Briefly, the facts of case are that petitioner owned land measuring 9 Kanals, 8 Marlas in village Khokharke Suburb of Gujranwala. Respondent No.2 issued notification for acquisition of land in question for respondent No.4 on 23-10-1982; Notification was published on 14-11-1984. Subsequently, respondent No.2 issued notification under section 17(4) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which was published in the Gazette Notification on 10-3-1987. Thereafter, respondent No.3 passed the order on 25-4-1987 for the delivery of possession to respondent No.4. The petitioner being aggrieved, filed this writ petition.
2. The petitioner's counsel submits that the Land Acquisition. Act is designed to deprive the citizens from their valuable rights in property through somewhat coercive measures by the State exercising authority under statute, therefore, provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are to be construed strictly.
In support of his contention he relied upon Province of Punjab v. Mufti Muhammad Ishaque and others PLD 1984 Lah. 261; that notification under section 4 was prepared on 23-10-1982 and was published in the official Gazette on 14-11-1984, statutory period of one year under the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983 expires on .15-11-1985, however, no further p, progress was made till 26-1- 1987 when the Commissioner issued another notification under section 17(4) of the. Land Acquisition Act, directing that the provisions of section 5-A of the Act shall not apply by the acquisition of land in question. He urged that respondents failed to take further steps within the prescribed time i.e. One year as is envisaged .By Rule 7 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983, therefore, proceedings shall be deemed to have come to an end; he relied upon the following judgments:-- Government of Pakistan Secretary, Works Communication Physical Planning---s' case 1996 SCMR 968, Nazar-ul-Hassan's case PLD 1990 Lah. 472, Qudrat Ullah and 4 others' case 1992 CLC 680 Syed Mehboob Alam and others' case 1989 CLC 1801.
He further submits that Full Bench of this Court has laid down principle that second notification under section 5 of the aforesaid Act commencing from the date of publication is 14 months but the respondents in the present case did not take action under' the provisions of Land Acquisition Act within reasonable time. In this behalf he relied upon Allah Ditta's case PLD 1997 Lah. 499. He further submits that Rule 7 was declared ultra vires by the Full Bench of this Court in Allah Ditta's case (supra) but Government failed to frame the Rule, therefore, action of respondents is without lawful authority; that action of respondents is mala fide as is evident that respondents prepared the notification under section 4 on 23-10-1982 which was published hi Gazette Notification on 14-11-1984 and thereafter notification was issued by the Commissioner under section 17(4) on 26-1-1987 which was published on 10-3-1987 and thereafter A.C. Passed the order on 25-4-1987 for the delivery of the possession of the land in question to respondent No.4; that petitioner requested respondent No.4 to acquire the land of petitioner adjacent to the vicinity. The respondents accepted the same subject to the condition that the petitioner should accept the price of the year 1984; that by efflux of time, the purpose of acquiring the land in question has come to an end; that respondent No.4 had sufficient land in their possession and ownership to comply the project for which the land in question was acquired; that petitioner has reserved land in question for the construction of the house for his children and two doors of his residential house open in the land in question; that Telephone Exchange should not be constructed in the very thickly populated area.
3. The learned counsel for respondents submits that notification under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 14-11-1984; thereafter the action was not taken by respondents Nos.1. To 3 as the estimate price was made during the interregnum period till the notification was issued under section 17(4) of Land Acquisition Act on 26-1-1987; that action of respondents is valid in the eyes of law. In support of his contention he relied upon:-- State of Madhya Pradesh v.1rishna Prasad Sharma AIR 1966 SC 1593 and Rati Lal v. State of Gujarat AIR 1970 SC 984.
He further submits that Rules 7 and 8 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Act, 1983 was declared ultra vires to the parent Act and was struck down by the Full Bench of this Court. He relied upon the following judgment:--- Allah Ditta and others' case PLD 1997.Lah. 499.
He further urged that it is by virtue -of section 17(4) -only subjective satisfaction of Commissioner- and this Court has no jurisdiction to substitute its own opinion for that of Commissioner; that it is executive act of Commissioner which is sole Judge of existence of urgency. He relied upon Muhammad Mushtaq Ahmad Khan's case PLD 1983 Lah. 178, Abdul Rahim's case 1983 CLC 1478, Sardar and others' case 1997 CLC 812; that original respondent No.4 was Government, now by operation of law, respondent No.4 is converted into Corporation which is controlled by the Government out of its public revenue. Therefore, provisions of Part VIII of the Act are not applicable to this. He relied upon PLD 1983 Lah. 355; that respondents had taken possession of the land in question on 25-4-1987, the respondents had deposited the estimated costs Rs.9.90,000 to respondents Nos.2 and 3 on 13-10-1986; thereafter under the direction of respondents Nos.2 and 3, respondent No.4 had deposited Rs.26,600 to respondents Nos.2 and 3 on 13-4-1987; he summed up his arguments that respondent No.4 should not be penalized by the inaction of respondents Nos.1 to 3; that respondent No.4 still needed the land in question by public purpose for construction of Telephone Exchange.
4. I have given my anxious consideration to the contentions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Rules 7 and 8 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983 were struck down by this Court in Allah Difta's case (supra) PLD 1997 Lah. 499. The learned counsel for petitioner heavily relied upon the judgment of Honourable Supreme Court Government of Pakistan's case (supra)
1996 SCMR 968. It is pertinent to mention here that leave was refused by the Honourable Supreme Court in this case and case was decided on 9-1-1995 whereas the Full Bench of this Court declared the Rules 7 and 8 ultra vires of the parent Act in Allah Ditta's case (supra) on 9-11-1996. In this view of the matter the judgments relied upon by the petitioner's counsel are distinguished on facts and law.
It is also pertinent to mention here that the judgment of Honourable Supreme Court was not placed before learned Full Bench. The Full Bench of this Court in the aforesaid case of Allah Ditta struck down Rules 7 and 8 of the Punjab Acquisition Rules, 1983 ultra vires of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and declared as being of no legal effect leaving the competent Legislature to make suitable amendment by fresh legislation. It is also admitted fact that competent authority has not made any amendment in the parent Act and the aforesaid Rules. Now the only question for determination is that in the absence of aforesaid Rules, no time limit is prescribed in the parent Act itself whether 'the respondents can be allowed to exercise unfettered powers or not to proceed with acquisition proceedings with no time limit or respondents have to exercise powers within the reasonable time. The Full Bench of this Court has considered this aspect of the case in para. 49 and observed as under:-- "'to do a thing as soon as possible' means to do it within a C reasonable time, with an understanding to do it within the shortest possible time."
The Full Bench of this Court to aforesaid case of Allah Ditta in para. 45 interpreted the words "at any time" be substituted by the words within reasonable time. The word reasonable means:-- "Fair, proper, just, suitable under the circumstances as defined it Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition."
It may also be observed that meaning of the word "reasonable" is defined it Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition which is as under:-- "'reasonable' means not extreme. Not arbitrary, capricious, of confiscatory. "
(Public Service Commission v. Havemeyer 296 US 506, 80 L Ed. 357 = 36 S Ct. 360).
What is reasonable depends upon a variety of considerations and circumstances. It is an elastic term which is of uncertain value in a definition "Sussex Land and Livestock Co., v. Midwest Refining Co. (CA 8 Wye) 294 F 597, 34 AIR 249; 257).
It is pertinent to mention here that competent Authority framed that Rules under the name and style Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983 under section 55 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which came into force on 22-2-1983. It may also be remembered that Government of West Pakistan Board of Revenue Department issued instructions vide Memo.No.2364-68/1533-LA(4)17/6-68 whereby all the Divisional Commissioners and D.Cs. Have been directed to ensure that if no action is taken by the acquiring undersection 4 of the Act, it should be withdrawn. The aforesaid instructions were not amended by the competently Authority through aforesaid Rules.
5. In view of the aforesaid discussion the acquisition proceedings are confiscatory in nature and it should be construed strictly as the owner of the land deprived compulsorily from his own land. The compensation must be determined as early as possible in terms of the Acquisition Act itself ant rules framed thereunder. In the present case notification for acquisition o land in question was issued on 23-10-1982 which was published or 14-11-1984 and notification under section 17(4) of Land Acquisition Act was issued by the Commissioner on 26-1-1987 which was published in the Gazette Notification on 10-3-1987. In case the aforesaid dates are put it juxtaposition, then the. Question emerges that whether the action o respondents from 14-11-1984 to 10-3-1987 which comes to two and half years falls under the terms reasonable or not? Two and half years does no fall within the reasonable time in view of the aforesaid discussion couplet with the fact that nobody should be penalized by the inaction of public functionaries. In arriving to this conclusion I am fortified by PLD 1994 Lah. 3, deprecating and expressing apathy over the dealings of public officials with the rights of the citizens involving valuable property, the Honourable Judges of Sindh High Court in Noor-ud- Din's case 1997 CLC 1971, declared the possession of the respondents to be trespasser as no compensation was awarded and paid to the petitioner within reasonable time after issuance of notifications under sections 4 and. 6 of the Act.