989 when the Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore purporting to act under section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 issued a notification that the land was urgently required and provisions of section 17(1) of the Act were applicable to the aforesaid land. It was further directed that in exercise of the powers under section 17(4) of the Act, that provisions of sections 5 and 5-A shall not be applicable to the acquisition and the Land Acquisition Collector, Lahore should take action accordingly.This was followed by another notification, dated 24th September, 1989 printed in the Punjab Gazette, Extraordinary of 26th September,1989 in which declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was published and the Collector was directed to take order of acquisition of land under section 7 of the aforesaid Act. . In all these petitions the vires of these two notifications have been challenged by the petitioners who claim to be the owners of the land sought to he acquired.
3. Mian Nisar Ahmad, Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners contended that as no proceedings were taken by the authorities concerned within a period of one year of the issuance of notification under section 4, the acquisition proceedings came to an end by virtue of rule 7 of the Punjab Land Acquisiton Rules, 1983 and these proceedings could not be resurrected by issuing notifications under sections 17 and 6 of the Act and the two notifications were void and without any lawful authority.
' It was also submitted that, there was no justification for the respondents to have acted under section 17 of the Act as there was no real urgency in contemplation of this provision which could only be resorted to in the event of an emergent and pressing need which brooked no delay. The learned counsel emphasised that notification under section 17 of the Act, takes away valuable rights vesting in the land-owners under sections 5 and 5-A to object to the acquisition and as such it should be demonstrated that opinion formed by the Commissioner was honest, bona fide and based on sufficient material. The learned counsel next contended that the Commissioner while issuing the notification under section 17 of the Act has acted contrary to law and in disregard of rule 11 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983.
4. Syed Zamir Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioners in the connected petition, argued that it was evident from the record that the acquisition of the land in question was not for public purpose but was mala fide. It was explained that though the land is sought to be acquired for extension of Kinnaird College, Lahore but 8 acres of land is lying vacant in the College and the request to acquire the land did not emanate from the College. It was also urged that notices as required by sections 4 and 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were not served upon the petitioners.
5. Mr. Maqbool Elahi Malik, Advocate-General contended that the petitioners have no locus standi to file these petitions as there is nothing on the record to show that they are owners of the disputed land; that the notification under section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act can be issued 'at any time' and no limitation can be placed on the powers of the Commissioner to act within specified period.
He submits that the words "at anytime" appearing in section 17 of the Act were comprehensive and wide enough to indicate that the action can be taken regardless of time. Reliance in this respect was placed upon the judgments in S.C. Prasher and another v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas and others (AIR 1963 SC 1356) and The State of Assam and another v. Deva Prasad Sarua and another (AIR 1969 SC 831).
' It was next argued that rule 7 was not mandatory in character and having been framed for guidance of the Officers was in the nature of instructions and its violation could not render the proceedings as invalid. The learned Advocate-General emphasised that if the rule is construed as placing an embargo on the power of the Authorities to acquire the land, it would be ultra vires of the Act.
6. Mrs. Nasira Iqbal, learned counsel for respondent No,5 reiterated the objection that the petitioners have no locus standi to file these petitions as their names did not appear in the Revenue Record as owners of the land in dispute.It was also argued that though the petitioners, according to them were owners of 14 kanals 10 marlas of land yet they were laying claim to an area measuring 16 kanals 12 marlas which included the property belonging to respondent No, 5 and as such this petition was mala fide. The learned counsel next emphasised that the land was being acquired for a laudable purpose i.e, the education of girls for which there was already a dearth of facilities and this object should not be allowed to be frustrated. The learned counsel placed certain facts and figures before this Court on the basis of published documents to show that the highest priority should be accorded to education of women in our country where the overall literacy rate is about 32 per cent but the female literacy rate is only 16 per cent and out of 16 per cent only 2 to 3 per cent. Females get the opportunity to avail of the facility of higher education. It was also objected that the petitions suffer from laches inasmuch as all the newspapers of 25-2-1988 carried the news that the land was being acquired for the purpose of Kinnaird College but the present petitions were not filed with due promptitudes and, therefore, suffer from laches.
' As regards rule 7 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983, the learned counsel maintained that under section 55 of the Land Acquisition Act, only the rules consistent with the Act can be framed and that too for the guidance of the Officers. It was submitted that rule 7 was directory and its violation cannot be visited with the penalty of rendering the proceedings as void. Reliance in this respect was placed on Muhammad Ashraf v. Nasreen Begum through legal heirs and 3 others (PLD 1989 Lah. 69). The case of Mrs. Benazir Bhutto and another v. Federation of Pakistan and another (PLD 1989 SC 66) was cited to urge that the rules repugnant to the Act are void and cannot prevail over the Act. It was submitted that rule 7 which places unreasonable fetters on the powers of the acquiring Authorities resulting in frustration of public purpose should be struck down.
' The learned counsel relied upon certain judgments to contend that the provisions of Statute cannot be subordinated to the rules which cannot be relied upon to defeat the very purpose of the Act. It was contended that the power of eminent domain vesting in the Government cannot be whittled down and the public purpose should not be allowed to be defeated. In the last analysis, it was emphasised that the Court should make efforts to harmonise the rules with the Act and to adopt the interpretation which advances the cause of justice and promotes the object for which the law had been framed.
' On merits, it was argued that the property was urgently required by the respondents for the purpose of setting up Post-Graduate Classes in the Kinnaird College for Women, Lahore and the matter has already been un-necessarily delayed by the public functionaries to the prejudice not only of the respondents but also the public-at-large.
7. The first question which falls for decision is as to the effect of rule 7 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983 which reads as under:- "(7) Where the land is to be acquired for a public purpose the Commissioner shall issue a Notification under section 5 of the Act not later than one year from the date of the publication of the Notification under section 4. If no Notification is issued under section 5 within the period specified in this rule, the Commissioner shall immediately report the matter to the Board of Revenue for extension in time and the Board of Revenue may, in its discretion extend the time for the issue of a Notification under section 5, which shall not be more than sixty days. If the Board of Revenue declines to grant the extension applied for or if the Commissioner fails to issue a Notification under section 5 within the extended period, the acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have come to an end. However, any time spent in the prosecution of a judicial remedy shall stand excluded from the period of litigation."
' According to this rule, if notification under section 5 of the Land Acquisition Act is not issued within one year of the notification under section 4, the matter has to be reported to the Board to Revenue which may extend the time for a period of sixty days. However, if no such notification is issued even within the extended period or the Board of Revenue declines to extend the time, the acquisition proceedings shall cease to be operative and shall be deemed to have come to an end.
8. The rule is unambiguous and is capable of no other interpretation except that if within the prescribed time the requisite steps are not taken, the proceedings stand frustrated. The rule is couched in emphatic terms which leaves no doubt as to the intention of its framers that on the failure to take action as contemplated by this rule, within specified period the proceedings shall be deemed to have come to an end. The contention of the learned Advocate-General as also learned counsel for respondent No,5 that the rule is directory and not mandatory in character cannot be accepted. The consequences flowing from the non-observance of the rule having been provided in the rule itself it cannot, be construed as directory but emphatic. In Niaz Muhammad Khan v. Mian Fazal Raqib (PLD 1974 SC 134) it was observed that:- "As a general rule a statute is understood to be directory when it contains matter merely of direction, but not when those directions are followed up by an express provision that in default of following them the acts shall be null and void. To put it differently, if the Act is directory, its disobedience does not entail any invalidity; if the Act is mandatory disobedience entails serious legal consequences amounting to the invalidity of the act done in disobedience to the provision."
9. In Govt. Of the Punjab v. Ijaz Hussain Qureshi (PLD 1985 SC 28) it was laid down that where law itself provides in unequivocal words consequences of failure or default, requirement has to be taken as mandatory. Reference may also be made to Col. (Retd.) Syed Mukhtar Hussain Shah v.
Wasim Sajjad and 30 others (PLD 1986 SC 178) wherein the Supreme Court was pleased to lay down:-- "When an affirmative direction is followed by a negative or limiting provision the negative or limiting provision makes the statute mandatory."
' While interpreting the provisions of law like the Land Acquisition Act or the Rules framed thereunder it is to be kept in mind that acquisition implies compulsory deprivation of property of an individual. Article 24 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 lays down that no property shall be compulsorily acquired or taken possession thereof save for public purpose and save by authority of law which provides for compensation thereof. The Land Acquisition Act, according to its preamble not only provides for the acquisition of land for public purpose but also ensures that adequate compensation is paid to the land-o hers. The different provisions of this enactment underline the anxiety of the legislature to ensure that due compensation is paid to the land-owners. It need not be reiterated that compensation means equivalent in value of the land acquired, i.e, gold for gold. In Col. Bashir Hussain and 10 others v. Land Acquisition Collector, Improvement Trust,Lahore and 2 others (PLD 1970 Lah. 321) this Court observed that :- "...The Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) as is clear from its title and clearer still from the preamble, is a --law for the acquisition of land needed for public purposes and for Companies and for determining the amount of compensation to be paid on account of such acquisition. The raison d'etre of this piece of legislation is, therefore, two-fold: firstly, to fulfil the needs of Govt. And Companies for land required by them for their projects, and secondly, to determine and pay compensation to those private persons or bodies whose land is so acquired. The exercise of the power of acquisition has been limited to public purposes. The principles laid down for the determination of compensation, as clarified by judicial pronouncements made from time to time, reflect the anxiety of the lawgiver to compensate those who have been deprived of property, adequately enough in the sense that they are to be given gold for gold and not copper for gold. In other words, the compensation has to be adequate compensation. It is with this end in view that the association of the persons interested in the property, with the: process of determination of its market value by the Collector is a highlight of this statute. A bare reading of the Act leaves one with the strong impression that one of the main intentions of the Legislature was to ensure the protection of the rights of the persons whose property was being acquired."
10. Considered in this light, it is not difficult to ascertain the reasons for enacting rule 7 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983. Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act provides for payment of compensation according to the market value of the land at the date of publication of notification under section 4, subsection (1) of the Act. As the basis for payment of compensation to the landowners has reference to the date of publication of notice under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is of utmost importance that after having issued the notification under section 4, the process for acquisition should be completed within shortest possible period. Rule 7 is geared towards this object. It would be no consolation for the owners who have been deprived of the land if they are given compensation at the rates prevailing at the time of the issuance of notification under section 4 though long period of time has elapsed since then.
11. Now the contention of the learned Advocate-General as also Mrs. Nasira Iqbal, learned counsel for respondent No, 5, that rule 7 is inconsistent with section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act and is, therefore, void, need be attended to. The learned counsel submitted that according to section 17 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended in its application to the Province of Punjab, in cases of urgency the Commissioner can at any time after 15 days from the publication of notice under section 9 (1) take possession of the land which shall thereupon vest in the Government. Placing emphasis upon the words "at any time" it was contended that as under the Act the land can be acquired at any time, the rule which places limitation on the power to acquire is ultra vires of the Act. This argument, however, proceeded on misconception about the true legal position. By the West Pakistan Ordinance 19 of 1%1, section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act in its application to the West Pakistan was substituted by the following :-- "17. Special power in cases of urgency. (1) In cases of urgency, whenever the Commissioner so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from publication of the notice mentioned in subsection (1) of section 9, take possession of any land needed for public purposes or for a Company. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances."
' As is obvious from the above, the words "at any time" on which much emphasis have been placed by the learned Advocate-General as also learned counsel for respondent No, 5 do not appear in the provision as amended and the argument proceeds on wrong premises. Even otherwise, the words "at any time" cannot be construed in the manner suggested by the learned Advocate- General as long as the proceedings for acquisition remain alive, the action under section 17(1) can be taken by the Commissioner at any time. However, if the proceedings have come to an end and the notification under section 4 has ceased to be effective, the question of taking possession under section 17(1) does not arise.
12. The learned Advocate-General contended that issuance of notification under section 4 was mere a formality and on no reasonable basis can it be insisted that further steps be taken within a specified period from the date of issuance of notification. This contention is wholly devoid of any force. The issuance of notification under section 4 is sine qua non and the date of the publication of the notification is terminus qua for these proceedings. In Umar Farooq v. Acquisition Collector, Bannu and 4 others (PLD 1975 Peshawar 103) it was observed that in all acquisition cases under the Act, the very jurisdiction of the Collector depends upon the prior publication of the notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Similarly, in Government of West Pakistan v. Ch. Muhammad Siddique (PLD 1968 Karachi 697) it was observed that the issuance of notification under section 4 was a condition precedent to the acquisition proceedings.
13. The question may be examined from another angle. After having issued notification under section 4 it is open to the Govt. At any time before taking possession of the land to withdraw from the acquisition by rescinding the notification. By framing rule 7, the Government has placed restriction upon its, functionaries that the notification under section 5 must be issued within the specified period failing which the proceedings shall be deemed to have come to an end. Rule 7 can be construed as a direction by the Government that if further proceedings are not taken within the period prescribed, the notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, shall stand rescinded. Consequently, it cannot be argued with any success that the Government is not empowered to fix limitation as to time in which the proceedings for acquisiton must be proceeded with. It is well-accepted principle of law that before striking down any provision of the rule, efforts may be made to harmonise the rules with the Statute and it is only where the inconsistency exists between the Rules and the Act that the rule should be struck down. Section 17 by its language does not provide any limit as to time during which the action contemplated by it must be taken. It is well-settled that if the Statute has not fixed any specified period for the purpose of a particular time, it must be performed within reasonable time. It is of advantage-to reproduce the following statement of law appearing in `Crazies on Statute Law' at page 282 of the 7th Edition:-- "(iv) Statutory powers of interference with property must be exercised within a reasonable time.-- Powers conferred by Act of parliament must, as a general rule, be exercised within a reasonable time after notice has been given to the persons whose property will be affected by their exercise, otherwise the notice will be liable to be treated as being no longer effective. Where powers are given to take lands compulsorily for the execution of works, the exercise of powers must be bona fide commenced within the time limited for the completion of the work."
' It need also to be noticed that section 17(1) provides for taking emergent measures in case of urgency. The object of enacting such a provision obviously was to allow the Authority to proceed in the matter without waiting for other formalities to be completed, as the purpose for which the land was being acquired brooked no delay. It would, therefore, be self-contradictory to contend that though section 17 contemplates the existence of urgency, the action thereunder can be taken despite even after a number of years.
' The contention of the learned counsel for respondent No,5 that rule 7 is unreasonable and should not be given effect to has no merit. The period prescribed for issuance of notification under section 5 in the said rule is one year from the date of notification under section 4 which period can further be extended by the Board of Revenue by another sixty days. The period of one year and two months, cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered as unreasonable. The reliance of the learne counsel on Muhammad Ashraf v. Nasreen Begum through Legal Heirs and 3 others (PLD 1989 Lah. 69) is not well-placed for, the decision in that case was with regard to the interpretation of `reasonable time' as used in section 9 of the Punjab Family Courts Act, 1964.
' The result of the above discussion is that by not having issued notification under sections 5 and 5- A or for that matter under section 17 of the Act, within the period prescribed by rule 7, the proceedings for acquisition came to an end and the subsequent notifications are clearly without lawful authority.
14. Reverting to the objections of the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioners having not shown themselves to be the owners of the land in question and as such have no locus standi, it is to be noticed that the learned counsel for the petitioners have placed on record the sale-deeds in favour of the petitioners. Even otherwise there appears to be no specific denial of the averments in the petitions which is supported by affidavits that the petitioners had purchased the land in question from its owners.
' As regards the plea of respondent No, 5 that the petitions suffer from laches, it is not well-founded.
Though it is correct that the notification under section 4 was issued as far back as 8th December, 1985 and the present petitions have been filed in 1989 but it is to be seen that the petitioners are not aggrieved of the notification under section 4 of the Act but of the two subsequent notifications issued under sections 17 and 6 of the Act, dated 5th September, 1989 and 26th September, 1989.
These petitions having been filed without any delay after the issuance of these notifications cannot be said to suffer from laches. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the petitioners should, in any case, have filed these petitions at the most after one year and 2 months of the notification under section 4 for obtaining a declaration that the proceedings for acquisition have come to an end. This argument of the learned counsel cannot be accepted. The petitioners were under no obligation to approach the Court after the expiry of the period prescribed by rule 7 and were within their right to treat the proceedings to have come to an end by efflux of time. It is only when the proceedings under sections 17 and 6 of the Act were taken that grievances arose to the petitioners for the redress of which they were obliged to approach this Court. This objection is also not well-founded.
' In view of what has been stated above, these writ petitions are accepted and the impugned notifications are declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. There shall be no order as to costs.