1. ' SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.-Leave to appeal was granted to the Government of the Punjab in four separate petitions arising out of a consolidated judgment of the Letters Patent Bench of the Lahore High Court, dated 22nd of June, 1973, to examine whether subsections (3) and (5) of section 9 of the ,A West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance (hereinafter referred to as! The Ordinance) have been correctly interpreted and applied in granting relief to the respondents, the writ petitioners.
2. ' In Civil Appeal No, 60 of 1974, Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi is the sole respondent. He was printer and publisher of a weekly magazine known as `Zindage. He had made and subscribed under section 7 of the Ordinance to a declaration in the prescribed Form '13' to the District Magistrate, Lahore, for printing and publishing of this weekly. The declaration had been duly authenticated by the District Magistrate under section 12 of the Ordinance.
3. ' In Civil Appeal No, 61 of 1974, Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi along with Altaf Hassan Qureshi, are the respondents. Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi was the printer of the monthly magazine 'Urdu Digest'. Its Publisher was Altaf Hassan Qureshi who was' also its Editor. They had also made and subscribed to a similar declaration under section 7 of the Ordinance which had been duly authenticated by the District Magistrate and it is said that the said monthly magazine was being published for a number of years.
4. ' In Civil Appeal No, 62 of 1974 Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi is the only respondent. He was the keeper of a press known as 'Urdu Digest Printers' from where various periodicals, including weekly `Zindagi' and monthly 'Urdu Digest' were published.- ' In Civil Appeal No, 63 of 1974 Mr. Hussain Naqi and Mr. Muzaffar Qadir are the two respondents. The first respondent in this appeal, that is Mr. Hussain Naqi, was the Publisher and Editor of Weekly 'Punjab Punch' and he had also made and subscribed to a declaration duly authenticated by the District Magistrate. The second respondent Mr. Muzaffar Qadir claimed to be its printer, though according to the record, the High Court found that one Sardar Muhammad Sarfraz was the declared printer.
5. ' On 5-4-1972 all these respondents were arrested under M. L. Rs, 16-A and 89. On the next day, that is, 6-4-1972 M. L. R. 259 was promulgated banning the publication of the periodicals mentioned in these four appeals. The respondents were tried by Martial Law Court and were convicted on 13th of April, 1972 and sentencad to one year's rigorous imprisonment. They were all, however, released on 28th of June, 1972 and M. L. R. 259 banning the publication of the periodicals stood revoked on the enforcement of the Interim Constitution of 1972 on 21st of April, 1972. The last issue of the Weekly 'Zindai' had appeared as No, 32 for the period 3-4-1972 to 9-4-1972. Its republication was resumed as Issue No, 33 for the period 17-7-1972 to 23-7-1972. As regards 'Urdu Digest' its last issue came out as No, 6 of April, 1972 and it was resumed with Issue No, 7 of July, 1972. The last issue of monthly 'Punjab Punch' was of 2nd April, 1972 and its publication was resumed on 9th of July, 1972.
6. ' The Director Public Relations, Government of Punjab, addressed a letter on the 25th of July, 1972 to all the respondents bringing to their notice the fact that there had been a default in terms of subsection (3) of section 9 of the Ordinance and as no attempt was made within the period contemplated under subsection (5) of section 9 of the Ordinance to satisfy the District Magistrate that the non-publication of the periodicals was for reasons beyond their control, the declaration stand automatically annulled. It was made clear in the same letter that "this position has been explained for your convenience and to meet the ends of the law which, no doubt, you will like to respect".
7. ' All the respondents replied to this communication stating that they are not responsible for the non-publication of the periodicals for the period mentioned in the letter of the Director Public Relations as in the meantime M. L.
0. 259 was promulgated banning the publication of the periodicals and as they had been arrested which arrest was found to be without lawful authority the publication of the periodicals was rendered impossible because of the action of the Government and the Martial Law Authorities.
8. Finally it was urged by the respondents that "we are absolutely sure that no unreasonable interpretation of law shall be attempted especially in view of the already prevailing unrest over the Government policy in respect of the newspapers etc.". The respondents, however, continued to publish their periodicals as mentioned.
9. ' The District Magistrate, Lahore, thereafter issued Search Warrants under section 37 of the Ordinance. On 31st of July, 1972 the searches were conducted by a Police Officer of Anarkali Police Station and recoveries were made of the offensive periodicals and the printing materials.
10. ' The respondents- feeling aggrieved by the general search warrants and the action taken against them instituted four constitutional petitions. Writ Petition No, 1085/72 was instituted by Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi as Printer and :_.'.;fisher of Weekly 'Zindagi'. Writ Petition No, 1064/1972 was instituted by Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi and Altaf Hassan Qureshi in respect of monthly magazine 'Urdu Digest'. Writ Petition No, 1134'72 was instituted by Dr. Ijaz Hassan Qureshi against the issue of a general search warrant relating to the publication of weekly `Zindige and monthly 'Urdu Digest'. Writ Petition No, 1048 of 1972 was instituted by the respondents Mr. Hussain Naqi and Mr. Muzaffar Qadir, printers and Publishers of 'Punjab Punch'. All of them challenged the action of the District Magistrate on the ground that their arrest and their detention as under-trial and then as convicts was all mala fide and made it impossible for them to comply with the requirements of the law and as soon as they were free and able to resume publication of the periodicals they started publishing it. For the omissions or non-compliance during the period they ' were under such detention, they could not be made liable nor their declarations of the periodicals taken as annulled on account of their failure to comply with the requirements of the law.
11. ' A learned Single Judge of the High Court by a consolidated judgment, dated 23rd of August, 1972 held that the requirement of the law was clear, that the consequence of non-compliance was provided in the law itself and without the further intervention of any authority or the passing of any order the declaration of these periodicals became null and void on their failure to publish them at intervals indicated in the law. The only way for them to avoid such a consequence was to have moved the District Magistrate explaining the circumstances and the reasons for which they were unable to publish the periodicals regularly. No attempt having at any stage been made to comply with these requirements the respondents incurred the liability provided in the law with the result that they had to subscribe afresh to the declaration and thereafter alone they could publish the periodicals as mentioned. All the writ petitions filed by the respondents were, therefore, dismissed.
12. The respondents thereupon filed Letters Patent Appeals which came to be disposed of by common judgment by a Letters Patent Bench of the High Court on 23rd of August, 1972.
13. ' Interpreting subsections (3) and (5) of section 9 as an integral part, the Letters Patent Bench came to the conclusion that the printer and publisher must have an opportunity of being personally present before the District Magistrate for satisfying him that the failure to publish the periodicals was for reasons beyond his control. This finding was recorded in the following words :- "It appears, therefore, that the provisions of automatic lapsing provided in clauses (1) and (3) of section 9 presuppose that the . Printer and publisher will be present before the District Magistrate in order to satisfy him that. Newspaper has been or cannot be published for reasons which are beyond their control. In other words, reading of the provisions of clauses (1), (3) and (5) of section 9 together would yield the result that the provisions of clauses (1) and (3) shall take effect subject to the condition that the printer and publisher are unable to show that the non-publication was beyond their control."
14. On this finding it was further held that as the respondents had been detained first as an under-trial and then as convicts, it was not possible ,for them to satisfy the requirement of the law. In interpreting the law and in testing the correctness of that interpretation the learned Division Bench visualised an exceptional situation as described hereunder :- "The above thinking can be illustrated by an example. Suppose major civil commotions and disturbances break out in a district, which result in the imposition of curfew for the better part of each day and this situation continues for weeks. The normal civil life of the city is suspended and the District Magistrate of the City is so greatly preoccupied with his duties relating to the maintenance of law and order that it is impossible for him to attend to his normal office work or to allow anyone to see him except those concerned with the maintenance of law and order. In this crisis it is neither possible for the printer and publisher to print and publish the newspaper nor it is possible for them to communicate with the District Magistrate. If the view that the declaration of a newspaper automatically becomes null and void, irrespective of the circumstances, by operation of law, is correct, then a daily newspaper which may have been publishing its paper with a complete regularity for decades must lose its declaration because under section 9 (3)(ii) it is laid down that the declaration of a daily newspaper which is not published for sixteen days in a calendar month, shall become null and void. It is difficult to impute the law-maker with such an unjust intention."
15. ' Thereafter, relying on the decisions Mare v. Harding (1) and I L R 13 All. 171 and Abdul Majid v. State (2), the Court came to the conclusion that "Our conclusion, therefore, is that unless a proper opportunity of hearing is afforded to the printer and publisher and no impediment exists in their way to appearing before the District Magistrate in person with a view to satisfying him of the grounds for their inability to print and publish their newspaper, the provision of subsection (5) of section 9 cannot be held to have been complied with. Merely because the printer and publisher could address a letter to the District Magistrate, which might or might not have reached him within the contemplated period and even if it did, may not be itself have been sufficient to clear the uncertainties and doubts that he may be entertaining, cannot be regarded as a sufficient compliance with the nature of the privilege that has been allowed by subsection (5) of section 9."
16. ' On these findings the 'Court positively held that the provisions of subsection (3) of section 9 of the Ordinance did not come into play during the period when the appellants were deprived of their liberty, that is, from the 5th of April, 1972 to 28th of June, 1972. All the appeals were, accepted and the necessary declarations were granted.
17. ' The learned Assistant Advocate-General representing -the appellants in all the four appeals contended that the language of the law was clear and peremptory and admitted of no manner of doubt or vagueness in interpreting it. According to him the very failure to publish the newspaper for the period-- indicated in subsection (3) of section 9 had the effect of the consequence provided therein namely that all the declarations became null and void. The only way in which this consequence could be avoided was for the printers and publishers to show to the satisfaction of the District Magistrate within the period stated in those subsections and applicable to the particular case, that the newspaper has not been or could not be published for reasons which were beyond their control. There is nothing in the law to' require the personal appearance or the ability or capacity to appear personally as a pre-condition for satisfying the District Magistrate. In the cases before the Court at no stage was it contended by the respondents that any effort whatsoever was made on their part to satisfy the District Magistrate. On the other hand, their explanation was that in spite of the provisions of the law, they being in preventive and punitive detention were not obliged to comply with this requirement of law and the law itself was held in abeyance and the consequence did not follow as long
(1) 1867 LR2QB 410 (2) PLD 1973 Lail. 448 as they remained in prison. The moment they came out they started republishing the news payers or periodicals and there was no breach of the law. This according to the learned Assistant Advocate-General, actually mixes up and confuses the situation of impossibility of publishing the newspapers or periodicals, with impossibility of making representation or showing cause to the satisfaction of the District Magistrate.
18. ' The learned Assistant Advocate-General also contended that the provisions of subsection (3) of section 9, in fact, cast a duty or obligation on the printer and publisher the failure to discharge which resulted in the declaration becoming null and void. According to him in the impugned judgment the discharge of that statutory obligation has been interpreted and explained by reference to all the cases which related not the discharge of the obligation but to the exercise of a right. The law applicable and the requirements of the two situations are quite different and one cannot be invoked for explaining or interpreting the other. It was also contended that the general law of the land enjoined even those under preventive or punitive detention to discharge their statutory obligations and in that respect a comprehensive provision existed in the Prison laws relating to Prisons to facilitate their proper representation while undergoing such detention or imprisonment. That law was altogether ignored while giving a general finding that the statutory provision was held in suspense or in abeyance as long as the respondents remained in prison.
19. ' The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that the very fact that a penalty is provided in subsection (3) of section 9 assumes that there must be a possibility of the publication of the periodicals. The detention did afford such a possibility but Martial Law Order No, 259 did not afford any such possibility of publication. Hence on account of the enforcement of Martial Law Order No, 259 on the very next day of the arrest of the respondents it became impossible to print and publish the periodicals and as long as that prohibition lasted it cannot be said that the respondents had any statutory obligation to inform the District Magistrate and satisfy him about the state of the law in the country. It was a matter of which the District Magistrate should have himself taken notice of and dealt with. The consequence of the declaration becoming null and void was not, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, in the circumstances applicable to them.
20. ' In this ease the law requiring interpretation is contained in subsection (3) and subsection (5) of section 9 of the Ordinance. It is reproduced hereunder - "9, (1) ........... ..................
(2) ............................
(3) Where a newspaper having been published is not published :
(i) in the case of a daily newspaper, for sixteen days in a calendar month,
(ii) in the case of a weekly newspaper, for two weeks in a calendar month,
(iii) in the case of a fortnightly newspaper, for one month,
(iv) in the case of a monthly newspaper, for two months,
(v) in the case of a quarterly newspaper, for six months and
(vi) in the case of a six-monthly newspaper, for one year the declaration made in respect of that newspaper shall become null and void, and the printer and the publisher shall make and subscribe a fresh declaration under section 7 before further printing or publishing the newspaper, and to every such fresh declaration the provisions of the two foregoing subsections shall, without prejudice to the provisions of this subsection, apply.
(4) ..............
(5) Nothing in subsection (1) or subsection (3) shall apply in the case of a printer and publisher who within the period stated in those subsections and applicable to the particular case, shows to the satisfaction of the District Magistrate that the newspaper has not been or cannot be published for reasons which are, beyond their control."
21. According to the accepted principle of interpretation of statutes where the law itself provides in unequivocal words the consequence of the failure or default, then the requirement of law is taken to be mandatory. The failure to publish renders the declaration "null and void". Subsection (5) contains and exception to the rigor of the law and it is confined to those cases where "within the period stated in those subsections and applicable to the particular case shows to the satisfaction of District Magistrate that the newspaper has not been or cannot be published for reasons which are beyond their control".
22. In understanding and interpreting this provision of law two maxims must be kept in view. First, Lex non cogit ad Impossibilia. (The law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform). Second, Impotentia Excusat Legem (where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and has no remedy over, there the law will in general excuse him). Within what limitations these maxims operate has been provided in Broom's Legal Maxims (page 162) in the following words : "In the performance of that duty, it has three points to which its attention must be directed. In the first place, it must see that the nature of the necessity pleaded be such as the law itself would respect, for there may be a necessity which it would not. A necessity created by a man's own act, with a fair previous knowledge of the consequences that would follow, and under circumstances which he had then a power of controlling, is of that nature. Secondly, that the party who was so placed used all practicable endeavours to surmount the difficulties which already formed that necessity, and which, on fair trial, he found insurmountable. I do not mean all the endeavours which the wit of man, as it exists in the acutest understanding, might suggest, but such as may reasonably be expected from a fair degree of discretion and an ordinary knowledge of business.
23. Thirdly, that this shall appear by distinct and unsuspected testimony, for the positive injunction of the law, if proved to be violated, can give way to nothing but the clearest proof of the necessity that compelled the violation." (s)
24. It is an admitted position in the case that none of the respondents while under detention made any attempt or endeavour to satisfy this requirement of law. It is not their case that they wanted to address the District E Magistrate or that they wanted to personally appear before him and were prevented from doing so. So, even on the view of the law taken in the impugned judgment the respondents could not claim benefit of their own inactivity.
25. Rule 542 of the Rules for the superintendence and management of1G Prison in Pakistan provides as follows :- "Prisoners may be permitted to address communications to Government, the Inspector-General or any other Government officers in their official capacity with a view to the redress of a grievance . ..."
26. ' Rule 549 (ibid) provides- "Writing materials, including service postcards shall be supplied to any prisoner permitted to write a letter and all letters shall be written at such time and place as the Superintendent may appoint.
27. One day in the week, preferably Sunday, shall be set apart for letter. Writing. Service postage stamps at Government expense shall be provided for prisoners' letters."
28. ' In view of these rules, it was not at any stage impossible for the respondents to communicate with the District Magistrate.
29. The expression "shows to the satisfaction of the District Magistrate" cannot in the context of the law, be given a restricted meaning of showing by personal appearance, and in no- other way. The word 'show' has the dictionary (Concise Oxford) meaning of disclose, reveal, exhibit, demonstrate, expound, prove, point out. In legal terminology (Aiyer's law Lexicon of Br. India) it means to make clear or apparent, as by evidence, testimony or reasoning. Such disclosure can be in writing, through an agent or by personal appearance, all the forms known to law. The writing by it self may be so objective and convincing as to satisfy the District Magistrate. Satisfaction implies honest conviction is one's mind, a firm state of mind admitting of no doubt or indecision Saeed Hasan's case (1).
30. It is an undisputed assumption that "laws ought to be, and usually are, framed with a view to such cases as are of frequent rather than such as are of rare or accidental occurrence". An argument advanced by recourse to the abnormal rather than the normal, exceptional rather than the ordinary was repelled by Baron Parke in the following words reproduced in Broom Legal Maxims :- "If in the vast majority of possible cases--in all of ordinary occurrence-,the law is in no degree inconsistent or unreasonable, construed according to its plain words, it seems to me to be an untenable proposition, and unsupported by authority, to say that the construction may be varied in every case, because, there is one possible but highly improbable one in which the law would operate with great severity, and against our own notions of justice. The utmost that can be reasonably contended is, that it should be varied in that particular case, so as to obviate that injustice-no further."
31. Martial Law Order 259 issued on 7th of April, 1972. It banned the printing and publication of all the three periodicals. It prohibited the respondents from printing or publishing it. It also gave the power to Government to lift the ban imposed as and when "it deems fit". Article.280(3) of the Interim Constitution repealed this Martial Law. Order as from 21st April, 1972. The prohibition was there for a fortnight only. It did not in any manner either preclude the publication of these periodicals
(1) I) L D 1976 SC 6 after 21st April or prevent the respondents from showing to the satisfaction of the District Magistrate their continued inability to publish the same.
32. ' In the circumstances, the view of the law taken by the learned Judge in the chambers was correct.
33. We accept this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the Letters Patent Bench. No order as to costs.