Pakistan Case Law← Search
1990 CLC 773

G. M. MALIK, CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY

Citation1990 CLC 773
CourtLahore High Court
Judge(s)Irshad Hasan Khan
ResultPetition accepted

This writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 seeks a declaration that the petitioner holds the office of the Chairman of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Faisalabad, for a period of three years with effect from 16-5-1988, and any action of the respondents retiring or removing the petitioner from the said office is without lawful authority.

2. The petitioner was working as an OSD in the Education Department, Government of Punjab wherefrom he had been sent on deputation to the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Faisalabad (hereinafter called the Board). By notification dated 16th May, 1988, the Government of the Punjab, Education Department appointed the petitioner as Chairman of the Board for a period of three years. His terms and conditions of service were to be settled later on. By notification dated 5th January, 1989, the Controlling Authority of the Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Punjab, laid down the terms and conditions of appointment of the petitioner. According to para. 1 of the notification, period of deputation of the petitioner was fixed till his superannuation i.e. 30-9- 1989.

3. The sole question, which arises for consideration is whether after the petitioner's superannuation on 30-9-1989, he can legally hold the office for the remainder term of three years, in terms of notification of his appointment dated 16th May, 1988.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in terms of Section 14 (2) of the Punjab Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education Act, 1976, as amended (hereinafter called the Act), the Chairmen of the Boards shall hold offices for a period of three years from the date of notification of their appointments and shall be eligible for re-appointment for such further period not exceeding three years as may be specified in the order of re-appointments. This being so, it is contended that the petitioner having once been appointed as Chairman of the Board was not liable to be removed before completion of his three years term of office.

5. Raja Muhammad Anwar, learned counsel for the new incumbent, contends that Mr. Aziz Ahmed Hashmi, Director of Education (Schools) has been approved by the competent authority for appointment as Chairman of the Board on petitioner's attaining the age of superannuation.

However, due to pendency of the writ petition, his appointment has not so far been notified. The submission is that approval of appointment of the new incumbent by the competent authority tantamount to reducing the term of appointment of the petitioner accordingly, which was within the competence of the Government. Reliance was placed on Muhammad Athar v. Pakistan (PLD 1962 S.C. 367), wherein it was held that the Government is competent to vary its previous administrative orders. The contention has no force. The ratio laid down in Muhammad Athar's case (supra) has no relevance here. In the precedent case a writ of mandamus was sought on the ground that some ad-doe appointees were never validly appointed, in that, at the time of their appointments they had exceeded the age limit of 24 years as laid down in the Indian Police Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1927. The writ was refused on the ground of laches, as the relief was sought 12 years after the cause arose. It was held that the writ of mandamus was not available for obtaining expedition of orders by Government in administrative matters. The observations "the Governments power to vary its previous order is undoubted" was with reference to the proposition that in absence of a statutory rule of seniority the instructions issued by the Government in that behalf and followed from time to time exhibit fluidity in marked degree and it is impossible for the Courts to select any one of them for the purpose of issuing an irresistible direction to the Government to act in a particular way. The direction can be issued only where there is violation of something having the force of law. In the instant case the petitioner has challenged the impugned action, which is in clear violation of section 14 of the Act. On his appointment as Chairman, the petitioner became entitled to continue on the said post for a statutory period of three years laid down in section 14 (2) of the Act and the Government or the Controlling Authority of the Board was not empowered to alter, modify or reduce the term of appointment of the petitioner except in the manner laid down in the proviso to subsection (2) ibid which was never followed. Under the aforesaid proviso, the Controlling Authority may at any time review the work of the officers of the Board and if on such review, it is satisfied that in the interest of the Board or for any other sufficient cause, it is necessary to do so, it may after giving the officer an opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action, dismiss or remove him from service or reduce the term of office of any such officer by such period as it may determine. Here no such action was I initiated against the petitioner. Refer Ch. Muhammad Bakhsh v. Government of Punjab (PLD 1989 Lahore 175), wherein it was held that three years' tenure of an officer of the Board cannot be reduced without first complying with the mandatory requirements of section 14 (2) of the Act. In the circumstances, the petitioner is entitled to continue to serve the Board as Chairman for a term of three years from the date of notification of his appointment.

6. It is next contended that the petitioner retired as civil servant on attaining the age of superannuation on 30th September, 1989 and, therefore, ceases to become a Government servant as well as Chairman of the Board on his superannuation. The contention has no force. The petitioner's appointment as Chairman of the Board was to be regulated by the provisions of section 14 of the Act irrespective of his previous status. The mere fact that before his superannuation, his service therein was that of a Government servant serving on deputation with a statutory Board, would not ipso facto lead to his retirement.

7. Raja Muhammad Anwar further submitted that the new incumbent has since been approved by the' competent authority for appointment as Chairman, the issuance of writ would tantamount to interference with the working of a Government Department. Reliance was also placed on Shahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan (PLD 1970 SC 139), to contend that section 56 (d) of the Specific Relief Act bars the jurisdiction of this Court to grant any declaration of the nature sought for. The contention is misconceived. In Muhammad Umar Beg's case (supra) it was observed, "even if it were to be accepted that section 56 does not limit the inherent power of a Court to grant temporary injunction, it cannot be said that in the exercise of those inherent powers it will not be a serious matter for the Court's consideration whether it would be right to issue an injunction to a Public Department, which would obviously disturb its working and it would not do so unless compelling reasons demand that course:" The precedent case is ex facie distinguishable.

Here it has D been found that the petitioner has a statutory right to hold the office of the Chairman of the Board for a period of three years and, therefore, issuance of writ would be in conformity with Article 199 of the Constitution.

8. Raja Muhammad Anwar next argued that on petitioner's retirement as a civil servant, it was at best the contractual obligation of the Board or the Government to retain him as Chairman of the Board but any grievance relating to contractual service is not justiciable in writ jurisdiction. In support of his contention reliance has been placed on R.T.H. Janjua v. National Shipping Corporation (PLD 1974 S.C. 140). The contention is again devoid of any force. In R.T.H. Janjua's case (supra), it was found by the learnrd Single Judge of the High Court that the petitioner therein did not disclose any violation of any statutory protection, which he might have enjoyed. In the present case, the tenure of service of the petitioner was governed by the statutory provisions of section of the Act and, therefore, any action, prejudicial taken against the petitioner in violation of the said provisions, can be competently set aside in writ jurisdiction. Refer the Principal, Cadet College, Kohat v. Muhammad Shoal) Qureshi (PLD 1984 SC 170).

9. Mr. Maqbool Elahi Malik, learned Advocate-General was also unable to show that the term of appointment of the petitioner could be reduced without having recourse to the mandatory provisions laid down in the proviso to subsection (2) of section 14 of the Act.

10. It may, however, be pointed out that the age of retirement of the officers and employees of the Board is laid down in section 17 of the Act, which is to the following effect: "17.An officer or other employee of a Board shall retire from service:-- (i)On such date after he has completed 25 years of service qualifying for pension or other retirement bcncfits as the competent authority or Controlling Authority may in the public interest direct or; and (ii)Where no direction is given under clause (i), on the completion of 60 year of his age or maximum of thirty years of service.

EXPLANATION: In this section "competent authority" means the appointing authority or a person duly authorised by the appointing authority in that behalf, not being a person lower in rank to the officer, teacher or other employee concerned.

11. The officers of the Board are specified in section 13 of the Act, which reads as under: "13.The following shall he the officers of a Board:-- (i)the Chairman; (ii)the Secretary; (i.e)the Controller of Examination; and (iv)such other officers as may he appointed by the Controlling Authority."

12. Under section 1-1 (') of the Act, tile term of officers of the Board is for a period of three years from the date of notification of their appointments.th

13. A bare perusal of the above-quoted provisions would show that the Act contemplates two categories of officers first; those which have been specifically mentioned in section 13 (i) (ii) and (i.e). i.e. The Chairman, the Secretary; and the Controller of Examination and secondly; such other officers as may be appointed by the Controlling Authority. The question, therefore, arises whether or not the Chairman of the Board appointed for a statutory period of three years automatically stands retired on completion of 60th year of his age. The answer to this turns on the scope of sections 1't, 14 and 17 of the Act.

14. It is well-established as a principle of statutory construction that words in different parts of a statute must he referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. This is the principle known as "rcdcndo singula singulis". By virtue of it, if the sense of the statute so requires, and in order to further the intent of the legislature, the various words, clauses and phrases are to be taken distributively. Refer the Construction of Statutes by Earl T. Crawford, 1940 Edition at page 332. In the light of this general principle of construction, if the provisions of section 17 relating to retirement from service of the officers and other employees of the Board are made applicable to the statutory offices of the Chairman, the Secretary and the Controller of Examination, the tenure of three years would become redundant. The provisions of section 13 are self-contained and are not subject to the provisions of section 17, which provides for retirement of the officers and employees of the Board other than those specifically mentioned in section 13 (i), (ii) and (i.e) ibid. Any other interpretation would lead to absurdity and would be in conflict with the express provisions of section 14 (2) of the Act, which fixes the tenure of the officers covered therein for three years extendable to another term of three years irrespective of their age and service in the Board and, therefore, the conditions of retirement laud down in section 17 ibid i.e. Completion of 25 years of service qualifying for pension and other benefits or on completion of 60th year of age or maximum of 30 years of service, are not applicable to them. I, therefore, hold that the age of retirement laid down in section 17 is not applicable to the officers specifically mentioned in section 13 (i), (ii) and (i.e) of the Act.

11. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is hereby declared that the petitioner is entitled to hold the office of the Chairman, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Faisalabad, for a term of three years from the date of notification of his appointment. The writ petition is accepted with costs.

Cited by 3 cases

For educational and research use only β€” not legal advice. Verify against the official report before relying on it. See our Disclaimer.
DisclaimerΒ·PrivacyΒ·TermsΒ·Search