This is an appeal under section 30(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1923. The facts briefly are that Muhammad Yousuf, a son of the appellant, was employed as a workman with the respondent and was earning Rs. 5.Su per day. The said Muhammad Yousuf died in the course of his employment on 5th December 1968. The appellant Mst. Lal Jan thereafter, filed a claim before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation Act and in the said proceedings she was awarded a sum of Rs. 6,000 under section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It appears that towards the end of the proceedings the respondent bad made an application before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation in which application an objection was taken that by reason of section 81 of the West Pakistan Employee's Social Security Ordinance, 1965, proceedings before the Commis-- sioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act were barred. Such an application was perhaps not read by the Commissioner who treated the same to be one for copy and granted the same. In any case the Commissioner made an award of Rs. 6,000 in favour of the present appellant who is the mother of the deceased. An appeal was thereafter, preferred before this Court and was heard by Qadeeruddin Ahmed, Chief Justice (as he then was). This appeal was numbered as M. A. 80 of 1970.
In this appeal the learned Chief Justice setting aside the order, passed an order remanding the case to the Commissioner for disposal of the application under section 81 of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965. In pursuance of this order of remand the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation heard the matter again and by order dated 15th December 1971 dismissed the application for compensation that had been trade by the present appellant. Being aggrieved with this order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, the present appellant had filed this appeal under sestion 30(a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
2. The main point and I should say the only point that requires consideration is whether section 81 of the Social Security Ordinance No. X of 1965 barred relief under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
I will at this stage reproduce section 81 and it reads as follows: -- "Supersession of certain laws etc.-Workmen's compensation and maternity benefit payable under the Wokmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923), the Employer's Liability Act, 1938 (XXIV of 1938), the Mines Maternity Benefit Act, 1941 (XIX of 1941), the West Pakistan Maternity Benefit Ordinance, 1958 (W. P. Ord. XXXII of 1958), or under any other law shall not be payable in respect of any employment on or after the appointed day in respect of such employment and the enactments and laws aforesaid shall in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance, cease to have effect."
3. On a reading of section 81 of the Ordinance, I must confess that the provision is not happily worded, although it would appear that the provision is made barring the grant of any compensation in such cases where the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are inconsistent with the provisions of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance.
Although no particular provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act have been repealed by the Social Security Ordinance, all the same by such an implication it has to be seen whether any of the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act are in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance, and if such be the result, to that extent the Workmen's Compensation Act shall cease to have effect and be deemed to have been repealed. For the purposes of coming to the conclusions on the point of enquiry it has first to be seen whether the objects of the two enactments are inconsistent or dissimilar or similar. If the objects are different, then inconsistency cannot be inferred, but if the objects are the same and the process for the achievement of the object may be dissimilar; that by itself will result in inconsistency. In such context I would first briefly refer to the purposes of the two enactments. The preamble to the Workmen's Compensation Act reads that it is an enactment to provide for the payment by certain clauses of employers to their workmen of compensation for injury by accident. On the other hand West Pakistan Employees'
Social Security Ordinance in the preamble states that the object is to provide benefit to certain employees or their dependents in the event of sickness, maternity, employment injury or death and for matters ancillary thereto.
Further to that the Workmen's Compensation Act provides for payment of compensation whereas the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, nowhere speaks of any compensation for injury. It speaks of gratuity. It does speak of "benefit" and "grant" but not of "compensation". In that context it would have to be seen whether the purposes of two enactments are similar and if these are not similar, then the question of any inconsistency in regard to the matter with which two enactments deal would not arise at all. In the same context I may also refer to the beneficiaries under the two enactments. Under section 2(1) (d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act "dependent" has been defined. On the other hand section 2(6) of the Social Security Ordinance also defines "dependent". There is a marked difference between these two definitions. The Workmen's. Compensation Act defines "dependent" as a person who is either a widow or minor legitimate son and unmarried daughter or widowed mother and also several other persons who are related to the deceased. The Social Security Ordinance limits the definition of "dependent" to wife or wives or a needy invalid husband and any unmarried children under the age of sixteen years dependent upon the secured person. This would clearly show that the beneficiaries under the two enactments are different. There is still another marked difference in the two enactments. Under the Workmen's Compensa--petition Act, compensation has to be paid by the employer to the employee if he is alive or to the dependents of the employee if he is dead. Under the Social Security Ordinance a fund has to be created and distributed by virtue of section 2(5). This fund has to be contributed by money payable by an employer and as the law stood before 1972, when the subsection (5) of section 2 was amended, even the employee had to make a contribution to the creation of this - fund. Moreover, in Chapter V entitled "benefits" what Social Security Ordinance contemplates are sickness benefits, maternity benefit, death grant, medical care during sickness and maternity, injury benefits, disablement pension, disablement gratuity, and survivor's pension. It does not at all speak of compensation on account of bodily injuries or death that a workman may suffer while he is employed in the course of his duties to the employer.
The Social Security Ordinance does not mention "compensation" as-being payable to the dependents of a person who dies in the course of his employment. Section 37 of the Ordinance however, speaks of a "death grant" being payable. This section reads as follows: --- "Death grant.-On the death of a secured person receiving or entitled to receive injury benefits, sickness benefit or medical care at the time of his death, the surviving widow, widows or needy widower, or if there be no surviving widow, widows or needy widower, the person who provided for the funeral, shall, subject to regulations, be entitled' to a death grant equal to the daily rate of sickness benefit multiplied by thirty, but in no case less than five hundred rupees."
On a plain reading of this provision it would appear that if a secured --person "receiving or entitled to receive" injury or sickness benefit at the time of his death dies, a sum equivalent to 30 times the sickness benefit as stated in section 36 of the Ordinance will be payable to surviving widow, widows or needy widower, and in case there is no widow to the person providing funeral, "Sickness benefit" according to Schedule appended in section 35 of the Ordinance is payable at 50 % of the daily Wages. Since "death grant" is to be equivalent to "daily rate of sickness multiplied by thirty'' the death grant will be equal to 15 days' wage only, and that in this case would amount to about Rs. 80 since the deceased workman was earning a daily wage of Rs. 5.50. This provision in my view is designed to provide funeral expenses rather than compensation. Firstly section 37 does not speak of compensation and secondly it does not speak of "dependents" as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, and secondly if compensation on account of the death of a workman was contemplated by section 37 of the Ordinance, it would be most unreasonable to assume that in case of absence of widow the same would be payable to the person providing funeral expenses.
One can visualise a case when a workman' dies leaving young children. In that case it would be absurd to conclude that "death grant" if it were a substitute for "compensation" as mentioned in Workmen's Compensation Act, should be payable to the person providing funeral rather than the dependent children of the deceased workman. I cannot persuade myself to interpret "death grant" to be a substitute for "compensation" so as to conclude that section 81 of the Social Security Ordinance has repealed any such provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act providing for payment of compensation.
Furthermore, I am of the view that section 37 of the Social Security Ordi--nance comes into operation only if a secured person dies after falling sick or after receiving injury. The plain words are that he should be receiving or be entitled to receive injury benefit or sickness benefit. A person would be entitled to receive injury benefit for the days "excluding the first 3 days after receiving the injury" so that if a person dies instantaneously he could not be entitled to any death grant for the simple reason that he could not be considered to be receiving or entitled to receive any injury benefit, clearly for such reason it would appear that the concept of "death grant" is widely different from "Compensation". In my view section 37 of the Ordinance is designed only to provide for funeral expenses. I may here state that section 8(4) of the Workmen's Compensation Act makes a provision in regard to the payment of funeral expenses. It is possible that section 81 of the Social Security Ordinance may be deemed to imply a repeal of section 8(4) of the Workmen's Compensation Act but it is not necessary to consider the point any further because it is not directly or indirectly in issue in the present case. I have however, no doubt whatsoever that the provisions of section 4 or 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Schedule IV of the said Act is not impliedly repealed by virtue of section 81 of the Social Security Ordinance. I may however, state that what is the exact meaning of "inconsistency". The word "inconsistent" has come up for definition by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In the case of Chittaranjan Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Staff Union (PLD 1971 SC 197) Hamoodur Rahman, C. J. Considered the impact of the two words inconsistent and incompatible as compared with dissimilar. His Lordship was pleased to express his opinion in the following words: "The provisions of the two statutes are, in my opinion, not only dissimilar but also inconsistent and incompatible. It is true that mere dis--similarity may not be enough to establish incompatibility in substance and in spirit, and not merely in form."
5. The word "compensation" has been defined in various dictionaries. A definition that was accepted by Anwarul Haq, J. In the case of Land Acquisition Collector v. Abdul Aziz (PLD 1965 Lah.
327) was the definition given in the Oxford Dictionary. The definition was counter-balancing, rendering equivalent, requittal, weighing one thing against another."
On the other hand there are definitions of the word "grant". I anti referring to these definitions because the Social Security Ordinance speaks of grant. Chamber's Dictionary defines grant---- "bestowing, something bestowed, an allowance, a gift and conveyance of property by deed."
The Oxford Dictionary again defines `grant' and this definition is a general definition, not reliable to case-law on workmen, but all the same the definition is: --- "To agree, consent; to assent to the request of; to accede to, consent to fulfill a request, prayer, wish etc. To allow or concede as an indulgence; to permit or suffer a person to have something; to bestow or confer as a favour or in answer to a request."
6. The Social Security Ordinance also speaks of gratuity and pension. Gratuity by its very connotation means a sort of bounty and not something, which is acquired as a matter of right.
Pension once again is widely different from compensation. It may be termed to be a reward for the e services done or things done by an employee for the employer for which he wishes to give some sort of compensation. But by no stretch of interpreta--petition "gratuity" and "pension" can be considered to be synonym or equivalent for "compensation".
7. On a consideration of the various reasons I find that the purposes of the two enactments are different, the beneficiaries under the two enactments are different, the manner of raising funds for.
Payment to beneficiaries are and in the context of the present circumstances, the appellant who different is the mother of the deceased will be deprived of her right in case interpretation that is sought to be placed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation in this case is accepted.
After all Workmen's Compensation Act is beneficial enactment and has to be given effect in a manner as would advance the purpose of it the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to compensate the worker or his dependents, in case the worker dies, on account of the loss of support that the dependents got from the worker if he is alive.
8. I am therefore, clearly of the view that although the provisions may, be dissimilar in certain respects the provisions in. So far as they relate to the present case viz. Compensation to the present appellant who is the mother of the deceased workman, there is no inconsistency so as to be a bail by reason of section 81 of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance.
9. Under these circumstances I allow this appeal and remand this to the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation who shall reopen the case and give decision in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case. Since this matter has involved discussion only on point of law I order the parties to bear their own costs.
S.A.H.