1. ' Writ Petition No,7200 of 1991 (Habib Ullah and 49 others v. Commissioner, Gujranwala Division, Gujranwala and 6 others) and Writ Petition No, 11876 of 1992 (Ranjha and 106 others v.
2. Commissioner, Gujranwala Division, Gujranwala and 6 others) have been instituted before this Court to challenge the validity of Notification having been issued by the Commissioner, Gujranwala, vide Annexure 'D'.
2. In nutshell, the facts are that a piece of land measuring 109 acres 3 Kanals 14 Marlas situated within the revenue estate of village Jetheikey, Tehsil Estate Daska, District Sialkot has been acquired for establishment of Small Industrial No,ll. The land in dispute undoubtedly belongs to the petitioners whose case is that the land could not be acquired for the aforesaid purpose. It may be recalled that objection petition of the present petitioners under sections 5 and 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was heard and dismissed by the learned Commissioner on 18-6-1990 in exercise of his powers under section 17(4) of the aforesaid Act. The petitioners still feeling aggrieved of the issuance of Notification filed Writ Petition No,5586 of 1990 before this Court which during hearing was withdrawn on 30-10-1990 for challenging the Notification before the learned Member, Board of Revenue for redressal of their grievance. The petitioners filed the requisite petition before the learned Member, Board of Revenue which was heard and dismissed on 8-6-1991 holding that the land was being acquired for a public purpose.
3. Mian Nisar Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that respondent No,4, the Punjab Small Industries Corporation, was a `company' within the meaning of clause (e) of section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. He argues that the provisions contained in Part VII of the aforesaid Act have not been followed and as such the acquisition proceedings are void ab initio on the face of record and as such are of no legal consequence. According to learned counsel, the proceedings in respect of acquisition of the land in dispute were not concluded within one year from the date of issuance of the Notification under section 4 and as such the same have been rendered null and void. In support of his submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the Cooperative Zenith Industries Ltd., D.G. Khan v. Mst. Qayyuman etc. (1984 SCMR 11%), Peoples Housing Society v.
3. Collector, Lahore (1979 CLC 180), Colony Sarhad Textile Mills v. Commissioner etc. (PLD 1957 Pesh.
4. 149), State of Punjab v. Raja Ram and others (AIR 1981 SC 1694), Kh. Zubair Ahmad and others v.
5. Collector and others (1990 MLD 1941), Nazar-ul-Hassan v. Collector etc. (PLD 1990 Lah. 472) and Valjibhai Muljibhai Soneji and another v. The State of Bombay and others (AIR 1963 SC 1890).
6. Learned counsel heavily relies upon rules 7 and 8 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983. On merits, it is submitted by the learned counsel that the money for the acquisition of the land in question is being provided by the aforesaid corporation which is a 'company' within the meaning of law as already stated above.
7. ' The plea of Mr. Mehdi Khan Chohan, learned counsel for the petitioners is that the respondent- Commissioner was not competent to issue Notification during the proceedings having been initiated by the competent authority under section 4. He relies upon M. Mushtaq Ahmad Khan etc. v.
8. A.C., Sialkot etc. (PLD 1983 Lahore 178). It is maintained by the learned counsel that the land in question is being acquired by paying its price from the funds of the Corporation and it would clearly show that the land in question is not being acquired for any public purpose. Reference in this behalf was made by the learned counsel to the impugned Notification vide Annexure 'D'. He relies upon Sadruddin Suleman Jhaveri v. J.H. Patwardhan and others (AIR 1965 Bombay 224) and Dau Dayal and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (AIR 1966 Allahabad 237).
9. ' Learned counsel also relies upon rule 10(3) of the Land Acquisition Rules, 1983 to contend that the land in question is situated in the neighbourhood of the Town which is meant for fodder and as such it cannot be acquired for the aforesaid purposes. Learned counsel has relied upon the report submitted by the Local Commission to show that most of the land was under Shatala and Sugarcane crops. The argument of the learned counsel in brief is that only some vacant land can be acquired and not the land in question. He maintains that the amount of cash compensation which was recommended to be awarded by the Revenue Staff to the petitioners would demonstrate that the land was not lying vacant and that the entire land in dispute was under cultivation as already pointed out above.
10. 3-A. It is forcefully contended by the learned Law Officer that the impugned Notification dated 18- 6-1990 did not relate to a Corporation. On the contrary, it is established that the land is being acquired by the Government for its own use and occupation for the establishment of Industrial Estate No,2. It is, therefore, argued by the learned counsel that the authorities produced and relied upon by the learned counsel would not apply to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.
11. The learned Law Officer relies upon Raja Muhammad Ameer v. Province of the Punjab (PLD 1983 Lahore 355). The alternative contention of the learned counsel is that even if it is assumed without conceding that the land is being acquired by a 'company' even then there is no bar to acquire it. It has been brought to the notice of the Court that the project is being funded by the Government and that no Corporation or company is involved in the establishment of the Industrial Estate. He urges that selection of a piece of land for the purposes of establishment of an Industrial Estate is the sole domain of the Government and that the wishes of the land owners are wholly immaterial in that context. It is argued that the Notification under sections 4 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1875 were issued within one year and that the objections were invited from the affected land owneRs, Attention of the Court was drawn to a detailed order dated 8-6-1991 passed by the learned Member, Board of Revenue which showed that the learned Member visited the spot and thereafter gave his decision against the present petitioneRs, It is stated that sufficient land is not available in the vicinity of the site. According to him, most of the lands were flood-affected.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also gone through the entire record with care. The order dated 8-6-1991 passed by the learned Member, Board of Revenue over the controversy shows that he visited the spot and gave a finding of fact that no other suitable area was available for the establishment of the Industrial Estate in the neighbourhood of village Nagrianwala. It may be observed that the said order was not assailed by the petitioners in these proceedings before this Court. They have, however, assailed the validity of the Notification issued by the Commissioner on 18-6-1990. The perusal of the Notification demonstrates beyond doubt that the land in question was being acquired for a public purpose and definitely not for the benefit of a company within the meaning of law. It is a fact that the Punjab Small Industries Corporation is an agency being run and funded by the Provincial Government through and through. In other words, the Corporation is a part and parcel of the Punjab Government. The points raised and argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners are, therefore, wholly irrelevant to the facts and circumstances of this case, and as such, are repelled.
12. So far as the next contention of the learned counsel that the area selected for the establishment of an industrial concern, should have been a vacant land or some inferior type of land is concerned, suffice it to say that the contention of the learned counsel would itself show that part of the land being acquired was under plough while the rest was undoubtedly lying vacant. This being so, the provisions of rules 10 and 11 of the Land Acquisition Rules, 1983, will not be attracted to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. It is, therefore, held that the land in question is being acquired for a public purpose and definitely not for the benefit of a company. There is thus no substance in the writ petitions which are hereby dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.