' This judgment disposes of the following two Constitutional petitions.
(1) W. P. No, 1489/75 Crescent Textile Mills Ltd v. Mst. Sakina Bibi and others.
(2) W. P. No, 2716/75 Solves Pakistan Ltd. v. Muhammad Abdullah and others.
2. The two petitions raise a common question of law 1. e. Whether the workmen compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 is payable in addition to the benefits available; to the workmen and his family under the Social Security Ordinance. The circumstances in which the question has arisen in the two petitions is that Muhammad Anwar Sheikh, the husband of Mst.
Sakina Bibi respondent in the first petition died, on 25th August, 1974 as a result of accident which arose during the course of his employment. His widow appalled for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and it was allowed to her, the amount being 15,000. The workman concerned was a secured person under the Social Security Ordinance and on his death by such an accident the widow became entitled to a survivor's pension under section 42. The employer resisted the claim before the Commissioner on the ground of duplicity invoking sections 81 and 73 of the Social Security Ordinance. The employer failed before the Commissioner, Workmen Compensation as well as an appeal before the Tribunal. The decision given by the Sind Baluchistan High Court in Mst. Lai Jan v. Messers Silver Paper Tube Co., Karachi was applied and the claim under both the laws was held admissible. In the other case Muhammad Abdullah the respondent is the workman concerned who received an employment injury resulting in the amputation of his hand. He approached the Commissioner Workmen's Compensation, Multan who allowed a compensation of Rs, 8,400. Before the Commissioner and the Tribunal bar of sections 73 and 81 of the Social Security Ordinance was pleaded but following its earlier decision the Tribunal held that1 the benefits under the two Acts were neither similar nor there was any inconsistency to lead to the supersession of the one by the other. In both the cases it is admitted that the workmen concerned were secured persons and the benefits under Social Security Ordinance were available and were being availed of by them or their survivors.
3. As I look at the point of law raised in these two petitions I find that there is an express provision with regard to it in section 81 of the Social Security Ordinance and it is not at all necessary to invoke section 73 thereof. Section 81 provides as follows :- "81. Supersession of certain laws etc.-Workmen's Compensation and maternity benefit payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923), the Employers' Liability Act, 1938 (XXIV of 1938), the-Mines Maternity Benefit Act, 1941 (XIX of 1941), the West Pakistan Maternity Benefit Ordinance, 1958 (P. W. Ord. XXXII of 1958), or under any other law shall not be payable in respect of any employment on or after the appointed day in respect of such employment and the enactments and laws aforesaid shall, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance cease to have effect."
' This section has two distinct parts, each independent of the ,other and each making a separate provision, the two being connected by the conjunction "and".
Analysed the language of the section yields following two propositions.
1. Workmen's Compensation and Maternity Benefits payable under :
(a) Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923).
(b) The Employers Liability Act, 1938 (xxIv. Or 1938).
(c) The Mines Maternity Benefit Ordinance, 1958_(W. P. Ord. XXXII of 1958).
Or
(d) any other law. ' shall not be payable in respect of any employment on or after the appointed day in respect of such employment. And II. The enactments and the laws aforesaid shall, insofar as they are inconsistant with provisions of this Ordinance, cease to have effect.
' The expression "workmen compensation" which has been used here finds mention in Chapter II of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 in its title. It is there that, the entitlement of a workman for injury disablement and the rights appurtenant thereto are defined and provided for the definition of workman, where the workman is dead includes, his dependants or any of them. For giving effect to first part of section 81 neither similarity nor contrarity or inconsistency has to be looked for.
Besides, "appointed day" has a difinition of its own in the Social Security Ordinance and if it is kept in view the express words leave no manner of doubt as to what the Legistlature intended to accomplish by the first part of section 81. Appointed day as defined in clause (i) section 2 of the Social Security Ordinance means "in relation to any area, class of persons, industries, establishments or benefits the day on which this Ordinance is applied to such area or in respect of such class of persons industries, establishments or benefits." If the employment is covered and is governed by the Social Security Ordinance, as admittedly was the position in the case of two workmen whose case is before this Court, the workmen compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 is not payable under the express words of the Legislature itself. Such a displacement of the workmen compensation payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 is not unprecedented because under that Act itself in section 3, subsection (5) makes a provision that if a civil suit for damages has been instituted no right of compensation under the Act shall exist and that no suit for damages be made by workmen if he has instituted proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The second part of section 81 is neither dependent nor controls the operations and effect of the first part. It is obvious that every word used by the Legislature has to be given meaning and an effect.
4. As regards the decision in Mst. Lal Jan's case referred to above, with great respect to the learned Judge, these two independent provisions made in section 81 were not taken note of. On the other hand after reproducing section 81it was observed on a reading of section 81 of the Ordinance, I must confess that the provision is not happily worded, although it would appear that the provision is made barring the grant of any compensation in such cases where the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are inconsistent with the provisions of the West Pakistan Employees'
Social Security Ordinance." The learned Judge thereafter undertake an examination of the provisions of the two statutes with a view to determine whether there existed any inconsistency of contrariety in the provisions of the two statutes and held in para. 4 as follows :- "In my humble opinion if the purposes of the two enactments are dissimilar and of different import, no question of inconsistency can arise unless there be some provisions which are commonly dealt with and the two enactments contain different provisions in that context."
This aspect of the case that section 81 has two different provisions for two different situations was if I may say so with great respect not taken note of and given full effect to in the case of Mst. Lal Jan and keeping this aspect of the case in view after applying first part of section 81 there is no scope left for looking for inconsistency or similarity or dissimilarity of the benefits conferred.
5. This view of the provisions of section 81 does not render the second part unnecessary for comparing the two legislations, the Workmen's Compensation Act is a more special Act than the Social Security Ordinance, and as held in Garnett v. Bradley . "An Act directed towards a special class of objects will not be repealed by a subsequent general Act embracing in its generality those particular objects, unless some reference be made, directly or by necessary inference, to the preceding special Act" This explains the presence and the necessity of the second part of section 81.
6. These two petitions are allowed and the decision impugned are declared to be not in accordance with law and for that reason of no legal effect. In the circumstances of the case parties to bear their own costs. PLD 1974 Kar. 140 (1878) 3 App. Cas. 944