' This appeal calls in question the correctness of the order, dated 29th March, 1982 passed by the learned Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Faisalabad, whereby the petition of the appellant for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the loss of the life of his father was disallowed on the ground that Social Security Ordinance was applicable.
2. The simple question involved in the case is whether compensation can be allowed under the Workmen's Compensation Act when an establishment is governed by the Social Security Ordinance and the deceased was duly insured under it. This is undisputed that the respondent establishment is governed by the Social Security Ordinance. 1 do not find any force in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that section 81 of Social Security Act is not applicable or that it does not bar the application of Workmen's Compensation Act. He says that the list of dependants given in section 42 of the Social Security Ordinance is different from the definition of defendants given in section 2 (d) of Workmen's Compensation Act. The list of dependents being different is not material. The first part of section 81 is quite independent and since it excludes the application of Workmen's Compensation Act without any qualification or condition, no claim can be established under the excluded Acts. Second part of section 81 is separate and covers those cases where there is any inconsistency between Social Security Ordinance and the excluded Acts.
Where remedy is provided in different laws, the question may arise that in the existence of inconsistency the excluding clause would not apply. So it was made clear in the second part that in spite of any inconsistency, section 81 would apply. What actually seems to be under the contemplation of the Legislature was that double benefit may not be derived under different laws.
The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, viz. PLD 1974 Kar. 140 and PLD 1971 SC 197 are not helpful. The Supreme Court's ruling is distinguishable as there was no provision of excluding section 9 of Act VI of 1965 even though it was inconsistent with section 7 of Ordinance LVI of 1959. As the members of the Labour Court were not selected according to section 9 (4) of Act VI of 1965 the Award given by the Labour Court was set aside. PLD 1974 Kar. 140 was dissented from by a Lahore High Court's ruling, copy of which is on the lower Court file. The rule enunciated in Lahore High Court's ruling is sound and correct and was rightly followed by the learned Commissioner.
3. As upshot of what has been observed above, I do not find any force in the appeal and dismiss the same.